By Emil AvdalianiMarch 9, 2018

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 764, March 9, 2018

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The new National Security Strategy of the US enumerates the major problems and challenges facing the US and its institutions, as well as the policies Washington plans to adopt to carry out its foreign policy agenda. Though the major thrusts of the document are relatively close to what US statesmen have expressed over the past few years, it can be argued that the new strategy signals a significant development in the US approach to foreign relations: the return of geopolitics.

On December 18, 2017, the US government unveiled the country’s new National Security Strategy. The document states unequivocally that “after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, the great power competition has returned.” This is a striking admission by the White House. Although in Europe, Russia, and elsewhere, the position of the new strategy document raised eyebrows, politicians in some parts of the Middle East as well as the South Caucasus (particularly Georgia) and Ukraine think it is well attuned to the geopolitical situation on the ground in the region.

The overall tone of the document indicates that Washington has begun to realize that the post-Cold War approach to Eurasia did nothing to ensure a lasting peace or a furthering of American state interests.

The Russian military resurgence in the former Soviet Union, the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific, and Iran’s successes in Syria have exacerbated the security situation across Eurasia. Geopolitical differences have reduced potential US-Russia cooperation on a number of issues (with the exception of counter-terrorism). The era of post-Cold War hopes for a lasting cooperation and peace in the post-Soviet space and elsewhere has officially ended. “[Future US strategy] is a strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology,” the document reads.

A bit of history

Over the past couple of centuries, political realism (foreign policy based on the balance of power and geopolitical calculations) and its German version (realpolitik) have been scaled back on occasion by notions built on ideological and ethical premises. In 1815, during the Congress of Vienna, European statesmen worked hard to build a lasting peace across the continent following the devastating Napoleonic wars. However, Napoleon III, Bismarck, Wilhelm II, and the Third French Republic destroyed the foundations of ethical politics, which led to the resurgence of realpolitik and the return of geopolitics. WWI followed, which ended with another hope for lasting peace after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Again, the subsequent rise of totalitarian governments in Germany, Italy, and Russia (1920-1930s) led to foreign policies based on geopolitical calculations that ultimately culminated in WWII.

The third era of expected prosperity and peace was the post-Cold War period, but here too, political realism has been slowly emerging as a dominant force across Eurasia. Hopes of lasting peace tend to emerge after brutal military and ideological wars, but all previous historical examples show that geopolitics are never fully replaced by moral principles in foreign policy.

International relations have never been free of geopolitical thinking to one degree or another. The new Trump document, which has now formally ushered in the end of ethical and moral premises in international relations and heralded the return of geopolitics, is an expected step and one rooted in the experience of past generations.

This thinking is well summarized in the following quote from the document, which notes increased competition among various powers in Eurasia: “These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies of the past two decades, policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.”

The new strategy also states that “the United States will respond to the growing political, economic, and military competition we face around the world. China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.” The nature of the fundamental threat emanating from Russia is also reflected in the fact that North Korea and Iran, both of which have nuclear programs, feature only after China and Russia, as do assorted transnational terrorist groups.

At the same time, it is important to stress that the return to Brzezinski-esque geopolitics by the US government did not happen overnight. It was the result of constant challenges to the US-led world order by such powers as Russia, Iran, and others over the past decade.

The rhetoric of the new US strategy is a positive development for Israel (pressured by the resurgent Iran) in the Middle East, as well as Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova in the former Soviet space. It is well-attuned to the unstable situation currently prevailing across Eurasia. Signs of stronger US engagement in Eurasia were already seen throughout 2017.

Overall it would be fair to say that the rhetoric of the document reflects the prevailing thinking in the White House, indicating that relations between the US and other major players in Eurasia such as Russia and Iran will now be more difficult to normalize. At the same time, geopolitical frictions among the big players will expose small states to ever more serious geopolitical challenges.

View PDF

Emil Avdaliani teaches history and international relations at Tbilisi State University and Ilia State University. He has worked for various international consulting companies and currently publishes articles focused on military and political developments across the former Soviet space.

BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family

By Franklin Holcomb, Emily Markee, and ISW’s Russia-Ukraine Team

Russia is intensifying its multifaceted campaign to destabilize Ukraine ahead of Ukraine’s 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections. The Kremlin is leveraging various political and economic tools to complement its ongoing military operations in Eastern Ukraine.[1] Russia has recently expanded its operations to spread ethnic tensions in Western Ukraine in order to drive wedges between Ukraine and its partners in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin also engineered the Russian energy company Gazprom’s vindictive and abrupt disruption in natural gas supply to Ukraine. 

Ukraine simultaneously faces its own internal challenges amidst stalling efforts to establish an independent anti-corruption court and other government reforms. The Kremlin will exploit the resultant domestic and international frustrations over the pace of reforms. Russia will escalate its subversive activities over the next year in order to remove the pro-Western government led by President Petro Poroshenko and empower populists and pro-Russia factions. The U.S. must take a clear stance supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and partner more closely with Kyiv to support the passage of key reforms and counter Russian subversion.

The Kremlin intensified its destabilization campaign in Western Ukraine in an effort to undermine Ukraine’s partnerships in Eastern Europe. Ukrainian officials accused Kremlin-backed groups of attacking the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Center in Uzhgorod, Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 4 and 27 to inflame local and regional tensions.[2] Zakharpatiya Oblast Governor Hennadiy Moskal accused the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) of recruiting nationalists to conduct the attacks in Uzhgorod in coordination with intelligence operatives based in Russian-occupied Transnistria in Moldova.[3] Poland detained two suspects connected to the attack on February 4.[4] The suspects are reportedly tied to the far-right Polish ‘Falanga’ movement, and had fought alongside the Russian-backed separatist Donetsk and Luhansk Peoples’ Republics in Eastern Ukraine.[5] These attacks against minorities are part of a wider campaign by Russia to undermine Ukraine’s relationships with Poland and Hungary. Ukrainian authorities previously arrested individuals reportedly connected to the defunct pro-Russia Party of Regions in Ukraine who attempted to destroy a Hungarian monument in Zakharpatiya Oblast in October 2017.[6] Ukrainian and Polish government sources have also accused Russia of attempting to drive a wedge between the two nations by orchestrating anti-Polish protests in Ukraine as well as attacks against Polish monuments and government buildings.[7] The Kremlin will further enflame ethnic tensions over the coming year to fracture Ukraine and drive wedges between Kyiv and its neighbors in Eastern Europe.

Nationalist Hungarian President Viktor Orban has exploited the Kremlin’s subversion campaign in Western Ukraine to strengthen his own domestic support ahead of Hungary’s April 8 general elections. Orban – who holds a close relationship with Russia – has boosted his nationalist credentials by deliberately escalating tensions with Ukraine.[8] Hungary revived its narrative that Hungarians in Ukraine are under attack from Ukrainian nationalists on March 1.[9] Hungarian organizations in Western Ukraine initially agreed with official statements accusing non-Ukrainians of conducting the attack in Zakharpatiya Oblast on February 27 before switching their narrative to accusing Kyiv of allowing “extremists to strengthen their positions” amidst an alleged “anti-Hungarian campaign” in Ukrainian media.[10] These statements mirror similar narratives peddled by the Kremlin. Hungarian groups further escalated tensions by calling for the OSCE to establish a monitoring office in Western Ukraine on March 7.[11] Orban has sustained a belligerent stance against Kyiv’s decision to require schoolchildren in Ukraine to learn both Ukrainian and their native language since September 2017.[12] Hungary has also attempted to stall Ukraine’s cooperation with Western institutions such as NATO and the EU.[13] Orban’s efforts support Russia’s ongoing campaign in Western Ukraine to drive social cleavages that prevent Ukraine’s integration with the West. Orban likely assesses that this escalation will help him gain electoral support. Orban’s Fidesz Party lost the mayoral race in traditionally pro-Fidesz Homdezovasarhely in Southern Hungary on February 25.[14] Orban will thus continue to fuel this crisis for political gain unless his international partners encourage him to de-escalate tensions with Ukraine.

