Αρχική Blog Σελίδα 2507

Την προσφυγή στο ΔΝΤ εξετάζει πλέον η κυβέρνηση Ερντογάν

Από
anixneuseis
-
0

Η πολιτική Ερντογάν προκάλεσε μαζική φυγή ξένων κεφαλαίων από τη χώρα. Οι εκροές έφτασαν στα 6,4 δισ. δολ. το πρώτο τρίμηνο του έτους.

Καθώς εξαντλούνται τα συναλλαγματικά διαθέσιμα της Τουρκίας και η οικονομία διολισθαίνει εκ νέου σε ύφεση, η κυβέρνηση Ερντογάν αρχίζει να εξετάζει λύσεις που απέκλειε έως τώρα. Ανάμεσά τους η προσφυγή στο ΔΝΤ με τις πολιτικές που το συνοδεύουν. Αρκετοί Τούρκοι πολιτικοί θα ήθελαν να αποφύγουν μια νέα προσφυγή στο ΔΝΤ, αλλά θεωρούν ότι λόγω της πανδημίας είναι η κατάλληλη περίοδος να συνάψουν μια καλή συμφωνία με το Ταμείο. Τα συναλλαγματικά διαθέσιμα της Τουρκίας έχουν μειωθεί κατά σχεδόν 11 δισ. δολάρια από την αρχή του έτους και ανέρχονται σε μόλις 94,5 δισ. δολάρια.

Αν από αυτά αφαιρεθούν τα αποθεματικά των τουρκικών τραπεζών και ορισμένες υποχρεώσεις που εκκρεμούν, τα πραγματικά διαθέσιμα φαίνεται πως δεν υπερβαίνουν τα 26,3 δισ. δολάρια. Σύμφωνα με τα τελευταία επίσημα στοιχεία, από το σύνολο των διαθεσίμων τα 25,9 δισ. δολάρια ήταν προϊόν δανεισμού. Αν η χώρα δεν καταφύγει σε εξωτερική χρηματοδότηση, δεν θα έχει τη δυνατότητα να θωρακίσει την οικονομία της και να αντιμετωπίσει το δυσθεώρητο εξωτερικό χρέος της, από το οποίο λήγουν ομόλογα αξίας 170 δισ. δολαρίων μέσα στο επόμενο έτος.

Την τελευταία φορά, πάντως, που η Τουρκία προσέφυγε στο ΔΝΤ, το 2001, η χρηματοπιστωτική κρίση εκείνης της εποχής κυριολεκτικά διέγραψε από τον πολιτικό χάρτη μια γενιά Τούρκων πολιτικών και προλείανε το έδαφος για την άνοδο του Ερντογάν στην εξουσία.

Μια άλλη δυνατότητα που φαίνεται να εξετάζει η κεντρική τράπεζα είναι να τυπώσει χρήμα, μολονότι η γειτονική χώρα έχει ιστορικό με πολύ υψηλούς δείκτες πληθωρισμού. Η προοπτική αυτή φαίνεται ρεαλιστική, ειδικότερα όταν η κεντρική τράπεζα αγοράζει μαζικά κρατικά ομόλογα από τη δευτερογενή αγορά και έχει εκφράσει την πρόθεση να αυξήσει περαιτέρω αυτές τις αγορές για όσο χρειαστεί.

Οπως τονίζει σχετικό ρεπορτάζ του Bloomberg, έχει αρχίσει να ατονεί το στίγμα που φέρουν οι δύο αυτές επιλογές καθώς εξαντλείται το οπλοστάσιο τόσο της κυβέρνησης όσο και της κεντρικής τράπεζας. Η παγκόσμια οικονομία διολισθαίνει στη χειρότερη ύφεση που έχει γνωρίσει σε καιρό ειρήνης μετά το 1930. Και οι κυβερνήσεις αναγκάζονται να παραβιάσουν κανόνες και δόγματα σε βαθμό και τρόπο αδιανόητο. «Η Αγκυρα πρέπει να βρει τρόπο να στηρίξει την οικονομία της χωρίς να προκαλέσει κρίση στο ισοζύγιο τρεχουσών συναλλαγών», σχολιάζει ο Μουράτ Ουσέρ, οικονομολόγος της Global Source Partners. Ο ίδιος επισημαίνει πως είναι πολύ δύσκολο να τα καταφέρει μόνη της και η πλέον πρακτική λύση είναι και πάλι ένα πρόγραμμα δανεισμού από το ΔΝΤ «παρά τις πολιτικές που αυτό επιβάλλει».

Μια άλλη δυνατότητα της Τουρκίας θα ήταν η επιβολή ελέγχων στις κινήσεις κεφαλαίου όπως εκτιμά ο Περ Χάμαρλουντ, αναλυτής αναδυόμενων αγορών στη SEB AB στη Στοκχόλμη. Ο ίδιος θεωρεί, πάντως, πιθανότερο να αναζητήσει η Αγκυρα διμερή στήριξη από τις ΗΠΑ και την Κίνα ή την Ε.Ε. προκειμένου να αποκαταστήσει την εμπιστοσύνη στην οικονομία της.

Σύμφωνα με τον κ. Χάμαρλουντ, «οι έλεγχοι στις κινήσεις κεφαλαίου είναι δίκοπο μαχαίρι, γιατί κρατούν πολύτιμα κεφάλαια έξω από τη χώρα».

Και βέβαια ο Τούρκος πρόεδρος φέρει μεγάλη ευθύνη για το αδιέξοδο στο οποίο έχει περιέλθει η τουρκική οικονομία. Με την επιμονή του στον φθηνό δανεισμό, ο Ερντογάν διέβρωσε την εμπιστοσύνη των επενδυτών στην τουρκική λίρα, εξωθώντας τον τουρκικό λαό στην αγορά δολαρίων και προκαλώντας, έτσι, τη λεγόμενη δολαριοποίηση της τουρκικής οικονομίας. Επιστρατεύοντας, άλλωστε, διάφορα μέτρα για να αποτρέψει τα στοιχήματα κατά του νομίσματος, προκάλεσε μαζική φυγή κεφαλαίων από τη χώρα. Οι εκροές ξένου κεφαλαίου από ομόλογα και μετοχές της Τουρκίας έφτασαν στα 6,4 δισ. δολάρια το πρώτο τρίμηνο του έτους, καταγράφοντας ρεκόρ από το 2005 οπότε υπάρχουν τα σχετικά αρχεία.

“Καθημερινή”

Η νέα επανάσταση, ο νεολουδιτισμός και τα νέα πολιτικά κόμματα.

Από
anixneuseis
-
3

του Παντελή Σαββίδη

Λεπτομερώς θα γράψω την άποψή μου σε άρθρο. Εδω θα περιοριστώ σε επιγραμματικές αναφορές.

