President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s telephone intervention during a public event in Echinos, Xanthi, represented another step in Ankara’s effort to exert influence over the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, the Greek region bordering Turkey, effectively challenging the framework established by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

Echinos is no ordinary village. It is inhabited primarily by Pomaks—Muslims by religion, but not ethnically Turkish. The Treaty of Lausanne recognizes a Muslim religious minority in Western Thrace, but not a Turkish national minority. For decades, however, Ankara has sought to merge Pomaks, Roma, and ethnic Turks into a single “Turkish” identity, allowing it to use the minority as an instrument of Turkish foreign policy.

Erdoğan’s intervention came only days before the July 7–8, 2026, NATO Summit in Ankara. At the very moment Turkey was seeking an enhanced role within the Alliance, it simultaneously portrayed itself as the “protector” of Muslim populations beyond its borders. Greeks and other Europeans understand this as political penetration into the territory of a NATO member state, rather than simple cultural or religious outreach.

The problem, however, extends beyond Ankara itself. For years, networks operating around the Turkish Consulate in Komotini have been active throughout Thrace. Individuals aligned with Ankara conduct propaganda campaigns, shape public narratives, and attempt to portray the minority as an extension of the Turkish state. Most recently, Greece barred the entry of a member of Turkey’s Zafer Partisi after the party’s leader provoked outrage during an earlier visit to Xanthi, where he posed for photographs in the town square while making the Grey Wolves hand salute.

The issue of the so-called “pseudo-muftis” is equally longstanding. The parallel religious authority supported by Ankara in Western Thrace has existed for decades. The recent events at the Xanthi Courthouse, during the trial of individuals accused of attacking the recognized Mufti of Komotini, exposed the confrontation between the institutions of the Greek state and the parallel structures backed by the Turkish Consulate, and represented an attempted uprising against state authority.

This is where Greece’s deeper structural weakness emerges. The principal challenge in Thrace is not only Turkish pressure, but also the local and national political establishment, which often operates according to narrow partisan calculations. Political mechanisms undermine government initiatives for domestic political reasons while, directly or indirectly, aligning themselves with the agenda promoted by the Turkish Consulate.

From municipal offices to cabinet ministries, many officials prefer to remain on good terms with the Consulate. Some seek electoral support; others, local influence. Many simply wish to avoid upsetting the existing balance. The result is a “business-as-usual” environment: Everyone talks to everyone, everyone understands what is happening, yet few are willing to pay the political price of confronting the issue openly.

There is also a leadership deficit. Some politicians attempt to fill the vacuum with patriotic rhetoric to cultivate their own public images. Others remain silent because Thrace attracts their attention only during election campaigns. Still others treat the region as a bargaining chip, sacrificing long-term national interests in exchange for political comfort and influence in Athens’ political circles.

Perhaps the greatest failure is that the positive developments taking place in Thrace rarely receive public attention. The healthy elements of society—Greek Muslims who reject Ankara’s influence, Pomaks resisting efforts to erase their distinct identity, and citizens working to preserve the region’s genuine multicultural character—are largely absent from national media coverage. Superficial reporting prevails.Recent statements made by İbrahim Karagül, one of Erdoğan’s closest media allies, further illustrate the ideological depth of the problem. Karagül publicly advocated a “preemptive” Turkish strategy that included the incorporation of Western Thrace, the seizure of Greek islands in the Aegean, and the complete conquest of Cyprus. Karagül’s remarks reflect the intellectual environment that now surrounds Erdoǧan and the normalization of Turkish revanchism.

Washington should approach developments in Thrace with the same seriousness it would apply to any foreign attempt to influence domestic affairs within an allied nation. It is akin to Russian President Vladimir Putin seeking to leverage openly the Russian minority in Estonia, for example, an action both Washington and NATO long have defined as a grave threat.

meforum.org