By Prof. Hillel FrischJanuary 28, 2018

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Donald J. Trump is facing unprecedented criticism one year into his term as president of the world’s greatest power. The allies of the US can assist him by making clear how much he has advanced American foreign affairs interests.

It is not the business of allies to meddle in the domestic affairs of the US, and certainly not to take a position in domestic controversies over the performance of its leaders and politicians. It is the role of the vibrant democratic process in the US to handle such matters.

What is of utmost importance, however, is for allies to make known to American citizens how they see the US president advancing what they perceive to be the foreign affairs interests of the US.

Most if not all US allies – with the possible exception of some in the EU – agree that President Trump and his team, Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of Defense Mattis, have made the world a safer place in Trump’s first year in office than it was under his predecessor, Barack Obama.  It is safer because Washington’s many allies, which, together with the US, easily amount to the greatest aggregation of power in the world today, are more assured of American resolve to lead.

Heading the list would no doubt be the important allies of the US in Asia – Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Vietnam, and Singapore, who appreciate Trump’s tough rhetoric towards North Korea and US assertiveness in maintaining the freedom of the seas in hotspots such as the South China Sea. Trump’s fiery rhetoric contraposed against Tillerson’s and Mattis’s more measured responses make for an effective political symphony that blends resolve with prudence.

EU member states in central and eastern Europe feel the same way. For Poland, the Czech Republic, and even more so, the Baltic states and Ukraine, the initial worries emanating from President Trump’s relations with Putin before the assumption of the presidency, Tillerson’s oil dealings with Russia as an energy business executive, and Trump’s critical views of NATO, dissipated as the US under Trump fulfilled its obligations made by the previous administration at the Warsaw NATO summit in 2016 by deploying a US army combat battalion in Poland; provided sophisticated arms to Ukraine despite the protests and threats of the Russian leadership; and 3) sent Vice President Pence on a visit to the Baltic states to reassure them of the US commitment to their independence.

Trump’s administration is even more positively viewed by the US’s Middle East allies. For Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, Trump’s administration is manna from heaven, coming on the heels of an administration that from their point of view favored foe over friends by signing a questionable nuclear agreement with Iran. The agreement only postponed Tehran’s  going nuclear, and also also paved the way for the withdrawal of punishing sanctions and the release of $50-100 billion of frozen funds into the Iranian treasury to support proxies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon to undermine Arab states.  Trump’s sanctions against six organizations and seven individuals from Iran in July, three of whom were involved in procurement of weapons and equipment for the Revolutionary Guard; and the notice in October 2017 that Iran was failing to live up to the 2015 nuclear agreement (decertification), sent reassuring messages to these states, which are acutely worried about the recent gains of Iran and its proxies in the Syrian civil war and in Iraq.

Egypt, of course, joins its Arab Sunni allies in welcoming the change in administration and champions the new Trump-Tillerson-Mattis team over its predecessor.

The Obama administration had a particular soft spot towards the Muslim Brotherhood, which it perceived as a positive catalyst in the unfolding of Egyptian democracy during the so-called Arab Spring. Accordingly, it took a dim view of Morsi’s downfall by what it saw as a military coup headed by then chief-of-staff Abdel Fattah Sisi and, since July 2013, Egypt’s incumbent president. Obama suspended military aid to Egypt over human rights issues, and, for a considerable length of time, delayed the provision of 10 Apache helicopters earmarked to be used in the fight against ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula. Obama also refrained from hosting the Egyptian leader at the White House.

Trump reversed course and hosted Sisi in April 2017. Still, relations are not what they were in their heyday: $290 million in aid was withheld in August over human rights concerns and remain suspended over Egypt’s initiative in drafting a condemnation of Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

Paradoxically, from the point of view of its many allies, President Trump’s shortcoming is not recklessness but a lack of sufficient daring. Allies in the Middle East wonder if the one-time missile strike against Syria in April 2017 to contain its use of chemical warfare was sufficient. The same question is raised regarding the US air attack a month later on the Syrian army and its Hezbollah ally as they raced south to team up with Iran-led Iraqi Shiite militias to restore the Shiite Crescent, which ISIS had temporarily destroyed.

