Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov’s stream is dedicated to the anniversary of Oleksandr Syrskyi’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
Syrskyi himself marked the occasion by publishing a report on his achievements over the past year. Our task is to analyze what has happened, what results have been achieved, what is true, and what appears less optimistic. This will help us assess the situation, predict future developments, and understand what is happening within the Defense Forces and on the front lines.
First, let’s examine the tasks set by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, in his February 8, 2024, address, which is available on the President’s website. Eight key tasks were outlined, and we will review which have been accomplished and which have not. After that, we will analyze Syrskyi’s report and conclude with my final assessment.
So, step by step. What tasks did Volodymyr Zelenskyy set for Oleksandr Syrskyi?
1) A realistic and detailed action plan for the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2024 must be presented.
Yes, indeed, such a plan has been prepared. The problem is that there are big doubts about its realism and validity. Many of the things that were planned, first of all, the stabilization of defense in 2024, could not be fulfilled, because the enemy managed to capture and hold the strategic initiative in the main theater of operations in Donbas throughout the year. It was not possible to build reliable defense lines there, to stop the offensive and defeat Russian strike groups.
Let’s look at the map of results over the past year.
If we look at the implementation of the plan, we see that we suffered significant losses in the Southern Donbas, and the enemy managed to advance significantly. They also managed to advance in some other parts of the frontline: Chasiv Yar, Lyman. But the main thing is that we see such significant losses of territory in Donbas. The enemy managed to capture about 4,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. And Ukrainian soldiers managed to create a buffer zone of about 500 square kilometers to cover the borders of Ukraine. So, there are doubts as to how realistic this plan was. I hope that the 2025 plan will still take into account the obvious things that were not foreseen there.
2) Each combat brigade on the first line should receive effective Western weapons. There should be a fair redistribution of such weapons in favor of the first line of the front.
A strange enough wish. Of course, nothing was done and no Western weapons were distributed. In fact, there has never been any systematic approach to this issue. Unfortunately, there are still cases when the latest military equipment is not given to the most combat-ready units, but to newly formed ones with no crews, no commanders, no intelligence, no repairmen. This applies to several new 150-series brigades. So, unfortunately, the redistribution did not take place. The only thing I don’t know is whether the task was adequately set. This is a question for the defense planning of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s office itself, not just the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.
3) Logistical problems need to be resolved. Avdiivka should not wait for the generals to figure out where their drones are stuck in their warehouses.
This task has been completely failed, but I want to say that it is not only the fault of the Armed Forces command, but also the fault of the defense planning of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. There has never been such an inadequate supply of drones as in 2024, because money was taken away from local budgets, thus depriving the brigades at the front of their funding, which used to come from local budgets, for each military unit, and thus depriving the troops of the supply of reconnaissance drones such as Mavic and Autel. And this had very serious consequences, leading to significant losses and to the enemy’s superiority in the air, in drones, in many parts of the front. Our main losses are caused by payload drops from various types of drones. Therefore, of course, this failure in logistics, in the organization of drone supply, is a huge failure of the Ukrainian leadership, not only the military, but first and foremost the political leadership, which took away the distribution of drones from the troops. Now, just last month, they are returning the money to the brigades, but, unfortunately, in a much smaller amount than previously allocated by local budgets. Let’s see if we can still provide the brigades with Mavics, Autels and other types of drones. On the other hand, it should be noted that the supply of FPV drones and heavy attack drones has improved. Again, no contracts have been signed for this year. That’s why it’s such a complicated story to assess. There are no Mavic-Autel drones in stock anywhere. This deficit has always been there.
4) Every general must know the front. If a general does not know the front, he is not serving Ukraine.
The phrase is quite unclear. What does it mean to know the front? In words, every general and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s office know the front. In reality, of course, the generals know the front, but unfortunately, they are limited to maps, because the top leadership has no real awareness of the situation at the front. I have repeatedly had proposals, and I have also submitted them to our top military leadership, and I have written about them, and I have addressed them privately. We do not have a drone front. Our frontline is just points on the map where infantrymen are sitting. And it is still impossible to check even whether there is someone at this point, how communication and control are organized there. That’s why the words “I wish the generals to know the front” are such abstract things. In my opinion, most generals, i.e. generals who sit in headquarters and do not visit troops every day, do not know the front. And there are literally only a few generals who go to the troops. In reality, people sit in front of maps and act as watchmen. I have repeatedly said that we have a big problem – generals who sit on the map all day, shouting at the brigade commanders that someone has not withdrawn or entered from some point. And they report these points to the top. And up there, on these points, they receive reports. Therefore, unfortunately, I can say that this task has not been fulfilled, but the task statement is completely unclear. And who is responsible for this, for such a vague statement? Well, obviously, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself does not understand what tasks he is setting.
By the way, last year we saw the situation with General Sodol. He was the commander of the Khortytsia OSGT (operational and strategic group of troops), meaning he headed it after Oleksandr Syrsky. And a situation arose when the chief of staff of the 12th Brigade of the National Guard “AZOV” Bohdan Krotevych wrote a post that he was filing a lawsuit against General Sodol, who, in his opinion, killed more Ukrainian soldiers than any Russian general. And the general is not being tried for the loss of regions and the loss of thousands of soldiers. Krotevych filed a complaint with the SBI against Sodol, and Sodol was appointed by Syrskyi himself. That is, he was Oleksandr Syrskyi’s trusted person. And what happened? It turned out that almost no one in the army pleaded for General Sodol. There was a wave of posts, likes, reposts, and tens of thousands of military personnel in support of Bohdan Krotevych. And there was no wave in support of General Sodol, the commander of the OSGT. There were some people who served with him when he was still a battalion commander – brigade commander. I saw a few positive comments, but I didn’t see a single person who spoke positively about his management methods when he became a general and commanded the Donetsk OTG (Operational Tactical Group) and then the Khortytsia OSGT. And the Marine Corps, and he commanded the Krynky operation. There was no support. So this shows the real authority of the general, who was appointed by Oleksandr Syrskyi himself, and shows the real trust in the command in the troops. As soon as there was an officer who spoke out, who has the authority to support and authority due to the authority of Azov and his personal participation in the fighting, as soon as he raised this issue, wrote openly, claimed to the SBI, the general had to be removed. And no one stood up for Sodol. Even Syrskyi himself, who appointed him, did not find a single word to say anything good about his subordinate, whom he had appointed.
In my opinion, this raises the question of whether the generals truly understand the front, whether the front knows its generals, and whether it respects them. The case of Sodol highlights a serious problem—a deep divide and a lack of trust in the military command from the troops on the front lines. This issue has come to the surface with Krotevych’s case. It’s a reason for everyone to seriously consider who will vouch for other leaders and General Staff commanders if another authoritative officer, like Krotevych, writes a similar statement about another general. We know that Sodol was removed from his position due to a conflict with Krotevych. Krotevych and Azov continue to fight and carry out their missions, while Sodol is no longer in command—he is no longer in the army. However, at the same time, the case against him remains at a standstill.”
5) The excessive and unjustified number of staff in the headquarters must be corrected.
