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Eastern Mediterranean may be scene of first conflict of 2018

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Metin Gurcan December 26, 2017 Al monitor

  

ARTICLE SUMMARY
Developments warn of growing tension between Turkey and the Greek Cypriots over newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean.

The eastern Mediterranean is expected to witness the first conflict of 2018, as developments at the end of 2017 are signaling worsening relationships between Turkey and the Greek Cypriot-Greece-Israel-Egypt bloc. Territorial disputes over natural gas and newly discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the eastern Mediterranean basin are the reason.

Up until a few years ago, the hope was that these hydrocarbon reserves would offer a real opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus conflict. But these optimistic hopes vanished with both Turks and Greek Cypriots unilaterally speeding up exploration and drilling operations.

In 2004, the European Union had declared the Greek Cypriots the sole entity representing the island of Cyprus and accepted it as an EU member. Feeling that its hand has been strengthened following the EU decision, the Greek Cypriots claimed the right of natural resources exploration in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) around Cyprus.

Turkey, however, has been insisting that the Greek Cypriot administration in Nicosia cannot unilaterally “adopt laws regarding the exploitation of natural resources on behalf of the entire island,” as it doesn’t represent the Turkish Cypriots. Also, there is a separate disputed EEZ between Turkey and Greece in the eastern Mediterranean — another point of tension in the conflict.

Ankara reacted strongly to the Greek Cypriots’ natural gas drilling efforts in July. The Turkish army dispatched a frigate in the eastern Mediterranean to “monitor a drilling ship that is believed to have begun searching for oil and gas off ethnically divided Cyprus despite Turkey’s objections,” The Associated Press reported.

On Nov. 20, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Greek Cypriot for a trilateral meeting in Nicosia to discuss hydrocarbon resources in the region. In addition to Egypt’s president, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras also participated in the meeting, which was hosted by Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades. The Turkish Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, declared the outcome of the trilateral meeting to be “null and void.”

However, despite Turkey’s opposition, drillship Saipem 12000 sailed to carry out exploration and drilling operations on behalf of French TOTAL and Italian ENI companies in the Calypso region between March 1 and Dec. 26 in accordance with an agreement reached during the trilateral summit.

Moreover, Italy, Greece, Greek Cypriot and Israel had already agreed on the construction of a gas pipeline from newly discovered fields. The project — dubbed “East-Med” — will cost some $6 billion. An over 2,000-kilometer-long (1,243-mile-long) pipeline will channel offshore reserves in the Levantine basin to Greece and Italy.

The East-Med project could be interpreted as an effort to form a regional alliance between Greek Cypriot and Greece to confront Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Cypriots and Greece also signed a separate agreement with Israel to channel natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean basin via an undersea pipeline. Italy’s participation in this project didn’t come as a surprise, as Italy has already been exploring natural gas in the Mediterranean on behalf of the Greeks. The undersea pipeline is expected to channel natural gas from Israel’s Leviathan Basin and Greece’s 12th plot — also called Aphrodite — to Crete, and then to Europe via Greece.

On Dec. 5, the energy ministers of Greece, Greek Cypriot and Israel and the Italian ambassador to Greek Cypriot signed an accord in Nicosia on the construction of the East-Med pipeline. The participation of EU representatives in the ceremony indicated Brussels’ support for the project.

In 2017, the Greek Cypriots, Israel and Greece conducted three joint exercises in March, June and November. At the beginning of Nov. 2017, Greece and Egypt held their first joint naval exercise for the first time in quite a while.

In response, Ankara initiated its own moves and issued a navigational telex to reserve an area for military exercises. The area covers the disputed sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth blocs that the Greek Cypriots had declared as their EEZ. Ankara’s declaration came at a time when Saipem 12000 arrived in the Mediterranean.

Also, the Turkish army has kept some of its forces in the eastern Mediterranean following NATO’s Standing Maritime Task Force exercise, which was conducted Nov. 7-16. The Turkish navy’s TCG Gediz and TCG Barbaros frigates; the TCG Kalkan, TCG Mizrak, TCG Bora and TCG Meltem gunboats; the TCG Akar fuel tanker; and four underwater commando teams are still in the sixth bloc.

In 2018, Turkey will have its first brand-new drilling vessel, the Deepsea Metro II. According to navigation data, the ship left Norway’s Hoylandsbygda port some two weeks ago and is currently sailing west of Portugal. It is expected to arrive in Turkey on Dec. 31. The critical question now is whether the Turkish navy will be providing military escorts for the new drilling vessel.

If the Deepsea Metro II is to be escorted by a Turkish navy fleet while sailing to the sixth bloc, then the affair is bound to heat up. In the meantime, the Nicosia administration also announced that drilling operations in its EEZ would begin Dec. 30 and that Saipem 12000would join the operations as well.

Now the question is whether Turkey’s Deepsea Metro II and Saipem 12000 and naval fleets escorting them will confront each other in the disputed sixth bloc.

One should also consider domestic developments in relevant countries when trying to measure the extent of a possible crisis. A possible hydrocarbon crisis is an excellent domestic political issue that all governments can use to consolidate their nationalist support base.

In sum — and in comparison to 2017 — one will witness more eventful scenes in the eastern Mediterranean in 2018. The only actor that could mediate between Ankara and Nicosia is not Washington but Moscow, the new shining star of the Middle East.

Found in:MARITIME STRATEGY, OIL AND POLITICS

Metin Gurcan is a columnist for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse. He served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008. After resigning from the military, he became an Istanbul-based independent security analyst. Gurcan obtained his PhD in 2016 with a dissertation on changes in the Turkish military over the preceding decade. He has published extensively in Turkish and foreign academic journals, and his book “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan: Understanding Counterinsurgency in Tribalized, Rural, Muslim Environments” was published in August 2016. On Twitter: @Metin4020

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/12/turkey-eastern-mediterranean-likely-to-heat-up-in-new-year.html#ixzz52R0j61cr

We ignore Iran at our peril  

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 The Washington Post

A screen grab of the computer virus known as Flame. (AFP/GETTY IMAGES)

By David Ignatius Opinion writer December 26 at 6:56 PM

When it comes to cyberweapons, America is an elephant and Iran is a flea. Still, a flea can be a persistent nuisance, especially for the unprotected.

Iran’s cyber capability is the focus of a detailed study called “Iran’s Cyber Threat,” to be published soon by Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It describes a country that, although “third tier” on the cyberthreat matrix, can still do considerable damage.

The disclosures about Iran’s cyberattacks are a reminder that the United States and its allies live in a dangerous electronic ecosystem. Russia’s hacking of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign gets daily coverage, and China’s theft of American secrets has also been well publicized. What gets too little attention are the less sophisticated but still toxic weapons available to dozens of smaller countries. The United States, with its relatively open systems, can be an easy target.

The Iran study is timely: The Trump administration has declared its desire to help Saudi Arabia and other allies push back against Iran’s proxies across the Middle East in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere. The U.S. call for rollback is largely rhetoric, at this point; there’s still little clear policy. But Tehran’s allies can fight back, sometimes in ways that are hard to identify or attribute. That’s especially true with cyberweapons.

The Carnegie study describes a small but useful Iranian cyber capability that evolved partly to gather foreign intelligence and partly to spy on domestic opposition groups that coalesced in the 2009 Green Movement. Iranian hackers developed payback motive, too, after 2012 news reports about the U.S. and Israeli “Stuxnet” malware attacks on the Iranian nuclear program that had started in 2007.

A decade ago, Iran began mobilizing its own resources. This homegrown hacking culture is one of the report’s most interesting findings, because it can probably be duplicated in dozens of other emerging economies. “Iran’s cyber capabilities appear to be indigenously developed, arising from local universities and hacking communities,” the report notes. “Threat actors seemingly arise from nowhere and operate in a dedicated manner until campaigns dissipate, often due to their discovery by researchers.”

The Iranian hackers began slowly in 2007, with cyber pinpricks. A group calling itself the Iranian Cyber Army defaced dissident Twitter accounts in 2009 and, soon after, websites belonging to Voice of America. But the attacks became more serious in 2011, after an Iranian hacker penetrated a Dutch security firm called DigiNotar, opening Gmail users in Iran to government surveillance, according to the Carnegie study.

Then came Iranian counterattacks, simple but destructive. After Iran’s oil industry was hit in April 2012 by malware known as “Flame” and “Wiper,” the Iranians launched an August 2012 attack on the Saudi Aramco oil company, using a wiper virus known as “Shamoon.” According to the Carnegie researchers, the attack affected tens of thousands of Saudi Aramco computers and caused tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in damage.

Iran successfully attacked the United States as well. In September 2012, a hacker group that called itself the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters began attacking U.S. banks and financial institutions with a primitive but destructive assault known as a “distributed denial of service,” or DDoS, which basically flooded targeted computers with so much traffic that their systems crashed. Here, too, the assaults did a surprising amount of damage.

The FBI concluded that from 2012 to 2013, the Iranian operation “locked hundreds of thousands of banking customers out of accounts for long periods of time and resulted in tens of millions of costs to remediate,” the Carnegie analysts explain. Many financial institutions that the Iranians hit said little about the attacks to avoid worrying customers or shareholders.

Why did the Iranians strike U.S. banks? Revenge is the simple answer. The Carnegie report cites a National Security Agency assessment that signals intelligence “indicates that these attacks are in retaliation to Western activities against Iran’s nuclear sector and that senior officials in the Iranian government are aware of these attacks.”

