When a temporary “emergency” organization transforms into a permanent Washington fixture with direct access to the U.S. government, when it pivots overnight from demanding sanctions to opposing them based solely on who controls Damascus, and when its leader’s social media history reveals support for designated terrorist organizations while publicly championing democracy, it’s time to ask uncomfortable questions about who really influences American Syria policy.

December 2024 marked a stunning turning point in Syria’s bloody civil war. After poison gas attacks, mass killings, rape, torture, and abductions left millions displaced and hundreds of thousands dead—and turned Syria into a veritable wasteland in desperate need of foreign aid and investment—the regime led by Bashar al-Assad finally collapsed.

In its place rose a new government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist organization once affiliated with al-Qaeda. While many cheered al-Sharaa’s ascendancy, others worried that his jihadist history would put religious minorities, especially Syria’s Alawite population—which served as the base of support for the Assad regime—at risk.

These fears gained credence in March when more than 1,000 Alawites were murdered in Syria’s coastal cities by Syrian security forces and allied militias, according to Amnesty International and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR). Violence escalated further in April-May and July 2025, with massacres targeting the Druze minority in Suwayda province resulting in over 200 deaths, including extrajudicial executions and looting by government-aligned forces and Bedouin tribes.

On July 15, 2025, Syria announced a ceasefire after the latest outbreak of violence, with reports documenting 21 Druze civilians executed in “field executions” by government forces.

Despite these atrocities, advocates for the new regime, including the Syrian Emergency Task Force (SETF) and its Palestinian-American activist CEO, Mouaz Moustafa, have downplayed the incidents. On March 12, 2025, SETF issued a press release condemning not the violence itself, but the “misinformation campaign” about it, attributing killings to “undisciplined armed factions” and “Assad regime remnants” while praising government security forces as “crucial in protecting civilians.” The organization claimed that “field sources and religious leaders from various Syrian communities have confirmed that no organized campaigns of sectarian violence were conducted by the government.”

SETF took a similar approach when Syrian government forces again invaded Suwayda early on July 16, prompting Israeli strikes on Syrian government facilities. Rather than condemning the renewed violence against the Druze minority, Moustafa launched into anti-Israel rhetoric on social media, revealing where SETF’s priorities lie when the government they support attacks ethnic and religious minorities.

This selective concern for sectarian violence contrasts sharply with Moustafa’s previous statements. In 2018, he described demographic changes under Assad as “ethnic cleansing” and emphasized that Assad “never protected minorities.” He detailed how “entire populations” were displaced and their properties given to “Iranian-backed militias,” calling it “a strategy led by the Iranians to change the demographics of Syria.”

Yet when similar demographic pressures and sectarian violence threaten Alawites and Druze under the new government, SETF has remained notably silent or offered only qualified criticism, demonstrating a double standard in how civilian protection is evaluated based on which government is responsible.

Who Is Mouaz Moustafa?

Who will influence American policy toward Syria in the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s ouster? The Syrian Emergency Task Force and Mouaz Moustafa are running what amounts to a coordinated campaign to align U.S. interests with Islamist objectives even as they masquerade as democratic reformers.

From its beginnings as a temporary crisis response organization, SETF has evolved into permanent political advocacy, contrary to its founding principles. Moustafa, who has served as SETF’s executive director since he founded the organization in April 2011, a month after the Syrian civil war began, told the Middle East Forum that he “had no idea the organization would still be around 14 years later” and was “hoping the whole thing would end in weeks or maybe a month.” “That’s why we called it the Syrian Emergency Task Force.” SETF was the first anti-Assad organization to set up offices in Washington, D.C., Moustafa explained. “All we wanted to say was ‘[Listen] to the voice of the Syrian people who were rising up against their dictator who threatens U.S. allies and supports terrorists.’”

The Assad regime is responsible for “some of the worst crimes of the twenty-first century,” Moustafa said, citing its alliances with Iran, Russia, Hezbollah, the presence of militias from Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as ISIS and Al-Qaeda. He emphasized that Bashar al-Assad created the vacuum that allowed ISIS to emerge and brought foreign death squads into Syria. Bashar al-Assad, he said, was the “source of all that misery.”

Even Assad loyalists were not safe from oppression, Moustafa declared, adding that “if the guy [manning] the checkpoint fought with his wife that morning, you could disappear forever.” The fall of Assad, he said, felt like “a lifting of a major burden” for all Syrians.

