Abstract

This study examines the growing role of state-sponsored religion in northern Cyprus and its implications for Turkish Cypriot society, democratic governance, and international human rights. Turkish Cypriots have not historically been viewed as dhimmis because of their Muslim identity. Following the Ottoman conquest, late Ottoman Tanzimat reforms, British colonial administration, and the secular modernization associated with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the community developed a comparatively secular political culture in which religion remained largely a private matter and public life was organized around secular institutions. Survey research has identified Turkish Cypriots as among the least religious Muslim populations in the Eastern Mediterranean. A dhimmitude analysis is nonetheless useful. Employed here as a contested analytical framework rather than a historical classification, it clarifies how Islam can be used as a tool of state to reshape the political and cultural character of a historically distinct community.

The study argues that developments in northern Cyprus cannot be understood merely as an increase in public religiosity. After 1974, demographic transformation through settlement from mainland Turkey and growing institutional dependence on Ankara created the conditions in which religion could function as an instrument of political influence, identity formation, and social transformation. During the AKP era, the expanding role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the growth of Imam Hatip education and Hala Sultan Theology College, the construction of mosques and symbolic projects such as the Külliye, and the increasing visibility of Islamic symbolism in public life integrated religion into governance, education, and public institutions. Turkish Cypriot teachers’ unions, journalists, and civil society organizations have framed their opposition not as hostility to Islam but as a defense of secular education, democratic pluralism, and cultural autonomy.

International human rights law, including Article 18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the ECHR, requires that state support for religion remain compatible with freedom of conscience, state neutrality, and the protection of cultural identity. Because Turkey exercises effective control over the territory, responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights rests with Ankara. The Turkish Cypriot case exhibits characteristics commonly associated with dhimmitude: the systematic integration of religion into state institutions, the use of education as a vehicle of identity formation, and the gradual transformation of a historically secular community under prolonged external influence.

Introduction

Over the past few decades, scholars have increasingly examined the relationship between religion, state power, and political authority, particularly in regions characterized by contested sovereignty, territorial disputes, and competing national identities. While religion has long shaped political communities, contemporary states have increasingly used religious institutions to project influence beyond their internationally recognized borders. This has led to growing scholarly interest in the relationship between religion, governance, and identity across political science, international relations, and human rights scholarship.

Northern Cyprus offers a particularly significant case through which observers can examine these dynamics. Following Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus[1] and its continued occupation of approximately 36 percent of the island’s territory,[2] northern Cyprus has remained politically isolated and recognized only by Turkey.[3] During this period, Ankara’s influence has progressively expanded across the political, economic, and administrative structures of the Turkish Cypriot community.

More recently, however, scholars have identified an increasing emphasis on religion as an additional dimension of Turkey’s engagement with northern Cyprus. The expanding role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the growth of religious education, the construction of mosques and religious complexes, and the rising visibility of Islamic symbolism in public life have generated sustained debate about Turkish Cypriot identity and the relationship between religion and the state.[4]

These developments are especially important because they affect a community whose historical experience differs from that of many other Muslim societies. As numerous scholars have demonstrated,[5] Turkish Cypriots developed a comparatively secular political culture[6] shaped by the late Ottoman reforms, British colonial administration, and the secular reforms introduced under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Contemporary debates[7] concerning religion in northern Cyprus therefore extend beyond questions of religious practice. They raise broader issues relating to collective identity, cultural continuity, democratic governance and political autonomy.

Existing scholarship has examined these developments from historical, political, and sociological perspectives. Studies have explored the historical evolution of Turkish Cypriot identity, the demographic transformation following 1974, and the changing relationship between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot community.

More recent research has analyzed the growing impact of the AKP’s religious policies,[8] Neo-Ottomanism, and institutions such as the Diyanet in reshaping public life. Legal scholarship, meanwhile, has focused primarily on questions of effective control, international responsibility and the application of human rights law in northern Cyprus.[9]

However, these strands of scholarship have largely developed in parallel. Scholars have done little to integrate historical, political, and legal perspectives into a single analytical framework capable of explaining how sustained state-sponsored religious policies may influence governance, identity formation and cultural autonomy within a contested territory.

This study argues that the developments observed in northern Cyprus cannot be understood simply as an increase in public religiosity. Instead, they reflect a broader process in which religion has become increasingly integrated into governance, education, and public institutions as part of wider strategies of political influence and identity formation. The study examines whether sustained state-sponsored religious policies may affect freedom of conscience, democratic pluralism, and the preservation of a historically distinct communal identity.

Building on this argument, the study further considers whether the concept of dhimmitude, understood as a contested analytical framework rather than a historical classification, provides a useful analytical lens through which to interpret the relationship between sustained state-sponsored religious policies, political authority, and the rights of a historically distinct community.

Methodologically, the study adopts an interdisciplinary approach that integrates historical analysis, political science, and international human rights law. It draws on scholarship on Turkish Cypriot history and identity, studies examining the AKP’s religious policies and Neo-Ottomanism, relevant international legal instruments, and contemporary scholarship on religion and politics in northern Cyprus. Collectively, these sources provide the foundation for analyzing the relationship between religion, governance, and identity in northern Cyprus.

