Αρχική Blog Σελίδα 1791

Errant Ukrainian missile likely the cause of explosion that killed 2 civilians: Polish president

0

The day after an explosion near Poland’s border with Ukraine caused the death of two civilians, Polish President Andrzej Duda and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the errant missile is not believed to have been fired by Russia.

WASHINGTON — The errant missile that inadvertently crossed into Polish territory and killed two civilians on Tuesday was likely fired by Ukrainian air defenses and was not an intentional Russian attack, top Polish and NATO officials said today, ratcheting down tensions between NATO and Russia that some observers feared could escalate into all-out war.

“From the information that we and our allies have, it was an S-300 rocket made in the Soviet Union, an old rocket and there is no evidence that it was launched by the Russian side,” Polish President Andrzej Duda said, according to Reuters. “It is highly probable that it was fired by Ukrainian anti-aircraft defense.”

Duda’s comments were echoed by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who stated after a meeting with NATO members earlier today that there is “no indication this was the result of a deliberate attack” by Russia.

“We have no indication that Russia is preparing offensive military actions against NATO,” Stoltenberg said. “Our preliminary analysis suggests that the incident was likely caused by a Ukrainian air defense missile fired to defend Ukrainian territory against Russian cruise missile attacks.”

On Tuesday, an explosion near Poland’s border with Ukraine amid a Russian barrage aimed at several Ukrainian cities prompted concerns that Russia had — either mistakenly or purposely — attacked a NATO member, which could have caused Poland to invoke Article 5 mutual defense discussions and set the stage for a war between NATO and Russia. Poland also signaled that it could invoke Article 4, which would bring NATO members together for a formal consultation on the issue.

Though Poland had said a “Russia-made” weapon had been used, at the time Russia denied responsibility, said that it didn’t launch any missiles in the area and that accusations that Moscow was to blame were provocations.

The incident prompted an emergency meeting in Bali between Biden and the heads of several allied nations taking part in the G20 summit there. On Tuesday Biden also spoke with Duda and offered US support in Poland’s investigation; US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin also reached out to his Polish counterpart.

However, by Tuesday night, there were signs that Russia may not have fired the missile after all. After a meeting, Biden told reporters that based on preliminary information it was “unlikely,” apparently based on the missile’s trajectory, that the missile was “fired from Russia.” He did not provide further clarification.

Although preliminary results have led NATO believe the missile had been fired by Ukraine, Stoltenberg said NATO support to Ukraine will not wane as a result of the incident.

“But let me clear: this is not Ukraine’s fault,” he said. “Russia bears ultimate responsibility as it continues its illegal war against Ukraine.”

Back in Washington, Austin convened a previously scheduled virtual meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group this morning. The group provides a venue for Ukrainian officials to convey their weapons and equipment needs.

Austin did not directly comment on the attribution of the strikes, saying that the United States continues to gather information and consult with its allies on the situation. However, his comments closely aligned with Stoltenberg, with Austin underscoring Russia’s role in starting the conflict and bombarding Ukrainian cities with missile strikes.

“What we do know is the context in which this is unfolding,” Austin said. “Russia is facing setback after setback on the battlefield. And Russia is putting Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure in his gunsights.”

https://breakingdefense.com/

A New Government in Iraq: The Significance for Tehran and the Iranian Camp

0

After a year of political upheaval marked by internal conflict among the Shiites in Iraq, the success of the pro-Iranian Shiite camp in forming a government without the camp’s main rival, Muqtada Sadr, is a source of satisfaction to pro-Iranian parties and militias in Iraq, as well as the Iranian regime. However, just as the road to the formation of the government was riddled with hurdles and political and economic problems that have not yet been resolved, the reality facing the new government is challenging, and has the potential for renewed escalation in the intra-Iraqi conflict.

More than a year after the parliamentary elections in Iraq, the saga of forming the government ended in late October, with the winner of the elections, Shia leader Muqtada Sadr, not included. In the elections of October 10, 2021, Sadr became the leader of the largest faction in parliament and accordingly announced his intention to form a government that would be based on a parliamentary majority, without the pro-Iranian camp. This stood in contrast to the governments established in the past in which the composition of ministers was based on broad agreement among all parties in the parliament, including those close to Iran.

The political upheaval in Iraq that resulted in the establishment of a government by supporters of Iran, who did not win the majority of seats in the parliamentary elections, is the result of a series of impulsive decisions by Sadr. After failing for many months to form a government that did not rely on the support of the pro-Iranian Shiite factions (united in the so-called Coordination Framework), in June, Sadr unexpectedly ordered all the members of his faction to withdraw from parliament. He subsequently even called on his supporters to protest in the streets, which escalated to the point of a violent confrontation in the Green Zone in Baghdad, the site of government buildings and the presidential palace. That day in late August was the height of demonstrations and clashes between Sadr supporters and the rival Shiite camp, during which there were reports of exchanges of fire between militia activists on both sides. In less than a day dozens of people were killed, until Sadr ordered his supporters to leave the Green Zone, thus ending the event. In tandem, the seats of the resigning Sadr loyalists were filled by the next in line according to the election results in the various constituencies, and the Coordination Framework was tasked with forming the government.

After talks and consultations with the leaders of the parliamentary factions, and especially the leaders of the Kurdish parties who were divided on the issue of the identity of the president, a compromise was reached. According to the compromise, which was approved by a parliamentary vote, Kurdish politician Abdul Latif Rashid would be the next President of Iraq. Immediately after his appointment, the new President entrusted the formation of the government to the Coordination Framework candidate, Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. In an attempt to appease Sadr, who, following the resignation of members of his faction demanded that parliamentary elections be advanced, al-Sudani announced that his government would prepare to hold elections within a year. In a vote held a few days later, the cabinet proposed by al-Sudani was approved. The Minister of Defense is Thabat el-Abassi, who represents a coalition of Sunni parties in the parliament. Al-Sudani appointed General Abd al-Amir al-Shammari, who previously served as deputy commander of the joint operations of the Iraqi security forces, as Interior Minister. Later, al-Sudani, announced that temporarily he would be in direct command of the National Intelligence Service, after dismissing the person at the helm appointed by the previous prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi.

Muqtada Sadr |

Incoming Prime Minister Mohammad al-Sudani, 52, held senior positions in the public sector over the previous two decades – starting in local government, as governor of the Maysan district bordering Iran, and later as a minister in the governments of Nouri al-Maliki and Haider al-Abadi. In foreign relations, continuity in the policy of maintaining diplomatic relations with various parties and even adversaries involved in Iraq is evident, as emerged from al-Sudani’s discussions with the United States Secretary of State and the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Iraq shortly after he assumed office.

So far, the new Prime Minister has refrained from explicitly relating to the activities of the pro-Iranian militias that are not coordinated with the government. In the basic guidelines of his government he was content with a general statement, which appears in the margins on security issues, whereby the government will try to put an end to the phenomenon of weapons over which there is no state control. This is a significant change in relation to al-Kadhimi’s policy, which underscored in the government’s basic guidelines the imperative to concentrate all weapons in the country in the hands of its security institutions; he even worked to enforce the law against the pro-Iranian militias, although he failed to realize this goal.

The fact that al-Sudani is a confidant of Nouri al-Maliki, Sadr’s bitter opponent, and the considerable influence of the pro-Iranian militias on his government’s decisions (such as the appointment of a journalist closely associated with them to the position of head of the Information Bureau in the government) have highlighted that the current Prime Minister is not more comfortable than his predecessor both with and for the militias. This matter clouds the government’s relationship with Muqtada Sadr and his movement. The preparation for early elections may also exacerbate the intra-Shia conflict, since on the road to these elections the Coordination Framework plans to pass an amendment to the election law with the aim of increasing the chances of the pro-Iranian camp in the next elections – which may lead to another clash with Sadr and his supporters.

Following the results of the parliamentary elections and prior to the establishment of the new government, there was concern in Iran that its position and influence in Iraq would be challenged. Furthermore, the fierce conflicts that erupted among the Shiites caused concern in Tehran about the loss of stability in its backyard. Faced with this concern, Iran attempted to mediate between the Shia political currents and establish a stable government that would secure its interests in Iraq, including its vital economic interests. In these efforts, the commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, Esmail Qaani, played a central role. In the past year, Qaani has made a series of visits to Iraq, during which he met with representatives of the Shiite factions, including Sadr, as well as with representatives of the Kurdish parties in northern Iraq. In February 2022, Iraqi sources reported that during his meeting with Sadr, Qaani relayed a message to him from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, calling for the preservation of the unity of the Shiite political camp under any conditions. However, Sadr continued to refuse to form a government with the participation of the militias close to Iran.

As expected, the Iranian regime hastened to welcome the establishment of the government headed by al-Sudani and is expected to strive to use its influence over this government to advance its long-term goals in Iraq – notwithstanding the results of the parliamentary elections and the sharp divisions of opinion in the Shia camp, which provided further evidence of the challenges facing Iran. The targeted killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and the head of the pro-Iranian Shia militias, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in January 2020, dealt a severe blow to Iran’s ability to advance its strategic goals in Iraq. Their deaths did not prompt Iran to relinquish its primary objectives in Iraq, but it obliged the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force under Qaani’s leadership to adjust their activities to the changing circumstances. The killing of al-Muhandis also somewhat damaged Iran’s ability to maintain its control over the Shiite militias in Iraq. In addition, Iran had to deal with the consequences of the policies of the outgoing Prime Minister. Since his election, it was evident that al-Kadhimi was determined to prevent his country from becoming a conflict theater between Iran and the United States, to preserve his country’s ties with the US administration, and to limit the influence of the Shia militias, especially those loyal to Iran, which he perceived as potentially destabilizing the country. Given the complexity of the political arena in Iraq, and especially the deep division in the Shiite camp, Iran tries to walk a fine line while demonstrating pragmatism and caution in an effort to preserve its ties with the central government in Baghdad and with the Shiite militias it supports.

Sadr’s failure in the current round of the internal struggle in the Shiite camp provides further evidence of the ability of Tehran-supported pro-Iranian militias to secure their interests, and the influence that the Iranian regime currently has in political processes and decision-making centers in neighboring Iraq. This is true despite the growing public criticism of these militias having become a center of power competing with the central government and of Iranian interference in general. Precisely in the face of the escalating challenges at home and abroad, primarily the escalating economic crisis, the ongoing protests at home, and the ongoing confrontation with the United States in the absence of a nuclear agreement, Iran attaches even greater importance to its influence in Iraq and is determined to preserve it for a long time.

The success of the new government in maintaining stability until early elections, and in particular in passing the amendment to the election law and holding the elections on the scheduled date, as promised by al-Sudani, depends on the agreement (or, at the very least, the absence of active opposition) on the part of Sadr – and this is far from guaranteed. His popular support base and the militia that supports him give him damage potential that could be used to undermine the new government’s moves. Furthermore, even after the battle over the prime minister was decided in favor of the pro-Iranian camp, the basic political problems that led to the split among the Shiites in Iraq have not yet been resolved – led by governmental corruption and the interference of Iran and the militias working in its support in Iraqi politics. These issues are expected to continue to be the focus of debates, tensions, and perhaps even further clashes between the rival Shiite forces.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.

Yaron Schneider

Dr. Yaron Schneider, a Researcher at INSS, holds a PhD from the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His PhD thesis is entitled: “The Triangle of Peacekeeping Operations, States, and Non State Actors as a Framework for Security Governance in Borderlands”. He holds a B.A. in International Relations and Arabic Language and Literature and an M.A. in International Relations, both from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Raz Zimmt

Dr. Raz Zimmt is an expert on Iran at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He holds a master’s degree and a PhD in Middle Eastern history from Tel-Aviv University. His PhD dissertation focused on Iranian policy towards Nasserism and Arab radicalism between 1954 and 1967. He is also a research fellow at the Alliance Center for Iranian Studies at Tel-Aviv University. In addition, he is the editor of “Spotlight on Iran” published by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. His main research interests are the politics, foreign relations, society & social media of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Publication Series
INSS Insight

Reports of Missile Blast Alarm NATO

0

 

 

Uncertainty and panic have gripped NATO countries after a missile or debris from one reportedly hit Polish territory and sparked an explosion on Tuesday, killing two people and stirring fears of the war’s potential expansion outside of Ukraine.

In the blast’s aftermath, contradictory reports sparked a diplomatic frenzy as alarmed NATO leaders raced to determine what had happened. But as of Tuesday night, it remained unclear whether Poland—a NATO member—had been hit by a missile or debris from one, who fired it, and whether the strike was intentional.

Poland said it was likely struck by a Russian-made missile and is currently weighing invoking NATO’s Article 4 provision, meaning it would consult with other NATO countries over security or territorial-related concerns. Russia, for its part, has denied any connection with the blast, dismissing Polish reporting as a “deliberate provocation in order to escalate the situation.”

But even if the missile itself was Russian-made, it wasn’t immediately obvious who launched it or where it came from. Some recent reports suggest it may have been fired by Ukrainian air defense units to intercept a Russian missile, according to the Financial Times. U.S. President Joe Biden said it was “unlikely” that the projectile was fired from Russia, given its launch trajectory, and publicly backed Warsaw’s investigation.

“I’m going to make sure we figure out exactly what happened,” Biden said. “Then we’re going to figure out our next step.”

Until more information is known, experts have urged caution.

When it comes to “the larger speculation of whether this is a Russian attack, whether this is a major escalation, then you have to hold your breath and say, ‘Wait a minute, let’s get the facts first,’” Daniel Fried, a fellow at the Atlantic Council and former U.S. ambassador to Poland, told Foreign Policy on Tuesday.

If intelligence agencies were to determine that the reported missile strike was a deliberate Russian attack on Polish territory, it could potentially set off NATO’s Article 5 collective defense commitment, as FP’s Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, and Amy Mackinnon report. So far, however, NATO leaders have largely avoided blaming Russia.

“Article 5 is not automatic,” Jim Townsend, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy, told them. “Even if Poland comes and says, ‘we’ve been attacked,’ it’s up to the [North Atlantic Council] to decide whether that is true or not.”

Confusion surrounding the missile crossing into Poland came as Moscow unleashed a spate of airstrikes across Ukraine on Tuesday, following the liberation of the strategic city of Kherson. The onslaught of missiles left nearly 10 million people facing power outages, Kyiv said, and hit some residential buildings.

Foreign Policy

Turkish embassy police spied in Greek cities of Athens and Thessaloniki, secret document reveals

0

Abdullah Bozkurt/Stockholm

A police liaison officer assigned to the Turkish embassy in Athens ran a covert operation to collect intelligence in Athens and Thessaloniki, a secret Turkish government document obtained by Nordic Monitor has revealed.

The document, sent by the Security General Directorate (Emniyet) on September 2, 2020 to nearly a dozen provincial police departments, said the Turkish Foreign Ministry had passed on intelligence gathered by a police officer who works at the Turkish embassy.

The communiqué, classified as secret, mentioned six business establishments in Athens and Thessaloniki and 13 residents who are allegedly linked to the Gülen movement, a group critical of the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Secret intelligence document sent from the Turkish embassy to headquarters in Ankara details spying activity in Athens and Thessaloniki : 

Click to access secret_espionage_document_greece_Redacted1.pdf

 

The people who were spied on were owners and operators of various businesses including a restaurant, a market, a real estate brokerage and a rental a car agency. In some cases, spouses of the owners were also targeted.

The document noted that the intelligence was part of a broader clandestine operation launched by the Turkish government in Greece to identify targets from the Gülen group, confirming that multiple agencies were involved in spying in a foreign territory.

The spying activity shows that the Erdoğan government not only disregards the law in a NATO ally — a neighboring country — by engaging aggressive spying activities but also does not feel bound by Turkish laws that prohibit Turkish police from carrying out such work.

A secret communiqué from a police chief which warned that the intelligence must be treated on a need-to-know basis and not be shared with unauthorized people/institutions.

Click to access secret_espionage_document_greece_Redacted2.pdf

 

By law, the Turkish police, part of the Interior Ministry, are barred from collecting intelligence beyond Turkey’s borders. Only the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) is authorized to collect such information in foreign countries, while the police are allowed to gather information inside Turkey.

Moreover, the police deployed overseas at Turkish embassies and consulates are tasked with providing security for the missions’ buildings as well as for ambassadors’ residences. They are not authorized to collect information while assigned to protective duty for the embassy and attached buildings in the diplomatic compound.

In fact, the police officers who were deployed for what was described as “mission protection” overseas were temporarily placed under the employment of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. In other words, they were not listed as “police” per se on the diplomatic list, but both the sending and receiving states were familiar with who they were and what they did. Their main task was to coordinate with local law enforcement officials.

Public prosecutor listed people who were spied on in Greece as suspects in criminal cases in Turkey: 

Click to access Prosecutor_investigates_people_profiled_in_Greece.pdf

 

In 2017 the Erdoğan government created a new position for Turkish diplomatic missions: specially selected people from the Interior Ministry to operate as counsellors. They work under the title of Interior Ministry Counsellors (İçişleri müşaviri) in embassies and Interior Ministry attachés (İçişleri ataşesi) at consulates. They supervise police officers at the missions they are assigned to as well.

The position at the Turkish embassy in Athens is currently filled by police chief Uygar Elmastaşı, who until last year used to run the aviation department at the the Security General Directorate, which has multiple aircraft, from surveillance planes and drones to attack helicopters. Elmastaşı is a far-right Turkish nationalist. He had worked with Selçuk Bayraktar, Erdoğan’s son-in-law who runs the company that manufactures Bayraktar drones.

Elmastaşı’s appointment indicates the Erdoğan government is planning to enhance its operations in Greece, a country that is already a primary target of Turkish intelligence agency MIT. In other words the Emniyet, with much larger resources and manpower than MIT would also weigh in on clandestine operations in the neighboring country.

Uygur Elmastaş (R), the police chief who works at the Turkish embassy in Athens, is seen next to Selçuk Bayraktar (L), Erdogan’s son-in-law and manufacturer of Bayraktar drones.

President Erdoğan and other government officials’ increasingly belligerent rhetoric towards Greece has clearly translated into policy actions and operations. Secret documents published by Nordic Monitor confirm such activity.

In this specific instance, the document was signed by Erdoğan Kartal, deputy chief of the Emniyet’s counterterrorism department, and distributed to 10 Turkish provinces in a secret message for further police action against Turkish nationals profiled by the police officer at the Turkish embassy in Athens.

Apparently concerned about a leak of the document that violated Turkish laws and possible fallout from the scandalous activity in Greece, Kartal referred to the source of the intelligence as “the information note obtained from the affiliated (V) institution.” The roman numeral V is the code number for the Foreign Ministry Security and Research Directorate (otherwise known as the intelligence section, or Araştırma ve Güvenlik İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü in Turkish).

In order to avoid diplomatic backlash and problems at the bilateral level in the event the unlawful spying activities in Greece were revealed, police chief Kartal warned that the information passed from the Foreign Ministry must be treated on a “need-to-know” basis and was “not to be shared with unauthorized people/institutions.”

Police chief’s letter that reveals intelligence was gathered by an embassy police officer in Athens and dispatched to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, identified as “Institution.