However, the organization has transformed from providing emergency humanitarian assistance into a sophisticated Washington lobbying operation. In the same 2018 panel discussion, Moustafa emphasized the importance of Syrian self-determination “without any outside intervention. Not from the Gulf States, not from Iran or Russia, not from Europe or the United States or anyone. Now Syrians can have the self-determination that they bled and fought for.”

Today, SETF actively lobbies the U.S. government to recognize and provide sanctions relief to HTS’s government—representing exactly the kind of American intervention in Syrian affairs that Moustafa previously criticized when it favored Assad. The organization has evolved from advocating for Syrian independence to specifically promoting one particular faction’s rule through American political influence.

Opposed Assad Because of His Crimes; Supports al-Sharaa Despite His Misdeeds

The same organization that lambasted Bashar al-Assad for his crimes has been a booster for al-Sharaa, who, according to NPR, was a designated terrorist since 2013. SETF’s efforts to legitimize Sharaa’s regime were evident in early March, when the organization praised the peace agreement in Syria, declaring it “a crucial step toward national reconciliation, stability, and inclusive governance.” Moustafa himself has become an ardent supporter of Al-Sharaa, with whom he met in late April. “It was supposed to be a 15-minute meeting; it turned out to be a three-and-a-half-hour meeting,” Moustafa told MEF.

Moustafa admits that al-Sharaa has “a checkered past,” but avows he “is a changed man [and] is someone who looks towards peace.” Moustafa believes al-Sharaa’s desire for peace reflects the hopes of all Syrians. “Everyone is just sick of war in Syria for 14 years. People just want to move on and rebuild and look towards Donald Trump,” he said.

Such pragmatic acceptance of a former al-Qaeda affiliate contrasts with Moustafa’s earlier views. In a recent critique of the Biden administration, he condemned officials as “complicit” in Assad’s crimes and demanded accountability, emphasizing that “Syria would not be forgotten.” Yet his organization now advocates for American support of al-Sharaa’s government while applying fluctuating standards to leaders based on their current political utility rather than consistent principles holding them accountable for past actions.

His support for al-Sharaa continued despite reports of mounting sectarian violence. In a 2018 Foundation for Defense of Democracies panel, Moustafa condemned Assad for releasing “Sunni Jihadists and terrorists from jails” and criticized the regime for manipulating extremist groups, stating that “ISIS and Assad aren’t friends, but they both have mutual interests.” He emphasized that Assad was a “master manipulator of Sunni extremism” who would “release Sunni Jihadists and terrorists from jails … in order to show the world that look, it is him against terrorism.”

Yet SETF now actively supports al-Sharaa, who led Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian progeny. Again, this fundamental shift from condemning jihadist manipulation to embracing a former jihadist leader assigns guilt based on political alignment rather than consistent principles about extremist leadership.

In March 2025, amid the coastal massacres that killed over 1,000 Alawites—described by Human Rights Watch as potential war crimes—SETF issued a press release welcoming a “landmark agreement” between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a “crucial step toward national reconciliation.” It failed to condemn the killings, instead attributing them to “undisciplined armed factions” and “Assad regime remnants” in a separate statement, while praising government security forces as “crucial in protecting civilians.”

Moustafa and SETF played a crucial role at every stage of Syria’s transition: from celebrating Assad’s fall and backing al-Sharaa’s rise, to countering disinformation against him and actively brokering meetings and policy shifts in his favor, to publicly justifying and cheering U.S. engagement with his government. Their support has been consistent and multi-faceted, combining grassroots activism, media advocacy, and high-level diplomacy.

Asserts Minorities Support Al-Sharaa

The massacre of more than 1,000 Alawites in early March represents an undeniable stumbling block to Moustafa’s narrative about Syrians of all backgrounds uniting under al-Sharaa’s rule. The massacre generated great concern from human rights organizations about the safety of Syria’s Christians. On March 12, SETF alleged the violence was committed by “undisciplined armed factions,” while the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said many of the killings were perpetrated by pro-government actors. In response to correspondence from MEF, Marie Cure, SETF spokesperson, declared that “SOHR is not a reliable source, as it has ties to Iran and the former Assad regime.”

