In response to the latest reported use of chemical weapons (CW) by Assad regime forces near Damascus on April 7, which reportedly killed dozens of civilians in the town of Douma, President Trump tweeted that there would be a “Big price to pay.” He subsequently told a cabinet meeting on April 9, “We cannot allow atrocities like that. Cannot allow it…Nothing’s off the table.” He then warned that regardless of whether Russia, the Assad regime, or Iran was responsible, the U.S. response would be “very tough,” repeating that everybody involved would “pay a price.”

If the United States opts to act militarily, its policy should be guided by several considerations. First, Washington should seek to divide Bashar al-Assad’s coalition with Iran and Russia. This means eschewing actions that could drive them together at a time when their interests may diverge (e.g., Moscow might be annoyed that Assad overreached by using CW, since such acts could drag the United States back into the war at a time when it seemed to be disengaging). Washington should also eschew actions that increase the potential for escalation; rather, the goal should be to de-escalate the situation by restoring deterrence vis-a-vis the Assad regime.

Specifically, any U.S. strikes should focus on regime assets while avoiding targets with higher risk of Russian casualties. Washington should also support Israel’s ongoing strikes against Iranian targets in Syria (establishing an informal division of labor there), to impose costs on Tehran for its policies. And the administration should continue to reserve the right to take action of its own against Iranian assets in Syria when they threaten U.S. personnel or interests.

Second, this problem will not end with a single set of strikes. Deterrence has a limited shelf life, and Assad will likely continue defying the international community and challenging the CW redline. Additional strikes may be necessary to deter him from doing so.

Third, the main “weapons of mass destruction” in Syria have been barrel bombs, artillery, and small arms. While CW may have killed several thousand, conventional arms have killed more than a hundred thousand civilians. Thus, while U.S. strikes should target CW infrastructure when collateral damage can be minimized, they should focus primarily on the regime’s conventional military capabilities. Focusing solely on CW capabilities would limit the damage to dispensable assets—the United States should also target forces that have been essential to Assad’s victories, namely, ground units such as the 4th Armored Division, Republican Guard, and Tiger Force, along with air units that deliver barrel bombs and CW. This would hinder the regime’s war effort much more than strikes focusing solely on CW capabilities.

This targeting strategy would have the added benefit of affecting the regime’s patrons. Russia and Iran have ensured the sustainability of their expeditionary activities in Syria by offloading risk and burdens on others, particularly Hezbollah and other foreign Shia militias. If U.S. strikes diminish Assad’s key ground and air units, this would increase the load on Russia, Iran, and the latter’s “Shia foreign legion,” raising the costs of their intervention.

To achieve that goal, U.S. forces would need to target major headquarters and destroy key capabilities and the people who enable them. Although Russia and Iran can replace the Assad regime’s equipment, they cannot replace its manpower, and manpower is what it lacks most. Moreover, by hitting the headquarters of the above-named ground units—which are manned by Alawites connected to the regime via family ties—the United States would strike a heavy blow and magnify the deterrent effect compared to hitting less important units or CW infrastructure alone. The administration should also consider striking symbolic targets such as the Presidential Palace on Qasioun Mountain overlooking Damascus, whose destruction could have a significant psychological effect on the regime and the Syrian people.

Fourth, U.S. military actions should be guided by lessons learned in past efforts at deterrence and coercive diplomacy in the Middle East:

• The United States should not set additional redlines unless it is willing to enforce them, and it should be prepared to answer any further attempts to test U.S. limits, since failure to respond would only invite more challenges.
• Because disproportionate responses are prohibited by the Law of Armed Conflict, Washington should respond to Syrian challenges asymmetrically. Thus, it should hit not only the source of the provocation, but also assets that the regime truly values. Striking only disposable assets would enable Assad to sustain his defiance, calibrate risk, and more safely test U.S. limits. Responding asymmetrically would introduce uncertainty into his cost-benefit calculus about future U.S. responses, thereby strengthening the deterrent effect of U.S. strikes.
• The administration should make clear that its strikes will not be a one-off operation by employing constructive ambiguity about the possibility of future strikes. Otherwise, Assad may believe that he can outlast the United States, and the deterrent effect of a strike will be limited.