It is clear that the Erdoğan government has turned police officers assigned overseas for protective duty and liaison work into intelligence agents who are ordered to spy on critics, opponents and dissidents. The government is not forthcoming on the data about how many such operatives are working abroad. But in 2021 Turkish authorities interviewed 1,400 police officers for mission protection duty, and 700 of them were selected on February 11, 2021 for deployment to diplomatic missions.

The selection is basically made through an oral interview conducted by Erdoğan’s loyalists, which suggests that ideology and political views, rather than merit, are critical factors in assessing the candidates.

The Turkish police, overseen by the Interior Ministry, had a staff of 328,719 as of last year. It was led by Süleyman Soylu, a far-right politician who was once designated under sanctions by the US government for his role in wrongfully imprisoning a US citizen in Turkey.

The police force was dealt a huge blow by the Erdoğan government with purges that started in 2014 and intensified in 2016 and 2017. Among 43,648 people who were purged without effective administrative or judicial probes, 14,000 were veteran police chiefs. The move was seen as an attempt by Erdoğan to transform the police force into a his own private detective agency to go after his political opponents, journalists, activists and human rights defenders.

In fact the intelligence gathered in Greece was used by the police to pursue criminal investigations in Turkey.  In a communiqué sent to the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office on January 27, 2021, Huseyin Agir, the acting chief of the Ankara police department’s counterterrorism bureau, asked for permission to investigate people who were spied on in Greece. He mentioned the intelligence passed from the Turkish embassy in Athens in his communiqué to justify the probe.

On September 13, 2022 public prosecutor Ali Tanil Gören sent a letter to courts and prosecutor’s offices in nine provinces where the population registries of profiled people were kept in order to take further legal action.

The entire process shows that the rule of law has effectively been suspended in Turkey under Erdoğan’s presidency and that the criminal justice system and law enforcement agencies were abused to punish critics and opponents on fabricated terrorism charges.

The intelligence document sent by the Foreign Ministry and shared with the prosecutor’s office by the police department cannot be considered evidence, which is stated on the bottom of all such documents in line with the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMUK). The evidence must be collected only after the police receive authorization by a court under the supervision of a prosecutor’s office.

The spying on critics who live abroad has dire consequences for those who were targeted by the Turkish government. The not only face politically motivated criminal prosecutions but also risk the imprisonment of their family members in Turkey and the unlawful seizure of their assets.

Abdullah Bozkurt

[email protected]

Nordic Monitor

Δ. Κωνσταντακόπουλος: Οι καύσωνες απειλούν την ανθρωπότητα

0

του Δ. Κωνσταντακόπουλου

Oι καύσωνες θα γίνουν τόσο ακραίοι στις επόμενες δεκαετίες που θα καταστήσουν ορισμένες περιοχές του κόσμου μη κατοικήσιμες, αν δεν ληφθούν μέτρα ανακοπής της κλιματικής αλλαγής, όπως προειδοποίησαν, με κοινή έκθεσή τους, ο Οργανισμός Ηνωμένων Εθνών και ο Ερυθρός Σταυρός-Ερυθρά Ημισέληνος.

Οι καύσωνες προβλέπεται να «ξεπεράσουν τα ανθρώπινα φυσιολογικά και κοινωνικά όρια» στο Σαχέλ, στο Κέρας της Αφρικής και στη νότια και νοτιοδυτική Ασία, προκαλώντας μεγάλης έκτασης οδύνη και απώλειες ζωής, παραιτέρω ένταση των ανισοτήτων και νέα μεταναστευτικά ρεύματα, σύμφωνα με τους δύο διεθνείς οργανισμούς. Σημειωτέον ότι, γεωγραφικά, μπορεί να θεωρηθεί και η Κύπρος ως μετέχουσα στη νοτιοδυτική Ασία.

Οι φετινές οικονομικές καταστροφές σε χώρες όπως η Σομαλία ή το Πακιστάν συνιστούν μία προειδοποίηση για ένα μέλλον με πιο φονικές, πιο συχνές και πιο έντονες ανθρωπιστικές κρίσεις εξαιτίας υψηλών θερμοκρασιών. Κατά τους δύο οργανισμούς, είναι απαραίτητο να παρθούν, άμεσα, αποφασιστικά μέτρα για την αποτροπή επαναλαμβανόμενων θερμικών καταστροφών και για την προστασία από τα χειρότερα αποτελέσματα της ακραίας ζέστης.

Στην έκθεση των δύο οργανισμών αναφέρεται ότι είναι πιθανό να αντιμετωπίσουμε ακραία ζέστη που θα καταστήσει αδύνατο στο κράτος να προσφέρει αποτελεσματική προστασία για όλους.

Το συνδυασμένο αποτέλεσμα της γήρανσης του πληθυσμού, της υπερθέρμανσης και της αστικοποίησης μπορεί να προκαλέσει σημαντική αύξηση του αριθμού ανθρώπων που θα κινδυνεύσουν στις επόμενες δεκαετίες στις «αναπτυσσόμενες» χώρες. Οι προβλεπόμενοι θάνατοι από ακραία ζέστη στις επόμενες δεκαετίες είναι αφύσικα υψηλοί και συγκρίσιμοι με τους αριθμούς θανάτων από καρκίνο ή από μολυσματικές ασθένειες. Τα φαινόμενα πλήττουν διαφορετικά κάθε κοινωνική ομάδα, εγκαθιστώντας μία νέα μορφή ανισότητας μπροστά στον θάνατο. Οι πιο τρωτοί, αυτοί που θα κινδυνεύσουν περισσότερο από αρρώστια και θάνατο, θα είναι οι εργάτες γης, τα παιδιά, οι ηλικιωμένοι, οι έγκυες και οι γυναίκες που θηλάζουν. Όσο συνεχίζεται ανεξέλεγκτη η κλιματική κρίση, τα ακραία καιρικά φαινόμενα, όπως η ακραία ζέστη και οι μεγάλες πλημμύρες, θα πλήξουν χειρότερα τους πιο ευάλωτους, όπως τόνισε ο επικεφαλής Ανθρωπιστικών Θεμάτων του ΟΗΕ, Martin Griffiths.

Και βεβαίως πουθενά δεν θα είναι πιο βίαιες οι συνέπειες από όσο στις χώρες που ήδη αντιμετωπίζουν πείνα, συγκρούσεις και φτώχεια.

Οι δύο οργανισμοί πρότειναν μία σειρά μέτρων προσαρμογής και άμβλυνσης των συνεπειών των ακραίων καυσώνων λόγω της κλιματικής αλλαγής. Μεταξύ αυτών η παροχή έγκαιρης προειδοποίησης στον πληθυσμό και τις αρχές, η χρηματοδότηση τοπικών δράσεων, η δημιουργία καλύτερων καταφυγίων από την υψηλή θερμοκρασία και «κέντρων ψύξης» και η εμπλοκή των ίδιων των κοινοτήτων στην τροποποίηση των αναπτυξιακών σχεδίων τους για να πάρουν υπόψιν τους τις πιθανές συνέπειες των κυμάτων ακραίας ζέστης.

Η προσπάθεια προστασίας από τις συνέπειες της κλιματικής κρίσης είναι ασφαλώς απαραίτητες, διερωτάται όμως κανείς μήπως θα ήταν καλύτερα το κύριο μέτωπο των προσπαθειών να είναι η προσπάθεια αντιστροφής της κλιματικής αλλαγής.

Δυστυχώς, με τον τρόπο που (δεν) κινείται η ανθρωπότητα σήμερα, δηλαδή τα κράτη, κινδυνεύει να μην αντιμετωπίσει εγκαίρως την κλιματική κρίση και να την καταστήσει μη αντιστρέψιμη.

Φόβους για ευρωπαϊκή επιδημία καρκίνου την επόμενη δεκαετία εκφράζουν ειδικοί

1

Τουλάχιστον ένα εκατομμύριο διαγνώσεις καρκίνου δεν έγιναν στην Ευρώπη κατά τη διάρκεια των δύο «χαμένων» ετών της πανδημίας, κάτι που μπορεί να έχει ως συνέπεια μια ευρωπαϊκή «επιδημία» καρκίνου μέσα στην επόμενη δεκαετία, προειδοποιεί μια διεθνής επιτροπή ογκολόγων και άλλων ειδικών.

Οι επιστήμονες της νέας επιτροπής του έγκριτου ιατρικού περιοδικού «The Lancet Oncology», με επικεφαλής τον καθηγητή Μαρκ Λόουλερ του Πανεπιστημίου Queen’s του Μπέλφαστ, οι οποίοι έκαναν σχετική δημοσίευση, τονίζουν ότι η Covid-19 ανέδειξε μια σειρά από αδυναμίες τόσο στο πεδίο της θεραπείας όσο και της έρευνας του καρκίνου στην Ευρώπη, οι οποίες αν δεν αντιμετωπισθούν έγκαιρα, υπάρχει κίνδυνος να επιφέρουν καθυστέρηση στην αντιμετώπιση του καρκίνου κατά μια σχεδόν δεκαετία.

«Εκτιμάμε ότι περίπου ένα εκατομμύριο διαγνώσεις καρκίνου χάθηκαν στην Ευρώπη στη διάρκεια της πανδημίας. Κάνουμε αγώνα δρόμου ενάντια στον χρόνο για να βρούμε αυτούς τους χαμένους καρκίνους. Επιπροσθέτως, είδαμε μια ανησυχητική επίπτωση στην αντικαρκινική έρευνα, με εργαστήρια να κλείνουν και κλινικές μελέτες να καθυστερούν ή να ματαιώνονται κατά το πρώτο πανδημικό κύμα», ανέφερε ο δρ Λόουλερ.

Η έκθεση «European Groundshot» της Επιτροπής Lancet Oncology Commission, η οποία παρουσιάστηκε στο συνέδριο «European Cancer Summit 2022», εκτιμά ότι κατά το πρώτο έτος της πανδημίας οι γιατροί είδαν 1,5 εκατομμύρια λιγότερους ασθενείς με καρκίνο, ενώ ο ένας στους δύο καρκινοπαθείς δεν έκανε έγκαιρα την αναγκαία χειρουργική επέμβαση ή χημειοθεραπεία. Ακόμη, δεν έγιναν 100 εκατομμύρια διαγνωστικές-απεικονιστικές εξετάσεις για καρκίνο, με αποτέλεσμα έως ένα εκατομμύριο Ευρωπαίοι μπορεί σήμερα να έχουν μη διαγνωσμένο καρκίνο.

Πέρα από τον κορονοϊό, ο πόλεμος στην Ουκρανία έχει τη δική του επίπτωση, με δεδομένο ότι Ρωσία και Ουκρανία ήταν ανέκαθεν δύο χώρες με μεγάλη συμμετοχή στην κλινική έρευνα για τον καρκίνο. Ο δρ Ανδρέας Χαραλάμπους, πρόεδρος του Ευρωπαϊκού Οργανισμού Καρκίνου, δήλωσε ότι “ενώ έχει υπάρξει μεγάλη ειδησεογραφική κάλυψη της ρωσικής εισβολής στην Ουκρανία, έχει περάσει σχετικά απαρατήρητη η βαθιά και συνεχιζόμενη επίπτωση στην κλινική έρευνα για τον καρκίνο. Υπάρχει ήδη ένα διευρυνόμενο χάσμα Ανατολής-Δύσης στην ευρωπαϊκή έρευνα για τον καρκίνο και είναι κρίσιμο ο πόλεμος Ρωσίας-Ουκρανίας να μη διευρύνει περαιτέρω αυτό το χάσμα».

Η έκθεση των ειδικών βρήκε ότι την προηγούμενη δεκαετία 2010-2019 οι συνολικές επενδύσεις στην Ευρώπη για έρευνες στον καρκίνο έφθασαν τα 20 έως 22 δισεκατομμύρια ευρώ ή περίπου 26 ευρώ ανά κεφαλή, έναντι 80,5 δισ. δολαρίων (76 δισ. ευρώ) ή 234 ανά κεφαλή στις ΗΠΑ την ίδια περίοδο. Η επιτροπή προτείνει τουλάχιστον τον διπλασιασμό της αντικαρκινικής έρευνας στην Ευρώπη στα 50 ευρώ ανά κάτοικο μέχρι το 2030, με έμφαση στη βελτίωση της πρόληψης.

«Εκτιμάται ότι το 40% των καρκίνων στην Ευρώπη θα μπορούσαν να προληφθούν αν οι στρατηγικές πρωτοβάθμιας πρόληψης έκαναν καλύτερη χρήση της τρέχουσας κατανόησής μας αναφορικά με τους παράγοντες κινδύνου για τον καρκίνο. Ακόμη, έως το ένα τρίτο των περιπτώσεων καρκίνου στην Ευρώπη είναι πιθανότερο να είχαν καλύτερη έκβαση, αν ανιχνεύονταν πιο νωρίς», δήλωσε η Άνα Σμουτς της Διεθνούς Υπηρεσίας για την Έρευνα στον Καρκίνο (IARC) με έδρα τη Γαλλία.

Capital Controls στη …Γερμανία;

0

Προχωρημένο το σενάριο, αλλά δυνατό σε περίπτωση εκτεταμένου μπλακ άουτ. Οι Γερμανοί ανησυχούν, ζητούν ασφάλεια σε μετρητά, η Μπούντεσμπανκ διαβεβαιώνει ότι έχει ρευστότητα.

    Απευκταίο σενάριο

Σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες που επικαλείται κατά αποκλειστικότητα το ειδησεογραφικό πρακτορείο Reuters οι χρηματοπιστωτικές αρχές της Γερμανίας επεξεργάζονται σχέδια έκτακτης ανάγκης για την παροχή μετρητών σε περίπτωση που λόγω της ενεργειακής κρίσης ή σαμποτάζ συμβεί το απευκταίο, μακροχρόνια διακοπή ρεύματος λόγω ενεργειακής κρίσης. Το ενδεχόμενο ενός σαμποτάζ, όπως είδαμε σε άλλους τομείς, είναι υπαρκτό. Πριν από μερικές εβδομάδες το σιδηροδρομικό δίκτυο στη βόρεια Γερμανία ακινητοποιήθηκε για πολλές ώρες λόγω δολιοφθοράς στο δίκτυο. Έτσι η Bundesbank, η Γερμανική Κεντρική Τράπεζα, η χρηματοοικονομική ρυθμιστική αρχή BaFin και αρκετές ενώσεις του κλάδου εντείνουν τις προετοιμασίες τους για μια τέτοια υπόθεση, όπως ανέφεραν στο πρακτορείο τέσσερα άτομα που γνωρίζουν από μέσα τις συνομιλίες.

Ρευστό: ψυχολογικό βοήθημα σε έκτακτες καταστάσεις

Τι θα γίνει εάν δεν δουλεύουν τα ΑΤΜ;Τι θα γίνει εάν δεν δουλεύουν τα ΑΤΜ;

Μέρος του σχεδίου είναι η εξασφάλιση ικανής ποσότητας μετρητών στην Bundesbank για την αύξηση της ζήτησης, αλλά ενδεχομένως και ο περιορισμός του ποσού που θα μπορούν να σηκώνουν οι πολίτες από τους λογαριασμούς τους. Δηλαδή, capital controls, όπως τα βίωσαν οι Έλληνες επί μήνες κατά το annus horribilis 2015, αλλά για άλλους λόγους. Επίσης οι τράπεζες και οι ρυθμιστικές αρχές εξετάζουν πιθανές αδυναμίες στη διανομή μετρητών, ανέφερε κάποιος με εσωτερική γνώση. Στη γερμανική οικονομία τα μετρητά συνεχίζουν ακόμη και σήμερα να παίζουν μεγάλο ρόλο. Σε περίπτωση διακοπής ρεύματος, τα συστήματα ηλεκτρονικών πληρωμών και τα ΑΤΜ θα είναι εκτός λειτουργίας. «Σε περίπτωση διακοπής ρεύματος, τα μετρητά θα είναι το μόνο επίσημο μέσο πληρωμής που θα εξακολουθεί να λειτουργεί», εκτιμά ο Τόμας Λάιτερτ, διευθύνων σύμβουλος της εταιρείας KomRe, ο οποίος συμβουλεύει τις πόλεις πώς να προετοιμαστούν για διακοπές ρεύματος και άλλες καταστροφές. Αλλά και σε ψυχολογικό επίπεδο η έλλειψη μετρητών μπορεί να προκαλέσει έκτακτες καταστάσεις. Το 2011, σε έκθεση σχετικά με τις συνέπειες μιας μόνιμης διακοπής ρεύματος που παρήγγειλε η γερμανική βουλή, αναφέρεται ότι θα μπορούσαν να προκύψουν “αισθήματα αγανάκτησης και μερικές φορές επιθετικές πράξεις», εάν η παροχή μετρητών κατέρρεε. «Οι άνθρωποι φοβούνται ότι δεν θα μπορούν να αγοράσουν τρόφιμα και άλλα είδη πρώτης ανάγκης», αναφέρεται στην έκθεση.

Πολλοί ετοιμάζονται δι' αυτού του τρόπου για τυχόν μπλακ άουτΠολλοί ετοιμάζονται δι’ αυτού του τρόπου για τυχόν μπλακ άουτ

Το πόσο οι Γερμανοί καταφεύγουν σε μετρητά σε έκτακτες περιόδους φαίνεται και από την περίοδο της πανδημίας. Από τον Μάρτιο του 2020 και για λίγους μήνες οι Γερμανοί τράβηξαν από τους λογαριασμούς τους 20 δις περισσότερα από όσα κατέθεσαν, ένα ποσό ρεκόρ, που όμως δεν δημιούργησε προβλήματα λόγω της επαρκούς ρευστότητας της Μπούντεσμπανκ, η οποία έχει και τη σχετική ευθύνη. Πηγή που γνωρίζει την κατάσταση εκ των έσω αναφέρει ότι η τράπεζα έχει αρκετά αποθέματα σε ρευστό, εάν το σενάριο επαναληφθεί. Η πρόσβαση σε μετρητά μέσω ATM προκαλεί ιδιαίτερη ανησυχία στους Γερμανούς, οι οποίοι εκτιμούν την ασφάλεια και την ανωνυμία που τους προσφέρει. Φαίνεται δε ότι χρησιμοποιούν μετρητά περισσότερο από άλλους Ευρωπαίους, με ορισμένους να συσσωρεύουν ακόμη και γερμανικά μάρκα που αντικαταστάθηκαν από ευρώ πριν από δύο δεκαετίες. Περίπου το 60% των καθημερινών αγορών γίνονται σε μετρητά, σύμφωνα με πρόσφατη μελέτη της Μπούντεσμπανκ.