Similar patterns emerged in subsequent violence against the Druze. In April-May 2025, government-affiliated militias executed dozens in Suwayda, with SOHR reporting mutilation and anti-Druze slogans. By July 2025, clashes in the same region killed over 200, including the 21 Druze civilians executed in “field executions” by government forces. SETF has not publicly condemned these murders, instead focusing on broader calls for stability and rejecting contrary reports as “misinformation campaigns” aimed at fueling sectarian tensions.

In interviews Moustafa, while acknowledging there is “definitely fear” among religious and ethnic minorities like the Alawites and Druze, asserts these same groups view the government as their “protector” and cites arrests of rogue militias as evidence. “It was the general security of the new government that they felt provided them their insurance, their security,” he said.

Moustafa praised the new leadership, especially President Ahmed al-Sharaa, for acting against armed groups committing abuses. He claimed militias were arrested or disbanded after harming civilians, including in coastal regions with significant Alawite populations, and described the government as working actively and at great cost to prevent sectarian violence: “Four hundred security forces died fighting against militias that slaughtered Alawite civilians,” he said.

In MEF’s May interview, before the Druze massacre and in order to demonstrate that life under al-Sharaa is safe for minorities, Moustafa pointed to the absence of widespread reprisal killings or massacres as proof that the situation is being managed responsibly. “The fact that there isn’t literal genocidal massacres unfolding in Syria every day since the fall of the regime is … remarkable,” he said.

The residents of Suwayda may beg to disagree.

While SETF attributed the March 2025 violence to “undisciplined factions” and “Assad regime remnants,” a flood of independent reports painted a far more gruesome picture. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) documented the extrajudicial killing of 803 people between March 6 and 10 alone, including 39 children and 49 women. The SNHR report detailed “systematic mass killings motivated by revenge and sectarianism.” Amnesty International corroborated these findings, concluding after its own investigation that the killings were “deliberate, targeted at the Alawite minority sect, and unlawful.” The violence was so severe that the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution condemning the attacks and calling for accountability. This wave of international condemnation and detailed reporting from on-the-ground monitors directly contradicts Moustafa’s narrative of a government acting as a “protector” of minorities.

Rhetoric Over Protection: The Suwayda Response Reveals True Priorities

Moustafa’s commitment to minority protection faced its starkest test when Syrian government forces invaded Suwayda following the July ceasefire, again targeting the Druze population. When Israel responded with defensive strikes on Syrian government facilities, Moustafa’s response exhibited a double standard that undermines SETF’s credibility as an advocate for all Syrians.

Rather than condemning the government forces attacking the Druze community his organization claims to protect, Moustafa took to social media to unleash a torrent of anti-Israel rhetoric. He reposted inflammatory content declaring “Today, you are either with Syria or with the Israeli occupation, there is no third option,” and personally declared it a “Horrific day in Damascus thanks to Israel.” His social media activity criticized Israel’s defensive response exclusively while omitting mention of Damascus’s triggering attack on the Druze minority.

This hypocrisy reveals that when forced to choose between protecting vulnerable minorities and defending the al-Sharaa government, SETF consistently opts for the latter. The organization that once condemned Assad for claiming to protect minorities even as he attacked them now employs the same selective outrage when those minorities suffer under the government it supports. Moustafa’s pivot from human rights advocate to government apologist becomes most apparent in these moments of crisis, when pledges to protect minorities collide with political allegiances.

The contrast is particularly striking given Moustafa’s earlier statements. While he previously emphasized that minorities view the government as their “protector” and cited arrests of rogue militias as evidence of good governance, his response to actual government attacks on minorities reveals these claims to be mere talking points rather than sincere commitments. When the Syrian government’s actions blatantly contradict this narrative, SETF blames Israel—the minorities’ true protectors.

Moustafa: Trump’s Recognition of Syria Protects Minorities, Keeps China and Russia at Bay

President Trump’s decision to end sanctions against Syria and negotiate directly with al-Sharaa gives the U.S. leverage over the new regime that can be leveraged to pressure elites to protect minorities in the country, Moustafa claimed.

“If they screw up, if they create a threat to America’s allies in the region or anywhere, if they kill minorities or slaughter Christians or crucify Alawites or murder Kurds … then sanctions should return,” he said.

Trump’s decision to engage Syria directly through a high-profile meeting with al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia marked a turning point. “He grabbed Syria,” Moustafa said, contrasting Trump’s approach with past policies that left Syria to fall deeper into the grip of adversaries. “Trump made the right decision—a historic one.”