Well, there has been zero progress. This task remains completely unfulfilled. Despite the President’s statements, the number of headquarters is only increasing. In reality, there have been no reductions in headquarters, command structures, or administrative bodies. Instead, cuts are being made elsewhere—radio engineering troops, security personnel, repair specialists—sending them all to the infantry. Yet, the excessive number of headquarters, which require additional support structures, remains untouched. I hope that after Oleksandr Syrskyi’s announcement of the corps structure, we will see real reductions. We’ll see what actually happens, but for now, this task remains unaccomplished
A functional rotation system needs to be established in the army. The experience of certain combat brigades of the Armed Forces and units of the State Border Guard Service could serve as a foundation. Well, I think it’s obvious to everyone that this task has completely failed. The preparation of operational reserves—particularly the 150-series brigades—has been inadequate. In 2024, nine new brigades were deployed to the front, or even ten, along with four additional infantry brigades that began forming in 2023. However, the quality of command and organization in these brigades was so poor that they were unable to implement any proper rotation. As a result, most units on the front line still lack a functional troop rotation. This task remains unfulfilled, and the issue requires a systemic approach. I hope that the introduction of corps structures, if granted the necessary authority and personnel, will ensure internal troop rotation. However, the current practice of shuffling military units from one location to another for two weeks is not a real rotation—it only worsens the overall organization and effectiveness of operations.”
6) We need to improve the quality of training of soldiers. Only trained soldiers on the front line.
I think that each of you understands the level of training of soldiers in 2024. Unfortunately, this task of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was not fulfilled, and it is not true. Formally, in September, the transition to six weeks of training began, but in reality, there have been no real changes, and the quality of training is simply very low. And this is the reason for the heavy losses at the front. When completely unprepared people get into combat conditions, they have a mark that they have already spent a month or a month and a half in a boot camp undergoing basic military training, but they did not really receive it, they were not tested, they were not given time to train in the brigade itself, because the combat order immediately sent everyone into battle. And unfortunately, such unprepared people are the ones who die the most at the front. That is, the issue of training and organization of troops has also not been fulfilled.
7) A new branch of the Armed Forces, the Unmanned Systems Forces, is being created. The first commander is to be appointed. In the coming days, Chief Syrskyi will present the plan for restructuring the Armed Forces of Ukraine. 2024 may prove to be a successful year for Ukraine—but only with effective changes at the core of our defense, which is the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Unmanned Systems Forces have been officially established.
Confirmed—they have been created. Overall, attention to unmanned systems has grown, and the number of drones ordered by the state has significantly increased. However, despite their formal creation, the Unmanned Systems Forces have not become the driving force behind the reorganization of unmanned capabilities across the military. This is because President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, acting on a proposal by Minister of Digital Transformation Mykhailo Fedorov, appointed Vadym Sukharevskyi—a Hero of Ukraine and commander of a motorized infantry brigade—as head of the Mobile Systems Forces, bypassing Syrskyi’s approval. This move sparked a conflict, as the head of the Presidential Office, Andrii Yermak, was the first to take offense.
Fedorov gained influence in personnel decisions, and the president took his advice. Meanwhile, Syrskyi saw Sukharevskyi as a rival, suspecting that he had been placed there to eventually replace him. As a result, tensions arose, and the Unmanned Systems Forces now find themselves in a state of isolation. They do not serve as the primary body responsible for policy development, operational deployment, technical regulations, or procurement planning for the Armed Forces. Instead, they have been sidelined from these matters and remain a small number of military units performing critical but highly specialized tasks. The broader development of unmanned capabilities within the Armed Forces continues in a disjointed and chaotic manner.
In addition, at the end of the year, Oleksandr Syrskyi succeeded in having Sukharevskyi removed from involvement in planning the defense procurement for the next year. Meanwhile, Andrii Yermak managed to have Mykhailo Fedorov sidelined from overseeing drone procurement. Yermak then installed his own people in key positions—both at the State Special Communications Service and the Ministry of Defense. As a result, he now effectively controls the allocation of budgets for all drone purchases. Naturally, this has not improved oversight in this sector but has only deepened the chaos. Now, all of Yermak’s business partners are scrambling to secure their share of procurement deals, each trying to maximize their orders. Planning remains our weakest link.
It is worth noting that the main issue lies in the eight tasks that Volodymyr Zelenskyy assigned to Oleksandr Syrskyi. To be frank, the only clearly defined objective was the operational battle plan. The rest were vague and disorganized. I am merely providing an assessment of their execution over the past year.
Analysis of the report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi.
Comments on his theses.
“Together we are defending Ukraine. Together , we stopped the enemy’s offensive in Kharkiv region, prevented an offensive in Sumy region and moved the war to the enemy ‘s territory . Together we are holding back the aggressor ‘s ongoing offensive in the east. Together, during the year, we destroyed more enemy manpower , military equipment and military facilities than in the previous years of the war. I amgrateful to each and every one of you who is fighting for our country with dedication and courage .”
The statement is somewhat unclear. One would expect pragmatism from the military and its generals—rather than slogans, pathos, or propaganda. Oleksandr Syrskyi cites as a success that “we stopped the offensive in the Kharkiv region together.” However, it is important to recall that the preparation for the enemy’s offensive in the Kharkiv region was a failure. In fact, a criminal case has been opened regarding this failure. Despite having long-standing intelligence about the enemy’s planned attack in these directions, we had more than a month to prepare defensive measures. Yet, all key preparations—the appointment of command for this sector, the establishment of the “Kharkiv” Operational-Tactical Group (OTG), the fortification of defensive lines, and the concentration of forces—were ultimately botched. As a result, when the enemy attack materialized, the frontline command structure collapsed. Notably, the commander of OTG “Kharkiv” has since been arrested and is currently in custody. Syrskyi himself supported the detention of General Halushkin, the former OTG “Kharkiv” commander. Additionally, the commander of the 125th Brigade and the battalion commander of the 415th unit have also been detained and are under investigation. The military leadership failed to preempt the offensive despite having detailed intelligence and ample time for preparation. However, once the crisis unfolded and the frontlines began to break, Oleksandr Syrskyi acted swiftly—redeploying experienced, well-coordinated units with sufficient combat capability. These forces were rapidly reinforced with ammunition and deployed to critical areas, managing to halt the enemy’s advance. By May 13, Ukrainian forces had begun reinforcing Vovchansk, Lypets, and Starytsia. Despite intense battles, the immediate threat of a frontline breakthrough was neutralized. Subsequent operations resulted in a decisive blow to the enemy’s assault force, inflicting heavy losses and disrupting their offensive momentum. Thus, while the preemptive defense planning was a failure, the overall defensive operation in Kharkiv—conducted under the leadership of Syrskyi and the newly appointed OTG “Kharkiv” commander, Mykhailo Drapatyi—proved successful. This was made possible thanks to the extraordinary resilience of the soldiers and infantrymen from multiple units of the Armed Forces and the National Guard, who engaged in brutal close-quarters combat under challenging conditions. Despite earlier strategic missteps, their actions on the ground ultimately rectified critical failures in planning and preparation.