Μετρητά για το τελευταίο πακέτο κεριών

Καθησυχάζει η ΜπούντεσμπανκΚαθησυχάζει η Μπούντεσμπανκ

Μια αχίλλειος πτέρνα σε μια τέτοια κρίση είναι οι πάροχοι υπηρεσιών μεταφοράς χρημάτων. Είναι εκείνα τα τεθωρακισμένα αυτοκίνητα που φέρνουν μετρητά από τη Γερμανική Κεντρική Τράπεζα στα υποκαταστήματα των τραπεζών και στα ΑΤΜ. Ο κλάδος, ο οποίος περιλαμβάνει εταιρείες. όπως η Brink, απαιτεί σε περίπτωση κρίσης, όπως η διακοπή ηλεκτρικού, να αξιολογηθεί ως κομμάτι των υποδομών ζωτικής σημασίας και να δοθεί προτεραιότητα στην πρόσβαση σε καύσιμα και σε τηλεπικοινωνιακές υπηρεσίες. Διαφορετικά, σε περίπτωση μεγαλύτερης διακοπής ρεύματος, δεν θα μπορεί να παραδώσει μετρητά. «Υπάρχουν μεγάλα ρυθμιστικά κενά στη νομοθεσία», λέει ο Αντρέας Πάουλικ, διευθύνων σύμβουλος της Ομοσπονδιακής Ένωσης Υπηρεσιών σε σχέση με χρήματα και αξίες (BDGW). «Πρέπει να αντιμετωπίσουμε προληπτικά το σενάριο μπλακ άουτ». Εκπρόσωπος εποπτικής αρχής, που δεν θέλησε να κατονομαστεί, ανέφερε ότι οι τράπεζες στη Γερμανία δεν είναι επαρκώς προετοιμασμένες για μια τέτοια κατάσταση κρίσης. Αν και οι γερμανικές αρχές δημόσια έχουν υποβαθμίσει την πιθανότητα διακοπής ρεύματος, οι συζητήσεις δείχνουν πόσο σοβαρά λαμβάνουν αυτήν την απειλή και πώς προσπαθούν να προετοιμαστούν για πιθανές διακοπές ρεύματος που προκαλούνται από το αυξανόμενο κόστος ενέργειας ή ακόμη και από σαμποτάζ. Βασική παράμετρος οι διευρυνόμενες συνέπειες του πολέμου στην Ουκρανία για τη Γερμανία, η οποία επί δεκαετίες βασίζονταν στην προσιτή ρωσική ενέργεια και τώρα αντιμετωπίζει διψήφιο πληθωρισμό και την απειλή διακοπής ηλεκτρικού λόγω ελλείψεων ενέργειας.

Ρευστό για τα τελευταία κεριά...Ρευστό για τα τελευταία κεριά…

Πρόσφατη δημοσκόπηση του ινστιτούτου σφυγμομετρήσεων Civey κατέδειξε ότι το 40% του πληθυσμού στη Γερμανία φοβάται ένα μπλακ άουτ τους επόμενους 6 μήνες. Πάντως η Γερμανική Ένωση Χρηματοπιστωτικής Οικονομίας (DK) το θεωρεί απίθανο, όταν ρωτήθηκε από το Reuters. Ωστόσο, όπως ειπώθηκε, υπάρχει επικοινωνία με τις αρχές για αυτό το θέμα, προκειμένου να διατηρηθούν οι χρηματοοικονομικές υπηρεσίες σε λειτουργία σε περίπτωση έκτακτης ανάγκης. Η DK μάλιστα δεσμεύεται να διασφαλίσει ότι τα κέντρα δεδομένων, οι συναλλαγές προμήθειας μετρητών και πληρωμών ανήκουν στις κρίσιμης σημασίας υποδομές. Ωστόσο, είναι δύσκολο για τις αρχές να εκτιμήσουν πόσα μετρητά θα χρειαστούν πραγματικά οι πολίτες, εάν αποτύχουν οι πληρωμές με κάρτα ή ηλεκτρονικά. “Οι λιγότεροι πολίτες είχαν σημαντικά ποσά μετρητών στην τσέπη”, εξηγεί ο Τόμας Λάιτερτ, επικεφαλής της εταιρείας KomRe. „Ο μέσος όρος είναι 120 ευρώ το άτομο. Πώς αλλιώς θα πληρωθεί μια κονσέρβα με ραβιόλια ή το τελευταίο πακέτο κεριών;»

Ειρήνη Αναστασοπούλου/Reuters

DW

Η Φόνισσα” του Πολυτεχνείου

3
του Ιωάννη Ρεβύθη*
Μία προσωπική εμπειρία που την μοιράζομαι με χαρά με τους φίλους του φβ.
Όλοι όσοι ζούμε στην Κέρκυρα, ξέρουμε ότι υπάρχουν δυο (2) μέρες του χρόνου, η μία είναι την Άνοιξη και η άλλη το φθινόπωρο, που κυριολεκτικά η πόλη μας αλλάζει πρόσωπο. Είναι η μέρα που ανάλογα με την εποχή η Κέρκυρα μεταμορφώνεται. Τότε που η τουριστική Κέρκυρα γίνεται η Κέρκυρα για τους Κερκυραίους και τανάπαλιν.
Είναι οι πρώτες μέρες του Νοέμβρη που η πολυπολιτισμική, η πολύβουη, η πολύχρωμη η λαμπερή Κέρκυρα, δίνει τη θέση της στην γκρίζα, την βροχερή την ήρεμη την δικιά μας Κέρκυρα.
Με τον ίδιο ακριβώς τρόπο αλλάζουν εμφάνιση και τα καταστήματα. Ιδιαίτερα τα καταστήματα εστίασης.
Μαζεύονται τα τραπεζάκια από τα πεζοδρόμια, επιστρέφει η ηρεμία στα πρόσωπα των καταστηματαρχών και φυσικά αλλάζει πλήρως το μενού και το πελατολόγιο.
Οι Άγγλοι, οι Γάλλοι, Πορτογάλοι, δίνουν τη θέση τους στο Γιώργο, το Νίκο το Γιάννη τον Κώστα. Και η Ιταλική κουζίνα μετατρέπεται αυτόματα στην παραδοσιακά Κερκυραϊκή με το μπουρδέτο και την παστιτσάδα.
Εκείνο το μεσημέρι, ενα μεσημέρι φθινοπωρινό σαν όλα τα άλλα, οι ώρες κυλούσαν πολύ ήσυχα, πολύ ήρεμα.
Ο Περικλής όπως κάθε τέτοια εποχή, ορεξάτος και χαμογελαστός, ήταν βλέπετε “φορτωμένος” με γεμάτες τις τσέπες από την πλούσια τουριστική σαιζόν, δεν πρόλαβε να μας δει και είχε δώσει ήδη τις παραγγελίες στην “κουζίνα”. Ούτε καν μας είχε ρωτήσει τι ” τραβά ” η όρεξη μας.
Η δική μας παρέα είχε πιάσει το γνωστό γωνιακό τραπέζι του Νίκου και οι δυνατές φωνές, τα γέλια, τα πειράγματα έδιναν και έπαιρναν.
Οι συζητήσεις διαδέχονταν η μια την άλλη.
 
Από τον Giabatista Viko με τη Νέα Επιστημονική Γνώση πηγαίναμε στον Ολυμπιακό με τον Rivaldo και από την Ευρωπαϊκή νεωτερικότητα, στην Ελλάδα των μνημονίων και τα προβλήματα της τριτοβάθμιας εκπαίδευσης.
Κάποια στιγμή ήρθε η συζήτηση και στην επερχόμενη αργία της 17 του Νοέμβρη.
Μιλουσαμε για τις εκδηλώσεις και τους εορτασμούς, για την επέτειο του πολυτεχνείου και εκεί ξαφνικά τα πράγματα σοβάρεψαν.
Τα πρόσωπα αμέσως συννέφιασαν και χαμηλόφωνα πλέον μιλούσαμε για το νόημα του πολυτεχνείου, για τις τραγικές εκείνες στιγμές που βίωσαν οι φοιτητές και για το τεθωρακισμενο άρμα που έριξε την σιδερένια πύλη του πολυτεχνείου και έβαψε με το αίμα των φοιτητών, τις σελίδες της ιστορίας της νεότερης Ελλάδος.
– Ηταν τραγικές οι στιγμές που ζήσαμε όταν το τανκ έριχνε την πύλη.
Δεν φαντάζεστε την άσχημη ατμόσφαιρα που επικρατούσε μας περιέγραφε ο Νίκος που συμμετείχε ενεργά στις κινητοποιήσεις της Νομικής και του Πολυτεχνείου. Δεν θα ξεχάσω ποτέ αυτή τη στιγμή συνέχισε.
Συνέχισε να μας διηγείται, αν και δεν του άρεσε να μιλά για το πολυτεχνείο, διάφορες προσωπικές εμπειρίες του, και φυσικά, κάποια στιγμή, ήρθε και η ώρα να μας μιλήσει για το άρμα που έκανε την επέμβαση.
– Το άρμα ήταν Μ-48 Αμερικανικης κατασκευής, είπε και μάς εξηγούσε με την άνεση ειδικού στα τεθωρακισμενα οχήματα τα τεχνικά του χαρακτηριστικά.
– Νίκο είσαι σίγουρος ότι το άρμα του Πολυτεχνείου ήταν Μ48, τόλμησα δειλά – δειλά να τον ρωτήσω.
Με κοίταξε με εκείνο το γνωστό ισοπεδωτικό βλέμμα, του ανθρώπου που κατέχει καλά το θέμα, πού δεν δέχεται αντιρρήσεις και συνέχισε:
– Ναι Γιάννη είμαι σίγουρος. Ηταν Αμερικανικής κατασκευής Μ-48. Ξέρω τι λέω!
– Νίκο μήπως ήταν Γαλλικό άρμα AMX-30;
– Μη συνεχίζεις. Ξέρω τι λέω, μού είπε και γύρισε το κεφάλι του από την άλλη πλευρά.
Τον κοίταξα κι εγώ συγκαταβατικά, γιατί ήμουν σίγουρος ότι πίστευε αυτά που μας έλεγε. Αυτό όμως που σίγουρα δεν γνώριζε ήταν η δική μου σχέση με το συγκεκριμένο άρμα που έριξε την σιδερένια πύλη του πολυτεχνείου. Και πώς να το ξέρει άλλωστε; που να φανταστεί την δική μου σχέση με το συγκεκριμένο άρμα!
– Ξυπνάτε στραβάδια. Σηκωθείτε. Ξυπνάτε ζαγάρια, σβέλτα, τροχάδην όλοι στο προαύλιο.
Ηταν σαν να έπεσε ο ουρανός της Θήβας και με πλάκωσε.
Έξω ηταν νύχτα ακόμη, ο ήλιος δεν είχε προλάβει να βγει. Στο θάλαμο το μικρό φωτάκι ήταν αναμμένο και ο θαλαμοφύλακας με τον δεκανέα υπηρεσίας έκαναν “το διάολο τέσσερα”.
Άνοιγαν απότομα τις πόρτες και τα παράθυρα, κτυπούσαν με τις ξιφολόγχες τα σιδερένια κράνη έβριζαν, χτυπούσαν τις άκρες από τα σιδερένια κρεβάτια και όλα αυτά για ένα …χαρούμενο πρωινό ξύπνημα !
Κάποιοι μόλις είχαν σταματήσει το ροχαλητό τους, αλλά αυτή η μυρωδιά, η μπόχα σε έπνιγε κυριολεκτικά. Μια μυρωδιά ξινιλας, βαρβατίλας, κοινώς ποδαρίλας, δεκάδων ταλαιπωρημένων στις στρατιωτικές αρβύλες, με τις άπλυτες κάλτσες, ποδιών των νεοσυλλέκτων του κέντρου εκπαίδευσης πυροβολικού στη Θήβα.
Αυτή ήταν η τελευταία μας νύχτα στη Θήβα και έχοντας το φύλλο πορείας στην τσέπη, ετοιμαζόμασταν για την μονάδα που θα υπηρετούσαμε.
Είχαν περάσει δυο πολυ άσχημοι χειμωνιάτικοι μήνες στη Θήβα σκεφτόμουν καθώς προχωρούσα, κρατώντας γερά το σάκο εκστρατείας μη μου πέσει από το REO που θα μας μετέφερε για το σταθμό του τραίνου.
Δύο μήνες με πολυ κρύο, ξεπερνώντας πολλές δύσκολες καταστάσεις, αλλά σκεφτόμουν τουλάχιστον στη μονάδα που θα πάω θα φάω επιτέλους σε πιάτο. Δεν την άντεχα με τιποτα αυτήν την καραβάνα!!
Ο Έβρος και πιο συγκεκριμένα η Αλεξανδρούπολη ήταν η πόλη που θα υπηρετούσα για το υπόλοιπο της 28μηνης θητείας μου.
Με τον σάκο στην πλάτη, ταλαιπωρημένος από το ταξίδι, ξενυχτισμένος, που να κοιμηθείς σαυτό το τρένο, περίμενα τη σειρά μου για να παραδώσω τα χαρτιά στην Πύλη του στρατοπέδου Ιωάννου.
Με κοιτάζει περιφρονητικά ο ΑΜ ιτης της πύλης σφραγίζει τα χαρτιά, μου πετάει ένα ” θα πήξεις στραβάδι” και μου δείχνει νευριασμένος τη μονάδα μου. Τη μονάδα μου που ήταν στην άλλη άκρη ένός απέραντου στρατόπεδου.
Περίεργο. Δεν κυκλοφορεί κανείς, δεν ακούγεται τίποτα σκέφτηκα. Θα εχει σημάνει σιωπητήριο φαίνεται.
Ημουν στην 151 ΑΚ Μοιρα πυροβολικού και έψαχνα την 1η πυροβολαρχία. Τον τόπο των …μαρτυρίων!!
Επικρατούσε απόλυτη ησυχία . Περίεργο.
Περνάμε παρέα με τους άλλους (6) στρατιώτες την 1η πόρτα και ξαφνικά…
Ανάβουν όλα μαζί τα φώτα, μια κραυγή μας ξεκουφαίνει και όλα τα κράνη του θαλάμου μας έρχονται στο κεφάλι.
Ηταν η γνωστή υποδοχή στους νεοσυλλέκτους πού την συνόδευαν με τα γνωστά πυροφάνια, τις αγγαρείες, τα καψώνια και τα συνεχή Γερμανικά νούμερα.
Περνούσαν οι μέρες, η σκληρή εκπαίδευση, οι αγγαρείες και η έλλειψη ύπνου μας είχαν γίνει συνήθεια, αλλά είχαμε παρηγοριά ότι σε δυο μήνες θα ερχόταν η νεα σειρά, η νέα φουρνιά νεοσυλλέκτων όπου και θα τούς παραδίδαμε την σκυτάλη.
Σιγα-σιγά, περνούσαμε την φάση της προσαρμογής και όλο και..ξεμυτίζαμε προς την άλλη πλευρά του στρατοπέδου. Και εκεί μάθαμε τα..σπουδαία.
Ήμασταν λοιπόν στο στρατόπεδο Ιωάννου λίγο πιο έξω από την Αλεξανδρούπολη δυο (2) μηχανοκινητες μονάδες. Η μια ηταν μονάδα πυροβολικού και η άλλη τεθωρακισμένων αρμάτων μάχης. Η αλήθεια είναι ότι όταν από περιέργεια κυρίως, ρωτούσα ποια ήταν η άλλη μονάδα, μου απαντούσαν χαμηλόφωνα και σχεδόν συνομοτικά να μην το ψάχνω.
Ημουν πολυ περίεργος γιατί όταν κοίταζα προς την πλευρά των τεθωρακισμένων έβλεπα τους μαυροσκούφηδες στρατιώτες μόνιμα να τρέχουν. Ακόμα και την ώρα που περίμεναν στην γραμμή τους με την καραβάνα στο χέρι για να πάρουν το πρωινό τους, ακόμα κι εκεί ηταν σε θέση σημειωτόν. Κάποιες δε βραδιές ακούγονταν δυνατές κραυγές από την πλευρά του πειθαρχείου. Δυνατές κραυγές που έσπαγαν τη σιωπή της νύχτας και ύστερα ξανά η ησυχία του στρατοπέδου.
Ακούγονταν διάφορα και είχε φθάσει στα αυτιά μας ή φήμη για έναν αξιωματικό που όταν ήταν επόπτης στρατοπέδου όλοι τον έτρεμαν. Είχα προσέξει ότι όλοι φρόντιζαν να μην έρθουν σε επαφή μαζί του.
Μέχρι πού κάποιο μεσημέρι, εκει πού καθαρίζαμε τις πατάτες για το βραδινό συσσίτιο, ένας φίλος μου το σφυρίζει το μυστικό.
Η άλλη μονάδα του στρατοπέδου μας, ηταν η 30η ΕΜΑ. Ηταν η γνωστή μονάδα που το 1973 είχε έδρα το Γουδί και είχε την ευθύνη για την επέμβαση στο πολυτεχνείο.
Ηταν η μονάδα εκείνη που στις τάξεις της είχε το πλήρωμα και το τεθωρακισμένο Γαλλικό άρμα ΑΜΧ-30 που έκανε την επέμβαση στο πολυτεχνείο τη νύχτα της 17 Νοέμβρη. Και ο Αξιωματικός που τον ετρεμε ολο το στρατόπεδο ηταν ο Μιχάλης Μάλλιος, αδελφός του Αξιωματικου της Αστυνομίας Ευάγγελου Μάλλιου, πού είχε κατηγορηθεί για βασανισμούς κρατουμένων κατα τη διάρκεια της δικτατορίας και βρήκε τραγικό θάνατο από την τρομοκρατική οργάνωση 17 Νοέμβρη.
– Και το άρμα; Το άρμα που έριξε την σιδερένια πόρτα από την πύλη του πολυτεχνείου τι έγινε, ηταν η επόμενη ερώτηση μου.
– Το άρμα αυτό είναι σχεδόν παροπλισμένο. Είναι καλά συντηρημένο αλλά δεν το βγάζουν στις ασκήσεις.
– Θα στο δείξω. Είναι δίπλα στη σκοπιά και κάποια στιγμή θα το φυλάξεις στα σίγουρα μου απάντησε. Κάποια στιγμή θα το μάθεις με το όνομα του. “Φόνισσα” το φωνάζουμε.
– Φονισσα τον ρωτώ απορημένος.
– Ναι φονισσα. Για να ξεχωρίζει από τα άλλα.
Φονισσα λοιπόν ηταν το παρατσούκλι που είχαν δώσει οι μαυροσκουφηδες του Έβρου στο άρμα του Πολυτεχνείου. Πολυ αργότερα διάβασα ότι του είχαν δώσει και το παρατσούκλι “μορφωμένος” επειδή ήταν το μοναδικό άρμα που είχε μπει σε ΑΕΙ.
– Και το πλήρωμα, τι έγινε το πλήρωμα συνέχισα.
– Αυτή είναι μια μεγάλη ιστορία. Την βραδιά εκείνη που δεν συμπεριλαμβάνεται στο ημερολόγιο του άρματος, μέλη του πληρώματος ηταν οι: Κωνσταντέλλος που είναι ακόμα στη μονάδα ο Γουνελάς που απετάχθη και ο Σκευοφύλαξ 105 σειρά που απολύθηκε πριν λίγους μήνες.
Ετσι τελείωσαν και οι πατάτες και καταλαβαίνετε την περιέργεια μου να δω από κοντά την “Φόνισσα”.
Δεν άργησε να έρθει αυτή η ώρα. Το γνώρισα αυτό το άρμα και μάλιστα το γνώρισα πολύ καλά.
Μού το έλεγαν διάφοροι φίλοι μου, που είχαν υπηρετήσει στον Έβρο αλλα δεν τούς πίστευα. Τους έλεγα ότι υπερβάλλουν. Έλα όμως που είχαν δίκιο!!
Μου έλεγαν για το φοβερό κρύο του χειμώνα. Αυτό το γνώριζα. Αυτό όμως που δεν καταλάβαινα ηταν η τρομερή ένταση των ανέμων. Κυριολεκτικά οταν έπιαναν οι δυνατοί άνεμοι, σε έπαιρνε και σε σήκωνε.
Επιτέλους έφτασε η ώρα.
Οι βάρδιες βγήκαν και το αποψινό μου νούμερο ήταν από τις 4 έως τις 7 το πρωί. Συνηθισμένα πράγματα δηλαδή. Τίποτα το ιδιαίτερο.
Αυτό όμως που απόψε ξεχώριζε απο τις άλλες βραδιές ήταν οι καιρικές συνθήκες και η θέση της σκοπιάς. Απόψε θα φύλαγα σκοπιά το άρμα του Πολυτεχνείου και θα ήταν η πρώτη μου φορά.
Τώρα όσον αφορά το κρύο θα το ξεπερνούσα. ΕΙχα φορέσει τα αληθινά ζεστά ρούχα του στρατού, ειχα τυλίξει το σώμα μου και τα πόδια μου με εφημερίδες, έριξα στην πλάτη μου την τρίχινη κάπα και με συνοδο τον Δεκανέα αλλαγής πήρα την θέση του σκοπού.
Είχα εφοδιαστεί με σταφίδες και γνώριζα ότι σε τακτά χρονικά διαστήματα θα μας μοίραζαν και κονιάκ. Άλλωστε ηταν τακτικές οι επισκέψεις και του Αξιωματικού εφόδου και της περιπόλου.
Αυτο ήταν λοιπόν το τανκ πού έπεσε στην σιδερένια πόρτα του Πολυτεχνείου.
Ένα τανκ σαν ολα τα άλλα του ορχου.Το βρήκα, το ακούμπησα και ηταν ψυχρό, άψυχο, χωρίς μνήμες. Δεν είχε τίποτα που να θυμίζει τις τραγικές στιγμές εκείνης της νύχτας. Και ηταν παγωμένο σαν το διαβολόκρυο που έκανε στον όρχο οχημάτων και αρμάτων.
Το άρμα που τόσος κόσμος το μίσησε, εγώ, κρατούσα σκοπιά για να το …προστατεύω…
Μέχρι που ένας απίστευτα δυνατός άνεμος, κυριολεκτικά με σήκωσε από το έδαφος. Έντρομος αρπάχτηκα από τις ερπύστριες για να μην με πετάξει ο αγέρας χάμω. Κρατήθηκα μέχρι να ηρεμήσει κάπως ο αγέρας και σιγά σιγά σύρθηκα μέχρι το πίσω μέρος του άρματος για να προστατευθώ.
Τι ειρωνεία!
Το Γαλλικό άρμα ΑΜΧ-30 που 3 χρόνια πρίν περνούσε την Πυλη του Πολυτεχνείου και στο πέρασμα του έφερνε την καταστροφή, απόψε κρατούσα σκοπιά για να το προστατεύσω. Και μου το ανταπέδωσε. Απο τις ερπύστριες του κρατήθηκα για να προφυλακτώ από την μανία του ανέμου.
Είχε περάσει η ώρα και τα πιάτα στο τραπέζι είχαν σχεδόν αδειάσει. Αφηρημένος είχα αδειάσει το μπουκάλι με το κόκκινο κρασί. Ο Περικλής ειχε ακουμπήσει στον πάγκο και άκουγε με προσοχή την ιστορία του τανκ του πολυτεχνείου.
Ηταν έτοιμος όπως πάντα για την παραγγελία του γλυκού η του φρούτου.
Γύρισα προς το μέρος του Νίκου και ήσυχα, ήρεμα, σχεδόν χαμηλόφωνα του λέω:
– Κατάλαβες Νικο γιατί είμαι σίγουρος ότι το άρμα που έκανε την επέμβαση στο Πολυτεχνείο “η Φόνισσα” ηταν το Γαλλικό AMX-30;;
– Κατάλαβα Γιάννη…
*Ο Ιωάννης Ρεβύθης είναι δημοσιογραφος. Το κείμενο δημοσιεύτηκε στη σελίδα του στο facebook.