1.-Μπήκαμε, ήδη, στην εποχή μιας νέας επανάστασης που θα κυριαρχείται απο την Τεχνητή Νοημοσύνη.
2.-Η συνύπαρξη ανθρώπου και ευφυούς μηχανής θα συμβεί στο προσδόκιμο της ηλικίας ενός σημερινού μεσήλικα.
3.-Δεν είμαι οπαδός των συνομοσιολογικών θεωριών αλλά αν έκανα μια έκπτωση θα έλεγα πως ο κορονοϊός κατασκευάστηκε για να επιταχύνει το μεταβατικό στάδιο εισόδου στη νέα εποχή.Αυτό που ζούμε είναι μια prova generale εθισμού στη ζωή του διαδικτύου. Το άλλο που κάνει ο κορονοίός είναι πως προτιμά τους ηλικιωμένους. Ειρήσθω εν παρόδω πως στη νέα εποχή οι ηλικιωμένοι δεν μπορούν να συνηθίσουν τον ψηφιακό κόσμο και η ύπαρξή τους είναι μια οικονομική αιμορραγία του νέου συστήματος. Άρα ανεπιθύμητοι.
4.-Η εποχή που ζούμε μπορεί να συγκριθεί, μόνο, με την εποχή της βιομηχανικής επανάστασης. Τότε εμφανίστηκαν και οι λουδίτες οι οποίοι κατέστρεφαν τις μηχανές διότι τους στερούσαν την εργασία. Σήμερα ως λουδιτισμός θα μπορούσε να χαρακτηριστεί το κίνημα των θρησκόληπτων αλλά οι περισσότεροι δεν γνωρίζουν τον ψηφιακό κόσμο. Καλοί λουδίτες θα ήσαν οι χάκερς αλλά χάκερ και λουδίτης είναι έννοιες ασύμβατες.
5.-Η εποχή στην οποία εισήλθαμε μπορεί να αποβεί επαναστατική για την ανθρωπότητα υπο προϋποθέσεις. Υπο άλλες προϋποθέσεις μπορεί να είναι ο απόλυτος ολοκληρωτισμός.
6.-Αυτό θα κριθεί και απο τους νέους πολιτικούς φορείς που θα συγκροτηθούν.Πάντως, οι υπάρχοντες είναι αναχρονιστικοί.

ICE: Τι κομίζει η ευρωπαϊκή πλατφόρμα μυστικών υπηρεσιών

Από
anixneuseis
-
1

Deutsche Welle

Στη σκιά των εξελίξεων της πανδημίας, 21 χώρες της ΕΕ από κοινού με τη Βρετανία και τη Νορβηγία δημιούργησαν μια νέα πλατφόρμα συνεργασίας μεταξύ των μυστικών υπηρεσιών: την Intelligence College of Europe, κοινώς ICE.

    
Konferenz für Nationale Cybersicherheit (picture-alliance/dpa/R. Hirschberger)

Τέλη Φεβρουαρίου 23 ευρωπαϊκές χώρες δημιούργησαν την πλατφόρμα Intelligence College of Europe (ICΕ), ένα νέο θεσμό για τη συνεργασία μεταξύ ευρωπαϊκών μυστικών υπηρεσιών. Ποιος όμως είναι ο στόχος του θεσμού και ποιες άλλες παρόμοιες συνεργασίες υπάρχουν εντός της ΕΕ;

Η πρωτοβουλία για το νέο θεσμό προήλθε από τον γάλλο προέδρο Εμμανουέλ Μακρόν, ο οποίος σε ομιλία του στη Σορβόννη τον Σεπτέμβριο του 2017 μίλησε για την αναγκαιότητα δημιουργίας νέων ευρωπαϊκών δομών ως προς τις μυστικές υπηρεσίες έτσι ώστε οι Ευρωπαίοι να περιορίσουν την εξάρτησή τους από πληροφορίες αμερικανικών, κινεζικών και ρωσικών υπηρεσιών.

Εκτός προς το παρόν, η Ελλάδα

Ο Εμμανουέλ Μακρόν στην περίφημη ομιλία της Σορβόννης είχε κάνει λόγο για την ανάγκη σύστασης ευρωπαϊκών δομών σχετικά με την ανταλλαγή πληροφοριώνΟ Εμμανουέλ Μακρόν στην περίφημη ομιλία της Σορβόννης είχε κάνει λόγο για την ανάγκη σύστασης ευρωπαϊκών δομών σχετικά με την ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών

Η ICE ιδρύθηκε επίσημα στις 5 Μαρτίου του 2019 στο Παρίσι, ενώ οι υπογραφές έπεσαν στο Ζάγκρεπ στις 26 Φεβρουαρίου του 2020. Παρά το γεγονός ότι είχαν προσκληθεί όλες οι χώρες μέλη της ΕΕ, Ελλάδα, Βουλγαρία, Σλοβακία, Πολωνία και Λουξεμβούργο δεν συνυπέγραψαν, προς το παρόν τουλάχιστον, το κείμενο προθέσεων. Σύμφωνα με ανεπιβεβαίωτες πληροφορίες οι πέντε αυτές χώρες και η Ελβετία θα αποκτήσουν μεσοπρόθεσμα ένα χαλαρό στάτους εταίρου. Ουδείς γνωρίζει ωστόσο τι ακριβώς σημαίνει αυτό.

Πολλά ερωτήματα παραμένουν αναπάντητα ακόμα και μετά την ίδρυση της νέας πλατφόρμας. Από το κείμενο προθέσεων προκύπτει τουλάχιστον τι δεν θα είναι η ICE: Δεν θα είναι πλατφόρμα ανταλλαγής απόρρητων πληροφοριών ή κέντρο σχεδιασμού επιχειρήσεων. Δεν θα αποκτήσει νομική μορφή, αλλά ούτε και έδρα. Θα διαθέτει ωστόσο προεδρείο και εποπτικό συμβούλιο. Όλες οι ανακοινώσεις και δημοσιεύσεις που θα προέρχονται από τη νέα πλατφόρμα δεν θα έχουν δεσμευτικό χαρακτήρα για τα μέλη.

Δεν είναι η μόνη ευρωπαϊκή πλατφόρμα μυστικών υπηρεσιών

Στόχος η απεξάρτηση από την παροχή πληροφοριών από αμερικανικές, ρωσικές ή κινεζικές μυστικές υπηρεσίεςΣτόχος η απεξάρτηση από την παροχή πληροφοριών από αμερικανικές, ρωσικές ή κινεζικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες

Η Intelligence College of Europe έχει σχεδιαστεί ως χαλαρή πλατφόρμα, η οποία θα συνεδριάζει τρεις φορές το χρόνο σε διάφορες ευρωπαϊκές χώρες στη μορφή συνεδρίων και σεμιναρίων. Στις εν λόγω διοργανώσεις θα συμμετέχουν συνεργάτες μυστικών υπηρεσιών, εκπρόσωποι δημόσιων υπηρεσιών, πολιτικοί, ειδικοί και επιστήμονες. Σκοπός των συναντήσεων είναι να εντατικοποιηθεί ο διάλογος και η ανταλλαγή απόψεων μεταξύ στελεχών μυστικών υπηρεσιών, ειδικών, αλλά και εκείνων που λαμβάνουν τις πολιτικές αποφάσεις.