Then the Commander-in-Chief mentions the Kursk region. This was indeed a successful operation, and Oleksandr Syrskyi rightly acknowledges it. I also believe that, considering previous developments, at the operational and tactical level, Oleksandr Syrskyi effectively planned and executed a high-level offensive operation. This marks the third large-scale offensive operation of such an operational magnitude that Syrskyi has led and successfully conducted during the war. It is worth emphasizing that, in terms of offensive actions, no other general in our ranks has achieved such accomplishments or demonstrated comparable success. So, the Kursk operation is undoubtedly a victory.
However, I was quite surprised by the statement at the end, claiming that over the past year, we inflicted more enemy losses than in the previous two years combined. To be honest, I found this assertion questionable. In reality, there are no solid objective grounds to support this claim, aside from the official reports of the General Staff, which merely present figures. Over the past year, these figures have increased significantly. But what is the basis for these numbers? Where is the evidence? There is insufficient factual confirmation. Where is the video proof? Since approximately September 2024, we have witnessed a genuinely successful reform. For some reason, Oleksandr Syrskyi did not mention it, although he did approve its implementation. However, the reform was initiated by the Ministry of Digitalization, led by Mykhailo Fedorov, with strong public support. Our audience also played a role in pressuring the authorities to make the right decisions. In September 2024, Mykhailo Fedorov launched a program of digital bounty points for destroyed enemy equipment. Under this initiative, each military unit reported the number of enemy personnel and vehicles eliminated in exchange for these digital rewards. This system provided a more concrete understanding of the actual scale of enemy losses, as verified by drone footage, and enabled a more accurate projection of overall enemy casualties.
There is no reason to say that in one year the enemy’s losses are greater than in the previous two, according to objective control data. I think that 2024 was indeed a record year, because in some positions, a record number of FPVs were used, and a record number of heavy copters were used. And, of course, the experience of our troops has increased. Therefore, the number of enemy personnel killed, I think, this year is really higher than in 2023 and 2022. But I can’t say what objective control data the General Staff is basing on when it concludes that there are more of them than in the past two years. This is not true, I see no reason for it. Because there were heavy infantry battles, heavy battles in 2023 and 2022. It’s even hard to list them, where the enemy went forward, head-on, in close combat.
This is an exaggeration that is not supported by any facts other than a written report. This is not enough to make such presumptuous conclusions. I don’t understand what this PR is for.
The military leadership of the Armed Forces was also reshuffled, with new commanders appointed. “Throughout the year, my deputies, the General Staff team, commanders, and our soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, officers and generals have stood in the ranks alongside me.”
Under Oleksandr Syrskyi, trials against military leadership and officers began. I do not agree that people should be detained, but I do support the initiation of criminal cases where necessary—such as the case in Kharkiv. However, the detention of Colonel Dmytro Riumshyn, commander of the 155th Brigade, based on the case materials I reviewed, is a complete fabrication and falsehood. How can such actions be justified? How can one speak of solidarity after this? It is simply unacceptable. Moreover, nothing has been said about the absence of General Sodol from this “lineup.” He was dismissed due to a scandal—and not without reason. In reality, the controversy surrounding Sodol and his resignation, as a trusted figure of Syrskyi who appointed him, raises serious questions about the credibility of the army’s leadership. This is not just about Sodol personally; it is about trust in the entire command structure. Yet, not a word is mentioned—everything is presented as if it were fine. Unfortunately, Syrskyi has a tendency to make statements that do not always reflect reality.
“I would like to remind you that a year ago, Avdiivka was under heavy defense, our units were semi-surrounded. One of my first decisions as Commander-in-Chief was to order an organized withdrawal from the city destroyed by artillery and GABs (guided aerial bombs).
This is our key priority: saving lives.
We are fighting for our land, but the life of a Ukrainian soldier is the most important thing. That is why the Armed Forces have developed and are implementing a comprehensive program to save the lives of servicemen. The key areas of the program are: technologization of the army, improvement of training of Ukrainian defenders, and improvement of medical care at all stages. An important aspect of the program is the actions of unit commanders, as they bear maximum responsibility for saving the lives of their personnel.”
I’m a little surprised why Syrskyi is talking about merit. He gave the order to withdraw from Avdiivka, which is good, but have any conclusions been drawn from this? Unfortunately, after the withdrawal from Avdiivka, we had other situations where Syrskyi did not give the order to withdraw in time. He did not give the order to withdraw from Vuhledar, to withdraw from Velyka Novosilka, and he is not giving the order to withdraw from Kurakhove now. And now, thanks to the decisions of Oleksandr Syrskyi, our troops are in the lowlands near Kurakhove, in a completely uncomfortable situation. The enemy controls the dominant heights, the commanding heights are convenient, and they are inflicting losses on our soldiers. For some reason, Oleksandr Syrskyi, who is supposed to know the frontline, does not come there and familiarize himself with what it is like to fight in conditions of constant drone control over the communication routes. This is said with the claim that it is about saving lives. We see that, unfortunately, this is not entirely sincere about saving lives, to put it mildly.
I do not see any change in Oleksandr Syrskyi’s approach to preserving the lives of soldiers on the frontline when analyzing specific operations. Let’s take a look at how orders are constantly being issued to “advance, advance” and “restore positions” without any consideration for the tactical situation. Furthermore, Oleksandr Syrskyi has significant issues with personnel preservation due to his persistent interference in tactical decision-making. He frequently oversteps his authority, assuming the powers of the commander of the OSGT, the OTG, and even tactical group commanders. He bypasses multiple levels of command, issuing direct orders to brigade commanders—without having a clear understanding of the frontline situation. This has led to serious consequences. In my conclusions, I will explain why we lost Toretsk and New York, and why the enemy advanced so rapidly towards these locations.
What was happening? In Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka, unit rotations were carried out in a completely irrational manner. The deployment of the 32nd and 155th brigades near Pokrovsk was a complete failure, executed under Syrskyi’s direct orders. This is a prime example of outright incompetent decision-making. A commander who is detached from the battlefield, unfamiliar with the real situation, and operating from a distant headquarters, orders troops to move into positions that have long been occupied by the enemy. This results in chaotic engagement scenarios, leading to unnecessary casualties. Our forces fail to secure advantageous defensive lines in time. Why does this happen? Because reports are falsified, accountability is lacking, and there is constant micromanagement at the tactical level. The facts are well known to those currently fighting on the frontlines.
I would like to point out that no one seems to be aware of any comprehensive program aimed at preserving the lives of soldiers on the front lines. It is not being communicated to the personnel. The way tasks are assigned, and the way defensive operations—especially—are planned and organized, is nothing short of chaos and incompetence at multiple levels. We keep repeating the same mistakes in battles for Bakhmut, Soledar, and Avdiivka—without drawing any lessons. Once again, the problems lie at the tactical command level, in defining defensive lines, and in organizing the troops. There are too many headquarters, and they all keep pointing fingers at each other. Unfortunately, this issue has yet to be resolved within the army.
That is why I want to emphasize: if a comprehensive program for protecting servicemen truly exists, its primary goal should be ensuring that those being protected—the soldiers—are actually informed about it. What concrete measures have been taken to safeguard our troops? How exactly has their protection been ensured? Frankly, I don’t see any. Maybe someone else does. Perhaps some soldiers will correct me and say they have seen this so-called comprehensive program for troop protection and survival. Maybe some commanders are aware of it? I would genuinely welcome being corrected on this matter. Because this is the first time I’m even hearing about such a program supposedly being implemented by the General Staff. And judging by how troops are deployed at the front, in many sectors, it’s clear that such a program, in practice, simply does not exist. It appears to be nothing more than a document on paper.