The chapters that follow examine the historical and political processes that have shaped Turkish Cypriot identity and the relationship between religion, politics, and society in northern Cyprus. Beginning with the historical development of the community’s secular political culture, the study explores the institutional, political, and legal dimensions of contemporary religious policy before assessing the extent to which the concept of dhimmitude provides a useful analytical framework for interpreting the cumulative developments identified throughout the study.

1. Historical Formation of Turkish Cypriot Secular Identity

Understanding the contemporary transformation of Turkish Cypriot society requires examining the historical processes that shaped the community’s political culture and collective identity. Turkish Cypriot society followed a distinct trajectory from many other Muslim communities in the Eastern Mediterranean, with its collective identity shaped by the late Ottoman reforms, British colonial administration, and the secular modernization policies introduced by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[10]

Although Islam became the dominant religion among them following the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571, religious affiliation did not result in the emergence of a socially conservative or theocratically organized community. As Mete Hatay argues, Turkish Cypriot society gradually developed a relatively moderate and pragmatic understanding of Islam, influenced by local traditions, Sufi practices, and, later, the nineteenth-century Tanzimat reforms, which reduced the political authority of religious institutions throughout the Ottoman Empire.[11] These reforms marked the beginning of a gradual separation between religion and public administration, laying the foundations for a more secular civic culture.

The British administration of Cyprus (1878–1960) accelerated this process by introducing legal and administrative institutions that increasingly operated according to secular principles. At the same time, education and public administration became progressively detached from religious authority. During this period, the Kemalist reforms implemented in the newly established Republic of Turkey also exerted a profound influence on Turkish Cypriot political elites. The adoption of secular nationalism, civil law, and the principle of separating religion from state institutions became defining features of Turkish Cypriot political culture, distinguishing the community from the more religiously conservative segments of mainland Turkish society.[12]

As Michalis N. Michael observes[13], this long-standing trajectory produced a community whose identity was rooted less in religious affiliation than in secularism, education, and civic modernity. Rather than viewing Islam as the principal marker of collective identity, Turkish Cypriots generally embraced a model in which religion remained largely a private matter, while public life was organized around secular institutions.

Survey data and sociological studies have generally identified Turkish Cypriots as among the least religious Muslim populations in the Eastern Mediterranean,[14] demonstrating comparatively low levels of religious observance and broad support for secular governance. Yeşilada’s analysis[15] of the 2006 World Values Survey similarly revealed that although most Turkish Cypriots identify as Muslims and attach importance to religion in their personal lives, relatively few regularly attend mosque services or believe that religious institutions should play a central role in public affairs.

The background outlined above is essential for understanding the developments examined in the following chapters. The contemporary expansion of state-sponsored religious institutions in northern Cyprus cannot be understood solely as a revival of traditional Islamic practices. Instead, it represents a significant departure from the long-standing evolution of Turkish Cypriot society. In this context, Petros Savvides argues that the post-1974 period, and particularly the policies pursued during the AKP era, represented a decisive shift in which religion became increasingly intertwined with demographic change, institutional restructuring, and identity politics. According to Savvides, the growing role of religious institutions has generated considerable concern among Turkish Cypriots, who perceive these developments not as a return to their historical traditions but as an externally driven transformation of their secular identity.[16]

Taken together, these developments demonstrate that secularism became a defining characteristic of Turkish Cypriot political and social identity, providing an essential point of reference for understanding the political and demographic transformations that followed 1974 and the institutional conditions that later facilitated the expansion of state-sponsored religious policies.

2. The Post-1974 Transformation: Demographic Change and the Foundations of Religious Influence

The events of 1974 marked a decisive turning point in the political, demographic, and institutional evolution of northern Cyprus. While the territorial division of the island has been extensively examined in legal and political scholarship, its long-term impact on the internal transformation of Turkish Cypriot society has received comparatively less attention. The post-1974 period not only transformed the political status of the northern part of the island but also reshaped its demographic composition, institutional structures, and relationship with Turkey. These developments laid the institutional and demographic foundations for the religious policies that Ankara would later promote.

One of the most significant consequences of the post-1974 period, following the Turkish invasion and occupation of the 36% of the island’s territory, was the large-scale migration of settlers from mainland Turkey. As Mete Hatay has demonstrated, the settlement policy substantially altered the demographic composition of northern Cyprus by introducing populations originating primarily from rural and socially more conservative regions of Anatolia[17] Beyond its demographic impact, this process gradually introduced different social norms, cultural traditions, and patterns of religious observance that contrasted with the historically secular political culture of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot community.

Demographic transformation was accompanied by growing political, economic and institutional dependence on Turkey. Following the 1983 unilateral declaration of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC),[18] the absence of international recognition reinforced Ankara’s central role in sustaining the de facto administration.

As Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay argue,[19] the institutions of northern Cyprus developed under conditions of structural dependence, relying extensively on Turkey for financial assistance, administrative capacity, political support and institutional development. This dependence extended beyond security and foreign policy to influence domestic governance, education, cultural affairs, and ultimately religious institutions.