Η ICΕ δεν είναι η μόνη ευρωπαϊκή πλατφόρμα μυστικών υπηρεσιών. Ήδη το 1969 ιδρύθηκε το «Κλαμπ της Βέρνης», στο οποίο οι αρχηγοί των μυστικών υπηρεσιών ανταλλάσουν απόψεις και εκτιμήσεις. Τον περασμένο Μάρτιο ωστόσο αυστριακοί και ελβετοί δημοσιογράφοι αποκάλυψαν ότι τα μέλη του Κλαμπ της Βέρνης συνεργάζονται πολύ στενότερα από ότι υποστηρίζαν και ότι η πλατφόρμα διαθέτει βάσεις δεδομένων, στις οποίες αποθηκεύονται και προσωπικά δεδομένα.

Άγνωστο αν θα καθιερωθεί η ICE

Ήδη η Europol προσφέρει σχετικές υπηρεσίες και συνεργάζεται με μυστικές υπηρεσίες. Η νέα δομή θα είναι όμως διαφορετικήΉδη η Europol προσφέρει σχετικές υπηρεσίες και συνεργάζεται με μυστικές υπηρεσίες. Η νέα δομή θα είναι όμως διαφορετική

Η ΕΕ διαθέτει όμως και άλλους θεσμούς συνεργασίας μυστικών υπηρεσιών, όπως είναι η Europol, αλλά και το κέντρο ανταλλαγής πληροφοριών Intelligence Analysis Centre (INCTEN). Το κέντρο αυτό όμως δεν είναι μυστική υπηρεσία, όπως γράφεται συχνά στο Τύπο. Τα κράτη-μέλη αποστέλλουν στις Βρυξέλλες εκπροσώπους για την ανταλλαγή, αξιολόγηση και ανάλυση πληροφοριών. Και επειδή το INCTEN δεν συλλέγει το ίδιο πληροφορίες με τις κλασικές μεθόδους των μυστικών υπηρεσιών είναι περισσότερο κέντρο αναλύσεων παρά μυστική υπηρεσία. Επειδή όμως βάσει των ευρωπαϊκών συνθηκών ζητήματα πολιτικής ασφαλείας βρίσκονται στην ευθύνη των χωρών-μελών είναι μάλλον απίθανο η ΕΕ να αποκτήσει κάποτε δική της μυστική υπηρεσία.

Το πώς και το αν η νέα πλατφόρμα ICΕ θα καθιερωθεί μέσα σε μια πληθώρα παρόμοιων θεσμών θα το δείξει το χρόνος. Αναμένεται ότι η Intelligence College of Europe θα αντιμετωπίσει τις ίδιες δυσκολίες, όπως και άλλοι αντίστοιχοι θεσμοί. Πόσο οι διάφορες χώρες-μέλη εμπιστεύονται η μια την άλλη; Τι μπορούν να προσφέρουν οι μικρότερες χώρες στις μεγαλύτερες έτσι ώστε να υπάρξει πραγματική συνεργασία; Ποιός θα ελέγχει και ποιός θα νομιμοποιεί εν τέλει τη νέα πλατφόρμα;

Κρίστοφερ Νέρινγκ

Επιμέλεια: Στέφανος Γεωργακόπουλος

Ο μεγάλος κίνδυνος είναι η αδράνεια

Από
anixneuseis
-
0

Water Wars: Coronavirus Spreads Risk of Conflict Around the South China Sea

Από
anixneuseis
-
0

lawfareblog.com

By Sean Quirk

Tuesday, April 7, 2020, 6:41 PM

The U.S. Navy coordinates transportation of sailors assigned to the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) who have tested negative for COVID-19 in Guam. April 4, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Matthew R. White).

Washington and Beijing are using their militaries to signal that neither is letting down its guard on Taiwan and the South China Sea during the coronavirus pandemic. Soon after Taiwan’s Vice President-Elect William Lai Ching-te visited the United States in early February, People’s Republic of China (PRC) military aircraft crossed the dividing line in the Taiwan Strait into Taiwan’s airspace two days in a row. The incursions included Chinese H-6 bombers, J-11 fighter jets and KJ-500 early warning aircraft. Taiwan responded by scrambling F-16s to shadow the Chinese aircraft out of Taiwan’s airspace. On March 19, both USS Barry (DDG 52) and USS Shiloh (CG 67) launched SM-2 missiles for a live-fire exercise in the Philippine Sea. Some Chinese military analysts deemed the exercise to be an uncommon “warning to the People’s Liberation Army [PLA].”

Then, on March 25, USS McCampbell (DDG 25) conducted a Taiwan Strait transit—the third such transit by a U.S. warship in 2020. In response to McCampbell’s transit, the spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense called U.S. actions “a serious violation of international laws on freedom of navigation.” However, there is little legal grounding for this assertion. The narrowest portion of the Taiwan Strait is more than 70 nautical miles wide, well beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of either coastal state. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea also allows for “continuous and expeditious” transit passage through international straits as well as innocent passage of warships through the territorial seas of coastal states.

The same week as McCampbell’s transit, Taiwan held large-scale military exercises to simulate repelling an “all-out Chinese aerial invasion,” according to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense. Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen added on March 24 that the Taiwanese “armed forces remain as vigilant as ever.” Although the Chinese, U.S. and Taiwanese military actions are individually unremarkable, they collectively signal what one analyst called posturing to prove “combat readiness remain[s] unaffected by the virus.”

Beyond Taiwan, security analysts have argued that China may be seizing the “COVID-19 advantage in the South China Sea.” China has reportedly made gains in both new research facilities and resource extraction in the South China Sea since the start of the pandemic. On March 20, Chinese media reported that China opened two new research facilities on its occupied features in the Spratlys. The Chinese Academy of Sciences will operate the two facilities on Fiery Cross (Tagalog: Kagitingan; Mandarin: Yongshu) and Subi (Tagalog: Zamora; Mandarin: Zhubi) Reefs for field studies on “deep sea ecology, geology, environment, material sciences and marine energy.” The International Business Times emphasized that China’s “supposedly civilian scientific purposes” come as the rest of the world is “distracted by coronavirus.” Then, on March 26, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources announced that it extracted and produced a record amount of natural gas in a single day in the South China Sea. The production process ran from Feb. 17 to March 18, as the coronavirus began its rapid spread around the world.

Around the South China Sea, rival Southeast Asian claimants Malaysia and the Philippines are preoccupied with enforcing mandatory quarantine measures. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte previously self-quarantined as a precaution, and the Philippine armed forces chief of staff recently recovered from COVID-19, the respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus. Vietnam and Indonesia are also enforcing measures to limit the spread of the virus.

Yet Chinese naval movements in the South China Sea appear lackluster for the time being. Some reporting speculates that a decelerating Chinese economy and a military hampered by COVID-19 could force China to scale back its maritime ambitions in the South China Sea.