The Trump administration decided not to follow through, with the result that the restoration is now an established fact.

Yet for all these shortcomings, the Trump administration is good news to America’s allies.

For this reason, think tanks, journalists, commentators, and, above all, the political leadership in these countries should make known that President Trump and his team are promoting US interests abroad so that Americans can be better informed in their aggregate assessment of their president.

What is certain is that the allies’ interests as well as American interests will be grievously affected by the tumult engendered by an American president who does not survive his full term, given the US’s role as benevolent global policeman.

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Prof. Hillel Frisch is a professor of political studies and Middle East studies at Bar-Ilan University and a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family

ARTICLE SUMMARY

As Turkey’s offensive against Kurdish forces in Syria nears the end of its first week, circumstances affecting the scope, progress and duration of the operation are complicated and full of risks.

 REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army fighters are seen near Mount Barsaya, northeast of Afrin, Syria, Jan. 23, 2018.

Turkey’s latest incursion into Syria has just begun, but the significance of when it will end deserves attention now. By the end of the fifth day (Jan. 24) of Ankara’s operation targeting Kurdish control of Afrin, the Turkish army and its allied local forces, along with the close air support of Turkish warplanes, had reached about 7½ kilometers (4½ miles) into Syria from six beachheads and captured at least 11 villages. Now there is a new front at Mount Barsaya north of Azaz, where heavy clashes continue.

Contrary to general expectations, the operation was not launched from the relatively flat terrain of the Azaz/Tell Rifaat/Afrin line, but from the opposite direction, crossing hilly terrain in the north and northwest. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) first want to seize the dominating hill features and then lay a long-duration siege on the city, which has a population of 200,000. The TSK’s strategy seems to be to open multiple front lines in different areas to disperse the 8,000 to 10,000 troops of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and weaken their defense lines.

Unlike the earlier Operation Euphrates Shield (August 2016 to March 2017) that Turkey launched as a special forces operation, the Afrin effort began as a conventional armored movement. I’m inclined to define the Afrin effort as Turkey’s second “effect-based operation,” after Euphrates Shield. An effect-based operation relies on complex security to obtain a specific political outcome or effect on rivals’ strategic preferences rather than eliminating the enemy altogether or disrupting its will to fight. The prime objective now seems to be to influence the strategic goals of other actors with stakes in northern Syria, particularly the United States and Russia. So rather than eradicating the 8,000 to 10,000 YPG militants seemingly stuck in Afrin, Turkey wants to show it is a strong player capable of changing the operational environment.

Sources Al-Monitor spoke with in Ankara say political and security bureaucrats agree and are fully determined to expand the operation first to Manbij and then east of the Euphrates River to undermine US cooperation with the Kurdish YPG on the ground.

How long will the Afrin operation continue? As long as it takes to achieve its objectives, according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. After Afrin is cleared of the YPG and any militants that might remain, a new administration is to be installed with Turkey’s input. This process may last until the beginning of summer.

There are many factors that could affect the course of the Afrin operation.

Unlike the rest of Syria, the Afrin region is partially mountainous with an unusual density of trees. To these land features that limit armored movements we have to add the heavy rains and fog of January. The harsh weather and terrain conditions favor the YPG defenses.

Will the YPG refrain from frontal clashes and leave, or will it resist? If it resists, will it withdraw to the hilly terrain in the northwest? The YPG is making use of the mountainous terrain that restricts armored unit movements and airstrikes. Will it conduct guerrilla warfare or intensify its resistance under cover of the people congregated in city centers? The Islamic State frequently withdrew into the crowds of cities and at times even forced people to remain in the combat zone to protect itself from airstrikes and long-range artillery fire. If the YPG adopts the same tactic — and there are indications it may — there will be heavy civilian losses. The YPG may well use these civilian fatalities as a major propaganda tool against Turkey.