Although these structural changes did not immediately alter the predominantly secular character of Turkish Cypriot society, they fundamentally reshaped the institutional environment within which later political and religious initiatives would emerge. As Nathalie Tocci observes, the post-1974 political order increasingly tied the future of northern Cyprus to developments in Turkish domestic politics, making the Turkish Cypriot community progressively more vulnerable to policy shifts originating in Ankara.[20] Institutional change thus created the framework within which religious influence could later expand.

The implications of these developments extended beyond governance. They also intensified debates over identity, political autonomy, and the preservation of the distinctive characteristics of Turkish Cypriot society. Niyazi Kızılyürek and Ahmet Sözen argue that relations between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey have long been shaped by tensions over political autonomy, identity and the limits of Ankara’s influence on local affairs.[21] These debates intensified as demographic change altered the social composition of northern Cyprus and heightened concerns about the future of Turkish Cypriot secularism.

Michalis N. Michael argues[22] that Turkish Cypriot identity and its relationship with religion were gradually redefined as Turkish state policies increasingly promoted a religiously informed understanding of national identity. In his view, this represented not simply a revival of religious practice but an attempt to reshape the historical self-understanding of Turkish Cypriots as a predominantly secular Muslim community.

Petros Savvides likewise contends that the importance of the post-1974 period lies not in the immediate emergence of Islamization, but in laying the political, demographic and institutional foundations upon which later religious policies were built.[23] While the secular character of Turkish Cypriot society largely persisted during the first decades after the division of the island, the structural changes introduced after 1974 enabled the more assertive religious agenda pursued during the AKP era.

The significance of the post-1974 period lies not in the immediate emergence of Islamization, but in the historical context it created for subsequent religious and institutional change. Demographic transformation, growing institutional dependence on Turkey, and evolving political relations between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot administration created an environment in which religion could increasingly function as an instrument of political influence, identity formation and social transformation. The AKP’s policies emerged from these structural conditions and must therefore be understood within this broader structural context.

3. The AKP Era: State-Sponsored Islam and Identity Transformation

The transformation of northern Cyprus during the AKP era reflected broader changes in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy over the past two decades. After coming to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gradually redefined Turkey’s domestic and external engagement by combining elements of conservative politics, Neo-Ottomanism,[24] and the strategic use of religion as an instrument of soft power.

Without abandoning Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions, the AKP integrated religious institutions, cultural diplomacy, and historical symbolism into its regional policy, presenting Islam as a source of political legitimacy and external influence. Because of Turkey’s extensive influence over public institutions in northern Cyprus, the region emerged as one of the principal arenas for implementing such policies.

Recent scholarship increasingly suggests that the AKP’s approach toward northern Cyprus should be understood as part of a wider strategy linking migration, religion, and identity politics.[25] These policies were not isolated measures but formed part of a sustained effort to reshape the political and cultural landscape of the Turkish Cypriot community. Akdeniz and Dayıoğlu[26] argue that Neo-Ottoman narratives, demographic transformation, and the expansion of Islamic institutions became mutually reinforcing elements of Ankara’s regional strategy of consolidating political influence through both institutional and societal mechanisms.

3.1 Expansion of Religious Institutions

This strategic reorientation became particularly visible through the expansion of religious institutions, which served as key instruments for implementing Ankara’s broader objectives in northern Cyprus. Unlike previous Turkish governments, whose engagement with northern Cyprus focused primarily on security, diplomacy, and economic assistance, the AKP increasingly invested in religious infrastructure and institutions.

Savvides documents a substantial expansion of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in northern Cyprus through increased financial support, the appointment of additional religious personnel, and closer cooperation with local authorities. At the same time, the Cyprus Foundations Administration (Evkaf) assumed a more prominent institutional role, while Turkish state agencies financed the construction of new mosques, religious complexes, and cultural projects designed to strengthen the public visibility of Islam.[27]

These developments marked an important shift in the relationship between religion and governance. Organizations such as the Diyanet operated as instruments through which Ankara projected political, cultural, and ideological influence beyond Turkey’s borders. As Arin argues[28], the AKP’s foreign policy increasingly relied on religious institutions and historical symbolism as key components of its soft-power strategy.

3.2 Education and Identity Formation

The expansion of religious institutions was accompanied by significant changes in education, which became an important vehicle for advancing the AKP’s broader objectives. Such expansion became aprincipal mechanism through which Ankara sought to influence future generations and reshape public understandings of religion and identity. The establishment and expansion of Imam Hatip schools, the creation of Hala Sultan Theology College, scholarship programs encouraging theological studies in Turkey, and the growing presence of religious education within public institutions reflected a coordinated strategy aimed at reshaping collective identity.[29]

As Dilek Latif[30] demonstrates, these initiatives generated significant debate among Turkish Cypriots, many of whom regarded them as a departure from the community’s historically secular traditions. Critics viewed these educational reforms not as ordinary curriculum changes but as attempts to redefine collective identity by strengthening the role of religion within public education.