Despite these setbacks, Beijing is still trying to project an image of military strength. Chinese media reported that PLA-Navy surface vessels, submarines and fighter jets conducted readiness drills “in the South China Sea in late March.” On March 24, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mouthpiece the Global Times stated that the Chinese aircraft carrier CNS Liaoning (CV 16) was hosting fighter “jet drills amid [the] epidemic.” The Global Times added that “[t]raining for war preparedness will not be stopped even in the middle of the COVID-19 epidemic.”

However, there is reason to doubt Beijing’s account of its readiness. The Global Times report included a photo from April 2018 and said the drills took place in “early spring in the Bohai Strait,” which several outlets misreported and misconstrued as in the South China Sea. The Bohai Strait is next to the carrier’s homeport of Qingdao in northeastern China—nearly 1,500 nautical miles from the South China Sea. The March 24 Global Times article also reported “zero COVID-19 cases on February 17” (emphasis added) for the new and South China Sea-based aircraft carrier the CNS Shandong (CV 17). The PLA has claimed that not a single person in its 2-million-strong military has contracted COVID-19, which is about as unbelievable as China’s underreported civilian COVID-19 tallies. Thus, the jury is still out on the true impact of COVID-19 on China’s two carriers and the PLA-Navy.

In contrast, COVID-19 has significantly and publicly impacted at least one of the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific. On March 31, the San Francisco Chronicle published a letter from Brett Crozier, the captain of USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), to military leadership pleading for greater assistance to control the COVID-19 outbreak among the ship’s crew of more than 4,800 sailors. He compared his situation to the COVID-19 outbreak on the Diamond Princess cruise ship and wrote, “We are not at war. Sailors do not need to die. If we do not act now, we are failing to properly take care of our most trusted asset—our Sailors.” The Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group had been conducting joint operations in the Indo-Pacific prior to the outbreak.

On April 1, then-Acting Secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly said, “The fact that [Captain Crozier] wrote the letter to his chain of command to express his concerns would absolutely not result in any kind of retaliation.” But Modly fired the captain the following day for “panicking” under pressure and to preempt President Trump from having to “intervene because the Navy couldn’t be decisive.” Modly then stated that Crozier was “too naive or too stupid” to be in command if he had believed his letter would not leak, in a speech to the ship’s crew on April 6 that quickly leaked to the media. It remains unclear who leaked Crozier’s letter. Trump said he supported the firing of Crozier, declaring that “I guess the captain stopped in Vietnam and people got off in Vietnam. Perhaps you don’t do that in the middle of a pandemic or something that looked like it was going to be.” Modly subsequently resigned on April 7 over his comments to the Theodore Roosevelt crew and bungled handling of the outbreak response.

The Theodore Roosevelt had arrived in Da Nang, Vietnam, on March 5 for a five-day port visit. It was a diplomatically significant port call to signal 25 years since the restoration of U.S.-Vietnam relations. It also served a strategic purpose, emphasizing the continuing U.S. naval presence in the South China Sea at a time when military relations with the Philippines have frayed. Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said that “there were only 16 positive cases in Vietnam” when the Theodore Roosevelt arrived, and Indo-Pacific Command Commander Adm. Philip Davidson made “a very risk-informed decision” to allow the port visit. At the time, Vietnam’s COVID-19 cases were all in Hanoi with none reported in Da Nang. On March 9, while the Theodore Roosevelt was wrapping up its port visit to Vietnam, Trump was still blaming the “Fake News Media” and “Democrat Party” for seeking “to inflame the CoronaVirus situation.”

Fifteen days after leaving Da Nang, three sailors on the Theodore Roosevelt tested positive for the coronavirus. Sailors are flown on and off aircraft carriers during routine operations, so it is unclear if the virus came aboard the ship from Vietnam, underway replenishments or airborne personnel transfers—a possibility Modly has cited.

As of April 7, 230 Theodore Roosevelt sailors have tested positive for the coronavirus, while none have required hospitalization. Crozier has also tested positive, but not before thousands of Theodore Roosevelt sailors cheered his name as he departed the ship for the last time. The aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), in port in Yokosuka, Japan, has also had at least two of its sailors test positive for the coronavirus.

The firing of Capt. Crozier raises several concerns for U.S. naval operations. One concern is that commanding officers will be less likely to raise systemic issues in the future due to a culture of “shoot the messenger,” which contributed to the training and readiness deficiencies that caused the fatal USS Fitzgerald (DDG 62) and USS John S. McCain (DDG 56) collisions in the Indo-Pacific in 2017. Retired U.S. Vice Adm. William Douglas Crowder, who formerly served as Seventh Fleet commander and deputy chief of naval operations, said that his worry was the signal the stricken carrier sent to China, North Korea and Russia. “They miscalculate our ability to respond,” he told the New York Times. This concern appears well founded, with Chinese media reporting on April 3 that the “outbreak of COVID-19 has significantly lowered the US Navy’s warship deployment capability in the Asia-Pacific region.”

The CCP has also professed its opposition to the firing of Crozier via the state-run Global Times. Editor Hu Xijin wrote on April 3, “[I]n our view, Crozier is more clear-minded than the officials of the Pentagon.” The CCP clearly wants the U.S. Navy to embrace the #StayAtHome mantra. Hu also compared Crozier to the Chinese “martyr” Li Wenliang—the doctor who initially raised alarms about the novel coronavirus spreading in Wuhan before being brutally silenced by the CCP and later dying from COVID-19; the CCP has since bestowed its highest title of “martyr” on Li. China has detained and disappeared several doctors, journalists and CCP members for not toeing the party line on the coronavirus. The CCP has also been orchestrating a coordinated propaganda campaign to reshape the narrative on COVID-19 and its Wuhan origins, in addition to vastly underreporting China’s numbers of COVID-19 cases and deaths.

In a time of social distancing and stay-at-home orders, navy crews worldwide are confined in tight spaces and deployed far from home. Policymakers and military commanders throughout the Indo-Pacific will have to decide if the strategic gains of naval operations outweigh the risk of COVID-19 rapidly spreading among ship crews. As the saying goes, “A ship is safe in harbor, but that’s not what ships are for.”

In Other News…

At-Sea Collisions

On March 30, a Japanese destroyer collided with a Chinese fishing boat in the East China Sea. The collision left a 3-foot by 6-inch hole in the port side of JS Shimakaze (DDG 172), which remained operational with no shipboard injuries. One of the 13 crew members on the Chinese boat complained of minor back pain after the incident. The collision occurred between Shanghai and Japan’s Yakushima Island—well north of the disputed islands (Japanese: Senkaku; Mandarin: Diaoyu) in the East China Sea.

On April 2, a China Coast Guard vessel reportedly rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracels (Vietnamese: Hoàng Sa; Mandarin: Xisha) in the South China Sea. China detained and later released the eight Vietnamese fishermen from the sunk vessel. Both Vietnam and China assert sovereignty claims over the Paracels. During the incident, the China Coast Guard allegedly captured and towed at least two other Vietnamese fishing boats to Chinese-occupied Woody Island (Vietnamese: Phú Lâm; Mandarin: Yongxing). The Vietnamese government lodged an official protest with the Chinese government following the incident, but the China Coast Guard responded that the Vietnamese boats were illegally fishing in Chinese waters. It is the second time in less than a year that a Chinese vessel has sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracels. The U.S. State Department said it was “seriously concerned” by the incident, calling on China to support “international efforts to combat the global pandemic, and to stop exploiting the distraction or vulnerability of other states to expand its unlawful claims in the South China Sea.” The China Coast Guard is also ramping up its protection of Chinese trawlers illegally fishing in Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone, according to the New York Times.