The Larger Geopolitical Shift Behind Iran’s Drone Sales to Russia

0

Source: Getty
Summary:  It’s an indication of major fractures, as emerging states leverage digital technology and sophisticated weaponry to compete for influence and power.

The images that have emerged from Ukraine’s urban centers over the past week are stark. Lethal Iranian Shahed-136 drones, nicknamed “lawn mowers” or “mopeds” due to their incessant buzzing sound, have rained destruction on the country’s power grids and electricity substations, water pipelines, rail lines, dams, and other critical infrastructure. Air raid sirens have returned to its cities—a glaring reminder of the early days of the war. Experts estimate that Russia has ordered 1,700 Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of different types to conduct attacks against Ukrainian special forces, military units, air defense, and fuel storage depots.

An important objective for Moscow is psychological—to spread fear and intimidation that will undercut Ukrainian morale and compel the government into submission—and the mental effect of the drones has been unnerving. Information operations are a key component of modern warfare, and Moscow knows that when it comes to shaping narratives about the war, it has been on the losing end. Russia intends for the kamikaze drones to shift the narrative, yet the psychological impact of the drone campaign is likely to be low. While the strikes will bring significant suffering, harm, and corresponding violations of international humanitarian law, they may perversely strengthen Ukrainian resolve. Historically, punishment strategies tend to fail: for example, rather than bring about surrender, the 1940–1941 Blitz in London galvanized the British public to make sacrifices for victory.

However, if the benefits of the drone campaign are dubious for Russia, the same cannot be said for Iran, the supplier of the drones. Iran’s entry into the conflict—similar to Turkey’s supply of TB2 drones to Ukraine’s military—signifies a more meaningful geopolitical shift. In the past decade, drone technology has advanced at a rapid clip, with emerging powers such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the UAE at the forefront. As the technology used for drones has become more cost-effective and accessible, an array of ambitious actors have been able to enter the market—bringing both profits and geopolitical returns.

IRAN’S COMPLEMENTARY INTERESTS

Two factors help explain Iran’s export of drones to Russia: Moscow’s need for a cheap, expendable unmanned system to target Ukrainian infrastructure, and Iran’s strategic interest in upending the U.S.-led world order and enhancing its geopolitical influence.

For Moscow, an important selling point for Iran’s drones is their low cost. The Shahed-186, for example, features a distinctive triangular wing and operates autonomously. It carries a warhead of around 80 pounds that is designed to explode on impact. These single-use units cost a mere $20,000. In contrast, Russia’s Kalibr cruise missiles, used widely by Moscow in the war, cost $1 million each. (Turkey’s TB2 drones, used by the Ukrainian side, come with a price tag of $1 million to $2 million per unit—before factoring in “platform” costs for portable command stations and communications terminals, which can cost in the tens of millions of dollars.) Despite its cheap cost, the Shahed retains important capabilities, including the ability to evade radar detection and to operate at a range of up to 1,500 miles. By comparison, U.S.-supplied single-use Switchblade drones only operate in the range of 25 miles.

Moreover, Iranian drones fill a production need for Moscow. Russia has lagged when it comes to prioritizing drone development. Manufacturers such as the Kronstadt Group have several models that should eventually carry large payloads and incorporate advanced features such as satellite communications capabilities for longer range—but they are still far from production. The UAVs Russia currently produces, such as the ZALA/Kalashnikov KUB loitering munition, have short ranges and small warheads that make them inferior to similar Iranian options. In the short term, Iranian drones are playing a critical stopgap until the Kremlin can shore up its domestic UAV manufacturing. But whether Moscow will obtain sufficient capacity to produce drones at scale is unclear, given the bite of sanctions and their disruption of Russia’s supply chains, so Iran’s drones likely will occupy a key role in Russia’s military strategy for the foreseeable future.

For Iran, the benefits of placing its drones in Russia’s hands are significant. Iran first began to develop drone technology in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War, and it has nurtured an advanced industry of both surveillance and attack vehicles, despite having to deal with major sanctions to its military and missile programs. Yet it has only had limited success selling its weapons to a handful of states, such as Ethiopia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Venezuela. The deployment of the Shahed and Mohajer drones have given Iran an important propaganda opportunity. As international attention has turned to Russia’s latest aerial assault, Iran’s armaments have accrued valuable attention and potential future clients, particularly from rogue regimes and sanctioned states that face difficulties in acquiring these weapons. Its linkage to the Russian campaign provides an important legitimizing effect and may help move Tehran’s weapons industry toward a more prominent role as a major arms exporter. Most importantly, Iran sees in Ukraine an opportunity to push back against U.S. interests and to bleed an American ally that has made unexpected gains in recent months.

To that end, Iran has been eager to facilitate Russian use of the UAVs. It has reportedly sent trainers and tactical advisers from the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a branch of the Iranian military, to Crimea to assist with mechanical problems and facilitate drone launchings. Social media outlets linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps have even posted videos of the drone attacks in Kyiv, perhaps to underline the prowess of its weapons system.

TURKEY’S DRONE DIPLOMACY

Turkey’s success in developing a robust drone export program is instructive for Iran. Ten years ago, Turkey relied predominantly on foreign-made drones from the United States and Israel. But in the early 2010s, in response to a growing reluctance by U.S. lawmakers to continue selling drones to Ankara, as well as deteriorating relations with Israel, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a push to develop domestic capacity to produce UAVs and related defense industry products. The start-up cycle was rocky (the first prototype in 2010 reportedly crashed after fifteen minutes in flight), but by 2015, Baykar Technologies oversaw its first tests of precision-strike capabilities for its new TB2 model. Subsequently, Turkey’s drone companies achieved a series of milestones: developing the ability to carry out satellite-controlled airstrikes, completing the first flight using a domestically produced engine, and continuously flying drones for more than twenty-four hours.

Turkey quickly ushered its drones into combat. Since 2019, Ankara has carried out a punishing campaign of drone strikes against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Syria and Iraq and has reportedly also used drones to conduct aerial raids against groups fighting for Kurdish causes in at least eleven provinces in the southeast of the country. But Turkey’s ambitions for its drones extend beyond fighting these organizations. In Libya, autonomous loitering drones from the Turkish manufacturer STM drove back forces under Libyan National Army leader General Khalifa Haftar in 2020. That same year, Azerbaijan forces used Turkish TB2 drones against Armenian vehicles and troops—footage that was then displayed on digital billboards in Baku. In 2021 in Ethiopia, Tigray insurgent forces had successfully routed the Ethiopian National Army to within 100 miles of Addis Ababa when drone strikes from foreign UAVs pushed the Tigrayan army back to their home province. While Turkish drones were not singly responsible for the battlefield reversal, Erdoğan had pointedly aligned himself with Ethiopia’s government, signing a military pact in 2021 and boasting that “even in Africa, everywhere I go, they want UAVs.”

Turkey’s march to expand its geopolitical influence via drone technology has been deliberate. Erdoğan has marketed drones to a broad range of countries, including states that have encountered obstacles in obtaining UAVs from Western suppliers due to export restrictions. A goal of Turkey’s so-called drone diplomacy is to broaden political, military, and economic ties that will benefit Turkey and allow it to boost regional and global connections. Turkey’s government has unsurprisingly invested millions of dollars to support the continued development of Baykar’s TB2 drone; in 2019, Turkey reportedly committed $105 million worth of additional funding to Baykar. Moreover, the ties between Erdoğan and Bayraktar run deep: In May 2016, Baykar’s founder married the president’s youngest daughter and has become an “outspoken defender” of his father-in-law’s government.

A WIDER EXPANSION

The moves by Turkey and Iran to secure new markets for their drone technology and obtain commensurate geopolitical benefits belie a growing trend. In just five years, the number of countries manufacturing and exporting UAVs has exploded: in 2017, nine countries were developing or manufacturing twenty-six models of loitering munitions; more than 100 models are in development or production in at least twenty-four countries today.

The implications of this expansion are unsettling. In part, it is an indication of larger geopolitical fractures, as emerging states leverage digital technology and sophisticated weaponry to compete for influence and power. Many of the new entrants pay scant regard to liberal norms or international humanitarian law. While manufacturers from the United States, Europe, and other democracies must contend with regulatory restrictions that limit which government clients they can sell to, Turkey faces fewer constraints, and Iran faces none at all. As a result, civilian casualties linked to drones are increasing precipitously. In Ethiopia, UN officials allege that the military has employed drone attacks with “wide-area effects in populated areas,” including a drone strike on a camp for internally displaced persons. In Ukraine, Russia’s deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, have raised charges of war crimes.

The proliferation of drones will bring more incidents of civilian harm and violations of humanitarian law, particularly from regimes that have little regard for human rights or the norms of war. The latest attacks in Ukraine illustrate how lower-cost, mass-produced drones can function as an important lever for advancing an exporting country’s geopolitical ambitions.

Steven Feldstein
Steven Feldstein is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, where he focuses on issues of democracy and technology, human rights, and U.S. foreign policy.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Carnegie

China Is Playing by Turkey’s Media Rules

0

Source: Getty
Summary:  Turkey has few explicitly pro-China voices. In response, the Chinese regime has opted for soft power strategies that leverage Turkish political players and seek a synergy with local media actors.

PREFACE

China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.

With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular.

Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.

Evan A. Feigenbaum

Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

SUMMARY

Chinese players have localized their strategies to improve China’s image in Turkey in recent years. Although China and Turkey have long maintained friendly relations at the official level, Turkish people remained notably skeptical of China throughout the 2000s. Indeed, Turkey’s unfavorable public opinion has been a constant headache for China, whose propaganda outlets in the country produce little Turkish language content that actually resonates with domestic audiences. Turkey also has few explicitly pro-China voices and no sizable overseas Chinese community, which has made positive public relations into an uphill battle for Beijing.

But having acknowledged these weaknesses in recent years, the Chinese regime has opted for strategies that aim at building a new synergy with local actors in the Turkish mediasphere.

Beijing has adapted to the local rules of Turkish media and sought new opportunities to elevate China’s image in Turkey by leveraging its friendly ties with Ankara. The Turkish government, which exerts substantial influence over domestic media, has provided new platforms for China to realize its soft power goals within a largely polarized setting with little press freedom. In this context, Turkey’s progovernment newspapers have published “advertorials” celebrating the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party. Similarly, journalists from Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency have participated in Chinese-sponsored press tours to Xinjiang, where Beijing has sought to undercut the Turkish narrative around abuses against the Uyghurs. On the other end of Turkey’s polarized ideological spectrum, China has also appealed to left-wing opposition groups through its narratives, which emphasize the country’s anti-imperialist credentials. Such messaging strategies may already have produced some results in Turkey, as the most recent opinion polls reflect a gradual increase in the number of Turkish citizens who perceive China as a potential partner.

INTRODUCTION

Much of the story of Sino-Turkish relations has a familiar ring. A developing country—in this case, Turkey—comes to acknowledge China’s rise, develops relations with it, seeks to leverage opportunities such as investment, and even joins newly established international organizations sponsored by Beijing. Like many other countries, Turkey’s engagement with China is driven primarily by economic pragmatism, but geopolitics has also become important in recent years.

Çağdaş Üngör
Çağdaş Üngör teaches at Marmara University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations in Istanbul. Üngör received her Ph.D. degree from the State University of New York at Binghamton, with a dissertation examining China’s external propaganda activities during the Maoist decades. Üngör contributes to various Turkish journals and newspapers on China-related topics and Sino-Turkish relations. Her academic publications include the edited volumes Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013, with Cangül Örnek) and New Horizons in Asia-Pacific Studies (Asya Pasifik Çalışmalarında Yeni Ufuklar, Küre Yayınları, 2020).

Ever since Ankara signed a strategic partnership treaty with China in 2010, Turkish officials have been eager to facilitate interactions with Asia’s largest economy.1 Turkey’s principal motivation is to attract investment dollars from China to stimulate the Turkish economy, including through Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, joined by Turkey two years later. Securing Chinese funding for its controversial Canal Istanbul project remains a particularly important goal for the Turkish government.2 Likewise, China-Turkey financial transactions, including currency swap deals,3 are crucially important for Ankara to alleviate the worst outcomes of its ongoing economic crisis.

But economic pragmatism is only part of the story. Turkish officials have also come to view Beijing as a useful geopolitical hedge against Western pressure. Although Turkey has long been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a candidate for the European Union (EU), the last decade has witnessed growing skepticism in the country toward the West under the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The transatlantic West is constantly attacked in the Turkish media as an antagonist to Ankara on various issues, ranging from the Syrian civil war to the dispute over eastern Mediterannean Sea reserves. Turkey’s anti-Western stance has redoubled since the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, an event that Turkey’s ruling elites have largely come to understand as a U.S.-sponsored plot. At the same time, Russia and China have increasingly gained respect in Turkey, not least because Moscow and Beijing parted with the West by throwing their explicit support behind Erdoğan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP).4

In a broad sense, Ankara favorably views China’s potential to check U.S. power—and to leverage that new balance in Turkey’s interest. In 2013 and 2016, Erdoğan expressed Turkey’s willingness to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,5 a security organization that is often dubbed in global media as a “rival to NATO.”6 In recent years, Sino-Turkish cooperation has expanded into areas that reflect more than the economic and commercial basis of their bilateral relationship—most notably, media and public opinion,7 judicial matters,8 and policing.9 Likewise, during the COVID-19 crisis, the Turkish government elected to buy a China-made vaccine, a step that was interpreted at home and abroad as a further sign of Ankara’s Eurasianist (or Avrasyacı) leanings. To enable this broadened collaboration, Turkey has toned down its previous criticisms of the human rights situation in China’s autonomous Xinjiang region, even as the plight of Turkic-speaking ethnic Uyghurs has deteriorated after the introduction of detention centers in 2017.

But it has not been easy to transfer the favorable state of official Sino-Turkish ties into the public opinion sphere. While many mass publics across the Middle East have embraced China as a friendly country, Turkish people remain notably skeptical of China for a complex set of reasons. In fact, the unfavorable media coverage on China-related matters in Turkey has been a constant headache for Beijing.10 In the COVID-19 vaccine case, for example, intense debate raged among the Turkish public over the decision to buy a Chinese vaccine instead of a Western-produced mRNA vaccine.11 Concerns over the quality and efficacy of Sinovac demonstrated that the weakest link in Sino-Turkish relations remains the unfavorable opinion of China among the Turkish public writ large.

To combat anti-China sentiment, Beijing has prioritized media engagement to influence Turkish public opinion. But Chinese propaganda has proven weak in the Turkish context, and the absence of explicitly pro-China voices in Turkey has not made engagement any easier for the Chinese regime. Today, there is really only one organized and politically salient source of support for China in Turkey—the Patriotic Party (Vatan Partisi), a left-wing party that is broadly against NATO and the United States and in support of Moscow and Beijing.