It appears Turkey had Moscow’s go-ahead for the offensive, given that Russia controls all Syrian airspace west of the Euphrates River. Russia no doubt sees that the operation will drive a deeper wedge between the NATO allies Turkey and the United States in light of the latter’s support for the YPG. Moreover, Russia probably calculates that, faced with the threat of being overrun by Turkey and its Free Syrian Army (FSA) allies, the YPG will now be more open to Moscow’s earlier suggestion of handing Afrin back to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

A key risk indicator will be whether Moscow provides Turkey with 24/7 access to the airspace over Afrin, or restricts the incursions, as was the case during Euphrates Shield. If it chooses the latter, Russia is likely to control the operation’s tempo, synchronizing it with the Syrian army’s advances in Idlib province south of Afrin and any confrontation with the US-backed YPG forces around Deir ez-Zor over the control of oil reserves. This would allow Russia to give the Syrian army more time to consolidate its territorial control in Idlib province, bringing it into a better position to take over the remaining YPG-controlled areas in Afrin and gain the upper hand in Deir ez-Zor to keep the YPG under pressure.

Turkey, which has gone back and forth on the issue of whether Assad should remain in power, has been negotiating with Assad about possibly working together against the YPG and the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Union Party (PYD). But the Syrian president knows Erdogan’s preference is an Assad-free Syria, so the Syrian army may end up assisting the Kurdish forces to an extent. Assad may decide to help evacuate the YPG units that appear to be squeezed in at Afrin, or help them receive reinforcements from east of the Euphrates. Still, another Assad policy could be to “wait and see,” thinking that at the end of the day Afrin will be handed over to the government.

Another consideration is the capacity of the Ankara-backed FSA force. The fighters aren’t the most dependable and could evaporate when faced with strong resistance, as happened at al-Bab during Euphrates Shield. That weakness could force Ankara to deploy more commando/infantry units to replace FSA units, increasing the risk of losing Turkish soldiers in urban warfare.

Then there is Turkish public opinion. Although there is no pertinent, reliable polling data, experience with Operation Euphrates Shield tells us the government won’t have much problem securing public support for the Afrin offensive.

If Turkey can wrap up the operation quickly, say by August, the country is likely to retain its current socio-economic posture. However, the longer the operation stretches out, and the more territory it involves — especially if it leads to a confrontation with the United States — the more likely it is to harm Turkey’s economic and political stability and its social cohesion.

Will Erdogan and his personal charisma manage the current operation in his favor, accelerating his fast-track toward becoming Turkey’s first executive president? Or will the operation spiral into more than the country can handle, further damaging Turkey’s already fluctuating economic performance, crippling bureaucratic capacity and deteriorating ethnic, sectarian and social-political neurological points?

Metin Gurcan is a columnist for Al-Monitor’s Turkey Pulse. He served in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Iraq as a Turkish military adviser from 2002 to 2008. After resigning from the military, he became an Istanbul-based independent security analyst. Gurcan obtained his PhD in 2016 with a dissertation on changes in the Turkish military over the preceding decade. He has published extensively in Turkish and foreign academic journals, and his book “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan: Understanding Counterinsurgency in Tribalized, Rural, Muslim Environments” was published in August 2016. On Twitter: @Metin4020

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/01/turkey-syria-olive-branch-continuing-under-fog.html#ixzz55XrchFf6

Ankara is retraining a core of fighters to wage its own war against Isis and Kurdish expansion

Kareem Shaheen in Hatay Sat 27 Jan 2018 23.03 GMT  

 

The young rebel from Idlib rolled down his sock to reveal a deep, blackened gash, a grim memento of weeks as an Islamic State captive. The man who tortured him in that prison was on his mind when he heard that Turkey was offering military training to 500 men, and decided to sign up.

Like all the recruits to Ankara’s latest experiment, he was a seasoned anti-Assad rebel with battlefield experience but no military education. Turkey promised to drill and discipline them, creating the nucleus of a new Syrian rebel army.

“They told us: ‘You have been fighting for six years, God bless you, but we want to train you to be soldiers’,” the former prisoner said. Like all Syrian fighters and officials who agreed to interviews about the latest offensive, he spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations with Turkey.