Iran’s cyber capabilities suggest that the Trump administration’s new anti-Tehran campaign may not be without cost, even if open conflict is avoided. A website called the Cipher Brief, which focuses on intelligence issues, posted this month that “Iran’s . . . Cyber Hackers Poised to Strike If Trump Shreds Nuke Deal.” A computer security firm called FireEye reported this month that a group of Iranian hackers, dubbed “APT34,” has developed a new backdoor cyber-surveillance technique.

Iran has an arsenal of cyber-stones, so to speak, ready to throw. The United States, meanwhile, lives in the world’s biggest glass house.

Twitter: @IgnatiusPost

Read more from David Ignatius’s archive, follow him on Twitter or subscribe to his updates on Facebook. 

David Ignatius writes a twice-a-week foreign affairs column and contributes to the PostPartisan blog.

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-ignore-iran-at-our-peril/2017/12/26/c246078c-ea80-11e7-b698-91d4e35920a3_story.html?utm_term=.b8cb7fcdb55c

A New History of the Second World War

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December 23, 2017

Victor Davis Hanson’s “The Second World Wars” is not a chronological retelling of the conflict but a high-altitude, statistics-saturated overview of the dynamics and constraints that shaped it.

Photograph by FPG / Hulton Archive / Getty

 In 1936, Charles Lindbergh arrived in Berlin to inspect the Luftwaffe. The visit had been arranged by Truman Smith, an ingenious intelligence officer who knew that Herman Göring, the Nazi air marshal, would find the American aviator’s celebrity irresistible; Lindbergh flew to Berlin with his wife, Anne, as his co-pilot, and then, along with Smith and another officer, spent a few days meeting German pilots, inspecting operations, and even flying several German planes. (The group also had dinner at Göring’s house, where they met his pet lion cub, Augie.) Lindbergh was impressed by what he saw; Göring so enjoyed impressing him that Smith was able to arrange four more visits over the next few years. Drawing on them, Lindbergh sent a dire warning to General Henry (Hap) Arnold, the commander of the U.S. Air Force, in 1938. “Germany is undoubtedly the most powerful nation in the world in military aviation,” he wrote, “and her margin of leadership is increasing with each month that passes.”

Lindbergh was right to sound the alarm about a German military buildup. But he was wrong about the strength of the the Luftwaffe, which was not as good as he—or the Nazis—believed it to be. It was true that the Germans had more planes than anyone else. But, as the historian Victor Davis Hanson explains, in “The Second World Wars: How the First Global Conflict Was Fought and Won,” the Luftwaffe had a number of weaknesses, some very fundamental. A lack of four-engine bombers, for example, made it hard for Germany to conduct truly devastating long-range strategic-bombing campaigns against enemies overseas. (The Nazis never succeeded in mass-producing an equivalent to America’s B-17 Flying Fortress, which was in the air before the war.) The German Navy had no aircraft carriers, which made air supremacy during naval battles impossible. (In total, the Axis fielded only sixteen carriers; the Allies, a hundred and fifty-five.) Germany had limited access to oil, and thus to aviation fuel, and this constrained the number of missions the Luftwaffe could fly. Unlike the Allies, who excelled at building tidy, concrete runways from scratch as the front shifted, the Germans relied on whatever slapdash rural runways they could find, resulting in more wear and tear on their planes.

The Nazis were slower than the Allies to replace downed aircraft (they had less experience with high-volume manufacturing); they were also slower to replace fallen pilots (their aircraft were harder to operate). Over time, this lower replacement rate eroded, then reversed, their initial numbers advantage. They also lagged behind in various other areas of aviation technology: “navigation aids, drop tanks, self-sealing tanks, chaff, air-to-surface radar.” Some of these factors emerged only during the war. But others were clear beforehand, and analysts could have noticed them. In truth, Hanson writes, Lindbergh and many others were “hypnotized by Nazi braggadocio and pageantry.” The Nazis were apparently hypnotized, too. As a land-based power with a small navy, they needed the Luftwaffe to perform miracles (for instance, bombing Britain into submission). They did not see the Luftwaffe realistically; they deluded themselves into believing it could do the impossible.

“The Second World Wars” takes an unusual approach to its subject. The book is not a chronological retelling of the conflict but a high-altitude, statistics-saturated overview of the dynamics and constraints that shaped it. Hanson is unusual, too: he is a classicist and a specialist in military history at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, where he edits Strategika, “an online journal that analyzes ongoing issues of national security in light of conflicts of the past”; he’s also an almond farmer and a conservative polemicist whose articles on race, immigration, and the decline of agrarian values appear regularly on National Review’s Web site and other places. I’ve long found his political commentary tiresome—but his deeply researched and detailed military analyses are fascinating. “The Second World Wars” confines itself to the latter subject, with spectacular results. Hanson starts with the idea that the Axis powers were more or less destined to lose, then works backward to understand the reasons for their defeat. The book revolves around a question highly relevant to our own brewing confrontation with North Korea: Why, and how, do weaker nations convince themselves, against all evidence to the contrary, that they are capable of defeating stronger ones?

Hanson begins by putting the Second World War in a “classical context.” Although it was a high-tech conflict with newly lethal weapons, he writes, it still followed patterns established over millennia: “British, American, Italian, and German soldiers often found themselves fortifying or destroying the Mediterranean stonework of the Romans, Byzantines, Franks, Venetians, and Ottomans.” In many instances, military planners on both sides ignored the lessons of the past. Some lessons were local: it’s always been hard to “campaign northward up the narrow backbone of the Italian peninsula,” for example, which is exactly what the Allies struggled to do. Others were universal. Small countries have difficulty defeating big ones, because—obviously—bigger countries have more people and resources at their disposal; Germany, Italy, and Japan, therefore, should have been more concerned about their relatively small size compared to their foes. History shows that the only way to win a total war is to occupy your enemy’s capital with infantrymen, with whom you can force regime change. Hitler should have paused to ask how, with such a weak navy, he planned to cross the oceans and sack London and, later,Washington. At a fundamental level, it was a mistake for him to attack countries whose capitals he had no way to reach.

In terms of management and logistics, the Axis powers were similarly, and sometimes quite conspicuously, disadvantaged. Before the war, the United States produced a little more than half of the world’s oil; Axis leaders should have known this would be a decisive factor in a mechanized conflict involving tanks, planes, and other vehicles. (The Nazis may have underestimated the importance of fuel because—even though they planned to quickly conquer vast amounts of territory through blitzkrieg—many of their supply lines remained dependent upon horses for the duration of the war.) In general, Allied management was more flexible—British planners quickly figured out the best way to place radar installations, for example—while the Axis powers, with their more hierarchical cultures, tended toward rigidity. Axis leaders believed that Fascism could make up the difference by producing more fanatical soldiers with more “élan.” For a brief time at the beginning of the war, Allied countries believed this, too. (There was widespread fear, especially, of Japanese soldiers.) They soon realized that defending one’s homeland against invaders turns pretty much everyone into a fanatic.

In any event, Hanson shows that the Second World War hinged to an unprecedented extent upon artillery (“At least half of the combat dead of World War II probably fell to artillery or mortar fire”): the Allies had bigger, faster factories and could produce more guns and shells. “The most significant statistic of the war is the ten-to-one advantage in aggregate artillery production (in total over a million large guns) enjoyed by the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States over the three Axis powers.” Russia, meanwhile, excelled at manufacturing cheap, easily serviceable, and quickly manufactured tanks, which, by the end of the war, were better than the tanks the Nazis fielded. Many Allied factories remained beyond the reach of Axis forces. There were a few possible turning points in the war: had Hitler chosen not to invade Russia, or not to declare war on the United States, he might have kept his Continental gains. Similarly, Japan might have contented itself with a few local conquests. But temperance and Fascism do not mix, and the outsized ambitions of the Axis powers put them on a collision course with the massive geographical, managerial, and logistical advantages possessed by the Allies, which, Hanson suggests, they should have known would be insurmountable.

The Axis powers fell prey to their own mythmaking: they were adept at creating narratives that made exceedingly unlikely victories seem not just plausible but inevitable. When the Allies perceived just how far Fascist fantasy diverged from reality, they concluded that Axis leaders had brainwashed their citizens and themselves. They began to realize that “the destruction of populist ideologies, especially those fueled by claims of racial superiority,” would prove “a task far more arduous than the defeat of a sovereign people’s military”:

Sober Germans, Italians, and Japanese, in the Allied way of thinking, had to be freed from their own hypnotic adherence to evil, even if by suffering along with their soldiers. . . . Death was commonplace in World War II because fascist zealotry and the overwhelming force required to extinguish it would logically lead to Allied self-justifications of violence and collective punishment of civilians unthinkable in World War I.

Hanson explores the specific decision-making processes behind the most merciless Allied decisions—“the firebombing of the major German and Japanese cities, the dropping of two atomic bombs, the Allied-sanctioned ethnic cleansing of millions of German-speaking civilians from Eastern Europe, the absolute end of the idea of Prussia”—while, from a higher altitude, pointing out that the delusional ideological fervor that shaped the beginning of the war shaped its end, too.