This paper explores how Beijing and its proxies have sought to alter this state of affairs through a more localized strategy. By adapting to the local rules of Turkish media and seeking new opportunities to elevate China’s image, Beijing has sought to establish a new synergy in Turkey’s public sphere. Promoting a synergy with local players has begun to pay dividends as most recent Turkish opinion polls reflect a gradual increase in the number of Turkish citizens who perceive China as a potential partner.12

China has developed better access to Turkey’s conventional media primarily by leveraging its favorable ties to the Turkish government, which has undue influence in Turkey’s domestic media sphere. Casting Chinese narratives in a better light in Turkey also serves Ankara’s best interests because some of the Sino-Turkish cooperation schemes facilitated by the governing People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) face bitter domestic criticism. The convergence between the interests of the Turkish ruling elite and China to improve the country’s image in Turkey has created more opportunities for the Chinese diplomatic corps to appear on Turkish TV. Published “advertorials”—publicity pieces masquerading as news or opinion items—in Turkey’s progovernment newspapers celebrate the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Similarly, journalists from Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency have participated in Chinese-sponsored press tours to Xinjiang, where Beijing has sought to undercut the Turkish narrative around abuses against the Uyghurs.

But leaning on the Turkish government is just one piece of a broadened and localized Chinese media strategy. At the other end of Turkey’s polarized political spectrum, Chinese narratives also appeal to the country’s left-wing intellectuals thanks to China’s ideological credentials. Unlike the Turkish government, which views China more from a pragmatic lens, some segments in Turkey’s secular opposition embrace China for its anti-U.S. and anti-imperialist rhetoric. Leveraging localization strategies to court this group presents a unique opportunity for China to capture all elements of the Turkish media spectrum. And Beijing is working toward this goal as a hedge against possible political sea change, which could come after Turkey holds general elections in June 2023.

The next sections of this paper explore the roots of the Turkish public’s skepticism toward China and Chinese messaging, the localized Turkish media landscape, and Beijing’s strategy of alleviating anti-Chinese sentiment through Turkish-language programming and messaging aimed at a specifically Turkish audience.

CHINA’S PUBLIC RELATIONS HEADACHE IN TURKEY

China’s double-digit economic growth in the decades following Deng Xiaoping’s shift in 1978 to policies of reform and opening up has been attractive to many around the world—including parts of the Turkish public. Not surprisingly, the CCP has worked hard to leverage this economic success in an effort to improve Beijing’s image abroad. Xi Jinping, who rose to power in 2012, has put an even greater emphasis on “telling China’s story well.”13 China’s soft-power tool kit today includes conventional and digital media, the use of cultural institutions for exchanges, diplomatic platforms, and the public relations effects of huge-scale investment projects such as the BRI.14 Most of the soft-power tools China employs to win hearts and minds across the world are also relevant in the Turkish context, whether it is a Confucius Institute—a Communist Party–sponsored educational exchange platform—or the local branch of China Radio International.

Particular weaknesses, however, have kneecapped China’s propaganda establishment from achieving its desired results in Turkey, despite favorable Sino-Turkish relations at the official level. First and foremost, the Turkish public’s negative perception of China has created an unfavorable media environment, which poses high hurdles to Chinese messaging. Indeed, Turkish public opinion polls suggest that neither China’s miraculous economic growth nor its public diplomacy initiatives have substantially improved the country’s image in Turkey in recent decades. To the contrary, Pew Research Center polls conducted in Turkey from 2005 to 2019 found that at least 60 percent of the Turkish public has remained skeptical of China.15 An August 2020 survey conducted by Istanbul Ekonomi Araştırma stated that 61.3 percent of the Turkish public views China either “unfavorably” or “very unfavorably,” as opposed to just 10.6 percent that considers it a friendly country.16 More recently, a survey conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies at Istanbul’s Kadir Has University concluded that only 27 percent of the Turkish public views China positively.17

This rampant hostility begs greater scrutiny. Given that Turkey and China had minimal interactions for most of the twentieth century, why is the Turkish public so disproportionately adverse to China? The roots and dynamics of anti-China sentiment among Turks are underexplored in scholarly studies. But it is clear that a number of factors are, in a loose sense, helping to drive this negativity.18 One is the impact of nationalist historiography in Turkey. Another is the historical legacy of the Cold War, when China and Turkey stood at the opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. A third involves popular cultural stereotypes in Turkey surrounding China. A fourth involves the Xinjiang issue, due to sympathy among Turks for Turkic-speaking Uyghurs.19

Unlike in many Western countries, China’s one-party rule and authoritarian politics are not a matter of substantial debate in Turkey, which itself has had a rather troubled democratic experience since the early twentieth century. Xinjiang (more commonly known in Turkey as East Turkistan, or Doğu Türkistan) is the only significant political issue related to China that has been on the Turkish public agenda. The plight of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang has been a sensitive issue for decades in Turkey, both among Muslim conservatives and secular Turkish nationalists. Whereas Turkish nationalists emphasize the Uyghurs’ Turkic identity, Islamic groups often take issue with the restrictions over Uyghurs’ religious freedoms in China. This sensitivity had reached its zenith in 2009, when Erdoğan, then serving as Turkey’s prime minister, referred to violence in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi as being “almost a genocide,” causing a diplomatic crisis between Ankara and Beijing.20

Although Ankara has kept a low profile on the East Turkistan question since then, Xinjiang continues to receive substantial media attention in Turkey and the issue still causes occasional Sino-Turkish crises. In 2015, street demonstrations in Istanbul over the Xinjiang issue allegedly resulted in an ultranationalist mob assaulting a group of South Korean tourists, who were mistaken by the mob as Chinese.21 In 2021, another crisis erupted when Meral Akşener, leader of the nationalist Good Party (İyi Parti), and Ankara’s nationalist mayor Mansur Yavaş used their social media accounts to commemorate the Baren Township Massacre, an April 1990 conflict between Uyghurs and Chinese government forces.22 After the Chinese Embassy in Ankara responded contentiously on Twitter,23 the Chinese ambassador was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The incident caused a social uproar in Turkey, although it did not inflict lasting damage on official ties.

These notions of pan-Turkic ethnic solidarity anchored by shared Islamic faith help to explain the Turkish public’s sensitivity over the Xinjiang issue. They are also crucial to understand the anti-China sentiment at large in Turkey. Turkish historiography in the early republican period, which places a particular emphasis on Turks’ secular roots in premodern Central Asia,24 is a key ingredient in shaping popular views of China in Turkey. Turkish history textbooks often place emphasis on the clashes between nomadic Turkic tribes and the sedentary Chinese civilization.25 Sinologists in Turkey refer to the Great Wall of China as a political, if not a military, barrier between the Chinese and Turks, alongside Mongols and Huns.26 The conviction that China built this wall against “Turks” is embraced today even at the top echelons of Turkey’s right-wing political parties.27

These ideas have their offshoots in popular culture. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Turkish movie industry produced several works, most prominently the Tarkan and Karaoğlan series, that capitalized on the idea of China as an ancient enemy.28 Anti-China sentiment in Turkey also emanates from literary fiction in the same historical vein, which can be traced back to the writings of ultranationalist intellectual Nihal Atsız in the 1940s.29 While his narratives on the so-called golden age of a nomadic Turkish past are not held in high esteem among contemporary Turkish literary circles, they still have their popular adherents today. Recent examples of this genre continue to cast Chinese characters in a negative light.30

An equally important factor in shaping ongoing anti-China sentiment in Turkey is the legacy of the Cold War. Having placed Turkey and China at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, the Cold War became a modern source of enmity between Turkey and China. Soldiers from the two countries even fought briefly, as Turkey sent a brigade to Korea to serve under the UN command between 1950 and 1953. Turkey’s involvement in the Korean War cemented China’s status as an enemy for years thereafter.31 Another source of enmity is China’s atheism, which remain antithetical to the beliefs of many in the Turkish public, whose voting preferences have generally skewed conservative since the 1980s. Beijing’s stance against religion has long been frowned upon by Turkey’s Muslim authors, who use very strong and unequivocal language in their books.32 Turkey’s conservative human rights organizations, likewise, were very critical of restrictions over Uyghurs’ Islamic religious practices until recent years.33 Some Muslim clerics in Turkey even hinted at the possibility that the Chinese may be the so-called yajuc majuc—the tribe that will bring destruction to humanity according to the Quran.34

Whereas nationalist and conservative groups have their distinct repertoire, cultural stereotypes about China are not exclusive to any political group in Turkey.35 China is often presented in the Turkish media as an exotic land with strange or absurd qualities, heightening perceptions that this country is wholly different from Turkey.36 A new study on “sourtimes” (ekşisözlük)—a popular digital platform among urban, educated Turkish youth—demonstrates that China-related entries often end up verging on racist hate speech.37 Pejoratives used to describe Chinese people on this popular platform include “merciless,” “cunning,” “dangerous,” and “untrustworthy.” Even China’s world-renowned cuisine has been a target of criticism, insult, or ridicule in Turkey. During the COVID-19 crisis, degradation of Chinese food became even more commonplace. Turkish media often depicted scenes from animal wet markets in China—the suspected origin of the coronavirus—to define Chinese food more generally.38 One survey conducted by Kadir Has University in April 2020 found that 41.3 percent of Turkish respondents believed that “Chinese eating habits and food preferences” were to blame for the coronavirus pandemic.39 Even progovernment columnists felt free to use deragotary phrases and racist imagery to mock China during this time.40 Another common racist trope is the rampant use of physical characteristics to describe Asian people, including the Chinese, in popular Turkish media. Such terms are used by Turkish journalists or columnists with impunity and without concern for backlash from their readers.41 Physical discrimination against Chinese tourists and residents in Turkey has become more commonplace during the COVID-19 crisis.42

CHINA’S EVOLVING MEDIA STRATEGY

China’s poor image in Turkey has long been a source of concern for Beijing.43 Although the CCP regime worked to overcome these hurdles, its ability to reach Turkish audiences has effectively been limited until recently. In this context, China has worked hard to adapt its strategy, leverage local media, and improve its standing with a deeply skeptical Turkish public. Beijing has been forced to throw out the standard playbook it used in Turkey to conform to the unique local context, seeking to persuade and enlist local actors—from both poles of the Turkish political spectrum—to carry its torch.

CHINA’S LIMITED TURKISH-LANGUAGE PROPAGANDA

China’s global propaganda media today is multifaceted, technologically savvy, and often locally tailored.44 Yet Chinese media offers little Turkish language content, even though most Turks speak only their native tongue.45 China Global Television Network (CGTN), for instance, has broadcasts in English, Arabic, French, Spanish, and Russian but not in Turkish. Although this network’s news content reaches most Middle Eastern countries in Arabic—and is geared toward African audiences46—CGTN does not have a Turkish version.

CGTN is just the beginning of the problem. Turkish language content is also lacking in other Chinese media, including major newspapers such as Global Times, China Daily, and People’s Daily. This leaves just two outlets, the official Xinhua News Agency and China Radio International (CRI), as the only Chinese media that can reach Turkish audiences in their own language.47

These shortcomings in China’s propaganda machine are precisely the reason that Beijing is now assertively developing new strategies to engage with local actors in Turkey. To be sure, Beijing is no newcomer to the game of propaganda and persuasion in Turkey. One of the two Turkish-language Chinese outlets, CRI (originally dubbed Radio Peking), started its Turkish broadcasts in 1957. Its Cold War–era programming reached only a miniscule audience in Turkey due to the highly ideological nature of its content and Turkey’s antagonistic relationship with Mao Zedong’s China.48 Today’s CRI is undoubtedly more entertaining than its Mao-era counterpart, with news and pop music broadcast via Turkey’s FM band as well as digital platforms throughout the country. But this, in itself, does not automatically translate into efficacy—much less popularity. If social media following is an indication of receptivity, Chinese radio’s reach in Turkey pales in comparison to its Western and even Russian counterparts. Based on Twitter data from October 2022, CRI Türkçe (@CRI_Turkish) had just 87,300 followers, compared to BBC News Türkçe’s (@bbcturkce) 4.2 million and Sputnik Türkiye’s (@sputnik_TR) 1 million followers. The Turkish branch of China’s official Xinhua News Agency is even less popular by these indicators, with a mere 11,500 followers as of October 2022 on its official Twitter account (@XHTurkey), compared to 5.3 million people following CNN Türk (@cnnturk).

In the last decade, China has made several attempts to engage domestic actors in the Turkish media field and produce its own Turkey-oriented content locally.49 It is difficult to measure precisely just how successful such attempts have been in terms of penetrating the Turkish audience en masse, but China’s attempts to expand its media network in Turkey in recent years is noteworthy. This was mostly done through the signing of cooperation agreements with local producers. Yön Radyo, which broadcast pro-China news items tailored toward the Turkish audience, is a case in point.50

Other attempts include the establishment of a Turkish branch for the GB Times media company, which took on the responsibility of CRI’s local operation.51 In 2014, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the launch of CTV, a Turkish language TV channel, which was promoted as a “media bridge” between the two countries.52 Despite the publicity, however, this experiment proved to be short lived with only largely obscure digital platforms remaining.53 On the print media front, Beijing’s propaganda magazine China Today launched its trimonthly Turkish version in 2012, thanks to a deal with the progovernment Turkuvaz Media Group.54 Another journal, Modern Silk Road (Modern İpek Yolu), started publication in 2017 under the guidance of the left-wing publication house, Kırmızı Kedi.55

But local language content has not been the only barrier to Chinese messaging. The Turkish context presented other obstacles to China in the realm of soft power. For example, unlike in most Western and Southeast Asian countries, Turkey does not have a sizeable overseas Chinese community, which, in other contexts, may act as a cultural intermediary between the host country and mainland China.56 Based on the Turkish Statistical Institute’s Address Based Population Registration System in 2020, Turkey hosts only 18,740 Chinese residents, a tiny community within the 1.3 million foreigners registered in this database.57 Likewise, none of the Turkish urban centers has a Chinatown area where locals can experience Chinese cultural life firsthand, from Chinese cuisine to calligraphy. Turkey also lacks any well-known public figure, professional role model, or celebrity from an ethnically Chinese background. This is in striking contrast to other East Asian countries that have produced social media phenomena in Turkey, like the Japanese student Yoshi (on Twitter @YoshiEnomoto_) and South Korean actor Chaby Han (on Twitter @chabyhan), who are well-known among the Turkish youth. Even in Israel, as explored in another paper in this series, a figure who calls himself “Chinese Itzik” is cherished as a cultural icon by many Israelis.58

Confucius Institutes in Turkey have not been of much help to Beijing either. Most commonly known for their Mandarin language teaching, these organizations have served a broader purpose of extending Chinese soft power since their advent in 2004. Stretched across some 100 countries today, Confucius Institutes and classrooms are particularly popular in the Global South, including in several Middle Eastern countries.59 Although Turkey has four Confucius Institute branches in Ankara and Istanbul,60 their influence in the public domain remains minimal. Confucius Institutes in Turkey offer Chinese courses at their host universities for degree students as well as the general public. While they occasionally organize academic conferences and other events, their impact is often limited to college campuses in Istanbul and Ankara.61 They do serve an important function in sponsoring native Turkish teachers of Mandarin language and organizing language proficiency exams, yet their role in elevating China’s national image among Turks is quite negligible.

Similar things can be said about China’s diplomatic outposts in Turkey. Their official websites, which only sometimes use the Turkish language for embassy and consulate content, hardly attract readers as a source of information about China.62 Their social media followings lag as a result, indicating that fewer Turks are interested in messages released by China’s embassy in Ankara compared, for instance, to its U.S. counterpart.63

WORKING “À LA TURCA” WITH LOCAL ACTORS

Given the broader backdrop of unfavorable Turkish public opinion on China and the weakness of Beijing’s own propaganda apparatus in Turkey, the CCP regime has been compelled to gradually acknowledge the significance of local actors in Turkey. Beijing has come to understand that elevating China’s image in Turkey will depend mostly on cooperation with local media actors, who—for one reason or another—may share China’s values or agenda. Now, it is leaning on them, rather than on Chinese players, in an attempt to alter this situation.

Until recently, there were very few political and social groups in Turkey receptive to Chinese messaging. The nationalist left-wing politician Doğu Perinçek’s Patriotic Party has historically been the only explicitly pro-China group in the country. Often called by the title of its journal, Aydınlık, this group has its roots in the 1968 student movement and is famous for its previous Maoist orientation. Today, Perinçek is an ardent supporter of Turkey’s Eurasianist foreign policy,64 as well as a defender of Chinese domestic and foreign policies, including controversial stances on the Uyghur issue. Although the Aydınlık group is well known in Turkey—and Perinçek enjoys media attention disproportionate to his small voting base—it is clear that the Patriotic Party’s tiny constituency has been unable to single-handedly sway public opinion on China.65 Having access to newspapers like Hürriyet and Sabah, which have a hundred times more circulation than Aydınlık, is a noteworthy step forward for China.66 In hopes of reaching a wider audience in Turkey, Beijing has adjusted and adapted its strategy—in part by leveraging favorable relations between Chinese and Turkish officials thanks to economic cooperation.

In Turkey, domestic political polarization between the ruling People’s Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) and the coalition of opposition parties, the Nation Alliance (Millet İttifakı), underpins the local mediasphere. In its current state, the Turkish government is able to dictate the editorial line in much of the conventional media through a number of legal, political, and economic tools.67 Not surprisingly, in Reporters Without Borders’ 2022 World Press Freedom Index, Turkey ranked 149 out of 180 countries.68 In such a restrictive media environment, it is much easier for Beijing to leverage its amicable ties with the government and official players in Ankara to improve its soft power prospects in the country.

Whereas Turkey’s ruling government views Western media through a highly critical lens, Chinese news outlets, which appear relatively harmless (if not also obscure), are rarely targeted by conservative and nationalist circles. In 2019, a controversial report examining the local branches of foreign media outlets in Turkey (labeled “appendages” or uzantılar) praised CRI for maintaining its impartial stance on sensitive topics, such as the Kurdish issue or Turkey’s Syria policy.69

China’s new media strategy in Turkey contains multitudes. First and most important, Beijing has stressed business cooperation in its outreach to Ankara. Sino-Turkish economic ties and investment opportunities are a crucial factor in bilateral relations, and they have become central to China-driven media narratives. Influenced by a sympathetic government in Ankara, BRI projects in Turkey, for instance, often receive favorable coverage.70 Progovernment think tanks point to the importance of cooperating with China, particularly over financial assistance and investment opportunities, against the “unilateral, spoiled and patronizing attitude employed by the US.”71 There is a visible attempt to downplay the significance of the Sino-Turkish trade deficit, which stood at $28.5 billion in 2021.72 Whereas Turkish media presented the country’s trade deficit with China as a major problem in the early 2000s, there is a visible attempt to sugarcoat this gap in today’s media.73 Progovernment think tanks explicitly advise against “scapegoating China for flooding the Turkish market with its cheap and low quality goods” and emphasize the positive prospects in relations.74 It is clear that this messaging has evolved alongside Turkey’s own official priorities.