The Kremlin continued its tradition of leveraging energy as a foreign policy weapon against Ukraine. Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom abruptly disrupted the delivery of natural gas to Ukraine on 01 March in response to a February 28 judicial ruling against Gazprom in favor of Ukrainian energy corporation Naftogaz.[15] Gazprom had been found to owe $2.56 billion to Naftogaz in a dispute over supply disruptions to Ukraine by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.[16] Ukraine immediately signed an agreement with Polish energy corporation PNGiG, stabilizing its energy supply after a week of turmoil.[17] Naftogaz CEO Andriy Kobolyev emphasized that “yet another attempt to use gas as a weapon” failed and warned the EU to “consider this case when making their final decision” on Russia’s NordStream 2 Pipeline.[18] Polish and Latvian officials have repeatedly warned against the threats posed to Europe by the NordStream 2 Pipeline.[19] Gazprom’s decision to cut the natural gas supply to Ukraine reinforces Russia’s long-standing strategy to use energy as a weapon against other countries. The U.S. should encourage its European partners to consider Gazprom’s actions against Ukraine before deciding to expand energy ties to Russia through the NordStream 2 and TurkStream pipelines.

The Government of Ukraine’s commitment to reform is simultaneously wavering at the time when it is most required. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s government is at risk of failing to approve the creation of an independent anti-corruption court in line with standards set by the IMF and EU.[20] The IMF, EU, and Ukraine’s National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) have repeatedly stressed the importance of choosing independent judges for the court via the Public Council of International Experts.[21] The Ukrainian Parliament has nonetheless relegated the council to a de-facto advisory role, undermining the court’s ability to maintain its independence from the Government of Ukraine.[22] Poroshenko asserted that “Ukraine did not do reforms for the IMF [but rather] for the Ukrainian people” and emphasized his government’s success in enacting other important reforms on March 6.[23] The U.S. and its partners must recognize the important progress achieved thus far on reform in Ukraine but sustain pressure on Kyiv to establish an independent anti-corruption court in line with EU, IMF, and NABU recommendations. If Kyiv fails to do so, it will likely fuel public frustration, lose a much-needed tranche of financial support from the IMF, frustrate its international partners, and empower pro-Russia and populist factions in the 2019 elections.

The U.S. and its partners must be willing to both support Ukraine against Russian subversion and simultaneously challenge Kyiv to meet its own reform obligations. The U.S. has taken key steps to support Ukraine, including most recently authorizing the sale of Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missile Systems to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.[24] U.S. military support will help Ukraine defend itself from the Armed Forces of Russia and its proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine. The U.S. also extended sanctions on Russia for its ongoing invasion of Eastern Ukraine.[25] The U.S. nonetheless must recognize the multi-faceted nature of Moscow’s campaign against Kyiv, which includes many political and economic, in addition to military, components. The Kremlin will intensify this subversion campaign over the next twelve months before Ukraine’s March 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections. The U.S. must focus its efforts over the next year on enabling effective counter-intelligence operations and tangible reforms in Kyiv lest the coming elections result in a windfall for populist and pro-Russia forces in Ukraine.

[1] “Ministry of Defense: Russia-backed militants fail to respect the recent ceasefire,” uacrisis(.)org, March 6, 2018, http://uacrisis.org/64996-hutsulyak-14

[2] [“Statement of the MFA of Ukraine in connection with the arson premises of the Society of Hungarian culture in Transcarpathia,”] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 27, 2018, http://mfa.gov(.)ua/ua/press-center/comments/8532-zajavamzs-ukrajini

[3] “Transnistrian mastermind behind arson at Hungarian NGO in Uzhgorod – Governor Moskal,”unian.info, March 5, 2018, https://www.unian(.)info/society/10030982-transnistrian-mastermind-behind-arson-at-hungarian-ngo-in-uzhgorod-governor-moskal.html ; “Molotov cocktail hurled at Hungarians Union building in Uzhgorod,”unian(.)info, February 4, 2018, https://www.unian(.)info/society/2381628-molotov-cocktail-hurled-at-hungarians-union-building-in-uzhgorod.html ; “Building of Hungarian Culture Association burns again in Uzhgorod,” 112.international, February 27, 2018, https://112(.)international/ukraine-top-news/building-of-hungarian-culture-association-burns-again-in-uzhgorod-26045.html

[4] “Poles suspected of arson attack on Hungarian center in Ukraine,” thenews.pl, February 27, 2018, http://thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/351494,Poles-suspected-of-arson-attack-on-Hungarian-centre-in-Ukraine ;