Could the Axis and Allied countries have performed a searching, clear-eyed inventory of their respective strengths and weaknesses and decided beforehand that there was no point in having a world war? Could the Allies have done this on their own and decided to check Hitler’s aggression earlier? One of the tragic elements of war, in Hanson’s view, is that it often uncovers a reality that might have been comprehended in advance and by other means. Unfortunately, in the years before the Second World War, confusion reigned. The Axis countries lived in a fantasy world—they believed their own propaganda, which argued that, for reasons of race and ideology, they were unbeatable. The Allies, meanwhile, underestimated their own economic might in the wake of the Great Depression. They allowed themselves to be intimidated by Fascist rhetoric; justifiably horrified by the First World War, they wanted to give pacifism a chance, and so refrained from the flag-waving displays of aggression that might have revealed their true strength, while hoping, despite his proclamations to the contrary, that Hitler might be satisfied with smaller, regional conquests. “Most wars since antiquity can be defined as the result of such flawed prewar assessments of relative military and economic strength as well as strategic objectives,” Hanson writes. “Prewar Nazi Germany had no accurate idea of how powerful were Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union; and the latter had no inkling of the full scope of Hitler’s military ambitions. It took a world war to educate them all.”

In a general way, Hanson’s ideas are reminiscent of the thought of the Austrianeconomist Friedrich Hayek, who saw the market as a kind of information-producing machine. Buying and selling, Hayek wrote, were a “procedure for discovering facts which, if the procedure did not exist, would remain unknown or at least would not be used.” In National Review Online, Hanson writes that “war is a horrific laboratory experiment that confirms or rejects vague and inexact prewar guesses about relative strength or weakness.” Seeing war as a tragically destructive form of information discovery makes Hanson think differently about peace. The problem with peace is that it obscures the realities of relative military strength; it’s especially important, therefore, for countries to flex their muscles during peacetime. In the present, Hanson favors an aggressive response to North Korea, in large part because it might clear up mutual ignorance about everyone’s capabilities and intentions.

Sadly, a detailed examination of exactly when and how deterrence averts conflict is beyond the scope of “The Second World Wars.” Instead, with an extraordinary array of facts and statistics, the book offers an account of the fatalism of war. Until it begins, war is a matter of choice. After that, it’s shaped by forces and realities which dwarf the individuals who participate.

  • Joshua Rothman is The New Yorker’s archive editor. He is also a frequent contributor to newyorker.com, where he writes about books and ideas.

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  • https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/a-new-history-of-the-second-world-war

Why a small Central American nation became a trailblazer on Jerusalem

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Guatemala played a key role in the Jewish state’s creation and has enjoyed Israeli security assistance ever since. It doesn’t hurt that its leader is deeply religious

By RAPHAEL AHREN 

Guatemala’s new ambassador to Israel, Dr. Juan Garcia Granados leaving the President’s Residence in Jerusalem after presenting his credentials, July 1955 (Moshe Pridan/GPO)

On Sunday, Guatemala became the first country after the US to announce its intention to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, a move seen as tantamount to recognizing the city as Israel’s capital, though President Jimmy Morales’s statement included no explicit recognition.

Predictably, the Central American nation’s decision was castigated by the Palestinians and other Arab states and hailed in Israel as an act of deep friendship that marked the beginning of a new trend. Neighbor Honduras is said to be next in line. Like Guatemala, it also voted last week against the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the US’s December 6 decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move its embassy there.

Other countries — Togo, Paraguay, Romania, Slovakia — are also said to be considering following in Guatemala’s footsteps in bucking decades-old diplomatic dogma to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

But what prompted a relatively small nation far removed from the Middle East and its problems to be the first to take the plunge after the US?

There are several reasons for Guatemala’s dramatic step. The country’s well-established historic friendship with Israel and ongoing deep security and trade ties are one key part of the story. The personal character of the country’s current leader is the other.

Seventy years ago, Guatemala’s ambassador to the UN, Dr. Jorge Garcia Granados, a member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, played a crucial role in convincing Latin American countries to vote in favor of General Assembly Resolution 181, which called for the partition of Mandatory Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state.

File photo of the vote on the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine or United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947 (photo credit: Israeli Government Press Office)

The vote on the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine or United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947. (Israeli Government Press Office/File)

“It could be that without Guatemala, the resolution on that fateful day would not have passed, and history would be very different,” Knesset Speaker Yuli Edelstein told Morales during his November 2016 visit to Israel.

At the time, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recalled that he had grown up in Jerusalem near a street named after Morales’s country. “In just about every town in Israel there is a Guatemala Street because we remember Guatemala’s friendship and the friendship and leadership of your UN ambassador at the time of the decision on the Partition Resolution, and so Guatemala was etched into our hearts then,” he said.

Guatemala was one of the first countries to recognize the nascent State of Israel in 1948, and the friendship has remained strong ever since.

Telegrams of recognition of the State of Israel sent by Guatemala, Finland and Romania (courtesy GPO)

In the 1970s, Israel was said to have assisted the military juntas ruling Guatemala a great deal in the area of counterinsurgency, providing them with advice and equipment.

“Israeli-Guatemalan military cooperation began in 1971, during the presidency of Col. Carlos Arana Osario,” political scientist Cheryl Rubenberg wrote in a 1986 article on bilateral relations.

“Then the Guatemalan chief of staff, Kjell Laugerud Garcia, visited Israel and met with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and other Israeli military officials. Laugerud Garcia expressed Guatemala’s interest in procuring armaments and military communications equipment. Later that year, the two countries signed their first cooperation agreement, though specifics were not made public,” she wrote.

Guatemala saw the Jewish state “as the world’s foremost practitioner of counterinsurgency” and looked to Jerusalem for expertise and arms, according to Rubenberg. “Israeli assistance began in 1971, but it took on increased importance after 1977, when the Guatemalan generals rejected US military aid in response to Carter administration pressures to remedy their gross human rights violations.”

Later that year, Israeli president Ephraim Katzir spent a week in Guatemala City, where he signed an agreement on military assistance.

Three years later, the Knesset passed a law declaring that united Jerusalem was Israel’s capital, leading the Security Council to call on all countries to withdraw their embassies from the city. Guatemala heeded the call and moved its embassy to Herzliya.

Relations with Israel remained strong, however. At least 300 Israeli security “advisers” were said to have operated in Guatemala in the early 1980s. “Israel is known to have intelligence teams, security and communications specialists, and military training personnel in Guatemala,” The New York Times reported at the time, though Israeli diplomats denied such claims.

Ties were also strong in the fields of civilian technology and tourism, among others.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President of Guatemala Otto Pérez Molina at Netanyahu’s office in Jerusalem. December 9, 2013. (Miriam Alster/Flash90)

In December 2013, Otto Fernando Perez Molina became the first president of Guatemala to visit Israel. “Guatemala did participate in the foundation of Israel, so that has led the foundations for a tradition and the unity between our two peoples,” he told Netanyahu at the time.

Fast forward to 2015, when Morales — a former comedian who’d never held political office — won the country’s presidential elections with 67 percent of the votes. Morales, a devout Evangelical, has been called “the Donald Trump of Guatemala.” In 2016, Guatemala received nearly $300 million in aid from the US.

Morales, who called his country’s relationship with Israel “excellent,” has been supportive of many of the current US administration’s policies, including Trump’s plan to build a border wall with Mexico, and, of course, his plan to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales (R) and wife Gilda Marroquin visit the Hall of Names at Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem on November 28, 2016. (AFP/Gali Tibbon)

On his visit to Israel last year — during which he received an honorary doctorate from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem — he announced his hope to strengthen bilateral cooperation in many fields.

“Guatemala has a special relationship with Israel, and we know we can continue to work together: in partnership and hand in hand,” he told President Reuven Rivlin in Jerusalem. “During our visit we hope we will be able to enjoy Israel’s rich culture and history, and learn from you how to improve in the areas of agriculture, husbandry, and technology — areas in which Israel excels.”

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Understanding the North Korea Threat

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 JOSEPH S. NYE Project Syndicate

The US has talked itself into Kim Jong-un’s trap of exaggerating how much power his rocketry gives him. If the US could deter a much stronger Soviet Union from taking an isolated West Berlin for three decades, it can deter North Korea.

BEIJING – North Korea recently tested its Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, reaching an altitude of 2,780 miles (4,475 kilometers) during its 53-minute flight. Using a flatter trajectory could provide Kim Jong-un’s regime with the capability of hitting the east coast of the United States. Although it has not yet demonstrated a re-entry vehicle capable of surviving atmospheric friction, North Korea announced that it has mastered nuclear strike capability and become a full-fledged nuclear state.

Like previous US presidents, Donald Trump has said that this state of affairs is intolerable. So now what?

Before turning to policy, it is important to dispose of several myths that interfere with clear analysis. First, Kim may be a vicious dictator, but he is not crazy or suicidal. Thus far, he has outplayed the US in this high-stakes game, but he understands that a nuclear exchange with the US means the end of the regime he is trying to preserve.

Second, the US has talked itself into Kim’s trap of exaggerating how much power his rocketry gives him. After all, North Korea has had nuclear weapons for more than a decade; they could be delivered to US ports on its east or west coast by other means, such as in the hold of a freighter.

Third, in this game of bluff and chicken, geography provides North Korea with local escalation dominance. With thousands of artillery tubes hidden in tunnels near the border, North Korea can threaten to wreak havoc on Seoul, South Korea’s nearby capital, by conventional means. The US found this out in 1994 – long before North Korea had a nuclear weapon – when it planned a pre-emptive strike to destroy the North’s Yongbyon plutonium reprocessing plant, only to find that its allies in South Korea (and Japan) were deterred by the risk of conventional retaliation.

In terms of policy, China has proposed “a freeze for a freeze” as a means to control the North’s nuclear ambitions. North Korea would halt all nuclear and missile tests (easily verifiable); while that would not reverse the North’s nuclear status, it would slow the development of its arsenal. In turn, the US would halt the annual military exercises that it conducts with South Korea. The US would reserve the right to resume exercises if North Korea violated its test ban, or exported nuclear materials.