This interpretation aligns with the broader argument advanced by Michalis N. Michael, who maintains that the transformation concerned not simply religious practice but the gradual reconstruction of Turkish Cypriot identity itself.[31] Educational policy became a central arena in which competing visions of identity, citizenship, and the relationship between religion and the state were contested.

3.3 Religion in Public Space

These developments were not confined to the educational system. They also became progressively visible in the organization of public space and the symbolic landscape of northern Cyprus. The construction of new mosques, the restoration of Ottoman religious monuments, and the development of major projects such as the Presidential Complex (Külliye)[32] served religious, political, and cultural objectives simultaneously. These projects increased the visibility of Islam within the urban landscape while reinforcing the symbolic presence of the Turkish state.

Within the AKP’s ideological framework, public architecture, Ottoman heritage, and religious symbolism became instruments of political communication. As Arin observes,[33] religion and historical memory increasingly functioned as components of Turkey’s external projection of influence, while Akdeniz and Dayıoğlu argue that these symbolic initiatives formed part of a Neo-Ottoman strategy linking identity, migration, and religion.[34]

3.4 Turkish Cypriot Responses

The growing visibility of these policies generated robust public debate and resistance[35] within Turkish Cypriot society. Many Turkish Cypriots viewed these developments as challenging the community’s long-established secular traditions and its distinct political identity. Teachers’ unions, civil society organizations, journalists, academics, and political parties criticized what they perceived as an externally driven attempt to reshape Turkish Cypriot society.

Particular opposition[36] focused on the establishment of Hala Sultan Theology College, the expansion of Imam Hatip education, compulsory religious instruction, and the construction of new mosques. Teachers’ unions, including KTÖS and KTOEÖS, argued that these policies undermined the secular character of public education and reflected what they regarded as growing political influence from Ankara.[37] Educators consistently framed the dispute not as opposition to Islam itself but as a defense of secular education, democratic governance and institutional autonomy.[38]

Journalists and intellectuals likewise expressed concern about these developments; several media organizations and international press freedom bodies expressed alarm over growing pressure on journalists and trade unionists who criticized the reforms.[39]

Critics argued that the expanding role of the Diyanet and the increasing visibility of state-sponsored religion marked a significant departure from the historically secular character of Turkish Cypriot society.[40] As Hatay, Michael, and Latif contend,[41] many Turkish Cypriots perceived these developments as an externally driven transformation that reflected the growing influence of the sociopolitical model promoted by the AKP in mainland Turkey.

Political leaders also voiced reservations regarding Ankara’s increasing intervention in domestic affairs.[42] Public debates concerning identity, autonomy, and self-government intensified amid growing concerns that these developments extended beyond religion and undermined the community’s capacity to preserve its historical and cultural identity. The debate over religion in northern Cyprus thus became inseparable from wider questions of political authority, cultural identity, and the future of the Turkish Cypriot community.

3.5 Conclusions

The analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that developments in northern Cyprus form part of a broader process through which religion has become progressively embedded in governance, education, and collective identity. The expanding role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the growth of religious education, the establishment of new religious institutions, and the greater visibility of Islam in public life illustrate how religious policy has evolved into a broader instrument of state influence extending beyond matters of faith.

The reaction of Turkish Cypriot society further underscores the significance of these developments. Teachers’ unions, academics, journalists, and civil society organizations have consistently framed their concerns not as opposition to Islam but as a defense of secular education, democratic autonomy, and the community’s distinct historical identity.

This pattern of civic engagement suggests that the debate in northern Cyprus is ultimately less about religion itself than about the future direction of Turkish Cypriot society and the preservation of its long-established political and cultural traditions. The following chapter builds on this analysis by examining the implications of these developments under international human rights law, focusing on freedom of conscience, state neutrality and the protection of cultural identity.

4. Human Rights, Religious Freedom, and Cultural Identity

The developments examined thus far raise broader questions concerning governance, identity, and the relationship between religion and the state, highlighting important issues under international human rights law.

International human rights law recognizes that states may support religious expression and regulate the relationship between religion and the public sphere.[43] At the same time, such policies must remain consistent with the principles of freedom of conscience, equality, pluralism, and state neutrality. The key question does not center around religion’s legitimate place in public life but whether sustained state support for a particular religious identity remains compatible with the rights of individuals and communities.

Against this background, this chapter examines the developments discussed in the previous chapters from the perspective of international human rights law, focusing on freedom of conscience, state neutrality, cultural identity, and the responsibility of states under international human rights law.

4.1 Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Conscience

One of the central questions addressed by international human rights law is the extent to which a state may encourage or promote a particular religious identity without interfering with freedom of conscience. The issue is not simply whether individuals remain free to practice their religion. It also concerns whether public authorities may shape the religious environment in ways that influence the beliefs, choices, and social conditions of communities with their own historical and cultural traditions.

Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[44] provides the principal international guarantee of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Its protection extends beyond religious practice and includes the freedom to adopt, change or reject religious beliefs without coercion. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has consistently interpreted Article 18 as protecting both religious and non-religious convictions[45] while prohibiting measures that compel individuals to conform to a particular belief system. Comparable protection is provided by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), under which the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly emphasized[46] that religious pluralism is a defining feature of a democratic society and that public authorities must remain neutral and impartial when regulating matters relating to religion.[47] State neutrality does not require indifference toward religion.[48] Instead, it requires governments to ensure that individuals are able to exercise their beliefs freely, without undue influence, coercion, or discrimination.