Sanctions leveled at Syria, while once justified, had become a liability, Moustafa warned. They discouraged U.S. and allied businesses from investing in Syria’s reconstruction, leaving a vacuum filled by authoritarian states. “When the Syrian government puts out bids … no one shows up because of American sanctions,” he said. “You know who shows up? Huawei, China, Russia.” (Huawei is a Chinese company suspected of helping the Chinese Communist Party undermine U.S. national security.)

This push for sanctions relief continued unabated even after the March Alawite massacres and July Druze killings. In June 2025, SETF applauded President Trump’s executive order lifting sanctions as a “historic step,” without referencing the ongoing violence. Critics, including the Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention, argue this advocacy risks enabling further atrocities against minorities.

The Trump administration formally terminated the Syria sanctions program on June 30, 2025, stating the goal was to “give Syria a chance at greatness.” The executive order lifted broad sanctions while maintaining targeted ones against figures like Bashar al-Assad, known human rights abusers, and those linked to terrorism or Iranian proxies. The order also directed the Secretary of State to review HTS’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Ahmed al-Sharaa’s personal designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. This policy shift was met with a mix of cautious optimism and stark skepticism from international observers. The Atlantic Council noted that, while al-Sharaa has presented a “pragmatic agenda” and gained U.S. sanctions relief, Israel remains wary. Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar, stated bluntly, “They were Jihadists and remained Jihadists, even if some of their leaders have put on suits.”

In sum, lifting sanctions prevents Syria from becoming a failed state and a magnet for extremist groups, while also keeping it tethered to the West, Moustafa argues. “Only U.S. sanctions, by lifting them, does Syria get saved from being a failed state … and it also allows Syria to close the door on China, on Iran, on Russia.”

Islamist Advocacy or Soft-Power Diplomacy

This may sound plausible, but given SETF’s history, there is reason to wonder if the organization is disguising its efforts to promote an Islamist agenda behind an “al-Sharra-has-changed-for-the better” narrative that feeds into President Trump’s fondness for dealmaking. In February 2025, Moustafa facilitated meetings between a delegation of Syrian Jews from the United States and prominent Syrians. The goal of the meeting was to encourage the Trump Administration to lift American Sanctions on Syria and allow for Damascus’s reconstruction. The meeting took place weeks after HTS militants—who had just conquered the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus— declared their intentions to wage war on Israel.

The Jewish delegation met with Musa Al Omar, a Syrian journalist photographed multiple times with al-Sharaa. Omar has expressed support for an alleged Houthi effort to eliminate America, Jews, and Israel, and in so doing, making Islam “victorious.”

Reuters states that the SETF delegation of American Jews to Syria “met with Syria’s deputy foreign minister at the ministry, now managed by caretaker authorities installed by the Islamist rebels who ousted Assad after more than 50 years of family rule that saw itself as a bastion of secular Arab nationalism.” The Reuters article names the official with whom the delegation met, but presumably his boss was Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani, a founder of Jabhat al-Nusra, designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. government in 2012. The organization, al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, was later folded into HTS. He was also a member of the Islamic advisory council known as Shura for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. MEF had a tough time finding images or mentions of the SETF-arranged meeting on the organization’s social media channels, raising questions over transparency.

During Moustafa’s involvement with the Libyan Emergency Task Force, he developed close connections with the Omeish family of prominent Islamist activists. Moreover, his early ties to Dar Al Hijrah Islamic Center, a known Muslim Brotherhood-linked mosque, indicate longstanding Islamist connections. According to the Center for Security Policy, Moustafa’s YouTube history includes tacit endorsements of terror groups: he reportedly liked videos praising Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and featured music videos glorifying Hamas and Hezbollah. One particularly inflammatory video titled “INTIFADA!!!” opens with “Palestine will be free, from the river to the sea,” a slogan advocating Israel’s destruction.

Just who is SETF meeting with and why?

SETF and Muslim Brotherhood

There are bigger issues, however. SETF has numerous ties to organizations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States. An analysis by Global Muslim Brotherhood Watch indicates that several SETF board members have held roles in Brotherhood-linked groups over the years.