Some see this as a good deal, but it depends on how one assesses Kim’s objectives. If all he wants is security, we could leave him alone, perhaps sign a peace treaty, relax sanctions, and let economic growth change the regime over time, as in China.

But North Korea under the Kim dynasty is not a status quopower. Since 1945, it has been an oddity: a hereditary communist dictatorship whose legitimacy rests on its claim to be the vanguard of Korean nationalism. Thus far, it has fallen behind in the economic competition with the South, but it hopes its nuclear status will change the balance.

As Sung-Yoon Lee of Tufts University recently warned, “for the North, menacing the US is a non-negotiable means of isolating and exercising dominance over Seoul. This is how the regime of Kim Jong-un seeks to ensure its long-term survival.”

If weakening the ties between the US and South Korea is central to Kim’s strategy, China’s “freeze-for-freeze” proposal plays into his hands. And, rather than reduce risks, it may embolden the North to return to risky conventional pressure on South Korea, such as in 2010, when it sank a South Korean corvette, killing 46 seamen, and shelled South Korean islands.

US policy options are limited. One is the limited use of force. Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, Trump’s National Security Adviser, has been quoted on several occasions saying a preventive war may be necessary if diplomacy fails. But even if designed as a limited strike, would a decapitation effort or missile shoot-down remain limited? If not, casualties could range from the tens of thousands to much higher numbers.

Sanctions continue to be an option, but thus far they have not generated enough pressure to make the Kim regime give up what it regards as its key strategic asset. Chinese diplomacy and sanctions are also crucial, but thus far China has pulled its punches. It has not cut off food and fuel. China does not like Kim, but it does not want chaos – or Americans – on its border.

A possible package could be something like Cold War “GRIT,” or gradual reduction of international tension: The US assures China of its limited goals and agrees to coordinate its actions with the Chinese. No more marches to the Yalu River of the sort that triggered China’s intervention in the Korean War. In return, China uses its economic pressure and diplomacy to freeze the immediate threat posed by North Korean tests, but does not insist on a freeze on US forces.

Possible scaling back of US exercises in the future would depend on North Korean behavior toward South Korea. The US would offer to negotiate a peace treaty after North Korea accepts détente with South Korea. The US and China would accept North Korea’s de facto nuclear status, but jointly reaffirm their long-term objective of a nuclear-free peninsula. North Korea agrees to stop tests and all further exports of nuclear materials. China threatens to impose food and fuel sanctions if North Korea cheats or breaks the agreement.

The prospects for such a China-centered package are not high; but if it fails, the US should not panic. If it could deter a much stronger Soviet Union from taking an isolated West Berlin for three decades, it can deter North Korea. The US should reinforce its deterrent and defense capability through its alliances with South Korea and Japan. The presence of nearly 50,000 US troops in Japan, and some 28,000 in Korea, makes extended deterrence credible. Kim cannot kill South Koreans or Japanese without killing Americans, and that, as he surely knows, would mean the end of his regime.

The World Economy in 2018

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anixneuseis
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 MICHAEL J. BOSKIN Project Syndicate

In the tenth year since the start of the global financial crisis, the US economy reached a new high-water mark, and the global economy exceeded expectations. But whether these positive trends continue in 2018 will depend on a variety of factors, from fiscal and monetary policymaking to domestic politics and regional stability.

STANFORD – All major macroeconomic indicators – growth, unemployment, and inflation – suggest that 2017 will be the American economy’s best year in a decade. And the global economy is enjoying broad, synchronized growth beyond what anyone expected. The question now is whether this strong performance will continue in 2018.

The answer, of course, will depend on monetary, fiscal, trade, and related policies in the United States and around the world. And yet it is hard to predict what policy proposals will emerge in 2018. There are relatively new heads of state in the US, France, and the United Kingdom; German leaders still have not formed a governing coalition since the general election in September; and the US Federal Reserve has a new chair awaiting confirmation. Moreover, major changes in important developing economies such as Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil have made the future outlook even murkier.

Still, we should hope for the best. First and foremost, we should hope that synchronized global growth at a rate of just under 4% will continue in 2018, as the International Monetary Fund projected in October. Growth not only raises incomes, but also makes vexing problems such as bad bank loans and budget deficits more manageable. As former US President John F. Kennedy famously said in an October 1963 speech in which he promoted his proposed corporate and personal tax reductions, “a rising tide lifts all boats.”

For my part, I predict that the global recovery will continue, but at a slightly slower growth rate of around 3.5%. The two most obvious risks to keep an eye on will be Europe, where a cyclical upturn could stall, and the oil-rich Middle East, where tensions could flare up once again.

Second, let us hope that the Fed, guided by the steady hand of its new chair, Jerome “Jay” Powell, will continue or even accelerate its monetary-policy normalization, both by raising its benchmark federal funds rate, and by shrinking its engorged balance sheet. And we should hope that economic conditions allow the other major central banks, especially the European Central Bank, to follow suit.

On this front, I predict that the major central banks will continue to normalize monetary policies more gradually than is necessary. The biggest risk here is that markets may try to test the Fed under its new leadership, for example, if inflation rises faster than anticipated.

Third, let us hope that the Republican tax package will, if enacted, deliver on its promise of increased investment, output, productivity, and wages over the coming decade. Here, I predict that the legislation will pass, and that investment in the US over the next few years will be relatively higher than if no action had been taken.

To be sure, whether investment will rise from its currently subdued level will depend on many other factors than the corporate-tax rate. But the tax package can still be expected to boost output, productivity, and wages. The question is not if, but when.

If the full effects of the legislation are not felt before the 2018 or 2020 elections, that lag could prove politically consequential. The biggest danger is that its benefits will be delayed, and that its key provisions will be reversed whenever the Democrats are back in power.

Fourth, let us hope that governments everywhere begin to address the looming crisis in public-pension and health-care costs, which have been rising for decades. As social programs become costlier, they crowd out government expenditures on necessities such as defense, while generating ever more pressure to impose higher growth-suppressing taxes.

Europe, in particular, must not let its cyclical rebound lull it into complacency. Many European Union member states still need to reduce their government debt, and the eurozone needs to resolve its “zombie bank” crisis. Beyond that, structural labor-market reforms of the kind French President Emmanuel Macron is pursuing would be most welcome.

Unfortunately, I’m afraid that progress on structural reforms will be sporadic, at best. The danger is that slow growth will not lead to sufficient wage gains and job creation to defuse the ticking time bomb of high youth unemployment in many countries. Another risk is that reform attempts could provoke a political backlash that would be harmful to long-term investment.

Fifth, let us hope that the eurozone can avoid a currency crisis. This will depend largely on whether German Chancellor Angela Merkel can form a coalition government and restore political stability to Europe’s largest economy.

Sixth, we should hope that the EU and the UK can agree on a reasonable Brexit deal that will preserve fairly strong trade relations. The main risk here is that localized declines in trade could spill over and cause broader harm.

And, beyond Europe, let us hope that negotiations between the US, Canada, and Mexico over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will result in an arrangement that still facilitates continental trade. For trade generally, the biggest risk is that the Trump administration could start a lose-lose trade dispute, owing to its understandable eagerness to help American manufacturing workers.

Seventh, let us hope that new policies targeting information and communication technology (ICT) strike the right balance among all stakeholders’ competing and legitimate concerns. On one hand, there is reason to worry about certain Internet companies’ concentration of market power, particularly in online content and distribution, and about the effects of new technologies on personal privacy, law enforcement, and national security. On the other hand, new technological advances could deliver immense economic gains.

It is easy to envision a scenario of too much regulation, or of too little. It is also easy to envision a large-scale public backlash against the major technology companies, particularly if poor self-policing or a refusal to cooperate with law enforcement leads to some horrible event.

Here, I predict that achieving an appropriate policy balance will take years. If some future event strikes an emotional chord, the public’s mood could swing dramatically. Ultimately, however, I suspect that competition and innovation will survive the forthcoming regulations.

Finally, and most important, let us hope that terrorism is thwarted everywhere, conflicts subside, democracy and capitalism regain some momentum, and greater civility and honest dialogue return to the public domain. Should that happen in 2018, it will be a very good year indeed.

Η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία στο «παιχνίδι» του Κρεμλίνου.

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anixneuseis
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Ο κόσμος παρακολουθεί με ενδιαφέρον την εικόνα μιας Αμερικής, να εκπέμπει μηνύματα  ιδεολογικής, πολιτικής και ηγεμονικής παρακμής.

Το ερώτημα είναι αν πρόκειται για μια συσπείρωση δυνάμεων που θα εκδηλωθεί κάποια στιγμή δυναμικά, ή, για το τέλος της δυναμικής ενός τρόπου ζωής που κυριάρχησε στη Δύση για πολλά χρόνια και οδήγησε με την έλξη του και στην κατάρρευση των ανατολικών καθεστώτων.

Και ενώ η Δύση φαίνεται να υποχωρεί, η Ρωσία δίνει την εντύπωση μιας ανερχόμενης ισχυρής δύναμης που επιχειρεί να διαδραματίσει έναν παγκόσμιο ηγεμονικό ρόλο.

Στην προσπάθειά της αυτή η Ρωσία, χρησιμοποιεί, μεν, την σκληρή ισχύ της (στρατιωτικά μέσα), όπως έκανε τελευταία στη Συρία αλλά, αξιοποιεί και όλες τις δυνατότητες που έχει για την ανάπτυξη της ήπιας ισχύος της.