Applied to northern Cyprus,[49] these principles help frame the discussion. The construction of mosques, the operation of religious institutions, and the provision of religious education are not, in themselves, incompatible with international human rights law. States retain broad discretion in organizing their educational systems and supporting religious life. Questions arise, however, when these measures form part of a sustained policy that consistently favors one religious identity while gradually reshaping the public sphere in ways that may affect freedom of conscience and the diversity of social and cultural traditions.

This is particularly evident in the developments examined in Chapter 3. The expansion of Imam Hatip schools, the establishment of Hala Sultan College, changes to religious education, and the growing role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs were not introduced as isolated initiatives. Together, they formed part of a broader policy through which religion assumed a more prominent role in education, public administration, and civic life. Whether any one of these measures would, on its own, interfere with protected rights remains open to debate. Considered together, however, they invite closer examination of the extent to which state policy may influence freedom of conscience by promoting a particular religious outlook within a historically distinct community.

The responses of Turkish Cypriot teachers’ unions, civil society organizations, and political actors reinforce this interpretation. As discussed in Chapter 3, opposition centered primarily on the perceived transformation of public institutions and the community’s diminishing ability to determine its own social and cultural development rather than on religion itself. From the perspective of international human rights law, these concerns are significant because freedom of conscience protects not only individual belief but also the conditions that allow individuals to develop and express their convictions without sustained ideological pressure.[50]

4.2 State Neutrality, Education, and Democratic Pluralism

The relationship between freedom of conscience and state neutrality becomes particularly important in education.[51] Schools are among the principal institutions through which states transmit knowledge, shape civic values, and influence future generations. For this reason, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently subjected educational policies involving religion to careful scrutiny. The discussion therefore turns to the relationship between education, democratic pluralism, and state neutrality.

The Court’s case law makes clear that states retain broad discretion in organizing their educational systems and determining curriculum content. That discretion, however, is not unlimited. In Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey,[52] the Court held that compulsory religious instruction must be delivered in an objective, critical, and pluralistic manner and must respect the religious and philosophical convictions of parents. Likewise, in Folgerø and Others v. Norway, the Court emphasized that public education cannot be used to promote a single religious worldview at the expense of others. These judgments do not prohibit religious education. Rather, they require educational policy to remain consistent with the principles of democratic pluralism, and freedom of conscience.

These principles provide an important framework for understanding developments in northern Cyprus. As discussed in Chapter 3, the expansion of Imam Hatip schools, the establishment of Hala Sultan Theology College, changes to religious education, and the enhanced role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs point to a gradual shift in educational policy, with religion assuming a more prominent institutional role. Although each individual measure may fall within the state’s discretion, their cumulative effect raises broader questions about whether educational policy has remained consistent with the principles of state neutrality and pluralism.

This does not automatically establish a violation of international human rights law. States remain free to support religious education, provided that such support respects equality, freedom of conscience, and state neutrality. However, where successive reforms consistently favor a particular religious outlook while coinciding with broader efforts to reshape public identity, questions arise as to whether the limits of that discretion have been reached.

The responses of Turkish Cypriot teachers’ unions and civil society organizations further illustrate why these reforms extend beyond curriculum design or administrative change. As discussed in Chapter Three, opposition focused on the perception that public education was increasingly being used to promote a particular ideological and religious orientation. Public demonstrations, statements by educators, and sustained criticism from professional organizations reflected wider concerns about secular education, institutional autonomy, and democratic participation in educational policymaking.

Ultimately, education cannot be assessed solely in terms of curriculum content or institutional reform. It must also be understood in light of its broader role in democratic society. In the context of northern Cyprus, the central question is whether the overall direction of educational policy continues to strike an appropriate balance between the state’s discretion in educational matters and its obligation to preserve pluralism and freedom of conscience.

4.3 Cultural Identity and Community Rights

The developments examined in this study also raise questions that extend beyond individual freedom of religion to the protection of cultural identity. While international human rights law primarily safeguards individual rights,[53] it also recognizes the importance of preserving cultural diversity and enabling communities to maintain their historical traditions.

This approach is reflected in instruments such as the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.[54] Although these instruments do not seek to prevent cultural change, they recognize that public policies should respect cultural diversity and avoid undermining the continuity of long-established communities.

In northern Cyprus, many of the debates discussed in Chapter 3 illustrate these concerns. Opposition to changes in religious education, the expansion of religious institutions, the Külliye project, and the growing role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs reflected concerns not simply about religion, but about the future of the Turkish Cypriot community’s secular identity and cultural autonomy.

International human rights law does not seek to preserve societies in a fixed historical form. Cultural identities naturally evolve over time. The key question, however, is whether such change reflects the choices of the community itself or is primarily driven by sustained state policies. In the context of northern Cyprus, the cumulative effect of educational reforms, religious institutions, and symbolic public projects raises broader questions about cultural identity, democratic participation, and community autonomy.