The Chinese private sector also contributes to the positive atmosphere that both Chinese and Turkish government officials hope to cultivate. Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant that is poised to build Turkey’s 5G network in coming years,75 has more followers on its Turkish social media than the Chinese embassy in Ankara.76 Turkey’s official news agency, Anadolu, as well as the state-run Information and Communication Technologies Authority (Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu) both advertise Huawei’s corporate social responsibility projects in Turkey.77 Likewise, Turkey’s Directorate of Communications (İletişim Başkanlığı) under Fahrettin Altun is an important government outlet for facilitating Sino-Turkish exchanges.78 In January 2020, Altun shared a Chinese-language promotional video about Turkey’s Canal Istanbul project from his own social media account.79

Another strategy that Beijing has leaned on more heavily in recent years is the use of local Turkish media outlets to propagate China’s economic achievements and diplomatic goals. The most important challenge in crafting a positive narrative is certainly the Xinjiang issue, which, despite the friendly Sino-Turkish ties, remains a thorny item. Even as Ankara has substantially toned down its criticisms of Chinese policy, which is appreciated by the Chinese side as a policy of “strategic silence,”80 sensitivities on the plight of Uyghur Muslims persist in Turkey. And Beijing is working to improve its own image relating to the Xinjiang issue in Turkey through several new mechanisms.81

In an effort to capitalize on the new atmosphere created by the favorable official ties between Ankara and Beijing, China has invited Turkish outlets on official press tours to Xinjiang, where Beijing attempts to showcase its alternative narrative and obfuscate mistreatment of the Uyghurs. Members of the official Anadolu Agency, progovernment press, and mainstream media organizations joined these visits.82 In 2019, several Turkish journalists were cited in Chinese official media for praising Beijing’s efforts to reduce poverty and safeguard minorities in Xinjiang.83 Columnists from Turkey’s mainstream and government newspapers who participated in these tours wrote several pieces in Turkish. Muharrem Sarıkaya of Habertürk, for instance, wrapped his story on China’s successful counterterrorism measures in Xinjiang around the favorable prospects of Sino-Turkish relations.84 Although this kind of press is not likely to make drastic changes in Turkish public opinion regarding this matter, these journalistic detours from the usual “East Turkistan” narrative in Turkey are still noteworthy.

Another strategy that Beijing has leaned on more heavily in recent years is the use of local Turkish media outlets to propagate Beijing’s economic achievements and diplomatic goals. Major newspapers such as Hürriyet, Sabah, and Cumhuriyet have published several full-page advertorials praising China, making the country a favorite new customer for the commercial side of Turkey’s key media outlets.85 Headlines celebrating the CCP’s anniversary or promoting the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics have also appeared in the Turkish media—spurred, no doubt, by the friendly state of Sino-Turkish official relations. Support from Ankara makes these commercial media deals possible; considering the poor state of Turkey’s relations with the West, an analogous full-page advertorial praising any Western government seems completely unthinkable today.

By paying for advertorials in Turkey’s mainstream, progovernment, and left-wing newspapers, China has been able to access a far vaster audience than the explicitly pro-China Patriotic Party could ever deliver. For example, Beijing used Sabah to praise the CCP’s accomplishments on the party’s one hundredth anniversary,86 which was unprecedented for a progovernment Turkish outlet. Other advertorials have covered topics like the optimistic prospects for Turkish exports to China or the achievements of Chinese technology companies such as Huawei in Turkey.87 This strategy of localization is likely to pay dividends because Turkey’s conservative and nationalist masses have, as noted above, never had much appreciation for China. Paid content in local mainstream media and progovernment outlets offers Beijing a fresh opportunity to reach these audiences. And such advertorials can often appear to ordinary Turkish readers as if they are regular news items.88

The coronavirus pandemic presented another opportunity for Beijing. When Ankara elected to buy China-made Sinovac Biotech vaccines, it prompted a firestorm of controversy, triggered by a general distrust of China-made goods, as well as Sinovac’s delivery problems and poor efficacy ratings.89 Turkey’s progovernment media—understanding that increasing trust in China-made goods would help increase trust in Turkey’s Ministry of Health—took it upon themselves to promote Sinovac’s product at home. Turkey’s government now had another incentive to promote pro-Chinese messaging—and with Ankara on the defensive, Beijing learned to leverage its position to cast China in a better light. This helped China make inroads into Turkey’s mainstream media during a strictly domestic political controversy.

During the COVID-19 crisis, Cui Wei, China’s consul general in Istanbul, frequently appeared on live TV broadcasts and answered pandemic-related questions with his fluent Turkish.90 To a lesser extent, the chargé d’affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Ankara, Cheng Weihua, also appeared on TV to offer his comments on China’s COVID-19 response. A number of mainstream and progovernment Turkish media outlets put a positive spin on China-related news during the pandemic, such as broadcasting news items asking, “How did China stop the coronavirus?”91 One piece published by Turkey’s official Anadolu Agency belittled Western claims of Chinese public health neglect, case underreporting, government repression, and pandemic mismanagement as overly exaggerated.92 Other officially backed stories praised the technological surveillance mechanisms employed in China to curb the spread of the disease—in stark contrast to Western media accounts that often portrayed these methods as dystopian or authoritarian.93

At the other pole of Turkey’s political spectrum, left-leaning opposition groups favorable to China have become more salient during the COVID-19 crisis. These groups, which range from former Maoist and current Eurasianist circles to orthodox Marxists and Kemalist republicans, are attracted to China for its secular state structure, Marxist-Leninist origin, and anti-imperialist discourse. That means they also are more inclined to accept Chinese messaging. During the pandemic, China’s so-called zero-COVID approach appealed most to Turkey’s left-wing intellectuals and journalists, including Gündüz Vassaf, a well-known Turkish writer and academic, whose take on the global pandemic was simply put as: “The East won with society, the West lost with individual.”94

Throughout the spring of 2020, Turkish left-wing media published many pieces praising China’s response to the public health crisis.95 Not surprisingly, Doğu Perinçek and the Aydınlık journal were among the loudest voices—but they were not alone.96 Mehmet Ali Güller, a columnist in Cumhuriyet and the founder of the Kırmızı Kedi publishing house, likewise praised China’s harsh quarantine measures. In one piece, Güller juxtaposed Chinese socialism against Western capitalism—and praised the former for prioritizing people’s health over economic interests while blaming the latter for the enormous death toll in Britain and the United States.97 Turkey’s Marxist media outlet BirGün praised Chinese diplomats on TV for highlighting the “humane” aspect of the health crisis vis-à-vis Turkish journalists who were more interested in death figures.98

Perhaps the most significant sign of camaraderie between China and the Turkish opposition media during the COVID-19 pandemic was a popular meme: “Atatürk paid for it.”99 According to the story, China refused to accept payment for a shipment of 2 million COVID-19 test kits that arrived in March 2020 in order to thank Turkey for the medical aid it sent to China during a 1938 cholera outbreak.100 This phrase—which was based on a falsehood101—spread like wildfire over Turkish social media. Backed by some of Turkey’s well-known journalists and academics, the “Atatürk paid for it” trend became one of the most memorable memes of the pandemic era in Turkey.102 Although not invented or spread by China’s propaganda establishment, this story boosted China’s standing by giving it undue credit while flattering millions of Kemalist-leaning Turks.

LESSONS LEARNED

The last decade has witnessed China’s growing media outreach across the world. There is evidence that this effort created a more favorable public opinion environment for Beijing, particularly in the developing world.103 Although several countries in the Middle East have positive views on China today, Turkish public remained skeptical of China. The weakness of China’s own propaganda outlets, most of which do not produce content in Turkish, contributed to this problem. As a result, the Chinese regime opted for new strategies that sought to engage local actors in Turkey, an approach that today renders the input from the Turkish government and various intellectual circles crucial to realize China’s soft power goals in the country.

The first major lesson coming out of this experience, therefore, demonstrates the significance of local agency, even when there is a huge power asymmetry between China and other actors. Although China had many means and sources at its disposal, its linear and top-down approach did not produce much result in the case of Turkey. The Turkish case shows that Chinese propaganda and public diplomacy work much better when they are assisted by local people and institutions. Chinese narratives, in other words, do not fall on deaf ears only if there is a reason in the local setting to hear them. The most important actor here undoubtedly is the Turkish government, which provided new platforms for China to improve its image in Turkey’s largely polarized media environment with little freedom of press. By leveraging its ties to Ankara, China has gained more ability to ensure favorable treatment in progovernment outlets. Turkey’s ruling People’s Alliance also had a stake here. The debate on the so-called Chinese vaccine demonstrated clearly that the long-term sustainability of Sino-Turkish cooperation requires immediate improvements to China’s image in Turkey.

Given the multifaceted sources of Turkey’s anti-China sentiment, it is clear that these new strategies will not create dramatic change overnight. Neither can they completely eliminate the discontent in Turkey relating to the CCP regime’s grave human rights abuses in the Xinjiang autonomous region. Nevertheless, there is some evidence indicating slow and incremental progress on China’s part, suggesting that Beijing’s localized strategies may have already moved the needle. According to Kadir Has University’s Research on Public Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy survey results, for instance, there was an increase in the number of Turkish people who consider China as a potential partner from 2019 to 2021.104 Turkey also has a more favorable public opinion on China compared to many of its Western allies. A poll conducted by the German Marshall Fund in 2021 demonstrated that 34 percent of Turkish respondents viewed China’s “influence in global affairs” either positively or very positively.105 Likewise, Turkey has the lowest score among a group of transatlantic countries in its support for tougher policies on China, in a number of topics ranging from climate to cybersecurity to human rights to trade.106

A final lesson learned from the Chinese experience in Turkey is, perhaps paradoxically, one about the popular impact of anti-American sentiment. In Turkey, although the regular Chinese soft power toolbox—its official media, traditional cuisine, or Confucius Institutes—does not raise much interest, China’s promise to balance U.S. power is attractive to many. While Turkey’s anti-China sentiment is deep and multifaceted, the Turkish public has long embraced an even stronger anti-Americanism that cuts across ideological divisions in the country. If Erdoğan’s government appreciates China due to its own power struggles and diplomatic hurdles with the West, Turkey’s secular opposition admires China because of its anti-imperialist credentials. China’s image in Turkey may be far from ideal, but Beijing is still ranked well below Washington in any public opinion poll about external threat perceptions.107 China’s local appeal, therefore, may have more to do with the country’s global status vis-à-vis the United States in the future rather than its concrete soft power strategies in Turkey.

NOTES

1 Ziya Öniş and Maimaiti Yalikun, “Emerging Partnership in a Post-Western World? The Political Economy of China-Turkey Relations,”Southeast European and Balkan Studies 21, 2021, 507–529, https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2021.1981624.

2 Canal Istanbul is an alternative corridor to the Bosphorus Strait, which connects the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmara. See Sinan Tavşan, “Eyeing Chinese Investment, Turkey Kicks Off Canal Istanbul Project,”Nikkei Asia, June 28, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Eyeing-Chinese-investment-Turkey-kicks-off-Canal-Istanbul-project.

3 Gökhan Ergocun, “Central Banks of Turkey, China Expand Swap Agreement,”Anadolu Agency, June 16, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/central-banks-of-turkey-china-expand-swap-agreement/2275566.

4 Çağdaş Üngör, “Heading Towards the East? Sino-Turkish Relations After the July 15 Coup Attempt,” in Emre Erşen and Seçkin Köstem (eds.),Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order (New York: Routledge, 2019), 64–78.

5 Lina Wang, “Will Turkey Join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Instead of the EU?,” Diplomat, November 24, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/11/will-turkey-join-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization-instead-of-the-eu; and Nazlan Ertan, “Why Erdogan’s Shanghai Ambitions Are Risky Business,”Al-Monitor, September 20, 2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/09/why-erdogans-shanghai-ambitions-are-risky-business.

6 Richard Weitz, “China-Russia’s anti-NATO?,” Diplomat, July 4, 2012, https://thediplomat.com/2012/07/is-the-shanghai-cooperation-org-stuck-in-neutral, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Marie Dumoulin, Ellie Geranmayeh, and Janka Oertel, “Rogue NATO: The New Face of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 16, 2022, https://ecfr.eu/article/rogue-nato-the-new-face-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation.

7 Turkey and China signed an agreement to fight disinformation and propaganda together. See Havva Kara Aydın, “Turkey, China to Fight Propaganda,” Anadolu Agency, November 6, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turkey-china-to-fight-propaganda/1637729.

8 Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti 2018 Yılı Türk Hakimler Semineri (People’s Republic of China seminar of Turkish judges in the Year 2018), Hakimler ve Savcılar Kurulu (Council of Judges and Prosecutors), https://www.hsk.gov.tr/cin-halk-cumhuriyeti-2018-yili-turk-h-kimler-semineri.

9 Türkiye Polis Akademisi ve Çin Ulusal Polis Üniversitesi arasında İşbirliği Anlaşması İmza Töreni (Signing ceremony of the cooperation agreement between Turkish Police Academy and the National Police University of China), Turkish National Police Academy, July 31, 2018, https://www.pa.edu.tr/turkiye-polis-akademisi-ve-cin-ulusal-polis-universitesi-arasinda-isbirligi-anlasmasi-imza-toreni-haberler.html.

10 See Yang Chen, “Developments in China–Turkey Relations: A View From China,”Critical Sociology, 2019, 6, https://doi.org/10.1177/0896920519885001.

11 Çağdaş Üngör, “The ‘Chinese Vaccine’ and Its Discontents: Turkey’s Public Debate on Sinovac During the COVID Crisis,” Middle East Institute, September 6, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/chinese-vaccine-and-turkeys-public-debate.

12 See, for instance, the linear rise in the number of surveyors who view China as a country that Turkey should cooperate with. In 2018, only 4.8 percent believed that Turkey should increase its cooperation with China. This percentage rose to 10.4 in 2019, 11.8 in 2020, and 23.0 in 2021. See Mustafa Aydın et al., Türk Dış politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması-2021 (Research on public perceptions of Turkish foreign policy-2021), Türkiye Çalışmaları Grubu, Kadir Has University, June 15, 2021, 42, https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/TDPA2021_KHAS_WEBRAPOR-BASIN_08062021.pdf.

13 Renee Di Resta, Carly Miller, Vanessa Molter, John Pomfret, and Glenn Tiffert, “Telling China’s Story: The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign to Shape Global Narratives,” Stanford Internet Observatory Cyber Policy Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, and Hoover Institution, 2020, https://fsi.stanford.edu/publication/telling-chinas-story.

14 Seng In Chan and Weiqing Song, “Telling the China Story Well: A Discursive Approach to the Analysis of Chinese Foreign Policy in the “Belt and Road” Initiative,”Chinese Political Science Review 5 (2020): 417–437, https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-020-00146-1.

15 See “Global Indicators Database, Turkey: Opinion of China,” Pew Research Center, accessed October 23, 2022, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/24/country/TR.

16 See “Toplumun Çin’e Bakışı” (Society’s view toward China), Türkiye Raporu, August 31, 2020, https://turkiyeraporu.com/arastirma/toplumun-cine-bakis-acisi-1882.

17 See “Türkiye’nin Dostu olan Ülkeler” (Countries which are Friendly to Turkey) in Mustafa Aydın et al., Türk Dış Politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması-2021 (Public Perceptions on Turkish Foreign Policy Survey-2021).

18 See Çağdaş Üngör, “Türkiye’de Çin Karşıtlığının Dinamikleri Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler” (A few thoughts on the dynamics of anti-Chinese sentiment in Turkey), Türkiye 2. Çin Çalışmaları Konferansı, April 17, 2017, Ankara.

19 Ibid.

20 Although the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to soften the situation by declaring that the Turkish government “had no intention of interfering with China’s domestic affairs,” Erdoğan’s remarks did not go unnoticed in China. See “Erdoğan: Adeta bir Soykırım” (Almost a genocide), Milliyet, July 11, 2009, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/erdogan-adeta-bir-soykirim-1116463; and Yitzhak Shichor, “Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations,” Policy Studies 53, East West Center, 2009.

21 “Çinli sanıp Korelilere saldırdılar” (They attacked Koreans, assuming they are Chinese), Hürriyet, July 5, 2015, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/cinli-sanip-korelilere-saldirdilar-29460272; Selin Girit, “China-Turkey Relationship Strained Over Uighurs,”BBC News, July 9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-33440998; Barbara Tasch, “Anti-China Sentiment Is Suddenly Sweeping Over Turkey,” Business Insider, July 21, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/china-turkey-uighurs-2015-7.

22 “Çin’den Meral Akşener ve Mansur Yavaş’a tepki” (China’s reaction to Meral Akşener and Mansur Yavaş), Sözcü, April 6, 2021, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/dunya/cinden-meral-aksener-ve-mansur-yavasa-tepki-6357244; İlkay Güder, “Çin’in Ankara büyükelçisi Liu, Dışişleri Bakanlığına çağrıldı” (Liu, China’s ambassador in Ankara summoned to the Foreign Ministry), Anadolu Ajansı,April 6, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/cinin-ankara-buyukelcisi-liu-disisleri-bakanligina-cagrildi/2200102.

23 The original text of the tweet employed very strong language (in Turkish) condemning any effort aimed at compromising China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Chinese Embassy’s Twitter account tagged Meral Akşener and Mensur Yavaş in person and mentioned China’s right to retailate. See Chinese Embassy (@ChinaEmbTurkiye), “Çin tarafı, herhangi bir kişi veya gücün Çin’in egemenliğine ve toprak bütünlüğüne herhangi bir şekilde meydan okumasına kararlılıkla karşı çıkmakta ve bunu şiddetle kınamaktadır. . . .,” Twitter, April 6, 2021, 6:26 a.m., https://twitter.com/ChinaEmbTurkey/status/1379379955042242562.

24 Fatih Yazıcı and Tercan Yıldırım, “History Teaching as a Nation-building Tool in the Early Republican Period in Turkey (1923–1938),” Paedagogica Historica 54, no. 4, 2018, 442–443, https://doi.org/10.1080/00309230.2017.1423363.

25 Sinan Ateş, Ayhan İncirli, Oğuzhan Karadeniz, and Mustafa Kapucubaşı, “Sosyal Bilgiler Ders Kitaplarında Eski Türkler: Türkiye ve Türkmenistan” (Ancient Turks in social science textbooks: Turkey and Turkmenistan), Uluslararası Sosyal Bilgilerde Yeni Yaklaşımlar Dergisi, 2018, 2(1), 76.

26 Bülent Okay, “Çin Seddi’nin Yapılış Nedeni Hakkında Değişik bir Görüş” (An alternative view on why the Great Wall of China was built), Belleten 57, no. 218, April 1993, 27­–40.

27 See, for instance, the public statement by Mustafa Destici, the leader of the Great Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi) to “declare war on China if necessary” in order to resolve the “East Turkistan” issue. See “Mustafa Destici: Gerekirse Çin’e savaş açarız” (Mustafa Destici: We will declare war on China if necessary), T24, February 25, 2021, https://t24.com.tr/haber/mustafa-destici-gerekirse-cin-e-savas-acariz,935367. Also see the statement of Muharrem Varlı, a member of Parliament from the far right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), expressing his hopes to build another Great Wall between Turks and Chinese in the future. “İnşallah, Türk Milleti Çin’e yeniden bir Çin Seddi yaptırmayı Allah nasip edecektir,” posted by Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, from TBMM TV, December 19, 2019, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7cFl0V2mMvE.