Ο όρος «ήπια ισχύς», καθιερώθηκε από τον Τζόζεφ Νάι στα τέλη της δεκαετίας του ΄80 και υπονοεί την αξιοποίηση μη άμεσων στρατιωτικών ή εκβιαστικών οικονομικών μέσων.

Ένα από αυτά τα μέσα, με μεγάλη επιρροή και αποτελεσματικότητα, είναι για το Κρεμλίνο η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία, της οποίας τη δύναμη προσπαθεί να εκμεταλλευτεί για να περάσει την πολιτική του, ιδιαιτέρως, σε χριστιανικές Ορθόδοξες χώρες, (Ρουμανία, Σερβία, Βουλγαρία, Ελλάδα).

Στο πλαίσιο αυτό είναι αξιοσημείωτη η παρουσία της Ρωσικής Εκκλησίας και η πολιτική που επιχειρεί να αναπτύξει στα Βαλκάνια. Το γεγονός αξίζει της προσοχής και της Ελληνικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας αλλά και της Ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής.

Το ενδιαφέρον, επίσης, είναι ότι η Ρωσία, ως μεγάλη πληθυσμιακά χώρα, έχει να αναδείξει και σημαντικές προσωπικότητες που μεγάλη επιρροή, οι οποίες διαδραματίζουν σημαντικό ρόλο και σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο, όπως τον Μητροπολίτη Ιλαρίωνα, ενώ στην ελλαδική Εκκλησία, όποιος ξεχωρίζει, «θάβεται».

Το κείμενο που θα διαβάσετε παρακάτω είναι από το worldaffairsjournal.org και αποκαλύπτει εύστοχα τη σχέση Κρεμλίνου- Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας.

Π.Σαβ.

Στα τέλη Οκτωβρίου, ο αρχηγός της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας ταξίδεψε στη Ρουμανία για πρώτη φορά από το 1962. Παρόλο που ο πατριάρχης Κύριλλος έφτασε, τυπικά, για μια θεολογική εκδήλωση στο Βουκουρέστι, οι πολιτικές συνέπειες της εμφάνισής του είναι αδύνατο να περάσουν απαρατήρητες. Η επίσκεψη ήταν μέρος της μακροπρόθεσμης στρατηγικής του Κρεμλίνου για την ανάπτυξη της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας (ROC) ως ενός ήπιου εργαλείου για την εκμετάλλευση των διαιρέσεων, τη νίκη των φίλιων δυνάμεων και την επέκταση της επιρροής της Ρωσίας σε μια περιοχή που έχει την ίδια χριστιανική ορθόδοξη πίστη. Αυτό είναι ιδιαίτερα σημαντικό στη Ρουμανία, όπου η δημόσια αντίληψη για τη Ρωσία είναι βαθιά αρνητική.

Η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία είναι ιδιαίτερα πρόθυμη να επηρεάσει την κοινή γνώμη, ενισχύοντας τις υπάρχουσες σχέσεις και δημιουργώντας νέους φίλους για το Κρεμλίνο στη Σερβία, τη Βουλγαρία, την Ελλάδα και τη Ρουμανία, όπου η χριστιανική ορθόδοξη πίστη είναι δημοφιλής. Κατά την άφιξή του στο Βουκουρέστι, ο Kύριλλος  δεν έχασε χρόνο να ξεκινήσει την επίθεση γοητείας του, υπενθυμίζοντας στους Ρουμάνους ότι «Ρουμάνοι και Ρώσοι λατρεύουν τους ίδιους αγίους και μοιράζονται τις ίδιες αξίες» – ένα μήνυμα που ευθυγραμμίζεται στενά με την ιδεολογική επίθεση του Κρεμλίνου να δημιουργήσει τριβές μεταξύ των Ορθοδόξων και των κοινωνικά συντηρητικών Βαλκανικών χωρών και της Δύσης. Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι, σύμφωνα με τα σοβιετικά αρχεία, ο Κύριλλος  πέρασε τα πρώτα χρόνια του ως πράκτορας της KGB (κωδικό όνομα “Mikhaylov”) όπως έκανε και ο προκάτοχός του, ο πατριάρχης Αλέξιος Β ‘. Στα πιο πρόσφατα χρόνια, από τότε που έγινε πατριάρχης το 2009, ο Κύριλλος, όταν αναφέρεται στην εποχή Πούτιν τη χαρακτηρίζει «θαύμα του Θεού».

Το σπουδαίο ταξίδι του Κύριλλου  στη Ρουμανία ήταν μόνο η πιο πρόσφατη προσπάθεια του άξονα Κρεμλίνου- Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας να απαλύνει τις μακροχρόνιες δυσαρέσκειες και φαίνεται ότι η στρατηγική ήπιας ισχύος του Κρεμλίνου λειτουργεί. Την Κυριακή ο Πατριάρχης Δανιήλ της Ρουμανικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας ταξίδεψε στη Μόσχα για να συμμετάσχει στον εορτασμό της 100ής επετείου της αποκατάστασης του Πατριαρχείου της Ρωσικής Εκκλησίας.

Η έννοια της ήπιας ισχύος, ένας όρος που καθιέρωσε ο Joseph Nye στα τέλη της δεκαετίας του 1980, περιγράφει πώς οι χώρες της σύγχρονης εποχής προσπαθούν συχνά να επιτύχουν τους στόχους της εξωτερικής πολιτικής μέσω της πειθούς αντί να ασκούν πιο παραδοσιακές μεθόδους στρατιωτικού ή οικονομικού εξαναγκασμού. Για το Κρεμλίνο, η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία είναι απλά ένα τέτοιο εργαλείο: μια κανονιστική δύναμη που μπορεί να αλλάξει τη στάση και τελικά να αναδιαμορφώσει το μετακομμουνιστικό ευρωπαϊκό γεωπολιτικό πλαίσιο προς όφελος της Ρωσίας.

Κάτω από την ηγεσία του Βλαντιμίρ Πούτιν, η Ρωσία έχει αναπτύξει μια ποικιλία μεθόδων ήπιας ισχύος για να υπονομεύσει την ευρωπαϊκή ενότητα και τη διατλαντική συμμαχία προκειμένου να δημιουργήσει μια πολυπολική παγκόσμια τάξη σύμφωνα με τις φιλοδοξίες του Κρεμλίνου, να εξασφαλίσει τη μόνιμη κυριαρχία του στο εσωτερικό και να επεκτείνει την επιρροή του στο εξωτερικό. Για να επιτύχει αυτούς τους στόχους, το Κρεμλίνο προσπαθεί να δημιουργήσει και να εκμεταλλευτεί σφάλματα που θα χωρίσουν την Ανατολική Ευρώπη, που αποτελούσε μέρος της σφαίρας επιρροής της, από την «παρακμιακή Δύση». Αυτή η συγκεκριμένη αφήγηση είναι ένα κυρίαρχο θέμα στο κουτί εργαλείων ήπιας ισχύος του Κρεμλίνου και χαρακτηρίζεται από έντονα αντι-δυτικά και αντι-αμερικανικά μηνύματα. Το Κρεμλίνο υιοθέτησε τη γραμμή «παρακμιακής Δύσης» περίπου πριν από μια δεκαετία και από τότε η γραμμή διαδόθηκε από πολλαπλά ρωσικά δημόσια πρόσωπα και πηγές, συμπεριλαμβανομένων σημαντικών πολιτικών, διπλωματικών, ακαδημαϊκών και εκκλησιαστικών ηγετών, και ενισχύθηκε στα μέσα μαζικής ενημέρωσης, φιλικές προς την κυβέρνηση ΜΚΟ και  στα σχολικά εγχειρίδια. Το θέμα είναι ότι  συμπίπτει με την άποψη ενός σημαντικού μέρους της ρωσικής ελίτ που πιστεύει ότι η ρωσική κοινωνία είναι βαθιά ριζωμένη στην χριστιανική ορθόδοξη πίστη και ότι είναι θεμελιωδώς ασυμβίβαστη με το φιλελεύθερο κοινωνικό μοντέλο της Δύσης.

Ο Πούτιν έχει αναλάβει ανοιχτά τον ρόλο του υπερασπιστή των παραδοσιακών χριστιανικών αξιών και της ρωσικής ταυτότητας. Συχνά αναφέρει και παραθέτει τον Ivan Ilyn (1883-1954), έναν φημισμένο ρώσο πολιτικό και θρησκευτικό φιλόσοφο, του οποίου τα οστά ο Πρόεδρος Πούτιν επαναπάτρισε από την Ελβετία τον Οκτώβριο του 2005 στη Μονή Donskoy στη Μόσχα. Ο Ίλιν χρησιμοποίησε τον όρο “mirovaya zakulisa” για να περιγράψει αυτό που ονομάζεται δυτική συνωμοσία κατά της Ρωσίας. “Η Δύση εξήγαγε αυτόν τον αντι-χριστιανικό ιό στη Ρωσία … Έχοντας χάσει τον δεσμό μας με τον Θεό και τη χριστιανική παράδοση, η ανθρωπότητα έχει ηθικά τυφλωθεί, εμπεδωμένη από τον υλισμό, τον ανορθολογισμό και το μηδενισμό …”

Στο δοκίμιο του 1950, “Τι σημαίνει η αποσύνθεση της Ρωσίας για τον κόσμο “, έγραψε αυτό που έχει γίνει η βάση για το μεγαλύτερο μέρος της σύγχρονης αντιδυτικής προπαγανδιστικής γραμμής της Μόσχας, υποστηρίζοντας ότι η Ρωσία έχει μια μοναδική πνευματική αποστολή μεταξύ των ευρω-ασιατικών εθνών.