After a month at a training camp near Antakya in 2016, they were sent back to fight in al-Bab, an Isis-dominated town over the border. The graduates, along with some others who would later train in Turkey, would come to be known by other Syrian rebels as “the Turkish army’s auxiliary force”, and last week they were called into action by their backers, playing a prominent role in a new Turkish offensive into Syria.

Their aim is to dislodge US-backed Kurdish militias from the enclave of Afrin, which lies on the border with Turkey. The groups are the Syrian wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), which has fought a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state. The Kurds won Washington’s support when they took on a key role in the battle for Raqqa, but Ankara has long protested at the alliance.

The decision to cross over into Syria, and directly intervene in the seven-year-long civil war, has underlined the depth of Turkey’s concern about Kurdish fighters inside Syria. But it has also thrown Ankara’s ambitious training project into relief. According to rebel commanders, Turkey has for nearly two years been supporting the build-up and training of a unified army in Syria capable of resuming the battle against President Bashar al-Assad, now in the ascendant in the long civil war.

The genesis of the idea came in the opening months of Turkey’s first military campaign into Syria, when it launched Operation Euphrates Shield in the summer of 2016. Its troops had orders to both oust Isis from key border towns and limit the Kurdish militias’ westward expansion.

After taking the town of Jarablus near the border, Turkey sought to augment the Euphrates Shield forces – a disparate coalition of rebel militias – with a cadre of trained fighters to tackle Isis and guard the frontiers against Kurdish forces.

Rebel officials say the training programme has continued, building up Euphrates Shield into a force of 10,000 to 15,000 battle-ready soldiers, with an additional 10,000 recent recruits. After major military losses to Assad and his Russian and Iranian allies, the rebels see this force as a lifeline that could allow them to relaunch their waning insurgency. That rebel army, they say, could wage a campaign to eliminate al-Qaida-linked fighters who dominate the opposition-controlled province of Idlib, and go on to fight Assad again.

“We cannot accept military defeat, we have to reinforce and start over,” said one rebel official. “Euphrates Shield is against both terrorism and the regime, and it is the first step to build a state.” But their prime aim of unseating Assad seems increasingly divergent from their Turkish patrons’ focus on attacking Kurdish troops, meaning the force may ultimately amount to nothing but another proxy militia under a foreign power’s command – much like most other groups fighting in Syria.

“The [moderate] rebels previously didn’t establish themselves as useful proxies for other internationals,” said Sam Heller at the Century Foundation thinktank. “As a result, they were driven to the margins.”

The idea of a unified force dates back to the start of the armed opposition, but chronic divisions, and foreign powers backing rival factions, stalled its creation. In September 2017, hit by military setbacks, dozens of rebel groups got behind a national army project set up by the interim opposition government, a cabinet based in Syria with limited powers, which formally administered areas held by Euphrates Shield forces.

Turkey has quietly continued to support the project as it has grown into multiple divisions led by Syrian commanders who coordinate with Turkish officers, and who are spearheading the campaign in Afrin now. Therein lies the dilemma of the rebels leading the ground assault. Abandoned by all their international allies, they see no choice but to follow Turkey’s lead.

While they agree with the rationale of the Afrin campaign, they also hope that taking the Kurdish enclave will open up a ground corridor into Idlib that would allow the national rebel army its first test against their greatest enemies – Assad’s regime, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the former wing of al-Qaida in Syria. Turkey has given them no promises of support for this. Its actions after the Afrin campaign will determine whether it has helped build up the rebel army to be its own proxy force, or to fight against the regime.

“We have to play on the differences between global powers negotiating in Syria,” said one rebel commander, whose group is not in Afrin but intends to join the national rebel army. “It is a strategic interest to open the ground corridor into Idlib, and it coincides with Turkish interests.”

The rebel who trained in Turkey said: “I would rather go fight [HTS] and the regime, but the Turks are the only ones who stood by us. How can I take on [HTS] and the regime by myself, without any allies?”

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/27/syrian-rebels-gamble-turkish-alliance-fight-kurds-assad