Priority No. 2: Strike from Afar. In 2024, the state supplied more than 1.3 million drones to the front. We became the first in the world to establish the Unmanned Systems Forces, expanding the already renowned units such as “Birds of Magyars,” “Achilles,” “K-2,” and others. We are actively developing robotic platforms, as well as land and naval drones. The enemy is fully experiencing the destructive power of our FPV drones. Over the past year, the number of targets hit by strike UAVs of various types has exceeded 461,000.
First of all, regarding the claim that “in 2024, the state supplied more than 1.3 million drones,” it is important to understand that drones come in many different types. When it comes to Mavics, the primary reconnaissance asset on the frontline, the state has provided less than 10% of what is actually needed—far below the real consumption rate at the front.
Throughout the entire year, the state failed to ensure the necessary supply of essential reconnaissance assets. The vast majority of the “one million drones” delivered were FPV drones. Unfortunately, a significant portion of these FPV drones had to be modified in field workshops due to serious quality issues across multiple models. Most importantly, when the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief refers to the “powerful strikes” of FPV drones, he is evidently unaware of the real statistics. The primary damage inflicted on the battlefield does not come from FPV drones but rather from drones equipped with payload drop mechanisms. Whether this is due to a lack of accurate reporting to the Commander-in-Chief, or simply because he has not yet taken the time to grasp the reality, is unclear. Perhaps another year will be needed for this realization—but these are the facts.
“Once again, I wanted to return to this part about the scaling up of the existing legendary units. Unfortunately, the scaling up that was just reported actually happened only two weeks ago. I don’t know what happened, maybe it was timed for the anniversary, but it hasn’t taken full effect yet. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief decided that 5 units at the front would receive additional funding. I will soon do a stream about the current situation with planning and funding, which is actually very problematic. It’s even worse than in 2024, with many issues, including underfunding of successful UAV units. We’ll discuss the ranking of the best units. I’d like to say that the Headquarters decided to fund five of approximately 400 UAV units that are actively operating on the front in Ukraine and have established a combat record. Five units received their funding. Of those, two regiments and three units still need to scale up; they don’t yet have the personnel to perform large-scale tasks. Well-known legendary commanders haven’t yet received the necessary manpower, organization, or resources to quickly prepare and deploy their operations. So it’s great that this has been recognized, but it’s not a fact, just a prospect. It wasn’t done over the year but rather two weeks before this report, and it’s only just starting to scale and be implemented. This is the reality. And there’s still a problem in that it’s unclear what decisions will be made by the Commander-in-Chief regarding the funding of other units, for which no decisions have been made yet. Who is going to take responsibility for this? Once again, we need to create public opinion, push for action, prod, and force things to happen. It’s not something that can be done on its own.”
“A year ago, the Russian forces had a significant advantage in artillery ammunition, with a ratio of approximately 10:1. Today, this gap has narrowed to nearly 2:1.
I am grateful to our partner countries for supplying ammunition. I also want to express my appreciation to Ukrainian arms manufacturers who are ramping up production and strengthening our frontline with weapons and military equipment proudly marked “Made in Ukraine.”
This progress has also been achieved through our targeted efforts to destroy Russian artillery. Over the past year, we have eliminated approximately 13,050 enemy artillery systems—compared to 8,400 over the previous two years combined. Effective counter-battery operations, along with the increasing role of drones, have disrupted Russia’s dominance on the battlefield.
However, to be frank, I don’t see evidence supporting the claim of 13,000 destroyed guns and mortars in the available footage—and neither does anyone else. So where does this number come from, and why is it reportedly higher than the combined total of the last two years? Logically, the number should indeed be greater in 2024 than in any previous year, as drones now account for 80% of all strikes, and their effectiveness has improved significantly. But stating that 13,000 artillery systems have been destroyed—implying an extraordinary daily rate—seems questionable without solid confirmation.
Let’s take a look at what the Oryx portal, which tracks visually confirmed losses, reports for the year. As of mid-February 2024, about 650 self-propelled artillery systems had been destroyed. By March 24, this number had risen to 706. On February 8, it was still around 650. As for MLRS (multiple launch rocket systems), the confirmed losses stood at 361 in March, while towed artillery losses were recorded at 353. Oryx only tracks losses that have been visually confirmed, so the discrepancy between official figures and confirmed data raises legitimate questions.
Over the past year, more self-propelled guns, multiple launch rocket systems, and towed artillery have been destroyed. However, I do not see a figure of 13,000 here. Of course, Oryx does not record everything. At present, when there are no deep offensive operations, the battlefield largely remains under Russian control. This means that a significant portion of the enemy equipment we destroy cannot be later confirmed from the ground using objective control data. The territory stays in enemy hands, allowing them to evacuate destroyed equipment and recover remaining scrap metal. However, I believe that estimates of 13,000 or even 8,400 destroyed units are overly optimistic. Russia simply does not have that many artillery guns or mortars in total. 2024 was likely the year with the highest number of destroyed enemy artillery pieces, but I do not believe the overall figure surpasses the combined totals of the previous two years. Russian artillery also suffered losses in 2022, and throughout 2023, our drones were highly effective in targeting enemy artillery. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that artillery losses increased in 2024, and the primary reason for this is the improved organization of UAV units. In my opinion, reported figures should either be confirmed or clearly marked as estimates. Oryx’s data is incomplete.
I know for a fact that many frontline units keep their own records of enemy losses, with objective evidence confirming the destruction of far more Russian artillery pieces, soldiers, and tanks than Oryx reports—significantly more. However, we are not talking about tens of thousands.
Priority No. 3: To Win, Prepare
Despite the enemy’s persistent pressure on the battlefield, we are making every effort to improve the training of Ukrainian servicemen. The duration of basic general military training (BGMT) has been extended to 1.5 months, allowing for an expanded curriculum that now includes electronic warfare (EW) and UAV operations. We are considering extending basic training to 2 months. Additionally, we are enhancing the training of instructors and have successfully conducted an experimental program to integrate BGMT within the rear facilities of combat brigades. Furthermore, I strongly advocate for the implementation of a 14-day adaptation course within military units following BGMT—before soldiers are deployed to combat operations. The better trained and psychologically resilient our soldiers are, the stronger and more stable our positions on the frontline will be.
Indeed, in the second half of the year, the basic training cycle was extended from one month to one and a half. Unfortunately, no qualitative improvements have taken place—training centers still fail to properly prepare infantry soldiers. I have written about this many times and discussed it on streams. Friends, no one has ever truly succeeded in this. During both the First and Second World Wars, when infantrymen and sergeants were mobilized on a massive scale, their training was conducted within the military units themselves.
Every division—in the U.S., Britain, Germany, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union—had dedicated training or reserve battalions responsible for preparing reinforcements. In some cases, new brigades were formed, but how was this done? Looking at the American experience in World War II, the U.S. Army had a far more effective training system. Newly formed troops underwent a basic training course—six months at the beginning of the war. By the second half of the war, this standard had been extended to 11 months, ensuring soldiers were fully combat-ready. Even then, commanders were cautious when deploying fresh troops.The key issue today is that to ensure proper training quality, the responsibility must be handed over to combat brigades themselves—or now, to the corps.