Πράγματι, στην αποκορύφωση της κρίσης στην Ουκρανία, κατά την περίοδο των Χριστουγέννων, η “Η αποστολή μας” (“Nashi Zadachi”) του Ilin ήταν ένα από τα τρία βιβλία που διανεμήθηκαν από τον πρόεδρο Πούτιν και το συνιστούσε για ανάγνωση σε περιφερειακούς διοικητές της Ρωσικής Ομοσπονδίας και ηγετικά μέλη του κόμματος “Ενωμένη Ρωσία”. Η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία ανταποκρίθηκε στην τιμή με πλήρη υποστήριξη της πολιτικής γραμμής του Κρεμλίνου για την Ουκρανία και την Κριμαία. Φωτογραφίες που κυκλοφόρησαν στο διαδίκτυο έδειχαν ρώσους ιερείς να ευλογούν ανθρωπιστικές συνοδείες και στρατιωτικά οχήματα καθ ‘οδόν προς την ανατολική Ουκρανία.

Το 2015 ο Μητροπολίτης Βολοκολάμσκ Ιλαρίωνας Alfeyev και ο δεύτερος αξιωματούχος στην ιεραρχία της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας ταξίδεψαν στη Ρουμανία για να ξεκινήσουν τη ρουμανική έκδοση δύο βιβλίων του Ιλαρίωνα και να δώσουν διάλεξη στο πανεπιστήμιο του Alexandru Ioan Cuza, . Ο Ιλαρίωνας είναι επίσης πρόεδρος εξωτερικών σχέσεων της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας και είναι επομένως άμεσα υπεύθυνος για την προώθηση της ημερήσιας διάταξης του Κρεμλίνου στο εξωτερικό, χρησιμοποιώντας την Εκκλησία ως όχημα.

Σε αντίθεση με τον Πατριάρχη Κύριλλο, ο οποίος θεωρείται σε μεγάλο βαθμό ως απαράτσικ του Κρεμλίνου, ( ο όρος σημαίνει αυτόν που είναι μέρος μιας εξουσίας ή μιας δομής δύναμης, κυρίως του ΚΚ), ο Ιλαρίωνας είναι μια δύναμη από μόνη της. Μόλις 51 ετών, είναι διακεκριμένος θεολόγος με περισσότερα από 600 δημοσιεύματα στο όνομά του. Έχει πάρει διδακτορικά από το Πανεπιστήμιο της Οξφόρδης και το Ορθόδοξο Θεολογικό Ινστιτούτο Αγίου Σεργίου στο Παρίσι. Είναι επίσης ένας σεβαστός συνθέτης. Αυτή η φήμη ενός σύγχρονου «αναγεννησιακού ανθρώπου» αυξάνει τη δημοφιλία του Ιλαρίωνα, καθιστώντας τον έναν ισχυρό, εκλεπτυσμένο υποστηρικτή των ρωσικών συμφερόντων στην παγκόσμια σκηνή. Για παράδειγμα, πριν από ένα χρόνο, βρέθηκε στο Λονδίνο για τα εγκαίνια ενός καθεδρικού ναού μαζί με τον Πατριάρχη Κύριλλο, συναντήθηκε με την βαρόνη Anelay, υπουργό Εξωτερικών και Κοινοπολιτείας, για να συζητήσει, μεταξύ άλλων, για τη Συρία και τη Μέση Ανατολή. Η διεθνής του έκκληση προς τους πνευματικούς και συντηρητικούς κύκλους είναι ένα ισχυρό πλεονέκτημα στις προσπάθειες του Βλαντιμίρ Πούτιν να προωθήσει τη Ρωσία ως φάρο των παραδοσιακών χριστιανικών αξιών, να διαμορφώσει μια σφήνα στην Ευρώπη και τη Δύση, να επεκτείνει την επιρροή του και να αναδιαμορφώσει την αρχιτεκτονική πολιτικής και ασφάλειας στην μετακομμουνιστική Ευρώπη.

Ο αυτοπροσδιορισμένος ρόλος της Ρωσίας ως υπερασπιστή των παραδοσιακών χριστιανικών αξιών είναι η μουσική στα αυτιά ρουμάνων ορθοδόξων ιερέων και μερικών συντηρητικών κύκλων στην Ανατολική Ευρώπη, οι οποίοι ανησυχούν βαθύτατα από την προώθηση στη Δύση αυτού που θεωρούν ότι είναι μια «παρακμιακή» κοινωνική ατζέντα που ανέτρεψε τον ορισμό της παραδοσιακής οικογένειας και των χριστιανικών ηθικών αρχών. Πράγματι, η Ρουμανική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία συγκέντρωσε πάνω από 3 εκατομμύρια υπογραφές για να υποστηρίξει ένα δημοψήφισμα που θα ορίζει τον γάμο αποκλειστικά “μεταξύ ενός άνδρα και μιας γυναίκας” στο κρατικό σύνταγμα, μια σαφή ένδειξη ότι οι συντηρητικές κοινωνικές αξίες έχουν ευρεία δημόσια υποστήριξη στην περιοχή.

Η Μόσχα είναι καλά προετοιμασμένη και πρόθυμη να εκμεταλλευτεί αυτό το χάσμα και να επεκτείνει την επιρροή της -όπως και άλλες διαιρέσεις στις φιλελεύθερες-δημοκρατικές κοινωνίες- με το χρίσμα του Κρεμλίνου και της Ορθοδόξου Εκκλησίας ως κοινών υπερασπιστών της χριστιανικής πίστης.

Ο Aleksandr Dugin, ο σημαίνων φιλόσοφος και ιδεολόγος υπέρ του Κρεμλίνου, εκμεταλλεύτηκε επίσης τη γλώσσα και το μήνυμα της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας κατά τη διάρκεια μιας σειράς επισκέψεων στα μοναστήρια της Μολδαβίας στην Ανατολική Ρουμανία. Αυτές οι επισκέψεις δεν θα ήταν δυνατές χωρίς τη σιωπηρή έγκριση του Προϊστάμενου της Μητροπολιτικής Εκκλησίας της Μολδαβίας και έτσι μπορεί κανείς να είναι σίγουρος ότι τις απόψεις του Dugin σχετικά με το ρόλο και την αποστολή της Ρωσικής Ορθόδοξης Εκκλησίας τις λαμβάνουν ευνοϊκά υπο όψιν οι μοναχοί και ιερείς πολλοί από τους οποίους έχουν σημαντική επιρροή στις αγροτικές περιοχές.

Για παράδειγμα, οι προσπάθειες της Chevron για την εξαγωγή σχιστολιθικού φυσικού αερίου στην ανατολική Ρουμανία δεν καρποφόρησαν λόγω της μαζική τοπικής αντίστασης  την οποία εμπνεύστηκαν και συντόνισαν πολλοί ιερείς. Προφανώς, αυτές οι διαμαρτυρίες καλύφθηκαν ευρέως από το ρωσικό κρατικό δίκτυο RT, το οποίο έδινε ένα μήνυμα που βολικά ανταποκρινόταν στον στρατηγικό στόχο της Μόσχας να αποθαρρύνει τα ενεργειακά έργα που θα μείωναν την ενεργειακή εξάρτηση από τη Ρωσία.

Κατά την τελευταία δεκαετία, η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία έχει γίνει προνομιούχος συνεργάτης του Κρεμλίνου, υποστηρίζοντας την εθνικιστική γραμμή του κ. Πούτιν καθώς και τις παραδοσιακές, συντηρητικές αξίες που προωθεί το Κρεμλίνο στη Ρωσία και στο εξωτερικό.

Τον Απρίλιο του 2015, στην αποκορύφωση της ελληνικής χρηματοπιστωτικής κρίσης, κατά τη συνάντησή τους στη Μόσχα, ο Βλαντιμίρ Πούτιν και ο Αλέξης Τσίπρας, ο Έλληνας Πρωθυπουργός, ήθελαν να τονίσουν τους «κοινούς θρησκευτικούς, πολιτιστικούς και ιστορικούς δεσμούς» των δύο Ορθοδόξων Χριστιανικών εθνών. Αν και αυτές οι παρατηρήσεις μπορεί να προκαλούν έκπληξη σε ό,τι αφορά τον κ.Τσίπρα,  ηγέτη ενός άκρως αριστερού κόμματος που περιλαμβάνει, μεταξύ άλλων, τους μαοϊκούς και τους θιασώτες του Τσε Γκεβάρα – είναι ρουτίνα για τον κ. Πούτιν, του οποίου οι στενοί δεσμοί με την Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία είναι καλά εδραιωμένοι.