28 Dilek Çakır, “Contextual Analysis of Nationalism Discourse in Turkish Historical Adventure Movies (1965–1980),” unpublished master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2019, 69.

29 Nihal Atsiz’s Bozkurtların Ölümü (1946) or Bozkurtlar Diriliyor (1949), for instance, focuses on the rise and fall of Göktürk states. See Jacob M. Landau, “Ultra-Nationalist Literature in the Turkish Republic: A Note on the Novels of Hüseyin Nihal Atsız,”Middle Eastern Studies 39, no. 2, April 2003, 204–210.

30 Hasan Erimez is a contemporary author who writes fiction in this genre under the following titles: Demirdağın Kurtları (Wolves of the Iron Mountain) (2015) and Kutlu Kağanlık (Glorious Khanate) (2016). His quite graphic description of Chinese traditions regarding the killing of Turks is noteworthy. See Hasan Erimez, Demirdağın Kurtları (Ötüken Yayınları, 2015), 11, available at https://www.otuken.com.tr/u/otuken/docs/demirkurt.pdf.

31 See Çağdaş Üngör, “Perceptions of China in the Turkish Korean War Narratives,” Turkish Studies 7, no.3, September 2006, 405–420.

32 See, for instance, Emine Şenlikoğlu, Çin İşkencesi (Chinese Torture)(Istanbul: Mektup Yayınları, 2007).

33 “Çin’e terkedilmiş bir kader: “Doğu Türkistan” (A destiny that is left in the hands of China: East Turkistan), İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı (Humanitarian Relief Foundation), September 14, 2009, https://ihh.org.tr/haber/cine-terkedilmis-bir-kader-dogu-turkistan-415.

34 Cevat Akşit, “Cennete Götüren Yollar” (The Paths leading to Heaven), Milli Gazete, March 2, 2017,

http://www.milligazete.com.tr/cennete_goturen_yollar/prof_dr_cevat_aksit/kose_yazisi/33454.

35 Çağdaş Üngör, “Türkiye’de Çin Karşıtlığının Dinamikleri Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler.”

36 For a couple of examples, see “Çin’in garip yüzü” (China’s strange face), Milliyet, August 11, 2012, http://www.milliyet.com.tr/fotogaleri/46125-yasam-cin-in-garip-yuzu/1; “Çin’in tuhaf yarışması” (China’s weird contest), Posta, March 11, 2016, http://www.posta.com.tr/cinin-tuhaf-yarismasi-galerisi-331559-8; and “Çin’de yaşanan garip olaylar” (Strange events in China), Sözcü, July 31, 2015, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/dunya/cinde-yasanan-garip-olaylar-2-897195/?_szc_galeri=1.

37 Çağla Pınar Tunçer, “Sosyal Medya ve Şiddet: Ekşi Sözlük’te Çinli algısı” (Social media and violence: Perceptions of the Chinese on sourtimes), İnsan ve İnsan 7, no. 25, summer 2020, 65–84.

38 For particular examples of the negative coverage on the Chinese cuisine in Turkish media from a wide ideological spectrum, see “Çinli bilim insanlarından corona virüsü açıklaması: Yılanlardan insanlara geçti” (Coronavirus explanation from Chinese scientists: It transmitted from snakes to people), Yeni Şafak, January 24, 2020, https://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/cinli-bilim-insanlarindan-corona-virusu-aciklamasi-corona-virus-nedir-insanlara-nasil-bulasti-3522948; “Ne Bulsa Yiyorlar! İşte Koronavirüsün Yayıldığı Pazar” (They eat whatever they find! Here is the market where coronavirus spread), A Haber, January 28, 2020, https://www.ahaber.com.tr/galeri/dunya/ne-bulsa-yiyorlar-iste-koronavirusun-yayildigi-pazar/6; and “Çin’de Hangi Egzotik ve Vahşi Hayvanlar Yeniyor?” (Which exotic and wild animals are eaten in China?), T24, January 29, 2020, https://t24.com.tr/foto-haber/cin-de-hangi-egzotik-ve-vahsi-hayvanlar-yeniyor,9330/4.

39 Mustafa Aydın, “Kim Korkar Covid-19’dan? Türkiye Kamuoyu Koronavirüs Algıları” (Who is afraid of Covid-19? Coronavirus Perceptions in Turkish Public Opinion), Perspektif, May 23, 2020, https://www.perspektif.online/kim-korkar-covid-19dan-turkiye-kamuoyu-koronavirus-algilari.

40 See, for instance, the articles written by Mehmet Barlas, a government pundit writing for the daily newspaper, Sabah: “Yemek yazarlarımız Çinli olmadıkları için çok şanslılar” (Our food writers are very lucky that they are not Chinese), Sabah, February 2, 2020, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/barlas/2020/02/02/yemek-yazarlarimiz-cinli-olmadiklari-icin-cok-sanslilar; and “Çinliler kedileri ve köpekleri yemekten galiba artık vazgeçiyorlar” (Chinese will probably give up on eating cats and dogs from now on), Sabah,April 3, 2020, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/barlas/2020/04/03/cinliler-kedileri-ve-kopekleri-yemekten-galiba-artik-vazgeciyorlar.

41 Hakan Çelik, “Çekik gözlüler!” (Slanty-eyed people!), Posta, July 9, 2015, http://www.posta.com.tr/cekik-gozluler-hakan-celik-yazisi-290427; and “Çinli saldırıları sonrası Türkiye’de yaşayan çekik gözlüler ne yapıyor?” (What are the slanty-eyed people in Turkey doing after the assualts on Chinese?), T24, July 12, 2015, http://t24.com.tr/haber/cinli-saldirilari-sonrasi-turkiyede-yasayan-cekik-gozluler-ne-yapiyor,302626.

42 See Aynur Tekin, “Türkiye’de yaşayan Çinliler: Bizi restoranlara ve otellere almıyorlar” (Chinese living in Turkey: They wouldn’t let us in the restaurants and hotels), Gazete Duvar, February 25, 2020, https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2020/02/25/turkiyede-yasayan-cinliler-bizi-restoranlara-ve-otellere-almiyorlar. In late January 2020, a Chinese travelers’ group visit to the Mevlana Musueum in Konya was disrupted by the local public. On another occasion, two Chinese tourists were briefly quarantined in the Central Anatolian town of Aksaray. Tourism professionals noted that Turkish travelers were uncomfortable with the scene of Chinese tourists at hotels. See “Yakup Dinler: Çinli turisti gören tedirgin oluyor!” (The ones who comes across Chinese tourists feel uncomfortable), Turizm Günlüğü, January 29, 2020, https://www.turizmgunlugu.com/2020/01/29/yakup-dinler-cinli-turist-coronavirus; and “Çinli turisti gören vatandaş köşe bucak kaçıyor” (Citizens who see Chinese tourists are running a mile), Sözcü, January 30, 2020, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/cinli-turisti-goren-vatandas-kose-bucak-kaciyor-5597795. Also see “Aksaray’da Çin vatandaşlarının Korona virüsü Taşıdıkları Şüphesi ile ilgili Açıklama” (Notice on the Chinese citizens suspected to have the Corona virus in Aksaray), Chinese Embassy in Ankara, January 28, 2020, http://tr.china-embassy.gov.cn/tur/lsfw/202001/t20200129_9618990.htm.

43 “China Sees Potential in Turkey But Lack of Trust Still a Problem,” Hürriyet Daily News, July 27, 2015, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/china-sees-potential-in-turkey-but-lack-of-trust-still-a-problem-85962; and “İmaj düzeltmek için Türkiye’ye geliyorlar” (They are coming to Turkey in order to fix their image), Dünya, April 24, 2014, https://www.dunya.com/ekonomi/imaj-duzeltmek-icin-turkiye039ye-geliyorlar-haberi-244877.

44 Available studies on Chinese propaganda suggest that Beijing uses different messaging in and outside of the mainland, as well as among different countries. See Samuel Brazys and Alexander Dukalskis, “China’s Message Machine,” Journal of Democracy 31, no. 4, October 2020, 59–73.

45 Foreign language acquisition in Turkey is not common. According to the English First (EF) English Proficiency Index, Turkey ranks 70 among a total of 112 countries. In the ten years following 2011, this index categorized Turkey either as a “low proficiency” country or a “very low proficiency” country. See “Turkey,” EF English Proficiency Index, accessed November 2, 2022, https://www.ef.com/wwen/epi/regions/europe/turkey.

46 Shaina Oppenheimer, “What Do Chinese Media Outlets Say About the Middle East? Depends Which Language You’re Reading,” Haaretz, February 11, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-what-does-chinese-media-say-about-the-mideast-depends-which-language-you-re-reading-1.9532023; and Iginio Gagliardone, “China as a Persuader: CCTV Africa’s First Steps in the African Mediasphere,” Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies34, no. 3, 2013, 25–40, https://doi.org/10.1080/02560054.2013.834835. China’s state-sponsored CCTV’s broadcasts to Africa, for instance, have substantial outreach in the continent.

47 See the official website of Xinhua Türkçe at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/europe/turkey/latest.htm; and the Turkish version of China Radio International, CRI Türk, at https://criturk.com.

48 Çağdaş Üngör, “China Reaches Turkey? Radio Peking’s Turkish Language Broadcasts During the Cold War,”All Azimuth 1, no.1, July 2012, 1–33, https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.167301.

49 See Veli Boztepe, “Bir Yumuşak Güç Kaynağı olarak Türkiye’deki Çin Medyası” (Chinese Media in Turkey as a source of soft power), Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 16, no. 4, 2016, 93–110, https://doi.org/10.18037/ausbd.415561.

50 Yön Radyo offers several podcasts and programs on China-related matters. Recent examples include favorable accounts of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress and the Belt and Road Initiative. See https://yonradyo.com.tr/ (accessed October 19, 2022).

51 “GB Times Türkiye şubesi açıldı” (GB Times Turkey branch is opened), Anadolu Ajansı, January 28, 2013, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/arsiv/gbtimes-turkiye-subesi-acildi-/280676.

52 “Türkiye’nin ilk Çin merkezli televizyon kanalı yayında” (Turkey’s first China-based television channel starts broadcasting), Cumhuriyet, October 25, 2014, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiyenin-ilk-cin-merkezli-televizyon-kanali-yayinda-134147; and “Çin ve Türkiye arasında medya köprüsü” (A media bridge between China and Turkey), TUCEM, November 9, 2014, https://tucem.com.tr/2020/01/30/cin-ve-turkiye-arasinda-medya-koprusu.

53 One of these platforms is a Turkish language YouTube channel operating under the label CRI Türk. See CRITURK, Youtube account, https://www.youtube.com/user/chinatvturkish. CRI Türk also has a digital TV platform that broadcasts Chinese content with Turkish subtitles, available at https://criturk.tv.

54 The magazine is published by Turkuvaz Media Group, which also owns several progovernment outlets in Turkey, most notably Sabah and A Haber. See the advertisement for China Today on the corporation’s PR website: “Çin’e Açılan Kapı (A door opening to China),” Turkuvaz Reklam, http://www.turkuvazreklam.com.tr/yayin/dergiler/china-today.

55 See the official page for Modern Silk Road (Modern İpek Yolu Dergisi) magazine at the Kırmızı Kedi Publication House website, available at https://www.kirmizikedi.com/modern-ipek-yolu-dergisi.

56 Overseas Chinese communities have long been target audiences for Chinese foreign propaganda. See Anne-Marie Brady, “China’s Foreign Propaganda Machine,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4, October 2015, 52–53, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0056.

57 This number probably includes ethnically Uyghur Chinese citizens as well. See “Vatandaşlık ülkesine göre yabancı nüfus,” Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi Sonuçları, Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, February 4, 2021,

https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Adrese-Dayali-Nufus-Kayit-Sistemi-Sonuclari-2020-37210.

58 Roie Yellinek, “How China Learned to Harness Israel’s Media and Booming Tech Scene,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 27, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/27/how-china-learned-to-harness-israel-s-media-and-booming-tech-scene-pub-85653.

59 Roie Yellinek, Yossi Mann, and Udi Lebel, “Chinese Soft-Power in the Arab World—China’s Confucius Institutes as a Central Tool of Influence,” Comparative Strategy 39, no. 6, 2020, 517–534, https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1826843.

60 Three of these institutions are located in Istanbul and one in Ankara. See Boğaziçi University Confucius Institute in Istanbul, http://www.confucius.boun.edu.tr/?lang=tr; Okan University in Istanbul, https://www.okan.edu.tr/en/ci/; Yeditepe University in Istanbul, https://confucius.yeditepe.edu.tr/en/about-us; and Middle East Technical University Confucius Institute, https://ci.metu.edu.tr/tr.

61 For a specific example, see the BRI conference organized by the Middle East Technical University’s Confucius Institute, “Perspectıves on the Belt and Road Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges for Exchange And Cooperation Between China and Turkey,” November 15, 2019, https://ci.metu.edu.tr/en/program.

62 The Chinese Embassy in Turkey does not maintain a fully translated Turkish-language web site. See the site that is partially in Turkish at “Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği,” accessed November 2, 2022, http://tr.china-embassy.gov.cn/tur.

63 As of October 2022, Chinese Embassy in Ankara (@ChinaEmbTurkey) has 31,200 followers on Twitter as opposed to the American Embassy’s (@USEmbassyTurkey) 133,600.

64 For a detailed analysis of this topic, see Suat Kınıklıoğlu, “Eurasianism in Turkey,” SWP Research Paper 7, Berlin: March 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2022RP07_EurasianismInTurkey.pdf.

65Aydınlık has a print edition that circulates around 1,700 copies, according to Medya Radar’s data from late September 2022, available at https://www.medyaradar.com/tirajlar. It should be noted here that the journal enjoys much wider publicity on digital platforms, with its Twitter account (@AydinlikGazete) followed by 303,300 people as of October 2022. This wide discrepancy probably owes to the general curiosity around Aydınlık’s sensational news rather than suggesting appreciation for the journal’s pro-China outlook.

66 Based on Medya Radar’s data from late September 2022, the circulation for Sabah newspaper is 190,000 and Hürriyet is almost 186,000, whereas Aydınlık had sold only 1,721 copies. See https://www.medyaradar.com/tirajlar, accessed October 22, 2022.

67 Murat Akser, “News Media Consolidation and Censorship in Turkey: From Liberal Ideals to Corporatist Realities,” Mediterranean Quarterly 29, no. 3, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-7003180; Bilge Yeşil, “Authoritarian Turn or Continuity? Governance of Media through Capture and Discipline in the AKP Era,” South European Society and Politics 23, no. 2, 2018, 239–257, https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2018.1487137.

68 World Press Freedom Index 2022, Reporters Without Borders, https://rsf.org/en/index.

69 This report was published by the progovernment think tank SETA. It was hotly debated in Turkey following its publication, because the report did not only analyze the content and editorial line of international media outlets but also commented on the specific social media messages posted by their employees in order to decipher their political orientation. See İsmail Çağlar, Kevser Hülya Akdemir, and Seca Toker, Uluslararası Medya Kuruluşlarının Türkiye Uzantıları (Appendages of International Media Organizations in Turkey) (Ankara: SETA, 2019), 160–166.

70 See Nurettin Akçay and Tang Qingye, “Turkey’s Perceptions of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (2013-2017): Media and Think-Tanks Discourse Analysis,” China Report 56, issue 2, 2020.

71 Translated by the author from its Turkish original. See Şerif Dilek, Büşra Zeynep Özdemir, and Deniz İstikbal, Asya Yüzyılında Çin-Türkiye Ekonomik İlişkileri (Sino-Turkish Economic Relations in the Asian Century) (İstanbul: SETA, 2019), 65.

72 “Türkiye-Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Ekonomik İlişkileri” (Turkiye-People’s Republic of China Economic and Trade Relations), Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-china.en.mfa.

73 See, for instance, the piece published by the official Anadolu Agency, which puts emphasis on the incremental rise of Turkish exports to China and the growing number of Chinese tourists visiting Turkey. Fuat Kabakçı, “Türkiye-Çin ilişkileri birçok alanda gelişiyor,”Anadolu Ajansı,March 24, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/turkiye-cin-iliskileri-bircok-alanda-gelisiyor/2186643.

74 Translated by the author from its Turkish original. See Altay Atlı and Sadık Ünay, Küreselleşme Sürecinde Türkiye-Çin Ekonomik İlişkileri (Turkish-Chinese Economic Relations in the Globalization Process) (Istanbul: SETA, Sayı 96, Haziran 2014), 22.

75 “Türk Telekom Signs MoU for 5G deal With Huawei,”Hürriyet Daily News, March 4, 2022, https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turk-telekom-signs-mou-for-5g-deal-with-huawei-171961.

76 As of October 2022, Huawei Türkiye (@HuaweiTurkiye) has 140,800 followers on Twitter as opposed to the Chinese Embassy’s 31,200 followers.

77 “Huawei ‘Gelecek için Tohumlar’ programı başladı” (Huawei’s “Seeds for the Future” program launched), Anadolu Agency, September 13, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/sirkethaberleri/teknoloji/huawei-gelecek-icin-tohumlar-programi-basladi/667357; and “Gelecek için Tohumlar Projesi’nin Açılış Toplantısı Yapıldı” (The opening meeting of “seeds for the future” held), Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu (Information and Communication Technologies Authority), September 10, 2021, https://www.btk.gov.tr/haberler/gelecek-icin-tohumlar-projesi-nin-acilis-toplantisi-yapildi.

78 The directorate organizes panels and other forms of exchanges. See, for instance, “Cumhurbaşkanlığı İletişim Başkanlığı, Çin’de Türkiye paneli düzenledi” (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye Directorate of Communication organizes a panel on Turkey in China), Directorate of Communication (İletişim Başkanlığı), https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/stratejik_iletisim_calismalari/detaylar/cumhurbaskanligi-iletisim-baskanligi-cinde-turkiye-paneli-duzenledi.

79 The tweet emphasizes Istanbul’s central location for maritime trade networks. See Fahrettin Altun(@fahrettinaltun), “作为世界海上贸易最重要中心之一的伊斯坦布尔,通过伊斯坦布尔运河项目将成为更加快速和实惠的贸易通道,” Twitter post, January 4, 2020, 3:29 p.m.,

https://twitter.com/fahrettinaltun/status/1213558175242297346.

80 See the interview with Hu Xijin, who was one of China’s top propagandists and the editor-in-chief of Global Times until his retirement in 2021: Tunç Akkoç, “Turkey Did Not Become a Tool of the Western Propaganda,”Aydınlık, December 21, 2019, https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/turkey-did-not-become-a-tool-of-the-western-propaganda-dunya-aralik-2019#4.

81 For a detailed analysis of China’s Xinjiang-related activities in Turkey, see Ondřej Klimeš, “The Xinjiang Crisis and Sino-Turkish Relations During the Pandemic: Part One,”China Brief 21,issue: 4, February 26, 2021,

https://jamestown.org/program/the-xinjiang-crisis-and-sino-turkish-relations-during-the-pandemic-part-one; and Ondřej Klimeš, “China’s Xinjiang Propaganda and United Front Work in Turkey: Part Two,”China Brief 21, no. 5, March 15, 2021,

https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-xinjiang-propaganda-and-united-front-work-in-turkey-part-two.