U.S. Naval News

Four years since its commissioning, the USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) is receiving its combat system to bring it one step closer to becoming the U.S. Navy’s first fully operational stealth destroyer. Cost overruns and ship modifications have troubled the Navy’s DDG-1000 program over the past few years. Originally intended to have a state-of-the-art rail gun for naval gunfire support, Zumwalt is now designated a ship killer with Maritime Strike Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles integrated into its combat system. Procurement and deployment of anti-ship missiles are a top priority for Navy leadership in order to counter and deter the growing fleet of Chinese PLA-Navy warships.

Analysis

Professor James Kraska of the U.S. Naval War College writes in War on the Rocks that the Chinese government may be legally responsible for trillions of dollars in damage for the COVID-19 outbreak. Kraska cites the Chinese state media’s suppression of coronavirus information, Wuhan government’s denial of human-to-human transmission, and China’s withholding of data and access from the World Health Organization as amounting to the “breach of a legal duty that China owed to other states under international law, and for which injured states—now numbering some 150 nations—may seek a legal remedy.” Possible foreign-state countermeasures include dissemination of information within China on topics such as Taiwanese media opinions and reports on Chinese belligerence against regional countries in the East and South China Seas—acts that would normally constitute a violation of national sovereignty under international law.

Retired U.S. Marine Corps Col. Mark Cancian and Brandon Schwartz argue in Proceedings that the United States should issue letters of marque to privateers in order to generate a “major wartime advantage and enhance peacetime deterrence” against China. They argue that the letters of marque are legally justifiable under both Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution and customary international law. Due to a constrained U.S. defense budget and China’s large merchant fleet, letters of marque could allow the U.S. Navy to focus on the PLA-Navy while the privateers focus on China’s 4,600-plus merchant and long-distance fishing fleets. The authors propose that the privateers would serve in a capacity analogous to the U.S. privateers who targeted the British in the War of 1812 and the 20,000 private armed contractors who operated at the height of the Iraq War.

Russia’s Strategy in Libya

Από
anixneuseis
-
0

rusi.org/commentary

Samuel Ramani
Commentary, 7 April 2020
Turkey, Russia, Libya, Global Security Issues, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The world’s attention may be focused on the coronavirus pandemic. But Russia continues its complicated game in Libya.

In early March 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasised their shared commitment to a ceasefire in Libya after both leaders arranged a phone call to discuss the conflict. Russia’s endorsement of a political solution in Libya reaffirmed its longstanding official position. The Russian Foreign Ministry expounded on this view on 25 March when it listed Libya as a conflict that needed to be suspended due to the coronavirus pandemic.

Russia’s rhetorical support for a peace settlement in Libya has been greeted with skepticism, as the Kremlin-aligned Wagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organisation, has deployed between 1,400 to 2,000 private military contractors (PMCs) to support the Libya National Army (LNA) chieftain Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli. Yet it is an oversimplification to claim that Russia’s rhetoric about peace in Libya is mere obfuscation, as Moscow’s strategy towards the Libyan conflict is multifaceted in nature. Russia is militarily supporting Haftar in order to increase its geopolitical influence in LNA-controlled areas, but it is also trying to present itself as a diplomatic arbiter in order to burnish its regional status and secure lucrative nationwide reconstruction contracts.

Although Russia balanced positive relations with the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and LNA from 2016 to 2018, Moscow provided material support for Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli in April 2019. Unlike the UAE and Egypt, Russia did not support Haftar because it believed that the LNA possessed the capabilities to unite Libya under his rule. Instead, Russia backed Haftar’s offensive to help the LNA achieve enough military success to bolster its stature in diplomatic negotiations. As Russia had assisted the LNA with PMCs and supplied banknotes to eastern Libya in order to ease the region’s liquidity crisis, Moscow hoped that the legitimisation of LNA control over eastern and southern Libya would ensure that it gained preferential access to oil reserves held by Haftar’s forces and revive Gaddafi-era basing agreements on Libya’s Mediterranean coast.

Due to Russia’s preference for a finite LNA offensive and uncertainties about Haftar’s leadership capabilities, Moscow has maintained a diplomatic backchannel with the GNA. As Haftar’s offensive continued, Russia maintained positive relations with the LNA through PMC deployments, which are reportedly financed by Saudi Arabia, and stepped up its arbitration role in Libya. On 13 January, Russia hosted diplomatic negotiations on Libya, but these talks failed, as Haftar left Moscow without signing a ceasefire agreement. In spite of this setback, Russia has regularly engaged with European leaders on the Libyan peace process, as it seeks to extend its leadership on conflict resolution initiatives in Syria to a new theatre. Russia also hopes that its contributions to the peace process will appease GNA officials, such as Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, who accused Moscow of fomenting instability in Libya, and allow it to secure lucrative nation-wide reconstruction contracts, such as the $2 billion Benghazi-to-Sirte railway line.

Although Haftar’s refusal to accept a ceasefire and countervailing pressure from the UAE’s embassy in Moscow have undermined Russia’s diplomatic efforts, the Kremlin’s strategy in Libya has also been complicated by Turkey’s growing assertiveness in the conflict. On 2 January, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey rubber-stamped troop deployments to Libya for a one-year mandate, in order to enforce Ankara’s maritime security deal with the GNA and derail the momentum of Haftar’s offensive. Russia strongly opposed Turkey’s military intervention in Libya. On 3 January, Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Leonid Slutsky expressed concern about Turkey’s actions, and warned that Ankara’s troop deployments ‘may deepen the crisis and deteriorate the situation’.

Russia’s concerns about Turkey’s military intervention in Libya featured prominently during Putin’s meeting with his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 8 January. After that meeting, Turkey and Russia helped broker a temporary ceasefire in Libya on 12 January, which culminated in the aborted negotiations in Moscow one day later. In spite of this episode of Russia–Turkey cooperation, escalating tensions between the two countries over Idlib spilt over to Libya. On 17 February, Erdogan accused Russia of ‘managing the war in Libya at the highest level’, and claimed that the Russian government was behind the Wagner Group’s PMC deployments. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov immediately dismissed Erdogan’s assertions, and Moscow’s close ally, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, formally aligned with Haftar against Turkey on 2 March.

OLD RIVAL, POTENTIAL FRIENDS

After Russia–Turkey tensions dissipated over Syria due to the 5 March ceasefire in Idlib, the public war of words between Russian and Turkish officials on Libya ground to a halt. Despite this de-escalation, the short-term prospects of Russia–Turkey cooperation in Libya are remote, as both countries disagree on Haftar’s place in Libya’s political future. In Turkey, Haftar is widely viewed as a rogue warlord who lacks popular legitimacy and depends on external military support. Senior Russian officials, such as Russian ambassador to Turkey Alexei Yerkhov, dispute this Turkish narrative by arguing that Haftar controls too large a portion of Libya to be ignored and that the GNA has lost its legitimacy by aligning with Islamist militias.