Instead of constant experiments, the military should formally recognize and institutionalize the unofficial training units that already exist in nearly every brigade. Commanders have long realized that soldiers coming from BGMT centers often have little to no real preparation and must be retrained from scratch. To prevent unnecessary casualties in their first battles, units conduct additional training in field camps. This is an obvious necessity. Unfortunately, Oleksandr Syrskyi has only allowed this approach in select brigades led by commanders he favors. In reality, 99% of brigades still lack the ability to train their own soldiers and sergeants. As a result, we are left with ineffective, centralized infantry training centers that fail to meet the army’s real needs.
Instead of entrusting training to experienced instructors from battle-hardened brigades—commanders who will actually lead these soldiers in combat—Ukraine continues to follow the outdated Soviet model. Throughout World War I and World War II, soldiers were trained within combat units by those who would later command them. Only Ukraine persists with the Soviet-era approach. In the 1970s, the USSR implemented a highly bureaucratic and counterproductive military reform, eliminating independent training battalions that had existed in each division since World War II. In their place, Soviet generals established separate training divisions to produce infantrymen and sergeants in isolation from actual combat units. This was a disastrous experiment driven by the desire to increase the number of general positions and expand the number of divisions. We see the results today. Training centers receive widespread criticism for their lack of experience and qualified instructors—and rightly so. Where is that experience supposed to come from? These centers do not participate in combat. Only frontline brigades possess up-to-date battlefield experience. So why not let brigades train their own soldiers? Because budgets and bureaucratic positions stand in the way. This basic, globally accepted military practice—used by every effective army in history—remains ignored in Ukraine. Oleksandr Syrskyi is doing nothing to fix it. Yes, a handful of favored brigades have been granted permission to train their own troops, but that’s it. What about the rest of the army?
What is happening? Brigades receive underprepared soldiers from BGMT, and the General Staff—Syrskyi included—considers them combat-ready. These new troops are immediately assigned combat tasks, but they are not ready. As a result, unit commanders are forced to improvise, scrambling to provide at least a few extra days of training—if they’re lucky, maybe 10 days. Some manage, some don’t. There is no systemic solution. At the very least, by 2025, Syrskyi needs to read military history textbooks—everything is open-source, everything is written there. He would find out exactly how modern armies train their soldiers and why. Ukraine must finally transfer training responsibilities to the training units within combat brigades—as is standard worldwide. Any experienced brigade already has the personnel and capability to do this. The legal framework must be changed to make this the norm.
One more thing: I find it astonishing that the Commander-in-Chief says: “I insist on a 14-day adaptation course.” You are the Commander-in-Chief. You do not “insist”—you issue orders. Why do we keep hearing “insist” instead of actual orders? Because there is no order, Syrskyi did not issue an order. And now he is using this phrase to shift the responsibility for the poor additional training onto the brigade commanders themselves. Insist, don’t insist, if you have a combat order, you have received people, a combat order, to bring them to their positions, the brigade commander has to fulfill it.
I expect that in the 2025 report, Oleksandr Syrskyi will not use the words “I insist” but rather “I ordered”, “I prepared an order”, “someone did not comply”, “but someone did”. This will be the military language of this report, as we all expect.
“This year, for the first time, training on foreign models of weapons and military equipment is being carried out in Ukraine instead of abroad, which significantly optimizes costs and time.”
But the experience of the 155th and 153rd brigades does not seem to be about optimizing time. Not at all. I believe that this experience of this year shows that optimization of time consumption occurs when brigades get time to prepare, when commanders are given much more time, not a month, and even a month and a half of BGMT is not enough. We need much more time, at least 3-4 months. After the BGMT in other brigades, such as the “Charter” brigade, the third assault brigade, they have an additional course, at least a month, for at least one month of training. And this is high-quality training in the brigades themselves, after the BGMT in training centers, which give little to nothing.
Well, instructors are trained abroad, and we have seen examples of specific brigades that are simply disbanding there, like the 153rd Brigade, which has already been trained in Germany and is disbanding its battalion. Well, because it was just lip service, just for show. Well, if people were thrown abroad and spent a month in some positions, they would not become a military organism, a brigade. You have to plan organizational measures.
“Priority #4: Russia is on fire.
Strikes on military targets in enemy territory continue to escalate. Military units, arsenals, storage depots, workshops of military-industrial enterprises, oil refineries supplying fuel to the Russian army, and other targets will be attacked as long as Moscow’s aggression against our country persists. DeepStrike’s reach into Russian territory has already extended up to 1,700 kilometers. We are preparing new long-range systems, and they will be used. This year, 377 military targets on Russian territory have been successfully hit with coordinated fire strikes.”
This is true, and it is indeed a remarkable achievement. It should be noted that both Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the heads of other security agencies—such as the Security Service, the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, and the National Guard—are paying significant attention to strikes on Russian territory and to destroying Russia’s military potential, achieving a scale in 2024 that had never been seen before. This is thanks to the improvement of technological capabilities and the allocation of substantial budgetary resources to this area in 2024.
The results are visible, and overall, it should be noted that this has been a success for the Ukrainian army. Questions may only arise regarding defense planning, such as how much money is being spent, and the balance of funds allocated to the active forces on the front line, including reconnaissance drones and drones with payload drops. But overall, there is no doubt that these strikes on Russian territory are a success that the Ukrainian leadership can rightfully take pride in. It was worth the effort. And we can all be proud of it as well.
“The Air Force and other components of the defense forces destroyed 9,200 air targets of various types over the past year, which is 2.4 times more than in 2023 (3,798).”
This statistic, once again, is rather conditional. The increase in available air defense systems has naturally led to a higher number of intercepted targets. However, it’s also important to acknowledge that, unfortunately, our air defense assets have suffered increased losses as well. Due to certain ill-advised maneuvers involving our Patriot systems, the enemy managed to strike several of our batteries, along with other inadequately camouflaged assets, resulting in significant setbacks. That being said, the overall number of air defense systems has increased, and it’s worth noting that this was largely driven by initiatives from the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Ukrainian forces—including the State Border Guard Service, the National Guard, the Armed Forces, and the Security Service of Ukraine—have inflicted heavy losses on Russian drones. In 2024, the widespread deployment of FPV interceptor drones has played a crucial role in countering enemy UAVs, greatly enhancing our effectiveness. Of course, challenges remain in implementing this technology, but overall, this can be considered a significant success. While we have managed to shoot down considerably fewer enemy aircraft and helicopters than in 2022-2023—something curiously absent from the statistics—the sheer increase in intercepted drones has dramatically improved the security of both our rear positions and frontline troops, mitigating the impact of numerous Russian attacks. Additionally, certain control systems saw improvements in 2024.
“Priority 5: Non-standard actions. Not just defense.”
I find it somewhat surprising that there is so much emphasis on “non-standard actions.” Defense should be our primary focus—it must be meticulously planned, well-organized, standardized, and scalable across the entire front. Yet, for some reason, this is not listed as a priority. Instead, the emphasis is placed on “non-standard actions” and operations beyond just defense. Initially, I expected to hear news about successful defensive efforts, but that doesn’t seem to be the case.