82 Murat Yılmaz, “Türk medya heyeti Çin’de” (Turkish media delegation is in China), Hürriyet, May 21, 2017, https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/ankara/turk-medya-heyeti-cinde-40464969; and “Çin’in Uygur gezilerine katılan Türk gazeteciler neler yazmıştı?” (What have the Turkish journalists who participated in China’s Uyghur trips written about?), Serbestiyet, August 24, 2020, https://serbestiyet.com/featured/cinin-uygur-gezilerine-katilan-turk-gazeteciler-neler-yazmisti-39766.

83 “Foreign Media Contingent Praises Xinjiang’s Development, Stability,” China Daily, January 18, 2019, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201901/18/WS5c412fd2a3106c65c34e533e.html.

84 Muharrem Sarıkaya, “İşte o eğitim merkezleri: O teknolojik devrimin çözemediği tek sorun” (Here are those training centers: The only problem that the technological revolution could not solve), Habertürk, November 17, 2019, https://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/muharrem-sarikaya/2540983-iste-o-egitim-merkezleri-o-teknolojik-devrimin-cozemedigi-tek-sorun.

85 “Özel haber: Gazetelerin favori reklamvereni: Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti” (Special news item: Newspapers’ favorite advertiser: People’s Republic of China), Serbestiyet, June 5, 2021, https://serbestiyet.com/haberler/ozel-haber-gazetelerin-yeni-favori-reklamvereni-cin-halk-cumhuriyeti-61693.

86 This text was published by the Chinese ambassador himself, according to the embassy’s web page. See “Çin Komünist Partisi’nin 100 Yıllık Şanlı Tarihi ve Başarı Kodları” (Chinese Communist Party’s 100 years old glorious history and the codes for its success), Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti Ankara Büyükelçiliği, July 1, 2021,http://tr.china-embassy.gov.cn/tur/xwdt/202107/t20210714_8923294.htm.

87 “Çin yakınlaşıyor: İhracatta hedef büyüyor” (China is getting closer: Export targets are growing bigger), Sabah, August 4, 2021, https://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2021/08/04/cin-yakinlasiyor-ihracatta-hedef-buyuyor; and “Türkiye devlerin telefon üretim üssü oldu” (Turkey has become a telephone production base for the giants), Sabah, August 4, 2021, https://www.sabah.com.tr/ekonomi/2021/08/04/turkiye-devlerin-telefon-uretim-ussu-oldu#:~:text=Tuzla’da%2012%20bin%20metrekare,anlamda%20istihdama%20katk%C4%B1%20sunmas%C4%B1%20bekleniyor.

88 “Medya Ombudsmanı Faruk Bildirici, Sabah gazetesi okurlarını uyardı: 3 gündür 7. Sayfada örtülü Çin reklamı çıkıyor” (Media Ombudsman Faruk Bildirici warned Sabah newspaper’s readers: A covert China advertisement is issued on page 7 for the last 3 days), T24, August 4, 2021, https://t24.com.tr/haber/medya-ombudsmani-bildirici-sabah-gazetesi-okurlarini-uyardi-3-gundur-7-sayfada-ortulu-cin-reklami-cikiyor,969999.

89 Çağdaş Üngör, “The ‘Chinese Vaccine’ and Its Discontents: Turkey’s Public Debate on Sinovac During the COVID Crisis.”

90 See, for instance, “Çin koronavirüs aşısını buldu mu? Çin İstanbul Başkonsolosu anlatıyor” (Did China find the coronavirus vaccine? Chinese Consul-General in Istanbul explains), Açık ve Net, posted on Youtube by Habertürk TV, March 2, 2020, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pn1o5WZxwgI.

91 “Çin koronavirüsü nasıl durdurdu?” (How did China stop the coronavirus?), posted on Youtube by CNN Turk, March 27, 2020, availabke at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoDiQpSvOIM.

92 Gülsüm İncekaya, “Çin’in koronavirüs salgınıyla ilgili verileri sakladığı iddiaları” (Claims that China has hidden evidence about the coronavirus pandemic), Anadolu Agency, April 8, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/koronavirus/cinin-koronavirus-salginiyla-ilgili-verileri-sakladigi-iddialari-/1796896.

93 Verda Özer, “Çin Virüsü Yendi mi?” (Did China defeat the virus?), Milliyet, April 1, 2020, https://www.milliyet.com.tr/yazarlar/verda-ozer/cin-virusu-yendi-mi-6178576.

94 Vassaf explained Asia’s success in containing the pandemic with reference to the Confucian norms that prioritized society over the individual in places like China, Taiwan, and Singapore. See Kürşat Oğuz, “Doğu Toplumla Kazandı, Batı Bireyle Kaybetti” (The East won with society, the West lost with individual), Habertürk, March 30, 2020, https://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/kursad-oguz/2628908-dogu-toplumla-kazandi-bati-bireyle-kaybetti.

95 See, for instance, Aytunç Erkin, “Çin sistemli ve örgütlü hareket etti: Koronaya karşı başarı kazandı” (China moved in a systematic and organized fashion: Achieved success against corona), Sözcü, March 17, 2020, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/yazarlar/aytunc-erkin/cin-sistemli-ve-orgutlu-hareket-etti-koronaya-karsi-basari-kazandi-5683004; and Fan Xun, “Çin’in Salgınla Mücadelesi Nasıl Başarılı Oldu?” (How did China’s struggle against the pandemic become succesful?), Cumhuriyet, March 23, 2020, http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/olaylar-ve-gorusler/cinin-salginla-mucadelesi-nasil-basarili-oldu-1728860.

96 Doğu Perinçek, “Merhaba Kamuculuk 8–Çin’den Filizlenen Çözüm” (Hello Publicism 8 –Solution emerging out of China), Aydınlık, April 1, 2020, https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/merhaba-kamuculuk-8-cin-den-filizlenen-cozum-204201-2.

97 Mehmet Ali Güller, “Karantina-Üretim Çelişkisi” (Contradiction between the quarantine and production), Cumhuriyet, April 20, 2020, https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/mehmet-ali-guller/karantina-uretim-celiskisi-1734030.

98 On March 3, 2020, BirGün newspaper’s official Twitter account shared the following item, which was retweeted 1,520 times and liked 8,598 times:

@BirGun_Gazetesi: “Habertürk anchorwoman Kübra Par: In fact, these are small numbers when you take China’s population into account. Chinese Consul-General in Istanbul, Cui Wei: These are not numbers, these are lives,” https://twitter.com/BirGun_Gazetesi/status/1234799265014259712. Translation provided by the author.

99 Çağdaş Üngör, “COVID-19 Krizi Işığında Çin Dış Propagandasının Dünü, Bugünü” (Past and present of the Chinese external propaganda in light of the COVID-19 crisis), Toplumsal Tarih, no. 323, November 2020.

100 “Çin 2 milyon virus kiti gönderdi, ücretini Atatürk ödedi dediler” (They said China sent 2 million virüs kits and the cost was covered by Atatürk), Yeni Çağ Gazetesi, March 22, 2020, https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/cin-2-milyon-virus-kiti-gonderdi-ucretini-ataturk-odedi-dediler-272607h.htm.

101 Health Minister Fahrettin Koca denied these allegations during a press conference on March 23, 2020, by stating that the Turkish side paid for all the Chinese test kits. See “Sağlık Bakanı Koca’dan Bilim Kurulu toplantısı ardından açıklama” (Remarks by the Health Minister Koca after the Scientific Board meeting), Halk TV, March 23, 2022, https://halktv.com.tr/gundem/saglik-bakani-kocadan-bilim-kurulu-toplantisi-ardindan-aciklama-421725h.

102 See, for instance, Tele1 TV’s Merdan Yanardağ’s comment on March 23, 2020, which was retweeted more than 4,500 times and liked by 19,400 people. @merdanyanardag: “In 1940, thanks to the vaccines sent by the Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, which was established by Atatürk in 1928, China was able to beat the cholera epidemic. Now, as a token of appreciation, China is sending coronavirus vaccines to Turkey . . .,” https://twitter.com/merdanyanardag/status/1241835889950707713. Translation by the author.

103 Catie Snow Bailard, “China in Africa: An Analysis of the Effect of Chinese Media Expansion on African Public Opinion,” International Journal of Press/Politics 21, no. 4, 2016, 446–471.

104 Based on this poll, while only 16.1 percent of Turks considered China a friendly country in 2019, this number rose to 27 percent in 2021. See Mustafa Aydın, Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, Mitat Çelikpala, Soli Özel, Cihan Dizdaroğlu ve Mustafa Gökcan Kösen, Türk Dış politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması-2019 (Research on public perceptions of Turkish foreign policy-2019), Türkiye Çalışmaları Merkezi, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, July 4, 2019, 27, https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/CTRS-TDP-2019.pdf; and Mustafa Aydın et al., Türk Dış politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması-2021 (Research on public perceptions of Turkish foreign policy-2021), p. 40.

105 See “2021 Transatlantic Trends: Transatlantic Opinion on Global Challenges,” German Marshall Fund of the United States and Bertelsmann Foundation, August 2021, 30, https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/TT2021_Web_Version.pdf.

106 Ibid., 34.

107 According to Kadir Has University’s Research on Public Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy in 2019, the United States was viewed as a threat to Turkey by a great majority of surveyors (81.3 percent) as compared to China (41 percent). In the same survey’s 2021 version, these numbers are 54 percent for the United States and 18.9 percent for China, suggesting a lower threat perception but still with a wide discrepancy between two countries. See Mustafa Aydın et al., Türk Dış politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması-2019 (Research on Public Perceptions of Turkish Foreign Policy-2021), 28; and Mustafa Aydın et al., Türk Dış politikası Kamuoyu Algıları Araştırması-2021 (Research on public perceptions of Turkish foreign policy-2021), 41.

Çağdaş Üngör
Çağdaş Üngör teaches at Marmara University’s Department of Political Science and International Relations in Istanbul. Üngör received her Ph.D. degree from the State University of New York at Binghamton, with a dissertation examining China’s external propaganda activities during the Maoist decades. Üngör contributes to various Turkish journals and newspapers on China-related topics and Sino-Turkish relations. Her academic publications include the edited volumes Turkey in the Cold War: Ideology and Culture (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013, with Cangül Örnek) and New Horizons in Asia-Pacific Studies (Asya Pasifik Çalışmalarında Yeni Ufuklar, Küre Yayınları, 2020).
End of document

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Carnegie

Lord of the Masses: How Russia’s Fringe Elements Went Mainstream

0

Putin’s immersion in the “masses” is becoming dangerous. His vocabulary and behavior are growing increasingly marginal, and the communication style of other high-ranking officials will in turn inevitably become marginalized too.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has one message that he likes to convey in his public speeches: that he is very much a man of the people, with the blood of simple Russian folk running through his veins. His idea of the people, however, has changed more than once during his lengthy reign, and is changing once again right now.

The people he chooses to meet in public and his own behavior show that for the president, the Russian people are currently embodied by somewhat marginal figures elevated by the war, such as the Donbas separatists, mercenaries, and a certain kind of self-proclaimed war correspondents. All the Russian authorities can do is adapt to the president’s version of reality and adopt his marginal style.

Putin loves to remind people of his humble origins. At the recent Valdai forum, he talked about his father (“a tradesman who went to technical college”) and his mother (“she didn’t even finish high school”). The president is, therefore, very familiar with “what makes ordinary people tick,” he concluded.

Putin constantly underlines his proximity to the common people through the vocabulary he employs. At the same Valdai forum, he used slang and even parts of speech suggestive of expletives.

Officially, he was speaking to the international relations experts assembled at the forum, but judging by his speech and manner of delivery, he was in fact setting out his message to the masses: the parts of society that symbolize the fabled “Putin majority” for him. Right now, that’s the Donbas separatists, some so-called war correspondents, private military contractors and Chechen battalions fighting in Ukraine, and soldiers, including those who were recently mobilized. Putin likes people who have been in the trenches and know what gunpowder smells like—or who at least have been close to the action.

The president’s new idea of ordinary folk stems directly from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin has waxed lyrical over the Donbas separatists who were “fighting for their homeland on the front line,” and awarded the notorious separatist commanders Arsen “Motorola” Pavlov and Vladimir “Vokha” Zhoga with posthumous Orders of Courage. The former was a classic example of the masses Putin is currently courting: born in Russia’s northwest where he was reportedly wanted by the police, Motorola went to fight in another country for fame and fortune on the pretext of defending the concept of the “Russian world.”

Another group Putin is fond of are self-proclaimed journalists who style themselves as war correspondents, are not afraid to mince their words, and “report” from the front line wearing bulletproof vests. These people also sometimes have a murky past, or even criminal convictions. Their cooperation with the Kremlin and its media managers dates back to before the war, so it’s not difficult now to arrange their presence at events for them to describe the “true horrors” they have seen.

The president is known to have met with these “war correspondents” on at least two occasions: ahead of the announcement of the mobilization in September, and in June. Securing an audience with Putin since the start of the COVID pandemic has been no mean feat, even for very influential representatives of Russian politics and business, yet Russia’s leader apparently can find the time for this motley crew.

Their role is obvious. A propagandist in uniform, even an audacious daredevil type, is not a true soldier, and will not, therefore, harass the president with complaints about the real hardships of war, never mind criticize the president’s decision to start that war. The “war correspondents” will slam the generals, talk about their mistakes, and suggest taking tougher action: broadening the mobilization, and stepping up the bombing campaign against Ukrainian cities. This point of view is close to Putin’s heart: it is not he who is at fault, but the generals, and the war is indeed necessary, it’s just that a few errors must be rectified.

One of these “war correspondents,” Vladlen Tatarsky, recently said: “Everyone we need to rob, we will. Everyone we need to kill, we will.” He should know: he himself has a conviction for bank robbery. Most telling of all was the setting for his comments: a meeting in the Kremlin on September 30 attended by high-profile members of the elite. Now Tatarsky personifies that elite.

Another figure who has taken root in the president’s inner circle is Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the infamous private military company Wagner, who also hails from the masses and has a checkered past. It’s difficult to say whether or not he personally has access to Putin, but what is certain is that he can get away with criticizing the Defense Ministry without any consequences.

In recent months, Prigozhin has publicly admitted after years of rumors that he did indeed found Wagner; he makes jokes and uses curse words when commenting for media publications; and he has been openly visiting Russia’s prisons, recruiting convicts for the armed forces.

Likewise, the notorious Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, long known for his controversial statements and actions, has also taken it upon himself to represent the “common people” via his social media channels, including by posting smutty humorous videos.

Such is the new surrogate for the Russian people in Putin’s eyes. The Russian leader has already changed his opinion several times before on what the “majority” looks like: the people he has always considered his audience. And every time, officials in the presidential administration built a new backdrop to correspond to the president’s changing image of the “majority.”

At the beginning of the 2010s, the “people” consisted of the All-Russian People’s Front: an organization made up of state employees and pro-regime activists. This was the Putin majority constructed for the president by Vyacheslav Volodin, who was then head of the Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc.

A few years later, the president’s understanding of his nuclear electorate changed slightly. The aging leader took a shine to the young careerists, such as participants in state competitions for professionals. Events with these “ordinary people” were accordingly set up by Volodin’s successor, Sergei Kiriyenko.

Kiriyenko has proven to be very flexible. He might be more at home organizing competitions for careerists, but he is also capable of building more rugged backdrops, throwing on some fatigues, and becoming just as militant as Kadyrov, Prigozhin, and the “war correspondents.” He demonstrated this during a forum at the end of October when he explained that Russia would win the war in every sense—including the “psychological information war”—but for that to happen, the war must become truly a “people’s war”: every Russian must “feel their involvement.”

The kind of people being invited to the Kremlin these days have long since felt involved, and are actively demonstrating that: both to Putin and to everyone else. And in all likelihood, the president truly believes that the population of these Potemkin villages constructed by those around him are “the people.”

Now the head of state has started borrowing certain traits from those whom he considers to represent the people. In his public speeches, he increasingly imitates the cocky manner of Prigozhin, for example, combining it with cliches about the decaying West. The president’s immersion in the “masses” is becoming dangerous.

His vocabulary and behavior are growing marginalized, and the communication style of other high-ranking officials will inevitably become marginalized too. After all, they had no qualms about repeating Putin’s less-than-intelligible word “denazification” or discussing the fight against fascism. They will have no problem adopting his vulgar tone.

By: Andrey Pertsev

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Carnegie

Turkey Seeks Sovereign Immunity in Two Cases Before the Supreme Court

0

November 14, 2022 | Flash Brief

(Getty Images)

 

Latest Developments

Two recent Supreme Court rulings in the United States may shed light on whether entities owned by foreign governments can claim immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in both civil and criminal cases. In the first instance, the high court declined to hear the matter petitioned by Turkey in what is sometimes referred to as the Sheridan Circle case, where Turkish security officials attacked peaceful Kurdish protestors in 2017. In a separate ruling, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Halkbank case, which will consider whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 confers blanket immunity on foreign state-owned enterprises from all criminal proceedings in the United States.  In 2019, a lower court indicted the Turkish bank, citing the bank’s brazen breach of U.S. sanctions on Iran.

Expert Analysis

“The Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the Sheridan Circle case is a legal setback for Turkey and is potentially financially costly as well. If the court rules against Turkey in the Halkbank case, the penalties that may be levied against Turkey can prove to be catastrophic for the bank and for Turkey’s already fragile economy.” – Sinan Ciddi, FDD Non-Resident Senior Fellow on Turkey

“Beyond impacting whether Turkey can rely on the court to get it out of legal jeopardy, how the Supreme Court rules on whether FSIA bestows wholesale immunity on foreign state-owned entities from all criminal proceedings in the U.S. may set a precedent for how Russia, China, Venezuela, and other sanctions evaders are treated. It’s hard to imagine that the intent of the law was to permit any entity affiliated with a foreign government that was engaging in criminal activity to be protected against U.S. prosecution.” – Toby Dershowitz, FDD Senior Vice President of Government Relations and Strategy

The Sheridan Circle Case

During President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s 2017 Washington visit, a group of peaceful protestors gathered near the Turkish ambassador’s residence on Sheridan Circle. President Erdogan’s security detail proceeded to attack and wound many of them. The Supreme Court’s decision not to hear the case means that a lower court will litigate it. The case could ultimately result in a ruling that requires Ankara to pay significant fines to the victims.

The Halkbank Case

The Turkish state-owned Halkbank, indicted by a U.S. federal court in 2019 for laundering approximately $20 billion of Iranian gas and oil money, petitioned the Supreme Court to overturn a lower court’s decision upholding the indictment. Turkey, which denied the allegations of misconduct, argued that it should be protected from prosecution under FSIA. The U.S. Justice Department countered that the FSIA does not protect Turkey from criminal prosecution, and even if it applied, the case fell within the law’s exceptions for cases involving commercial activities.

If the Supreme Court ultimately sides with Ankara in the Halkbank case, Turkey would be protected from criminal prosecution. If it rules against Ankara, officials at the highest levels of the Turkish government could expect significant fines, potentially in the billions of dollars. Turkey also could be subject to further U.S. sanctions and monitoring.

fdd.org