In spite of the intransigence of both sides, the current state of cold peace between Russia and Turkey could morph into renewed cooperation. If the US remains detached from the Libyan conflict and European powers continue to advance conflicting agendas in Libya, Russia and Turkey could see an opportunity to marginalise Western powers through cooperation on a Libyan peace settlement. The persistence of the Astana talks, in spite of continued strategic competition between Russia and Turkey in Syria, provides a model for this form of diplomatic cooperation, and Turkish officials viewed the 8 January Putin–Erdogan ceasefire negotiations on Libya as a noteworthy display of Turkey’s international status. As 58% of Turks polled in February oppose Erdogan’s decision to deploy Turkish forces to Libya and Russian public’s focus has been redirected to socioeconomic challenges, Erdogan and Putin could exert pressure on the GNA and LNA to de-escalate the war in Libya. Due to the wide array of external players involved in Libya and the independent agency of Libya’s warring factions, this de-escalation effort may not succeed, but it could cause Russia and Turkey to agree to deconfliction mechanisms in Libya.

A return to confrontation between Russia and Turkey over Idlib remains the most serious impediment to bilateral cooperation in Libya. As Russia regards Turkey’s military overextension at a time of economic weakness as a major vulnerability, Moscow could encourage Haftar to retaliate against Turkish forces in Libya when Ankara strikes military targets in Syria. The LNA’s downing of a Turkish drone and strike on Turkey’s Mitiga air base in Tripoli on 3 March during Ankara’s Operation Spring Shield intervention in Syria reveals Russia’s potential to carry out an asymmetric retaliation, which could derail Russia–Turkey cooperation on Libya.

Although Russia continues to deploy PMCs on Haftar’s behalf, Moscow’s economic interests in Libya and long-term geostrategic ambitions in the Middle East are best furthered by a swift de-escalation of Libya’s protracted conflict. While Libya’s internal factions and their primary external sponsors will ultimately decide the country’s future, Russia’s hopes for de-escalation in Libya are closely intertwined with the state of its bilateral relationship with Turkey.

Continued cooperation with Ankara would advance Russia’s strategy in Libya, but renewed confrontation with Turkey over Syria could reluctantly drag Russia into a prolonged military intervention in Libya.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil candidate at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

BANNER IMAGE: Courtesy of Kremlin.ru

US-Turkish Relations Could Warm; Turkey Should Pledge No Russian Arms

Από
anixneuseis
-
0
By   on April 08, 2020 at 12:03 PM

US-Turkish relations seem to be trending in a more positive direction because Turkey has been forced to seek help from NATO and Washington against its Syrian and Russian foes in the fighting around Idlib.

Diplomatic tensions between the United States and Turkey reached a high point last year when Ankara launched a military invasion into northern Syria, which Defense Secretary Mark Esper later described as having undermined American gains against the Islamic State and threatened regional security.

Then, dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed last month in an attack by Syrian artillery and Russian aircraft. Predictably, Russia denied its involvement and Turkey’s defense minister expressed frustration that the attack transpired even though the “locations of [Turkish] troops had been coordinated with Russian officials in the field.” He did stop short of accusing Moscow outright.

Idlib holds tremendous symbolic and strategic value for Russia and for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Over the last nine years, the city has been a safe haven for refugees displaced from the rest of Syria and is now the last bastion of the anti-government uprising. Already, over 4.1 million Syrians have trekked across the Syrian-Turkish border. Should Idlib fall, Ankara could find itself having to host another 1.3 million refugees.

US Ambassador to Turkey David Satterfield has remarked that the prospect of another million-plus refugee exodus is “a self-identified existential challenge” for Turkey. This, Satterfield elaborated, was precisely the aim of Syria and Russia’s offensive against Idlib: to knock Turkey out of the war en route to securing a military victory for Assad. President Putin hopes that triumphing in Idlib will allow him to scale back or even end Moscow’s increasingly expensive military commitment to its Middle Eastern client state.

After the attack on its soldiers, Turkey requested support from NATO under Article 4, the treaty provision that enables any alliance member the right to “request consultations whenever, in [their] opinion…their territorial integrity, political independence, or security is threatened.” While NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg condemned the “indiscriminate air strikes by the Syrian regime and Russia” and expressed “full solidarity” with Turkey’s plight, the situation does not meet NATO’s ‘mutuality’ standard so direct military support will not be forthcoming.

One of the factors behind this relatively cool response must have been the fact that Turkey has spent the last several years often operating against NATO interests. This has ranged from its refusal to support NATO’s defense plan for Poland and the Baltics, as a ham-handed attempt to secure assistance for its war against Kurdish forces in Syria, to threats that it might review the status of important NATO military facilities located in Turkey.

But Ankara started singing a very different tune this year as the country celebrated the 68th anniversary of its ascension to NATO. The prevailing discourse in Turkey had blamed NATO for shackling Ankara’s pursuit of its national interests; but in February, the Turkish Foreign Ministry declared that it was “among [NATO’s] top contributing allies.”

This sudden change of heart has more do with Turkish officials realizing that they need help after the Russian attacks. The ceasefire negotiated between Moscow and Ankara in early March may not last long even though Russia is currently holding talks with Syria to enforce it.

Turkey is trying to convince the United States to support its military efforts more directly. Turkey has requested the establishment of a no-fly zone in northern Syria and wants Washington to deploy additional Patriot missile batteries on its southern borders.=

While both ideas have won support from US Special Envoy for Syria Ambassador James Jeffrey, a State Department official has ruled out any “military moves by American units.” The official added the US could provide information sharing and equipment. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Mark Milley expressed a similar sentiment when he testified that he was unaware of any “intent [or] plans to reengage in the Syrian civil war, [or] to put troops back on the Syrian-Turkish border.”

In this context, Turkey’s request for more Patriot missiles could represent an opportunity to improve Ankara’s relationship with NATO, while also driving a deeper wedge into its relationship with Russia.

For this to happen, President Erdogan would need to deactivate and return Russia’s S-400 air defense system that it purchased and deployed last year in the face of open American displeasure. It could also open the door to discussions about welcoming Turkey back into the F-35 program.

The United States should insist on receiving additional commitments from Turkey that will help ensure it remains a loyal NATO ally moving forward, such as a declared mortarium on purchasing Russian weapons or systems. Washington should also impress upon Ankara that its hostile foreign policy towards its European and Eastern Mediterranean neighbors is counterproductive and will result in the US beginning to relocate its military assets away from Turkish soil.

This combination of different types of leverage will be necessary to turn into reality the optimistic remarks by US Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchinson that she hopes “President Erdogan will see that we are the ally of their past and their future.”

Charles Wald, former deputy commander of U.S. European Command, is a distinguished fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy. 