These issues also provide the context for considering which state bears responsibility for ensuring compliance with international human rights obligations.

4.4 Responsibility under International Human Rights Law

Having considered the human rights implications of the developments discussed in this chapter, a further question arises: which state bears responsibility for ensuring compliance with international human rights law?

According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, responsibility in northern Cyprus is determined by the principle of effective control rather than international recognition. In Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v. Turkey,[55] the Court held that Turkey bears responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights because it exercises effective control over the territory.

This principle is directly relevant to the issues examined in this study. As discussed throughout the previous chapters, the expansion of religious institutions, educational reforms, and the growing role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs form part of a broader policy promoted with Turkey’s support and influence in northern Cyprus. These developments must therefore be assessed not only as matters of domestic policy but also in light of Turkey’s obligations under international human rights law.

Accordingly, if these policies are found to affect freedom of conscience, democratic pluralism, or the cultural identity of the Turkish Cypriot community, responsibility under the European Convention on Human Rights rests with Turkey as the state exercising effective control over the territory.

While international human rights law provides the normative framework for assessing these developments, understanding their broader political and societal significance also requires an analytical perspective capable of explaining their cumulative and long-term character. The following section examines dhimmitude as an analytical framework.

4.5 Dhimmitude as an Analytical Framework

The historical, political, and legal analysis developed throughout this study provides the foundation for examining whether dhimmitude offers a persuasive explanatory framework for understanding the cumulative transformations observed in northern Cyprus. The discussion therefore turns to the explanatory value of this concept.

Before considering its relevance to the present case study, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the concept of dhimmitude. Developed primarily through the work of Bat Ye’or,[56] dhimmitude refers to the political, legal, and social condition historically associated with the status of dhimmis under Islamic rule. In its original formulation, the concept describes the long-term consequences of a system in which non-Muslim communities were granted protection while remaining subject to legal, political and social restrictions reflecting their subordinate status.

While rooted in this historical context, the present study employs dhimmitude as an analytical framework to examine how political authority may use religion to influence governance, public institutions, communal autonomy, and collective identity over time.

Despite attracting considerable scholarly attention, dhimmitude remains one of the most debated analytical concepts. Historians such as Mark R. Cohen, Bernard Lewis, and Norman Stillman have offered competing interpretations of the historical institution of the dhimma, emphasizing significant variations across different periods and regions.[57] By contrast, proponents of the concept of dhimmitude argue that it provides a useful analytical framework for understanding broader patterns in the relationship between political authority, religion, and communal autonomy.

The present study adopts the latter approach, employing dhimmitude as an analytical rather than a historical category because it enables the cumulative effects of sustained religious policies on governance, public institutions, and communal identity to be examined within a coherent analytical framework. The developments examined throughout this study reveal a number of interconnected characteristics rather than isolated policy initiatives. Religion increasingly functions as an instrument of state policy, reflected in the expanding role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs and Turkey’s growing involvement in religious affairs. It has also become more deeply embedded within the education system through the expansion of Imam Hatip schools, the establishment of Hala Sultan College and successive educational reforms.

At the same time, symbolic state projects, such as the construction of the Külliye complex, reinforce the growing visibility of religion within public institutions, while debates surrounding the headscarf regulation illustrate how these developments extend beyond individual religious freedom to broader questions of communal identity, secularism, and political authority.

Taken together, these developments reveal a gradual and cumulative process in which religion assumes an increasingly central role in governance, education, and public life. Rather than resulting from any single policy or event, this transformation reflects the sustained interaction between political authority, religious institutions, and identity formation.

Applied to northern Cyprus, the concept helps explain how sustained state-sponsored religious policies can gradually reshape institutions, influence collective identity, and alter the relationship between political authority and society. Rather than highlighting isolated policy decisions, it draws attention to a broader process of institutional and cultural transformation that has unfolded over time. Understood in this way, dhimmitude provides a useful analytical framework for interpreting the findings of this study while contributing to wider discussions on religion, governance, and identity in contested territories.

Conclusion

This study has examined the growing role of state-sponsored religion in northern Cyprus and its implications for Turkish Cypriot society, democratic governance, and international human rights. The developments examined cannot be understood merely as changes in religious policy. Rather, they form part of a wide transformation in which religion has increasingly been integrated into governance, education, public institutions, and public life under Turkey’s sustained political influence.

The expanding role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the growth of religious education, the establishment of Imam Hatip schools and Hala Sultan Theology College, the construction of symbolic projects such as the Külliye complex, and the increasing visibility of religion within public institutions collectively reveal a consistent pattern in which religion has increasingly become an instrument of governance and identity formation, extending well beyond the promotion of religious observance.

Equally significant are the responses of Turkish Cypriot civil society. The reactions of teachers’ unions, academics, journalists, political leaders and civil society organizations demonstrate that the principal concern has not been Islam itself, but the perceived use of religion to reshape public institutions, weaken long-standing secular traditions and influence the future character of the Turkish Cypriot community.