[“Internal Security Agency detained Poles suspected of trying to set fire to the building of the association of Hungarian culture in Ukraine,”] wiadomosci.onet.pl, February 27, 2018, https://wiadomosci.onet(.)pl/swiat/abw-zatrzymala-polakow-podejrzanych-o-probe-podpalenia-budynkustowarzyszeniakultury/yw1mdfj?utm_source=wiadomosci_viasg&utm_medium=nitro&utm_campaign=allonet_nitro_new&srcc=ucs&utm_v=2

[5] “Putin’s Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com, March 5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/

[6] Nataliya Bugayova, “The Kremlin Targets Ukraine Through Hungary,” Understandingwar.org, October 31, 2017, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/kremlin-targets-ukraine-through-hungary ; [“In MVD tied series resonant crime audio band, whose members are detained (added),”] novosti.dn(.)ua, October 2, 2017, http://novosti.dn(.)ua/news/274911-v-mvd-svyazaly-ryad-rezonansnykh-prestuplenyy-s-odnoy-bandoy-uchastnyky-kotoroy-zaderzhany

[7] “Attack on Poland’s Consulate General in Northwestern Ukraine seen as provocation,” euromaidanpress.com, March 29, 2017, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2017/03/29/polands-consulate-general-attacked-in-lutsk/ ; [“If Ukraine does not receive a visa-free regime, it will be a scandal” – Ambassador of Poland to Ukraine,”] lb.ua, April 4, 2017, https://lb(.)ua/world/2017/04/04/363012_yakshcho_ukraina_otrimaie_bezvizovogo.html ; Catherine Harris, Franklin Holcomb, Charlie Bacsik, and Charles Frattini III, “Ukraine Update: Russia’s Aggressive Subversion of Ukraine,” ISW Research Blog, August 4, 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/08/ukraine-updaterussias-aggressive.html ; Franklin Holcomb and Kyle Miller, “Moscow Seeks to Destabilize Increasingly Vulnerable Ukraine,” ISW Research Blog, October 10, 2017, http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/10/moscow-seeks-to-destabilize.html ; Benjamin Knudsen, Alexandra Lariiciuc, and Franklin Holcomb, “Ukraine Update: Russia’s Active Campaign in Ukraine,” ISW Research Blog, May 12, 2017 http://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2017/05/ukraine-update-russias-active-campaign.html ;

“Polish foreign ministry “concerned” over attack on Polish school in Ukraine – media,” unian.info, June 1, 2017,

https://www.unian(.)info/society/1953886-polish-foreign-ministry-concerned-over-attack-on-polish-school-in-ukraine-media.html ; “Polish Consulate General in Ukraine’s Lutsk shot at, Consul considers incident “terrorist act”,” unian.info, March 29, 2017,

https://www.unian(.)info/society/1847584-polish-consulate-general-in-ukraines-lutsk-shot-at-media.html ; Lviv “RSA says 3rd party behind desecration of Polish memorials,” unian.info, March 13, 2017, https://www.unian(.)info/society/1819852-lviv-rsa-says-3rd-party-behind-desecration-of-polish-memorials.html  ; “”Useful idiots” both in Poland, Ukraine play into Russia’s hands – Envoy,” unian.info, December 11, 2017,

http://www.unian(.)info/politics/2290341-useful-idiots-both-in-poland-ukraine-play-into-russias-hands-envoy.html  ; “Poor Ukrainian-Polish ties benefit Russia: Ukrainian vice-PM,” thenews.pl, February 2, 2018, http://www.thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/347731,Poor-UkrainianPolish-ties-benefit-Russia-Ukrainian-vicePM ; “Ukrainian FM condemns ‘provocation’ after Polish bus damaged near Lviv,” thenews.pl, December 11, 2017, http://thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/339166,Ukrainian-FM-condemns-%E2%80%98provocation%E2%80%99-after-Polish-bus-damaged-near-Lviv ; “Monuments of contention: a study into Russia’s interference in Ukrainian-Polish relations (video),” Inform Napalm, December 5, 2017, https://informnapalm(.)org/en/monuments-of-contention-a-study-into-russias-interference-in-ukrainian-polish-relations-video/ ; [“Overlap road Lviv – Rava-Ruska investigated as incitement of ethnic hatred,”] zaxid.net, March 29, 2017,  https://zaxid(.)net/perekrittya_dorogi_lviv__ravaruska_rozsliduyut_yak_rozpalyuvannya_mizhnatsionalnoyi_vorozhnechi_n1421918