America’s Nukes Will Never Be Safe In Turkey

Από
anixneuseis
-
0
April 8, 2020

As long as Erdogan is in power.

by Mark Episkopos

Key point: The loss of Incirlik would be a major blow to the U.S. capacity to project power in the Middle-East.

In what may become the latest wedge in Turkey-NATO relations since Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system earlier in 2019, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has threatened to shut down the Incirlik air base.

This first appeared in December 2019 and is being reposted due to reader interest.

“If it is necessary for us to take such a step, of course we have the authority … If this is necessary, together with our delegations, we will close down Incirlik if necessary,” Erdogan told Turkish state television earlier this week.

President Erdogan’s comments were prompted by a recent Senate vote to recognize the early 20th century massacres and mass deportations of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as a genocide, as well as the ongoing prospect of Ankara’s S-400 deal being sanctioned under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

Far more than merely a symbolic rift in the U.S.-Turkey defense relationship, the prospective closure of the Incirlik air base forebodes immediate and serious military repercussions for the U.S. The base, located deep in southern Turkey off the mediterranean coastline, houses a 50-unit stockpile of B61 nuclear bombs. A legacy of Cold War-era nuclear deterrence strategy, Incirlik remains the largest U.S. nuclear weapons storage site in Europe. But what used to be a forward post for a retaliatory strike against prospective Soviet encroachment into Western Europe, as well as a crucial bargaining chip during the 1960’s Cuban Missile Crisis, is increasingly seen as a strategic liability amid the stark downturn in U.S.-Turkish relations over the past several years.

Since 1965, Incirlik has also been home to the 39th Air Base Wing (39 ABW). Units from the 39 ABW’s bombardment wing, which today is known as the 39th Tactical Group, played a central role in two of the largest U.S. airpower operations of the past decade: Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The U.S. Air Force asserts that as much as 68 percent of all air support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan flowed through Incirlik in the early 2000’s.

So, what does the U.S. Air Force stand to lose if forced to pack up and leave Incirlik? First, the opportunity to “pack up” should not be granted as a foregone conclusion; depending on the overarching diplomatic hostility of that divorce if it were ever to happen, the Pentagon cannot discount that Ankara may move to seize some, or all, of the U.S. arsenal in Incirlik.

Barring that catastrophic scenario, the loss of Incirlik would be a major blow to the U.S. capacity to project power in the Middle-East. The U.S. Air Force stands to lose a major logistical support center and refueling site for ongoing its operations in Afghanistan, even as U.S. raids against ISIS and other terrorist targets in neighboring states risk becoming more difficult and expensive. The closure of Incirlik would also weaken US leverage against Iran; though Incirlik was never in the running as a staging post for a strike against Tehran, it is one of several American forward bases for countering the covert activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) across the Middle East.

With the future of Turkey’s geopolitical orientation hanging in the balance, the Trump administration continues to tread lightly as Washington assesses the likelihood and military consequences of losing Incirlik. The White House moved to block the Senate resolution labeling the massacres of Ottoman Armenians a genocide yesterday, calling it “one of the worst mass atrocities of the 20th century” instead. Although the specter of CAATSA continues to loom over Turkey, Washington has dragged its heels on the concern that sanctions would needlessly antagonize Ankara without yielding any Turkish concessions in return.

Mark Episkopos is a frequent contributor to The National Interest and serves as research assistant at the Center for the National Interest. Mark is also a PhD student in History at American University. This first appeared in 2019.

Image: Reuters

Ποια είναι η διέξοδος από την κρίση;

Από
anixneuseis
-
4

του Δημήτρη Μακροδημόπουλου.

Ο Καρλ Σμιτ στην “Πολιτική θεολογία” έγραφε ότι «κυρίαρχος είναι αυτός που αποφασίζει για την κατάσταση έκτακτης ανάγκης (εξαίρεσης)». Στην προκειμένη περίπτωση που βιώνουμε, κυρίαρχοι δεν είναι οι ηγέτες των κρατών που επέβαλαν τα περιοριστικά μέτρα στη ζωή των πολιτών αλλά ο κορωνοιός και ο φόβος του θανάτου που μετέδωσε στις κοινωνίες.

Ο Καρλ Γιάσπερς, μέντορας και φίλος της Χάνα Άρεντ, της έγραφε ότι «τα βακτήρια προκαλούν επιδημίες που εξολοθρεύουν πληθυσμούς, παραμένοντας όμως απλώς βακτήρια», όπως σήμερα ο κορωνοιός, παραμένοντας απλά ιός. Διαπίστωση που αναδεικνύει την αδυναμία των προηγμένων κρατών και της σύγχρονης ανθρωπότητας που με την ανάπτυξη της τεχνολογίας μπορεί να εξολοθρεύσει τα πάντα αλλά αποδεικνύεται αδύναμη να αντιμετωπίσει την πανδημία ενός ιού. Και αυτό προφανώς διότι στο επίκεντρο της εξέλιξης δεν είναι ο άνθρωπος αλλά η εκθετική συσσώρευση κεφαλαίου και η ισχύς στα στενά όρια ενός έθνους κράτους. Αυτό ανέδειξε με αποκαλυπτικό τρόπο η σύγκρουση εντός της ΕΕ για την έκδοση ευρωομολόγου για την αντιμετώπιση της πανδημίας. Αλλά και οι σκέψεις για την επομένη της πανδημίας εκεί εστιάζονται.

Ο Γάλλος υπουργός Οικονομίας και Οικονομικών Λε Μερ σε ψηφιακή συνέντευξη Τύπου την Πέμπτη 2 Απριλίου, αφού αναφέρθηκε στην κοινή πρωτοβουλία για την τόνωση των ευρωπαϊκών οικονομιών, μίλησε για “ιδανική ευκαιρία”, όπως τη χαρακτήρισε, να αναθεωρήσει η ΕΕ το οικονομικό της μοντέλο, ενισχύοντας την οικονομική της κυριαρχία με τον επαναπατρισμό ζωτικών βιομηχανιών στην Ευρώπη και τη μείωση της εξάρτησης από τρίτες χώρες σε κρίσιμους τομείς, όπως η τεχνητή νοημοσύνη. Δηλαδή με άλλα λόγια θα “διατάξουν” το κεφάλαιο να επαναπατρισθεί; Είναι δυνατό αυτό σε συνθήκες οικονομικής παγκοσμιοποίησης; Αν ναι, τότε πώς θα γεφυρωθεί το χάσμα του εργασιακού κόστους μεταξύ Ευρώπης και Ν.Α Ασίας; Ο μόνος τρόπος είναι η επικράτηση της ρομποτικής και της τεχνητής νοημοσύνης στην παραγωγή εκτοπίζοντας τους εργαζόμενους. Όμως δεν θα επιφέρει την εκτόξευση της ανεργίας; Αν συμβεί αυτό από πού θα αντλεί το ευρωπαϊκό κεφάλαιο την υπεραξία για να επανεπενδύει; Διότι η υπεραξία προκύπτει από την ανθρώπινη εργασία. Γιαυτό το κεφάλαιο δεν μειώνει τις ώρες εργασίας ώστε να μειωθεί η ανεργία.