These developments also raise important questions under international human rights law concerning freedom of conscience, state neutrality, democratic pluralism, and the protection of cultural identity. While international law does not prohibit states from supporting religious institutions, it requires that such policies remain compatible with equality, pluralism, and respect for individual autonomy. Where religion becomes embedded within structures of governance, international human rights law provides an essential framework for assessing whether such policies remain consistent with democratic pluralism, equality and respect for individual autonomy.

Beyond its substantive findings, this study contributes to existing scholarship by integrating historical analysis, political science and international human rights law within a single analytical framework. Rather than examining northern Cyprus solely through one disciplinary lens, it demonstrates the value of analyzing the interaction between governance, religion, education, identity and law within the particular context of a contested territory.

Finally, this study argues that the concept of dhimmitude, understood as an analytical framework rather than a historical classification, offers a compelling lens through which observers can view the cumulative process documented throughout this study. The developments examined form part of a wider progressive process through which religion has increasingly been institutionalized within governance, education, and public life under Turkey’s sustained political influence.

The Turkish Cypriot case exhibits several characteristics commonly associated with dhimmitude, including the systematic integration of religion into state institutions, the expanding authority of religious bodies, the use of education as a vehicle of identity formation, and the gradual transformation of a historically secular community under prolonged external influence. Viewed in this way, dhimmitude helps explain the cumulative process through which political authority employs religion to reshape institutions, influence collective identity, and redefine the long-term trajectory of a distinct community.

The implications of northern Cyprus therefore extend beyond the Cyprus conflict itself, demonstrating how sustained state-sponsored religious policies may gradually transform institutions, education, and public life while reshaping the political and cultural character of a historically distinct community. More broadly, the Turkish Cypriot case demonstrates how religion may function as an instrument of political authority and identity transformation in contested territories, while reaffirming the continuing importance of democratic pluralism, cultural diversity and international human rights law in safeguarding communities confronted with long-term processes of political, institutional and cultural change.

Endnotes

[1] Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Turkish Military Invasion and Occupation,” last modified August 6, 2024, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

[2] James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15–42.

[3] Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem, 45–53.

[4] Petros Savvides, The Islamification of Occupied Cyprus (Nicosia: Armatolos, 2019); Svante E. Cornell, “The Rise of Diyanet: The Politicization of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs,” Turkey Analyst 8, no. 18 (2015); Kıbrıs Türk Orta Eğitim Öğretmenler Sendikası (KTOEÖS), “We Will Continue to Defend Secular Education and Fight for Our Rights,” Kıbrıs Postası, April 2, 2025; KNEWS Kathimerini Cyprus, “Educators Accuse Authorities of Silencing Dissent Rather Than Addressing Governance Failures,” December 20, 2025.

[5] Rebecca Bryant, The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Mete Hatay, Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus (Oslo: PRIO, 2005); Michalis S. Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[6] Hatay, Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus; Bryant, The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus.

[7] Savvides, The Islamification of Occupied Cyprus; Hatay, Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus.

[8] M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jenny B. White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[9] Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[10] Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay, Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020); Hatay, Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo [PRIO], 2005); Michalis N. Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

[11] Mete Hatay, “‘Reluctant’ Muslims? Turkish Cypriots, Islam, and Sufism,” The Cyprus Review 27, no. 2 (2015): 49, 58–59, 61.

[12] Bryant and Hatay, Sovereignty Suspended.

[13] Michalis S. Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict.

[14] Michalis S. Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict; Hatay, Beyond Numbers.

[15] Birol A. Yeşilada, “Islam and the Turkish Cypriots,” Social Compass 56, no. 1 (2009): 49–59.

[16] Savvides, The Islamification of Occupied Cyprus.

[17] Hatay, Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus; Mete Hatay, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno-Demography of Cyprus in the Light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census (Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2007).

[18] In Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984), the UN Security Council declared the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus legally invalid and called upon all states not to recognize the purported state.

[19] Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay, Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020).

[20] Nathalie Tocci, EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

[21] Niyazi Kızılyürek, The Politics of Ethnicity and Identity in Cyprus (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1997); Ahmet Sözen, “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish–Turkish Cypriot Relations,” in The Turkish Cypriots: The Politics of Identity and Survival, ed. C. H. Dodd (Huntington: Eothen Press, 1999), 95–118; Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay, Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020).

[22] Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History.

[23] Savvides, The Islamification of Occupied Cyprus.

[24] Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, Religion, Identity and Power: Turkey and the Balkans in the Twenty-First Century (Edinburgh University Press, 2021); Behlül Özkan, “Turkey, Davutoğlu, and the Idea of Pan-Islamism,” Survival 56, no. 4 (2014): 119–140.

[25] Kubilay Yado Arin, “The AKP’s Foreign Policy: Neo-Ottomanism, Soft Power and Political Islam,” in The AKP Since 2002: A Critical Perspective on Religion and Politics in Turkey, ed. Ümit Cizre (London: Routledge, 2015).

[26] Ali Dayıoğlu and Nur Köprülü, “Turkey’s New Identity Revisited and Its Islamist Reflections in North Cyprus,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 19, no. 4 (2019): 605–623, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2019.1692443

[27] Savvides, The Islamification of Occupied Cyprus.