Για το Κρεμλίνο, η Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία είναι ένα εξαιρετικά πολύτιμο ήπιο εργαλείο που συμπληρώνει άλλα μέσα επιρροής, όπως κρατικά μέσα ενημέρωσης (συμπεριλαμβανομένης της RT και του Sputnik), κυβερνοχώρου και ψηφιακού πολέμου πληροφοριών, επιχειρηματικούς και χρηματοοικονομικούς δεσμούς και συνεργασίες μεταξύ των ελίτ. Η προώθηση μιας προοδευτικής κοινωνικής ατζέντας από τις Βρυξέλλες, η οποία θεωρείται ενοχλητική για πολλούς στην Ανατολική Ευρώπη, έχει κάνει τη Ρωσική Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία, σε συνεννόηση με το Κρεμλίνο, ένα χρήσιμο όχημα για την ενίσχυση των δεσμών μεταξύ της Μόσχας και αυτών των χωρών, ιδιαίτερα εκείνων που αγκαλιάζουν την ίδια Χριστιανική Ορθόδοξη πίστη με την εκμετάλλευση κοινωνικών, πολιτιστικών και θρησκευτικών διαιρέσεων. Πράγματι, καθώς οι εντάσεις αναπτύσσονται εντός της ΕΕ, ο κ. Πούτιν θα έχει πολλές ευκαιρίες να τις ενισχύσει και σύμφωνα με τον στόχο του να διαλύσει τους ευρωπαϊκούς και διατλαντικούς δεσμούς.

La justice russe étudie la théorie antisémite d’un « meurtre rituel » de la famille impériale en 1918

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Le Comité d’enquête va former une commission chargée d’enquêter sur les circonstances de l’assassinat du tsar Nicolas II, de son épouse et de ses cinq enfants.

 

La cathédrale d’Ekaterinbourg, en Russie, construite à l’endroit exact où la famille Romanov a été exécutée en 1918.

C’est une vieille lune antisémite qui était jusqu’à présent cantonnée aux franges les plus extrémistes de l’Eglise orthodoxe russe. L’idée que l’assassinat de la famille impériale russe par les bolchéviques, en 1918, puisse relever du « meurtre rituel » a effectué un retour en force fin novembre, promue à la fois par de hauts responsables du clergé et du Comité d’enquête.

Institution judiciaire de premier plan et traditionnel bras armé du Kremlin dans les affaires sensibles, le Comité d’enquête va former une commission spéciale chargée de se pencher sur le sujet, réunissant des membres de l’Eglise et des historiens, a indiqué l’une de ses dirigeantes au cours d’une conférence consacrée à la mort des Romanov, lundi 27 novembre, à Moscou. « Nous vérifions toutes les versions possibles des circonstances du décès, notamment la destruction des corps à l’aide de feu et d’acide, leur décapitation… ainsi que la version d’un meurtre rituel », y a déclaré Marina Molodtsova, une haute responsable du Comité d’enquête.

Lors de la même conférence, la théorie du meurtre rituel a reçu un autre soutien de poids, celui de l’évêque Tikhon, un dignitaire religieux qui passe pour être le confesseur du président russe, Vladimir Poutine. Selon l’évêque, cette théorie est partagée par de nombreux membres de la commission d’enquête, qu’il dirige, mise en place par le Patriarcat sur l’exécution de la famille Romanov. « Les bolchéviques et leurs hommes de main n’étaient pas étrangers à toutes sortes de rituels symboliques », a-t-il ensuite expliqué à l’agence RIA Novosti.

« Un exemple choquant d’ignorance médiévale »

Le 17 juillet 1918, le tsar Nicolas II, son épouse et leurs cinq enfants avaient été exécutés par un détachement bolchévique dans la ville d’Ekaterinbourg, dans l’Oural. Leurs dépouilles ont été découvertes en 1991 et 2007, et en 2000 l’Eglise orthodoxe russe a fait de l’ensemble des membres de la famille des martyrs et des saints. L’Eglise conteste toutefois l’authenticité des restes des corps – pourtant authentifiés par des analyses génétiques – qui ont été ramenés à Saint-Pétersbourg, et en 2015 la justice a rouvert son enquête sur ces meurtres.

Ni les autorités religieuses, ni le Comité d’enquête ne font explicitement mention des juifs, mais l’expression est une référence traditionnelle et exclusive à un mythe antisémite ancien, selon lequel des juifs tuent des enfants chrétiens à des fins rituelles, afin de boire leur sang ou de confectionner avec lui du pain azyme. Ces vieilles accusations furent à l’origine de nombreux pogroms dans le passé.

S’agissant du meurtre des Romanov, la thèse repose non seulement sur l’incertitude sur le destin des corps, mais aussi sur d’obscures théories selon lesquelles le dirigeant bolchévique, Iakov Sverdlov, juif, aurait commandé à un autre juif, Iakov Iourovski, de tuer la famille impériale en accomplissant ainsi un « rite cabalistique ». De telles théories sont en vogue dans les milieux nationalistes et chez certaines franges de l’Eglise, notamment le mouvement des « Tsar Dieu », qui ne cesse de gagner en influence.

Plusieurs historiens ont dénoncé le caractère farfelu de ces théories, Andreï Zoubov notant notamment dans la Novaïa Gazeta que le meurtre rituel n’a jamais été pratiqué par les juifs, pas plus que de quelconques rituels religieux ne l’auraient été par les bolchéviques.

Les représentants de la communauté juive de Russie ont émis de vives protestations, et appelé les autorités à réagir. Le rabbin Borouch Gorin, représentant de la fédération des communautés juives, a notamment dénoncé « un exemple choquant d’ignorance médiévale », d’autres craignant y voir le signe précurseur du retour d’un antisémitisme d’Etat, qui a existé à différentes périodes tant de l’Empire tsariste que de son successeur soviétique.

LE MONDE  Par Benoît Vitkine

http://www.lemonde.fr

Egypt denies Russian mediation to restore ties with Turkey

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Image processed by CodeCarvings Piczard  

By: Nawal Sayed  Sun, Dec. 24, 2017 CAIRO – 24 December 2017: Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry denied speculations about Russian mediation between Egypt and Turkey, stressing that the Egyptian and Turkish people have many things in common.

“Egypt hopes to overcome tensions with Turkey on bases of respect of countries’ sovereignty without interfering into each other’s domestic affairs,” Shoukry told Akhbar al-Youm newspaper on Saturday.

Shoukry’s statements come amid several denials made by Egyptian officials, while Turkish officials have reaffirmed hopes to restore normal relationship with Cairo. On the other hand, ongoing circumstances have not encouraged re-normalizing Cairo-Ankara ties amid Cairo’s accusations to Turkish regime of supporting outlawed Muslim Brotherhood group, observers stressed.

Shoukry revealed that many Turkish officials had expressed the Turkish leadership’s wishes to restore good ties with the Egyptian regime, stressing that, “Egypt seeks to build relationships based on mutual respect.”

Since the ouster of the brotherhood affiliated Morsi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish statesmen have made statements criticizing the Egyptian authorities and interfering in Egypt’s domestic affairs, according to local media reports.

“Turkish and Egyptian people are closely attached to each other through mutual heritage and marriage relations,” Shoukry added.

In November, General Prosecutor Nabil Ahmed Sadeq ordered the arrest and imprisonment of 29 defendants for 15 days pending investigations by the Supreme State Security Prosecution on charges of conspiring with Turkey with the aim to harm national interests, joining terrorist organizations, conducting overseas calls without licensing, money laundering, and illegal currency trading.

Exclusive_images_obtained_by_Egypt_Today_of_the_arrests_ordered_by_Egypt_s_prosecutor_general_on_Wednesday
Exclusive images obtained by Egypt Today of the arrests ordered by Egypt’s prosecutor general in November 2017

Many brotherhood leaders fled to Turkey after the June 30 revolution where they have broadcasted TV shows from Turkey to criticize and falsify news about Egypt. Since December 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood has been declared a terrorist group in Egypt.

Turkey has been forcefully siding with the MB; thus mutual relations have been strained since the ouster of ex-MB affiliated President Mohamed Morsi in 2013.

“The United States administration has wanted for some time to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, but has held off so far. One of the factors for the delay is Turkey’s opposition to the designation,” Tom Little, an international affairs specialist for the U.S. army, told Egypt Today.

“Turkey is a key strategic partner with the United States in the war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Turkey has threatened to withdraw this support if the United States goes ahead with designating the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group. This would be a serious blow to the United States in that region. Negotiations with Turkey continue to find a successful resolution and maintain their cooperation in Syria and Iraq.” Little explained. He further illustrated that the delay of such a move does not negate the U.S. commitment to the global war on terror.

Shoukry manifested that his recent visit to Istanbul aimed only at backing the Palestinian cause in reference to the American administration’s decision to relocate the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognizing it as Israel’s capital city.

Shoukry also revealed that President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi will pay a visit to Oman.
“The upcoming tripartite meeting on Libya with foreign ministers of Tunisia and Algeria has not been determined yet,” Shoukry said.

He asserted the Egyptian keenness on achieving stability and order in Libya. “After two years of signing the Skhirat Political Agreement in Morocco, there is a state of despair because the agreement could not accomplish the political agenda.”

On November 23, 2013, Egypt expelled the Turkish ambassador from Cairo and downgraded the diplomatic ties with Ankara.

Turkey is “attempting to influence public opinion against Egyptian interests, [and has] supported meetings of organizations that seek to create instability in the country,” Foreign Ministry statement said in November 2013.

Later, Ankara took counter measures following the expulsion of the Turkish ambassador from Cairo. Turkey summoned Egypt’s charge d’affaires. Ankara also declared the Egyptian ambassador, currently out of the country, persona non grata.

Early November 2013, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry condemned comments from Turkish officials about ousted Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. The Egyptian government accused Turkey of interfering into Egypt’s domestic affairs and falsifying news, MENA reported.