[8]“Putin Tells Hungary’s Orban Nuclear Plant Expansion To Start Next Year,” RFE/RL, August 29, 2017 https://www.rferl(.)org/a/putin-hungary-orban-judo/28700669.html ; “Putin’s Hungary Visit Aimed at Cementing Ties With Orban,” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2017, https://www.wsj(.)com/articles/putins-hungary-visit-aimed-at-cementing-ties-with-orban-1486072262

[9] “A brutal attack has been launched against national minorities in Ukraine,” Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1, 2018, http://www.kormany(.)hu/en/ministry-of-foreign-affairs-and-trade/news/a-brutal-attack-has-been-launched-against-national-minorities-in-ukraine ; “Torn flag in western Ukraine to be last straw for Hungary,” dninews.com, November 17, 2017, https://dninews(.)com/article/torn-flag-western-ukraine-be-last-straw-hungary ; “Ukrainian nationalists threatened the Hungarian minority,” visegradpost.com, March 18, 2016,https://visegradpost(.)com/en/2016/03/18/ukrainian-nationalists-threatened-the-hungarian-minority/ ; “Ukrainian nationalists tear down, try to burn Hungarian flag (VIDEO),” RT, November 15, 2017, https://www.rt(.)com/news/409884-ukraine-hungary-flag-nationalists/  

[10] Olena Babakova, “Putin’s Falanga: meet the Polish neo-fascists who tried to burn down a Hungarian center in Ukraine,” euromaidanpress.com, March 5, 2018, http://euromaidanpress(.)com/2018/03/05/the-falanga-group-in-poland-whos-really-behind-the-arson-attacks-on-hungarian-associations-in-uzhhorod/ ; [“In the Hungarian association, I am convinced that their office was not blown up by Ukrainians,”] euro-integration.com, February 27, 2018, http://www.eurointegration(.)com.ua/news/2018/02/27/7078133/ “Brenzovych sees the anti-Hungarian campaign in the Ukrainian media as the cause of the incident in the KMKSZ office,” uzhgorod.in, March 1, 2018, http://uzhgorod(.)in/en/news/2018/mart/brenzovych_sees_the_anti_hungarian_campaign_in_the_ukrainian_media_as_the_cause_of_the_incident_in_the_kmksz_office

[11] [“The Hungarians’ Union of Transcarpathia wants to introduce into the region a permanent OSCE mission,”] Pravda, March 7, 2018, https://www.pravda(.)com.ua/news/2018/03/7/7173900/

[12] “Ukraine’s decision is harmful for the Hungarian minority and particularly unfair,” Office of the Prime Minister of Hungary, September 11, 2017, http://www.kormany(.)hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/ukraine-s-decision-is-harmful-for-the-hungarian-minority-and-particularly-unfair

[13] [“Hungary blocked the meeting of Ukraine-NATO Commission,”] Interfax, February 9, 2018, http://interfax.com(.)ua/news/political/483897.html ; Eugen Theise, “Hungary threatens Ukraine’s EU ties over new education law,” dw.com, October 13, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-threatens-ukraines-eu-ties-over-new-education-law/a-40944967

[14] Palko Karasz,“Hungary’s Opposition Sees Hope After Orban’s Candidate Falls,” New York Times, February 26, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/europe/hungary-viktor-orban-opposition.html

[15] “Ukraine ‘Stabilizes’ Gas Supply Amid Fresh Energy Dispute With Russia,” REF/RL, March 3, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-stabilizes-gas-supply-amid-fresh-dispute-with-russia/29076472.html ; “Russia’s Gazprom to terminate gas contracts with Ukraine,” dw.com,March 3, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/russias-gazprom-to-terminate-gas-contracts-with-ukraine/a-42814931 ; Vladimir Soldatkin and Natalia Zinets, “Gazprom seeks to halt Ukraine gas contracts as dispute escalates,” Reuters, March 2, 2018 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-gas/gazprom-seeks-to-halt-ukraine-gas-contracts-as-dispute-escalates-idUSKCN1GE2DW