“Ukraine is capable of counterattacking, striking, and driving the enemy back. This was proven by the defense of Kyiv, the Kharkiv offensive, and the liberation of the right-bank Kherson region. The Kursk operation further demonstrated this capability. We established a buffer zone in the Kursk region, thwarting the enemy’s plan to launch a new offensive on Sumy and Kharkiv. This operation also helped relieve pressure on certain sections of the frontline.
Over six months of active combat operations on Russian territory, total Russian troop losses amounted to over 47,000 personnel, including more than 19,000 killed. Notably, these were among the most highly trained Russian forces. A contingent of North Korean mercenaries was also decisively defeated.
During the operation, 924 Russian soldiers were taken prisoner. The replenishment of the exchange pool enabled the release of several Ukrainian servicemen, including those who had been in captivity since the spring of 2022.”
Everything stated here is true: the Kursk offensive was a successful operation at the operational level and a strategic achievement for Ukraine’s military leadership. The fact that this operation was executed at all is, without a doubt, a major Ukrainian success. One of its most important outcomes was that it forced Russia to divert a significant number of its best, most combat-ready units from other parts of the front—including elite formations such as marines, airborne troops, and even Korean mercenaries. The enemy has suffered massive, unexpected losses, throwing everything they have against Ukrainian defenses. This sector has effectively become a “sanitary zone” that absorbs enormous Russian resources. While the full casualty numbers may not exactly match statistical reports, the losses are undeniably significant and are close to the figures cited by the General Staff. Reports on the number of prisoners captured are also credible.
And here we have to thank Syrskyi for the implementation. The problem is that Oleksandr Syrskyi only has problems with standard actions. He does not know how to organize and plan defense. But he is indeed a master of improvisation in this offensive operation, the three that he has conducted are of an operational level. This is the first offensive near Kharkiv in May 2202, then the offensive in the Kharkiv region, the Balakliia breakthrough in September 2022, and this Kursk operation in August. These are successful offensives that, in principle, no one else has conducted during this war, except for Syrskyi. In terms of such offensive operations at the operational and tactical level, Syrskyi is certainly competent. He has problems with the fact that he does not know how to build a defense, as we have seen throughout the war.
“The creation of new mechanized brigades allowed fresh units to be deployed in the Kursk offensive. Thanks to this, we were able to rotate out three Air Assault Brigades from the Donetsk region to restore their combat effectiveness, replenish their ranks, and rearm them. As a result, we have now been holding hundreds of square kilometers of territory inside the aggressor state for over six months.”
This is completely untrue. If we look at the defense lines currently held by the newly formed mechanized brigades, up to 70,000 mobilized personnel were deployed to man them. A significant number—around 10,000—ended up going AWOL. And what directions do they actually hold? Let’s examine the positions of the newly formed 155th, 142nd, and 153rd brigades in the Pokrovsk direction. These cover only a few kilometers. And even then, they are supported by every available resource. So, unfortunately, these are false statements, and they mislead both society and the government. Why do this?
To admit the mistake, the formation and use of brigades in the way they were used was a mistake. Everyone knows this. There are even journalistic investigations into each of these brigades. There are a lot of complaints. Thousands of AWOL cases in the brigades. Who are you misleading? And this is in the report of the Commander-in-Chief.
“Priority #6: Changing to Win.
A year ago, we initiated an audit of military units and command structures, including the General Staff. As a result of this audit, several military structures and institutions were either disbanded or downsized, allowing us to eliminate redundancy, remove non-essential functions, and cut unnecessarily bloated personnel. The General Staff has since become a more efficient command body. The freed-up personnel were reassigned to reinforce operational and tactical command structures, as well as combat units. In total, around 70,000 service members were deployed to the combat zone following the downsizing of security, maintenance, and support units.”
I cannot agree with this assessment. Unfortunately, simultaneously with the reduction of certain bodies, new bodies were being formed. And where are these formations now? Last year, they also began forming corps, but not for the frontlines. Instead, these corps were meant to duplicate the functions of operational commands and create additional administrative structures. There are numerous headquarters, but which ones have been reduced? Tactical groups exist at every front-line position, duplicating the same tasks as operational-tactical groups. It is unclear what function the OSGT performs when the Commander-in-Chief himself gives orders to the OTG and tactical brigade commanders directly through the head of the OSGT. So, they have created a lot of officers, but where are they? I am now looking at the newly formed brigades. Yet, there is a significant shortage of experienced officers. Most of the officers in these 150-series brigades are mobilized personnel with little to no experience. Where are the trained officers in the military units? Who has actually been reinforced? This is simply not true.
“We have introduced a system of promotion and appointment of officers in the military command and control bodies, subject to the participation (experience) of servicemen in combat operations during the repulsion of the large-scale invasion of Russia. Intermediate levels of command were reduced and new military command and control bodies were formed.
The staff of the General Staff and the Office of the Commander-in-Chief was strengthened with experienced combat generals and officers. The command staff of formations and units was significantly renewed. The main criterion for appointment is the ability to effectively perform combat missions while preserving the lives and health of subordinates.”
I think that the entire army that read this is just laughing. Unfortunately, they are laughing bitterly. In terms of personnel management, unfortunately, Oleksandr Syrskyi has shown a very low level of leadership. The personnel shuffle, those constant changes of brigade and battalion commanders without any logic or planning—this is a major factor in the disorganization of the Armed Forces. Who is being appointed? I’ve written and spoken about this on air. And about the commander of the 41st Brigade, Romashko, for example. What experience? What experience during a full-scale war? They appointed a person with no experience to the brigade, Syrskyi himself. He has now unsuccessfully commanded the 41st Brigade, with significant losses in personnel, and no efforts to preserve lives were made. And despite all the statements, all the allies, and all the subordinate unit commanders saying it was a disaster and that management was poor, they kept Romashko. ‘Remove Romashko,’ they said. But no, Syrskyi kept him because he has his favorites. And there’s no experience there. Romashko didn’t command any troops during the ATO at all. At the beginning of the war, he was in charge of a mobilized battalion, and honestly, he didn’t prove himself well. Then, suddenly, he was put in charge of a brigade. Why? What merits? As a result, there were problems when the 41st was deployed in the Kursk region. Many months passed, and now Romashko has been replaced, reassigned from the 41st Brigade from Kursk. He was removed and reassigned to the 128th Territorial Defense Brigade. I sympathize with the personnel of that brigade. But when Oleksandr Syrskyi writes about his personnel policy, frankly, it’s not funny—it’s tragic. When a person doesn’t realize that people should be appointed based on real merits from combat operations, not because you like them.
And this system of favorites—someone loses a few strongholds, and I’ve talked about this repeatedly on air. In the 59th Brigade, an infantry brigade, there was a brigadier. Maksym Stetsenko was appointed after Sukharevskyi, and he was removed after only a month on the job. The official reason was that he lost one company stronghold and 10 other positions during the Russian offensive near Krasnohorivka. Then Bohdan Shevchuk, a 32-year-old commander who is liked by Oleksandr Syrskyi, was appointed. And now, despite the loss of villages, positions, and settlements, Syrskyi still likes him and keeps him in his position. So, a system has been created where if someone loses a position, Syrskyi immediately removes them. But if someone else loses a position, they are allowed to stay—Romashko is allowed. Others are allowed as well. It’s a double standard.