On November 5, the Turkish Foreign Ministry urged Cairo to release Morsi, who has been held in detention pending trial since July 2013.

https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/2/38129/Egypt-denies-Russian-mediation-to-restore-ties-with-Turkey

Catalogne : le roi d’Espagne demande d’éviter un nouvel « affrontement »

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Dans ses vœux de Noël, Felipe VI a mis en garde contre l’« appauvrissement moral, civique et économique » de la Catalogne en cas de sécession.

<p>Le roi Felipe VI a présenté ses voeux à l'Espagne lors d'une intervention télévisée. (Illustration)</p>
Le roi Felipe VI a présenté ses voeux à l’Espagne lors d’une intervention télévisée. (Illustration)
À l’occasion de ses vœux de Noël, les quatrièmes depuis son accession au trône en 2014, Felipe VI s’est exprimé au sujet de la Catalogne, trois jours après des élections remportées par les partis indépendantistes avec 47,5 % des voix, mais au cours desquelles leurs adversaires les plus résolus, du parti Ciudadanos, ont remporté le plus de voix. Le roi a demandé dimanche aux nouveaux élus du parlement catalan, en majorité indépendantiste, d’éviter un nouvel « affrontement » après une tentative de sécession qui a divisé la Catalogne et secoué l’Espagne.

In pictures: Greek Navy’s medical mission

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When the tourists have gone, there’s no one to provide health care on remote Greek islands.

On remote Greek islands, inhabitants struggle for easy access to medical care.

In the winter months, when the tourists are long gone, connections between the islands and major urban centers are reduced — in some cases to once per week.

Obtaining much-needed health care becomes difficult for islanders, especially as the outposts struggle, due to their unforgiving isolation, to attract young doctors and nurses.

To combat the problem, the Greek Navy organizes medical missions to the islands three or four times a year.

Military doctors, specializing in various branches of medicine, sail from island to island, treating the handful of inhabitants they meet. In disused clinics and classrooms, nurses and doctors set up their medical equipment to tend to old and young alike.

Greek Navy officers and military doctors are seen through a porthole on the warship Prometheus.

Yannis Mpoulafetis, 68, is examined by military doctor Perikles Syros, during a mission on the Greek island of Lipsi.

Yannis Papadopoulos, 85, drinks a raki in the yard of his house as he waits to be seen by military medical staff on the island of Folegandros.

Viktoras Divolis, 73, during an examination by military doctors on the island of Folegandros.

A rigid-hulled inflatable boat takes military doctors and nursing staff to the island of Sikinos.

Syrian woman Maysoon Alderi, 31, and her son Yasin Alghazaoui, 3, are examined by military doctor Zafeiris Manikas on the island of Tilos.

A Greek flag flutters as the military ship Prometheus sits off the coast of Anafi in the Aegean Sea.

Nikolaos Gavalas, 86, a resident of Anafi, waits to be examined by military doctors.

Also on Anafi, Rampelia Patinioti is examined by the military doctor Perikles Syros.

On the island of Folegandros, elderly women attend a church service.

Military doctors and nursing staff pose for a picture in front of medical facilities on Folegandros.

Nikolis Andreas, 87, sits in front of his house awaiting his turn with the navy medical personnel.

Military general surgeon Vassilis Gatziolis, right, performs surgery on the finger of David Brown, 63, on the island of Sikinos.

Kosmas Segredos, 87, waits to be examined by military doctors inside a classroom at the school on Sikinos.

All pictures by Yannis Kolesidis/EPA

https://www.politico.eu/author/ali-walker/

Το λεπτό ζήτημα των μουφτήδων

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Κατά την πρόσφατη επίσκεψή του στη Θράκη (εδώ στο τζαμί Κιρ Μαχαλέ), ο Ταγίπ Ερντογάν έθεσε θέμα εκλογής μουφτήδων από τη μειονότητα.

Ο μουφτής είναι ο καθοδηγητής των μουσουλμάνων, ο δάσκαλος που ορίζει ποιες πράξεις των πιστών είναι σωστές και δίκαιες ερμηνεύοντας τον ιερό ισλαμικό νόμο, τη σαρία. Γι’ αυτό τον λόγο πρέπει να έχει καλές θεολογικές γνώσεις και να μπορεί να αιτιολογήσει τη συγκεκριμένη λύση που δίνει σε κάποιο ιερονομικό πρόβλημα.

Τον 16ο αιώνα ο Οθωμανός σουλτάνος Σουλεϊμάν ο Μεγαλοπρεπής (1520-1566 μ.Χ.) θέλησε να δημιουργήσει ένα κρατικό σύστημα μουφτήδων. Hταν μια προσπάθεια να ελεγχθεί ένας θεσμός που μπορούσε να ασκήσει μεγάλη επιρροή μεταξύ των πιστών. Κάθε μεγάλη πόλη της αυτοκρατορίας απέκτησε τον επίσημο μουφτή της. Ολοι μαζί υπάγονταν στον μεγάλο μουφτή (σεΐχ-ουλ-ισλάμη) που έδρευε στην Κωνσταντινούπολη. Εκτοτε, σε όλα τα ισλαμικά κράτη υπάρχει επίσημος μουφτής που διορίζεται από το κράτος.

Στην ελεύθερη Ελλάδα, ο θεσμός του μουφτή εμφανίστηκε για πρώτη φορά μετά την προσάρτηση της Θεσσαλίας με τον Νόμο ΑΛΗ’ του 1882. Εκεί ορίστηκε ότι οι μουφτήδες ήσαν πνευματικοί αρχηγοί των μουσουλμανικών κοινοτήτων. Παράλληλα, ήσαν δημόσιοι λειτουργοί που διορίζονταν και παύονταν με βασιλικό διάταγμα ύστερα από πρόταση των υπουργών επί των Εκκλησιαστικών και της Δικαιοσύνης και ορκίζονταν ενώπιον του νομάρχη.

Η Συνθήκη των Αθηνών

Μετά την εδαφική επέκταση της Ελλάδος κατά τους Βαλκανικούς Πολέμους, βρέθηκαν εντός του κράτους πολυάριθμες μουσουλμανικές κοινότητες. Στη Συνθήκη Ειρήνης των Αθηνών μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Τουρκίας του 1913, περιλαμβάνονταν διατάξεις που αναφέρονταν στους μουφτήδες και στα καθήκοντά τους. Επίσης, δημιουργήθηκε και ο θεσμός του αρχιμουφτή.

Η καινοτομία της Συνθήκης ήταν ότι οι μουφτήδες δεν ήσαν πλέον αρμόδιοι μόνον για γνωμοδοτήσεις του ισλαμικού νόμου. Αποκτούσαν και δικαστικές αρμοδιότητες επί θεμάτων οικογενειακού και κληρονομικού δικαίου. Στο πνεύμα της Συνθήκης των Αθηνών ψηφίστηκε ο νόμος 2345/1920 που όριζε ότι οι μουφτήδες εκλέγονται από τους μουσουλμάνους εκλογείς κάθε περιφέρειας.

Η ανταλλαγή των πληθυσμών που έγινε το 1923 άλλαξε ριζικά τα δεδομένα. Στην Ελλάδα παρέμειναν μουσουλμάνοι μόνον στην περιοχή της Θράκης. Είναι οργανωμένοι γύρω από τις μουφτείες Ξάνθης, Κομοτηνής και Διδυμοτείχου. Ο νόμος 2345/1920 δεν εφαρμόστηκε ποτέ ως προς τις διατάξεις που όριζαν την εκλογή των μουφτήδων. Εκείνοι επί δεκαετίες διορίζονταν από το ελληνικό κράτος, ύστερα από κάποιες άτυπες διαβουλεύσεις με τους τοπικούς μουσουλμάνους βουλευτές.

Ο νέος νόμος

Τη δεκαετία του 1980 οι δύο υπέργηροι μουφτήδες Ξάνθης και Κομοτηνής απεβίωσαν. Η Τουρκία και κύκλοι της μειονότητας ζήτησαν την εφαρμογή του νόμου 2345/1920. Η ελληνική πολιτεία θέσπισε τον νόμο 1920/1991 που έχει ως δεδομένα ότι αφενός μεν σε καμία μουσουλμανική χώρα στον κόσμο ο μουφτής δεν εκλέγεται απευθείας από τους πιστούς και αφετέρου ότι οι δικαστικές αρμοδιότητες που έχουν παραχωρηθεί από το ελληνικό κράτος καθιστούν τον μουφτή δημόσιο υπάλληλο. Κατόπιν προχώρησε στην επιλογή των μουφτήδων Ξάνθης και Κομοτηνής.

Ενα τμήμα της μειονότητας με προτροπή της Τουρκίας προχώρησε σε επιλογή δικών του μουφτήδων που δεν ασκούν όμως δικαστικές αρμοδιότητες. Το ελληνικό κράτος καταδικάστηκε από το Ευρωπαϊκό Δικαστήριο επειδή στράφηκε κατά των συγκεκριμένων ατόμων, θεωρώντας ότι έκαναν αντιποίηση Aρχής. Εκτοτε, στη Θράκη συνυπάρχουν οι επίσημοι μουφτήδες με αυτούς που επέλεξε ένα τμήμα της μειονότητας.

Ο Τούρκος πρόεδρος Ταγίπ Ερντογάν κατά την πρόσφατη επίσκεψή του στην Αθήνα έθεσε θέμα εκλογής των μουφτήδων. Μια εβδομάδα μετά, ο πρωθυπουργός Αλέξης Τσίπρας και ο υπουργός Παιδείας Κώστας Γαβρόγλου έσπευδαν να προαναγγείλουν διάλογο με τη μουσουλμανική μειονότητα.

“Καθημερινή”

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