[16] [“Gazprom announces the termination of all treaties with Ukraine,”] depo.ua, March 2, 2018, https://www.depo(.)ua/ukr/politics/gazprom-zayavlyaye-pro-rozirvannya-dogovoriv-z-ukrayinoyu-20180302736499 ; “Ukraine’s Naftogaz claims $2.56 billion victory in Gazprom legal battle,” Reuters, February 28, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-gazprom/ukraines-naftogaz-claims-2-56-billion-victory-in-gazprom-legal-battle-idUSKCN1GC2Z8  “Ukraine’s Naftogaz Claims $2.5 Billion Victory In Legal Battle With Gazprom,” RFE/RL,March 1, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-naftogaz-gazprom-legal-victory/29069422.html

[17] [“Naftogaz and Polish PGNiG signed a gas supply agreement,”] RIA Novosti, March 2, 2018, https://ria(.)ru/economy/20180302/1515634846.html ; “Ukraine ‘Stabilizes’ Gas Supply Amid Fresh Energy Dispute With Russia,” RFE/RL,March 3, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-stabilizes-gas-supply-amid-fresh-dispute-with-russia/29076472.html

[18] “Poland’s PGNiG to supply gas for Naftogaz in Ukraine,” Hydrocarbons Technology, March 6, 2018, https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/news/polands-pgnig-supply-gas-naftogaz-ukraine/

[19] [“Nord Stream 2 contravenes the principles of the Energy Union – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia,”] ukrinform,ua, March 6, 2018,  https://www.ukrinform(.)ua/rubric-world/2417065-nord-stream-2-superecit-principam-energeticnogo-souzu-mzs-latvii.html; “Nord Stream 2 will make Russo-Ukrainian war more likely: Polish PM,” thenews.pl, February 15, 2018,  http://www.thenews(.)pl/1/10/Artykul/349432,Nord-Stream-2-will-make%20-RussoUkrainian-war-more-likely-Polish-PM

[20] Oleg Sukhov, “Poroshenko puts up more resistance to independent anti-corruption court,” Kyiv Post, March 7, 2018, https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/poroshenko-rejects-demands-create-independent-anti-corruption-court.html

[21] “Ukraine Moves Closer To Anticorruption Court, But Doubts Remain,” RFE/RL, March 1, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-anticorruption-court-passes-first-reading/29070605.html ; “Successful anti-corruption fight is impossible without the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Court — Artem Sytnyk,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, February 22, 2018, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/successful-anti-corruption-fight-impossible-without-establishment-anti-corruption-court-artem ; “Attempts to limit the independence of the NABU will cause irreversible consequences for the fight against corruption in Ukraine,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, December 7, 2017, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/attempts-limit-independence-nabu-will-cause-irreversible-consequences-fight-against; “In 26 out of 86 NABU’s proceedings the trials have not started yet,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, September 11, 2017,  https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/26-out-86-nabus-proceedings-trials-have-not-started-yet ; ;  “IMF mission supports functional independence of NABU,” National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, November 11, 2016, https://nabu.gov(.)ua/en/novyny/imf-mission-supports-functional-independence-nabu

[22] Oleg Sukhov, “Lawmakers advance flimsy anti-corruption court,” Kyiv Post, March 2, 2018, https://www.kyivpost(.)com/ukraine-politics/lawmakers-advance-flimsy-anti-corruption-court.html

[23] “President in an interview to Financial Times: We do reforms not for the IMF, but for the Ukrainian people,” Office of the President of Ukraine, March 6, 2018, http://www.president.gov(.)ua/en/news/mi-robimo-reformi-ne-dlya-mvf-dlya-ukrayinciv-prezident-v-in-46182

[24] “U.S. State Department Approves ‘Javelin’ Missile Sale to Ukraine,” RFE/RL, March 2, 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-state-department-approves-javelin-anti-tank-missile-sale-ukraine/29072069.html

[25] “Executive Order on the President’s Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine,” The White House, March 2, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-presidents-continuation-national-emergency-respect-ukraine/

Posted by Institute for the Study of War at 10:32 AM 

Email This