[28] Kubilay Yado Arin, “The AKP’s Foreign Policy: Neo-Ottomanism, Soft Power and Political Islam,” in The AKP Since 2002: A Critical Perspective on Religion and Politics in Turkey, ed. Ümit Cizre (London: Routledge, 2015),

[29] Bryant and Hatay, Religion, Politics and Identity in Northern Cyprus; Samim Akgönül, The Imam Hatip Schools and Turkish Religious Policy; International Crisis Group, Cyprus: Reunification or Partition?.

[30] Dilek Latif, “Beyond Secular? AKP’s Religious Policies and Societal Polarization in North Cyprus,” Turkish Studies 22, no. 5 (2021): 801–823, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2020.1858813.

[31] Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History.

[32] Nicoletta Kouroushi, “Turkey’s Latest Construction Shreds the Cyprus Status Quo,” Middle East Forum Observer, January 8, 2025, Middle East Forum.

[33] Arin, “The AKP’s Foreign Policy.

[34] Doğukan Akdeniz and Ali Dayıoğlu, “Neo-Ottomanism, Islam and Migrants: The AKP’s Battle in North Cyprus,” Third World Quarterly 46, no. 5 (2025): 523–537, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2025.2488494.

[35] Nicoletta Kouroushi, “Turkey’s Hold over Occupied Cyprus Is Breaking. Don’t Reinforce It,” Middle East Forum Observer, July 20, 2025, https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/turkeys-hold-over-occupied-cyprus-is-breaking-dont-reinforce-it.

[36] Nicoletta Kouroushi, “Turkish Cypriots: The Achilles’ Heel in Erdoğan’s Religious Strategy?” Middle East Forum Observer, May 29, 2025, https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/turkish-cypriots-the-achilles-heel-in-erdogans-religious-strategy.

[37] Kıbrıs Türk Orta Eğitim Öğretmenler Sendikası (KTOEÖS), “We Will Continue to Defend Secular Education and Fight for Our Rights,” Kıbrıs Postası, April 2, 2025; Kıbrıs Türk Öğretmenler Sendikası (KTÖS) and KTOEÖS, “Teachers’ Unions to Hold Protest in Defense of Secular Education,” Kıbrıs Postası, April 3, 2025.

[38] KNEWS Kathimerini Cyprus, “Educators Accuse Authorities of Silencing Dissent Rather Than Addressing Governance Failures,” December 20, 2025.

[39] Council of Europe, Platform for the Safety of Journalists, “Authorities Intensify Pressure on Journalists and Trade Unionists in Northern Cyprus” (Alert No. 107642773, 2025), Council of Europe Platform for the Safety of Journalists.

[40] Svante E. Cornell, “The Rise of Diyanet: The Politicization of Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs,” Turkey Analyst 8, no. 18 (October 9, 2015), https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/463-the-rise-of-diyanet-the-politicization-of-turkey%E2%80%99s-directorate-of-religious-affairs.html

[41] Hatay, Beyond Numbers; Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict; Latif, “Beyond Secular?”.

[42] Cyprus Mail, “Turkish Vice President Visits Controversial Islamic Project in North (Updated),” November 9, 2022, https://cyprus-mail.com/2022/11/09/turkish-vice-president-visits-controversial-islamic-project-in-north; Cyprus Mail, “Oktay’s Statements in North Seen as Threatening,” November 10, 2022.

[43] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 18; Lautsi and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 30814/06, ECHR 2011.

[44] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 18.

[45] United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: Article 18 (Freedom of Thought, Conscience or Religion), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, July 30, 1993.

[46] European Convention on Human Rights, November 4, 1950, ETS No. 5, art. 9.

[47] Kokkinakis v. Greece, no. 14307/88, Judgment of May 25, 1993, para. 31; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, no. 30985/96, Judgment of October 26, 2000, para. 78.

[48] Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, para. 78; Lautsi and Others v. Italy, no. 30814/06, Grand Chamber Judgment of March 18, 2011, paras. 60–61.

[49] Bryant, The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus.

[50] United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, para. 1; Folgerø and Others v. Norway, no. 15472/02, Grand Chamber Judgment of June 29, 2007; Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, no. 1448/04, Judgment of October 9, 2007.

[51] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18; European Convention on Human Rights, art. 9.

[52] Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, no. 1448/04, Judgment of October 9, 2007, paras. 51–76; Folgerø and Others v. Norway, no. 15472/02, Grand Chamber Judgment of June 29, 2007, paras. 84–102.

[53] UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27.

[54] UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001); Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, ETS No. 157 (1995).

[55] Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), no. 15318/89, Judgment of March 23, 1995; Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), no. 15318/89, Judgment of December 18, 1996; Cyprus v. Turkey, no. 25781/94, Grand Chamber Judgment of May 10, 2001.

[56] Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude: Where Civilizations Collide (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002).

[57] Bat Ye’or, Islam and Dhimmitude; Mark R. Cohen, Under Crescent and Cross: The Jews in the Middle Ages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Norman A. Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands: A History and Source Book (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1979).

https://www.meforum.org/dhimmitude-project/the-transformation-of-turkish-cypriot-identity-state-sponsored-islam-human-rights-and-dhimmitude?