And I want to say that the decision to replace commanders is also a chaotic mess that Syrskyi orchestrated in the 24th Mechanized Brigade, effectively undermining its combat capability. Replacing competent commanders like Holishevskyi and Mazarchuk is an unjustified blow to combat effectiveness. It’s sheer arbitrariness when experienced officers are removed simply because they are inconvenient, because they report critical information, take initiative, and refuse to stay silent. Some positions have been lost and not regained. And he is not allowed to act. But why? Many brigade commanders have far more experience in building defenses than Oleksandr Syrskyi and a much better grasp of the tactical situation. How can you just remove such a person? For what reason?
“Intermediate management levels have been reduced.”
Well, to put it mildly, this is a joke. Especially when it comes to Colonel Ledovyi—I’ve mentioned him several times before. He dismantled the command structure of the Luhansk OTG, then did the same to the Donetsk OTG while serving as chief of staff. And yet, Oleksandr Syrskyi appointed him to lead the Luhansk OTG—straight from the Ground Forces headquarters. A man who had never commanded a brigade, who had never fought in actual combat. So everything stated in this report is simply false. A person with no command experience during active combat was placed in this position, yet the report claims that only qualified individuals are appointed. How can anyone trust this? What’s the point of this? I just don’t get it. Who are these praises meant for? The army knows this isn’t true.
This is nothing more than a sad joke.
“This year, the Armed Forces have fully transitioned to NATO standards and principles in training and command.”
Can I ask what specific NATO standard or principle of command and organization has been adopted in the Armed Forces of Ukraine? Just one. The correct answer is zero. There is none. What NATO charter have we applied to troop organization and command? Can you provide a name? A number? There is nothing. Our command system is a Soviet model, translated into Ukrainian with some minor modifications—improvisations that depend on the intellectual capacity of the leadership. But there is nothing from NATO. Decentralized command in NATO starts with responsible planning. For decentralized command to work, the organizational structure of the troops must be changed. Are OTGs and TGs (Tactical Groups) part of NATO doctrines? No, they are not.
I advise Oleksandr Syrskyi to look at U.S. Army regulations on organization—division, corps, army. We have nothing like that. Planning… Do we plan our operations according to MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process) standards? Who applies MDMP in the General Staff? OTG? TG? OSGT? Or maybe the General Staff itself? It doesn’t exist. This is not true.
Why blatantly lie? Not a single NATO command and control standard has been implemented in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. There are a few brigades where commanders who understand these concepts—who have studied independently or abroad, usually on their own initiative—are implementing modern management systems, creating a proper NCO corps, and decentralizing command structures. But they are doing this on their own, not as part of an official, systemic reform.
Because a NATO standard is not just an Excel table or a name tag on a uniform. It is a comprehensive set of measures that reshapes the organizational structure of the armed forces. And when the structure changes, so do the principles of tasking, operational planning, reporting, and the so-called after-action review standard—which, despite all the discussions, is still absent in our army. This is what NATO-style command and control really means. And it’s a major issue that we are not implementing it. Our generals train a handful of officers according to NATO standards and allow its use in certain units. They don’t obstruct it. But, unfortunately, it’s happening in only a few select units. 98% of the army never encounters these practices. And most importantly, the entire command hierarchy—from the General Staff down to tactical groups—does not function according to these principles.
“Priority No. 7: Strengthening Capabilities.”
Over the past year, the Armed Forces have increased their combat potential, allowing us to prevent enemy breakthroughs and hold back their offensive, despite the enemy reinforcing its forces by another 140,000 troops.
This is a general statement. The enemy has increased by 140 thousand and we have somehow increased our combat potential. There are no specifics. I also believe that the potential of the Ukrainian army has increased. But this has nothing to do with the fact that the number of the enemy is increasing. And it has nothing to do with any of our targeted actions. Unfortunately, this is chaotic warfare, where our more motivated troops, who are engaged in self-organization, self-training, receive more drones or buy them, order them for volunteers, get them, and inflict more damage on the enemy. And, unfortunately, there is no planned effort to reduce the potential of the Russian military. And we still have no defense line or defense borders where the enemy could be stopped and troops could be deployed in time. This is a big problem.
“We have created assault units (companies, battalions) that have proven their effectiveness during active combat operations, including in the Kursk region. Today, we are forming assault regiments based on them.”
Here, I agree and believe that Syrskyi demonstrated strong intuition and leadership, particularly in organizing these assault units. I’d note that when he personally engages in micromanagement, he does it quite effectively. The problem, however, is that he cannot replicate this level of control across the entire army. In the Kursk region, three assault battalions played a key role in breaching the enemy’s defensive lines and expanding the bridgehead. They secured breakthroughs on the flanks in the center of the Russian battle formation: 225th Assault Battalion, commanded by Oleh Shyriaev; 33rd Assault Battalion, commanded by Oleh Manko; 253rd Assault Battalion “Arey” These battalions demonstrated high combat effectiveness, successfully securing a breakthrough corridor and enabling our air assault brigades to push forward. This was a critical achievement and a strategically sound decision. I fully support the decision to scale up these assault battalions into assault regiments. Some of these units have proven their ability to hold the front, manage personnel effectively, and maintain combat readiness—they are, in fact, one of the pillars keeping the frontline stable. This decision is well-founded and a genuine success.
“We have also managed to significantly increase the capabilities of the Armed Forces to fight in the electromagnetic spectrum. An additional electronic warfare battalion , more than a hundred electronic warfare companies in brigades and electronic warfare units in line battalions of brigades have been formed. The formation of a separate training center for electronic warfare specialistshas begun . The “Iceberg” electronic warfare management system was developed and implemented in the troops. 83 newest electronic warfare devices were codified and tens of thousands of them were delivered to the troops . The capabilities of the electronic warfare subsystem ” Pokrova” were increased “.
Of course, I partially agree here, there is attention to the development of electronic warfare. Unfortunately, there is no systematic development of planning as it is written there. Yes, new organizational forms have been signed, but there are simply no people, no support, and the development of our electronic warfare troops is inferior to the scale and level of those in the Russian Federation, and we need to catch up. This requires budget planning, because most of the tens of thousands of electronic warfare equipment that Oleksandr Syrskyi said were supplied by volunteers at their own expense. This is not the result of a supply from the state.
In addition, I would like to address the EW-Aisberg management system: there is an ongoing struggle over who will oversee it. Unfortunately, there is no clear planning. Oleksandr Syrskyi recently announced the EW-Aisberg system—but why? Other systems have also been effectively used. Why this one? Where exactly is it deployed, and how is it managed? We have systemic problems with electronic warfare, and the coordination between EW systems and drones is one of the weakest links. Our own EW systems are shooting down and destroying a significant number of our own UAVs. In some sectors of the frontline, there were periods when up to 50% of drone losses were caused by friendly EW systems. Additionally, while a large number of EW companies and battalions have been deployed, this does not necessarily mean they are fully staffed. Specialists should first be assigned from technical branches of the military—not immediately to assault troops, but primarily to technical units. This is the only way to truly protect the lives of infantry soldiers on the front. However, in our case, both drone units and EW units are staffed on a residual basis. This severely slows down the implementation of all these plans. Still, the creation of additional organizational structures is at least a small step forward.