Finally, Washington should use the threat of a strike to test the potential for multilateral diplomacy. This threat might help drive a wedge between Damascus and Moscow, and perhaps create new opportunities for pressing Syria to eliminate its undeclared CW stockpiles and observe its ceasefires with various rebel forces around the country—though experience does not provide reason for optimism.

Michael Eisenstadt is the Kahn Fellow and director of the Military and Security Studies Program at The Washington Institute.

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On April 2, the Egyptian election commission declared that President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi had won a second term with 97 percent of the vote. During his first term, he focused on suffocating the political environment and sidelining his opponents, so his attention will now shift to reconstructing the political establishment. In fact, the seeds of the new political system have already been planted, largely unnoticed in Washington.

Ever since the 2013 coup, Sisi and his allies have sought to destroy the opposition by cracking down on Islamists, primarily the Muslim Brotherhood. The only faction spared was the ultraconservative Nour Party, which supported the coup and provided religious legitimacy to Sisi’s government. Similarly, several leftist and liberal opposition members were either driven out of the country or banned from all media services, while the intelligence services began buying or investing directly in press outlets for the first time. The government has also banned all political activities at universities.

Elsewhere, the majority of parliament has been filled with members handpicked by the security services, ensuring that bills act as a mere rubber stamp to Sisi’s decisions. Among the new legislation are laws that impose stiff penalties on any citizens who dare to hold unauthorized demonstrations, offering highly restrictive “protest permits” instead.

All of these actions stem from an inherent belief that political bickering and politics in general are a distraction to the country. Sisi himself seems to despise politicians, casting them as self-serving, hypocritical, and corrupt; in his view, the establishment that came to dominate Egypt after President Anwar Sadat reopened the political sphere in the 1970s has outlived its purpose.

At the time, Sadat reintroduced political parties to provide an aura of legitimacy and window-dressing democracy. Over time, however, the opposition carved out a sizable political role that culminated in the 2011 revolution. According to Sisi and his allies, that uprising almost destroyed the state and the military by bringing the Muslim Brotherhood to power; they now fear that maintaining such wide political space could result in another uprising.

Hence, Sisi envisions refilling the political sphere with “loyal, patriotic” youths chosen by the security services and the president’s office. These youths would replace the old-guard elites who began their careers in the 1970s.

After the death of former president Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egyptian leaders struggled to articulate a political ideology capable of competing with leftists, Islamists, and liberals. Sisi has taken notice of his predecessors’ failure and is building the new establishment around issues such as fighting terrorism and protecting the homeland from a perceived axis of evil, foreign conspiracies, and fourth-generation warfare—in other words, he believes the solution lies in whipping up ultranationalist sentiment.

The government has been working on this plan for a while, announcing its first “National Youth Conference” in January 2016 and holding it in Sharm al-Sheikh that October. The media department of the President’s office organized the event in partnership with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Presidential Leadership Program, and other agencies. The estimated 3,000 participants included university students, athletes, intellectuals, and budding politicians; they attended lectures delivered by around 300 “experts” and public figures. At least three other domestic youth conferences have been held since then.

The backbone of these events is the Presidential Leadership Program, founded in September 2015 with the goal of creating new political leaders. Participants in the nine-month program are divided into groups and placed in workshops on economics, media, political science, strategy, and national security. According to a November 2017 interview with Education Minister Tarek Shawki, two classes have graduated from the program so far, and twenty-two of its alumni are currently working in various ministerial positions.

Sisi’s long-term goal is to create a political class completely free of the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition members. This vision may start coming to fruition during the next local elections, which the government has repeatedly postponed until it prepares suitable candidates—namely, participants in the Presidential Leadership Program and the youth conferences. Minister of Local Development Abubakr al-Gendi indicated that parliament would pass the implementing legislation related to management of these elections after the presidential vote.

Regardless of Washington’s feelings toward the Sisi government, nurturing this new political generation and engaging them during their formative years could help U.S. officials reestablish influence in Cairo. This includes inviting them to the United States through State Department public diplomacy initiatives such as the International Visitor Leadership Program. Any such efforts are more likely to succeed if done in cooperation with the Egyptian government.

Haisam Hassanein is a PhD candidate at Tel Aviv University and a former Glazer Fellow at The Washington Institute. 

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