- JONATHAN GORVETT
People pose for photographs with a large snowball at Süleymaniye Mosque after a snowstorm on Jan. 18, 2021 in Istanbul, Turkey. (PHOTO BY CHRIS MCGRATH/GETTY IMAGES)
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March/April 2021, pp. 48-49
Talking Turkey
By Jonathan Gorvett
RECENT TIMES have seen a wide range of about-faces around the Middle East, from the Gulf states’ public re-embracing of Qatar to a cluster of Arab countries recognizing Israel.
Now, Turkey seems intent on boarding this bandwagon too, with Ankara announcing an ever-widening new friendliness in relations with nations it had only recently been condemning.
It began with Israel, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had accused of “genocide” against the Palestinians back in 2018. By Dec. 25, 2020, Erdoğan was ready “to bring our ties to a better point,” he announced, after top adviser Mesut Hakki Caşın had told Voice of America that, “If Israel comes one step, Turkey maybe can come two steps.”
Next, it was France’s turn. With Paris having been Ankara’s rival from the Sahel to Syria, as recently as Dec. 4, Erdoğan had been urging the French leader, Emmanuel Macron, to undergo “mental checks,” while loudly backing a boycott of French goods. By Jan. 15, however, Erdoğan was reported to be exchanging letters with Macron, while wishing him a happy new year.
In the meantime, Ankara has also reached out to the EU—and Germany—after years of disputes over issues ranging from Turkish human rights abuses to refugees and maritime limits in the Eastern Mediterranean. By Jan. 18, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu was announcing that, “A forward-looking development path with permanently constructive relations,” was now in the cards with Brussels.
Meanwhile, in the Gulf, Turkey has also been making nice with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE; rivals for power and influence from the Horn of Africa to the Western Desert.
The Jan. 5 Al-Ula deal ending the blockade of Qatar—a strong Turkish ally—was praised by Erdoğan, with the regional rumor mill now suggesting everyone from the Qatari emir to Lebanese prime minister-designate, Saad Hariri, may be about to mediate a Gulf-wide reconciliation with Turkey.
Finally, even Greece was invited in from the cold. On Jan. 12, Çavuşoğlu announced that the two countries would resume talks— suspended since 2016. These talks took place on Jan. 25 in Istanbul, and concluded with both sides agreeing to another round of talks in Athens.
Yet, despite the Turkish foreign ministry’s hyper-active start to the new year, serious doubts remain as to the sincerity of Erdoğan’s volte face. Indeed, many suspect that these moves may not signal a real change of heart in Ankara, but rather, a combination of domestic pressures and one major international change: the new U.S. presidency of Joe Biden.
DOMESTIC DILEMMAS
While Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) remains the most popular single party in Turkey—a January poll by Istanbul Economic Research gave them around 31.6 percent of the vote—it has also recently been losing support.
“The AKP faces a generational challenge,” says Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, the German Marshall Fund’s Ankara director. “Young and first-time voters are less likely to vote AKP, so there is therefore a chance Erdoğan might lose the next election.” While that is not scheduled until 2023, Erdoğan is clearly concerned at this erosion of popular support—with the economy another major factor driving this political development.
Last year, “Turkey experienced a near-death situation,” says Ünlühisarcıklı. Back then, Erdoğan had insisted on un-conventional economic policies regarding interest rates, triggering a major currency depreciation and rocketing inflation.
At the same time, Erdoğan’s more confrontational foreign policy has led to Turkey clashing with many key trading partners, such as the EU, and global powers, such as the U.S.
This has had economic consequences, too, as the threat of sanctions from both the EU and U.S. has impacted investor confidence in Turkey, hampering the crucial foreign investment flows and credit lines that finance much of the country’s economic growth.
Faced with imminent economic meltdown, Erdoğan eventually made a major about-turn, firing the finance minister—his son-in-law—and the central bank governor in early November 2020. Both were replaced with more conventional figures.
“This happened almost simultaneously with the start of the new foreign policy approach and talk of democratic reform,” says Ünlühisarcıklı.
Indeed, along with the start of reconciliatory remarks about Turkey’s neighbors, Erdoğan also began talking of a new era of judicial and democratic reforms for the country.
DEVIL IN THE DETAIL
Yet, within days of that announcement, Erdoğan fired Bülent Arinç, one of the last “big beasts’” of the early AKP, which Arinç had helped found.
Arinç’s misdemeanor appeared to have been his call—under the new spirit of democratic and judicial reform—for the release of the imprisoned co-chair of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), Selahattin Demirtaş, and human rights activist Osman Kavala.
Likewise, on the economic front, after tolerating interest rate hikes for two months, on Jan. 15, Erdoğan returned to his old position, slamming such moves—and giving the Turkish currency its biggest one-day fall against the U.S. dollar since late November.
Under such circumstances, trust is also likely to be a factor when it comes to dealing with Erdoğan’s new foreign policy friendliness. Indeed, “The initiative looks more like an exercise in Turkish diplomacy and a kind of face lift for Erdoğan,” says Ekavi Athanassopoulou, assistant professor of international relations at the University of Athens.
Similarly, Gallia Lindenstrauss from the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, says that for Israel, “There is also a high level of mistrust” for Erdoğan’s outreach, given his history of anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic rhetoric, and continued support for Hamas.
Given Turkish understanding of the control the Israel lobby has over U.S. foreign policy in general, too, there is also a suspicion in Israel that “With a Democrat administration entering office in the U.S., it is better to repair relations with Israel,” says Lindenstrauss.
Regarding relations with Brussels, meanwhile, “There is rhetoric, but so far not followed by substance, on the EU,” says Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, an associate professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at Bilkent University in Ankara and head of the Turkey Program at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens.
In March, the EU is due to examine sanctions against Turkey, over Turkish hydrocarbon activities in Eastern Mediterranean waters, which are claimed by EU-members Greece and Cyprus. Ankara’s dismal human rights record has also caused consternation in Europe, as did Turkey’s weaponization of the refugee issue last February, when refugees and migrants were shipped to the Greek border and ordered to cross in an effort to pressure the EU over Syria.
Regarding the U.S., under Trump, Erdoğan was often protected from congressional and judicial enquiries and economic sanctions over the purchase of Russian anti-aircraft missiles. Now, there is a fear in Ankara that this will come to an abrupt end under Biden.
“Biden is one of only two living senators who voted for an arms embargo against Turkey in 1974,” says Ünlühisarcıklı, recalling the U.S. response to Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus that year. “Biden is interested in the Eastern Mediterranean and knows it well.”
That is certainly causing alarm in Ankara. Whether it will also cause a real shift in policy, however, remains to be seen—with plenty of skepticism about this new friendliness to overcome currently around the region.
Jonathan Gorvett is a free-lance writer specializing on European and Middle Eastern affairs.