“We have increased the capabilities of fighter air cover by deploying F-16 aircraft. We are also strengthening our air defense with Mirage 2000 multi-role fighters, which have already been provided by our French partners.”
This is true and represents a significant reinforcement. Most importantly, these aircraft provide additional platforms for strike missions and greater capabilities for air defense, allowing for more effective interception of Russian drones and cruise missiles.
“We have improved counteraction and defeat of UAVs by engaging combined airplane and helicopter detachments and UAV interceptor crews. Countering guided aerial bombs and defeating GABs (guided aerial bombs) was enhanced by additional deployment of modern hardware and software systems and electronic warfare systems.
We provided direct cover for priority critical infrastructure facilities in the fuel and energy sector and industry.”
Yes, in principle, this is true. Indeed, there are serious developments and improvements. We cannot yet create such a dense air defense, but a certain percentage of the enemy’s weapons, attack weapons, and air attacks are being shot down.
Again, what is needed to create order? It is necessary to formulate a vision and issue orders so that operators of mobile groups that destroy drones can perform their tasks accurately and have the opportunity to continue doing so, so that effective teams are not transferred to other branches of the military to perform other tasks. In order to train more electronic warfare crews and air defense interceptor crews on the basis of air defense units, this will be a qualitative strengthening and manning. That is, again, manning up and allocating people and resources. This is the defense planning that the state needs.
“We have banned the enemy’s surface forces in the western part of the Black Sea, thus creating the conditions for the launch of the sea corridor and exports from/to Ukrainian ports. We forced the Russian Black Sea Fleet to withdraw virtually all warships, including Kalibr carriers, from Sevastopol and Feodosia to Novorossiysk.”
This task was accomplished in 2023, but it is good that it is also being fulfilled in 2024.
“The experience of three years of combat operations against the enemy’s superior forces dictates the need for changes in the formation of groups and the structure of troops to become more stable and manageable. We see and understand this. Therefore, these changes will soon take place. In particular, the transition to the corps system initiated by me. We conducted a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the existing command and control system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Based on its results, the National Security and Defense Council put into effect the Concept of Reorganization of the Armed Forces in Warfare, which we developed to maximize the combat potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We have almost started forming army corps as the first step towards improving our army.”
Yes, it is true, this has been done literally in the last two weeks, but this concept has not yet been implemented, that is, they have just begun. Again, at the end of the year, some changes began, nothing was done for a whole year, and moreover, the leadership of the Armed Forces has repeatedly stated over the past year that they do not need any divisions and corps, that they are well managed as they are. But now it is clear that other organizational forms are still needed at the front, which is very good, they have recognized this, but again, orders have been issued, they have not yet been implemented. No corps has actually been deployed to the front with its own set of troops. We will follow and hope that these statements of the Commander-in-Chief will be implemented in practice, in the sense that the corps exist according to NATO standards. You can look at the US Army.
“At the end of the third year of the large-scale war, we continue to fight, no matter how difficult it is. We are streamlining mobilization and intensifying recruitment. At the same time, under the current circumstances, we cannot do without relocating and seconding servicemen from non-combat military units to combat ones. This process is currently underway. After all, if the frontline collapses, as they say, all our plans will be worth nothing.”
I would like to point out that there are serious problems with mobilization and recruitment. The main issue is that the waves of scandals surrounding the transfer of personnel from rear units to combat units arise because, in 99% of cases, these individuals do not receive combat training while serving in rear positions, nor do they receive adequate preparation before being deployed to the front. This is the core problem. For them, this transition is highly stressful and leads to significant casualties. As a result, numerous scandals erupt—scandals that could be avoided if proper care were taken. Not just in theory, as written in some concept that no one in the army is aware of or finds useful, but through concrete orders. If there were a clear directive ensuring that personnel were transferred first to a training combat unit—a brigade where they are meant to serve—preferably an experienced one rather than a newly formed one, the situation would be different. There should be an official order from the Commander-in-Chief, not just a recommendation from Syrskyi, establishing an intensive three-month additional training course. In those three months, the individual could acquire the combat specialty deemed necessary by the command. If such a system were in place, these scandals would not be happening.
And the scandals are severe because they take a person in a rear position, a radar station operator, and tell them, ‘Tomorrow, you’re an assault trooper. Go ahead.’ And that’s it. Naturally, people go AWOL, fail to perform, or evade. But what else can they do? They are human beings. For some reason, the generals don’t go on assaults, even though they are career military personnel. They could set an example for the inexperienced, the mobilized, but they don’t. Because the generals believe, rightly, that a specialist follows a career path and should remain in their designated role. But if everyone, including the air force, the radio engineering troops—everyone—must be in the infantry, then why don’t we have general platoons in the infantry? It would be very useful. They could be seconded. Temporarily attached for a time. Sent to an assault regiment for a couple of missions. There are large staffs, the Commander-in-Chief has thousands of people working in the General Staff, in the Ministry of Defense. A temporary platoon of generals, just like radar station operators and electronic warfare specialists who are also sent to the front. If you’re reassigned to an assault platoon, at least storm for a week, and then you can pass on your valuable experience to your superior.
Because if the entire army is infantry, then it should all be infantry. But if not everyone is infantry and some positions require specialists with experience, then this principle should apply not only to generals but also to soldiers, technical specialists, and officers. Everyone should have a clear logic for their deployment. That would be fair.
“Priority #8: Unity is the key to our resilience.
“I have spent this year alongside our soldiers. I regularly meet with them on the front lines, listen to their suggestions and requests, and work with them at command posts to develop new solutions for the battlefield.”
I acknowledge that Oleksandr Syrskyi does frequently visit the front. However, my one piece of advice to him would be to visit not only brigade command posts, which are often located dozens of kilometers away from the actual fighting, but at least once during the war, he should visit a company command post. Somewhere in the Kurakhove direction, for example, where troops are ordered to hold the line in the lowlands. Just to feel the war firsthand and understand how it actually unfolds in practice. Arrive, speak with a company commander—he will lay out all the problems. Can this be done just once during the war? Just once. It would make for an impressive photo op, and I’d gladly acknowledge it on air. But it must be a real company-level visit. A company command-and-observation post is small—it cannot accommodate large entourages. Only a guard, a driver, and the Commander-in-Chief himself should go. Just once. He should simply listen—listen to what the soldiers and frontline commanders, the ones actually waging this war, have to say. Then he will truly understand the conditions in which they operate.
I simply suggest this because the war from the perspective of the General Staff or brigade headquarters often looks vastly different from the war experienced by the soldiers on the ground. To be with the troops means to be among them, where they carry out their missions. This would be an invaluable, eye-opening experience, which I hope would allow the next report in 2025 to be presented without the issues I’ve outlined today. A report that fully reflects reality—where we can be proud not just of certain isolated achievements but of every aspect, every point, every effort. Thank you, friends, for this stream. It was quite long, but the topic is vast. Thank you for tuning in! Glory to Ukraine!” Source: https://censor.net/en/r3534969