Among SETF’s board members with troublesome ties is Zaher Sahloul, photographed in April 2025 with Assad Hassan al-Shaibani, the Jabhat al-Nusra founder mentioned above. According to the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch, Sahloul is the last known chairman of the Syrian Medical Society and former president of the Mosque Foundation, organizations allegedly part of the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence operations in the U.S.

The Mosque Foundation, also home of the Bridgeview Mosque, was the focus of a 2004 Chicago Tribune investigation revealing that as much as $1 million a year had been raised from mosque members that was then sent to overseas Muslim charities, three of which were involved in financing terrorism: the Holy Land Foundation, Benevolence International, and the Global Relief Foundation. In effect, SETF organized a meeting at which an alleged affiliate of the Muslim Brotherhood network in the U.S. spoke with the founder of a designated terrorist organization.

Former Members

Former SETF board members with ties to troubling organizations include Jihad Qaddour, identified as a trustee of the Muslim American Society (MAS), an “overt arm“ of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Bassam Estwani, former imam of the Dar Al-Hijrah Islamic Center, described by the Treasury Department as a front for Hamas.

Moustafa clarified that early board members “had no real control or influence over SETF.” He referred to them as “random singing uncles” who shared opposition to Assad. These board members “were never decision makers … I have been,” said Moustafa, who expressed outrage in response to questions about SETF’s alleged ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. “That’s a crazy accusation and you’re wrong to ask it,” he said.

SETF’s board members today are nothing like those who served when the organization was founded, Moustafa declares. Today, SETF’s board includes Stephen Rapp, United States ambassador-at-large for war crimes during the Obama Administration, and Ivan Nielsen, Denmark’s former special representative for the Syria crisis.

“I want people to understand that the board and staff we have now and have had for the past several years are entirely different from the names listed back in 2011 or 2012, when I was just trying to legally register the organization in Virginia,” Moustafa claimed. “At that point, you needed a board on paper, but we hadn’t yet evolved into a fully functioning organization. Once we did, I couldn’t risk having anyone involved who posed even a fraction of a threat to the mission. The stakes were too high, and the work was bigger than any of us.”

Moustafa’s pattern of collaborating with hardline Islamist elements stretches back years. In 2013, he urged Western policymakers to engage with the Islamic Front, a coalition that promotes the establishment of an Islamic State in which non-Sunni Muslims would be second-class citizens as part of a campaign to drive groups such as Iran-backed-Hezbollah from Syria. He argued the organization “should also be seen as the best hope against al-Qaida and the extremists in Syria and also against Hezbollah and Assad.” He also stated that Western powers “must engage with the Islamic Front and need to be more pragmatic and realistic about what is going on ground in Syria in order to bring them on board with whatever political solution will happen in the future.”

Nevertheless, Moustafa declares that SETF’s mission is rooted in American ideals—democracy, human rights, religious freedom—and that its funding comes primarily from U.S. churches, synagogues, and private donors, not Syrian or Arab sources. “We are not a foreign agent for any country,” he said firmly. “We get donations from amazing Americans that don’t believe in conspiracies.”

While Moustafa claims SETF’s goals have always aligned with American national interests, the organization’s track record raises serious questions. From its sudden reversal on sanctions policy to Moustafa’s documented connections with Islamist networks and his social media endorsements of groups designated as terrorist organizations, SETF’s influence on U.S. Syria policy demands greater scrutiny.

The pattern is clear: an organization that began as a temporary emergency response has evolved into a permanent advocacy operation that applies vastly different standards based on political alignment rather than consistent principles. When minorities faced violence under Assad, SETF demanded accountability. When they suffer under Ahmed al-Sharaa, the organization deflects blame and attacks those who respond defensively, including Israel, America’s greatest ally in the region.

As Syria enters this new chapter under al-Sharaa’s leadership—marked by ongoing sectarian violence that SETF continues to minimize—American policymakers would be wise to examine more closely the motivations and associations of those who claim to speak for the Syrian people. The stakes are too high, and the danger signs too ominous, to accept at face value the narrative that a former al-Qaeda affiliate has transformed into a democratic reformer simply because it serves convenient political interests.

After conducting an initial interview with Moustafa in May, the Middle East Forum sent a number of follow up questions via email prior to publication of this article. MEF will add his response when and if it is received.

https://www.meforum.org/fwi/the-curious-case-of-mouaz-moustafa?utm_campaign