Ο άλλος τρόπος είναι η δραστική περικοπή μισθών και ημερομισθίων που θα επιφέρουν την καταβαράθρωση του βιοτικού επιπέδου των εργαζομένων. Για να επαληθευτεί η προφητική προειδοποίηση του Μαρξ στο Κεφάλαιο, σύμφωνα με την οποία η τάση της καπιταλιστικής διεθνοποίησης με την εκβιομηχάνιση της Κίνας θα ήταν να εξισώσει τα βρετανικά (τότε) μεροκάματα με εκείνα της Κίνας, μεταφορικά σήμερα τα ευρωπαϊκά με τα κινέζικα.

Όμως είτε επιλεγεί η εκτόξευση της ανεργίας με την επικράτηση της ρομποτικής και της τεχνητής νοημοσύνης στην παραγωγή είτε η ισοπέδωση μισθών και ημερομισθίων, το ερώτημα θα είναι: Ποιοι θα καταναλώνουν; Ποιο θα είναι το νόημα της παραγωγής χωρίς ζήτηση; Αυτή είναι και η κύρια αντίφαση στην κυκλοφορία του κεφαλαίου. Διότι δεν αρκεί η παραγωγή αλλά η πραγματοποίηση της αξίας της στις αγορές. Διαφορετικά με ζήτηση που θα υπολείπεται της παραγωγής, θα ανακυκλώνονται οι κρίσεις υπερσυσσώρευσης του κεφαλαίου για να φθάσουμε στο οριακό πλέον σημείο που θα απαιτείται η βίαιη επαναφορά στην προηγούμενη κατάσταση. Θα απαιτείται δηλαδή η «δημιουργική καταστροφή» των παραγωγικών δυνάμεων (μέσων παραγωγής και υποδομών) με την εκδήλωση ισχυρότερης κρίσης ή πολέμου ώστε να επανέλθει η ανάπτυξη.

Γιαυτό όσα χρηματικά ποσά και να διαθέσουν τα θεσμικά όργανα της ΕΕ στα κράτη μέλη για να ανακουφιστούν οι οικονομίες τους από την κρίση του κορωνοιού θα έχουν ελάχιστο αντίκρισμα στην ανάκαμψη των οικονομιών των κρατών μελών αν δεν φθάσουν απευθείας στα νοικοκυριά μέσω κρατικών επενδύσεων που θα αυξήσουν τη ζήτηση,

Κάποτε το διευθυντήριο της ΕΕ θα πρέπει να υιοθετήσει την κευνσιανή λογική της αύξησης της ζήτησης με την αναδιανομή εισοδήματος στις κατώτερες τάξεις έναντι της νεοφιλελεύθερης συνταγής που εστιάζεται στον έλεγχο της προσφοράς, για να αποφεύγονται οι κρίσεις υπερσυσσώρευσης κεφαλαίου, δίνοντας έμφαση στη λιτότητα. Διότι «ο καιρός για λιτότητα, έλεγε ο Κέυνς, είναι η οικονομική άνθηση, όχι η κάμψη».

Ας μη ξεχνάμε ότι η Μεγάλη Ύφεση του 1929 ξεπεράστηκε με το New Deal του προέδρου Ρούσβελτ με μια έκρηξη κρατικών δαπανών στις υποδομές και αργότερα στις στρατιωτικές δαπάνες που δημιούργησαν θέσεις εργασίας, αύξησαν τα οικογενειακά εισοδήματα με αποτέλεσμα να πάρουν την ανιούσα και οι καταναλωτικές δαπάνες. Αν το κράτος δεν αυξήσει τη ζήτηση με δική του πρωτοβουλία και δαπάνες δεν πρόκειται ο ιδιωτικός τομέας να επενδύσει. Και οικονομική ενίσχυση να πάρει, χωρίς ζήτηση θα χρεοκοπήσει ή θα μεταναστεύσει..

Μακροδημόπουλος Δημήτρης

Αλεξ/πολη – κιν.6947-771412

7-4-2020

 

 

The 50th Anniversary of Apollo 13

Από
anixneuseis
-
0
  

The Atlantic

This Saturday will mark a half century since the ill-fated Apollo 13 mission to the moon launched from the Florida coast on April 11, 1970. Apollo 13 was planned to be NASA’s third manned mission to land on the lunar surface, and, despite a few minor issues, went according to plan—until disaster struck about 56 hours into the journey. As the crew were approaching the moon, an explosion took place on the service module, blasting open a panel, damaging equipment, and venting oxygen into space. Rapid calculations and actions by the astronauts and Mission Control in Houston were able to salvage life-support systems, alter course to return to Earth (skipping the lunar landing), and get the crew safely home. Events that could have resulted in tragedy became stories of ingenuity, perseverance, and survival. Below, a few images from those eventful days 50 years ago.

An earlier version of this photo essay inadvertently included a photo from a previous Apollo mission. The photo has been removed. 


  • This view of the severely damaged Apollo 13 service module was photographed from the lunar module/command module following service-module jettisoning on April 17, 1970. As seen in this cropped image, enlarged to provide a close-up view of the damaged area, an entire panel on the service module was blown away by the apparent explosion of an oxygen tank. 

    NASA

  • The crew of Apollo 13, Fred W. Haise Jr., John L. Swigert Jr., and James A. Lovell Jr., photographed on April 10, 1970. 

    NASA

  • A close-up of astronaut Fred Haise during training in January of 1970 

    NASA

  • The Saturn V rocket for Apollo 13 is bathed in floodlights during an early-morning rollout at Kennedy Space Center on December 16, 1969. 

    NASA

  • Apollo 13 astronauts leave the Manned Spacecraft Operations Building en route to a van that will take them to launch pad 39A for their liftoff on a lunar-landing mission. Mission commander James Lovell leads astronauts John Swigert and Fred Haise, far left. 

    NASA / Bettmann / Getty

  • On April 11, 1970, the Saturn V rocket blasts off, carrying the crew of Apollo 13 skyward. 

    Tony Linck / The LIFE Images Collection via Getty

  • A clear view of Mexico and the Baja California Peninsula on a third-quarter Earth, from the Apollo 13 spacecraft 

    NASA / Corbis via Getty

  • A view of the Mission Operations Control Room during a television transmission from the Apollo 13 mission in space. Eugene F. Kranz (foreground, back to camera), one of four Apollo 13 flight directors, views the large screen, while astronaut Fred W. Haise Jr., lunar-module pilot, is seen on the screen. 

    NASA

  • On the way to the moon, shortly after the maneuver to attach the lunar module to the command module/service module, a view out the window, looking at the Saturn V rocket’s third stage, which had been carrying the lunar module. It was jettisoned and set on a course to crash into the moon to facilitate seismic tests. 

    NASA

  • A view inside Mission Control Center during the Apollo 13 oxygen cell failure on April 14, 1970. An explosion on the service module had sent the crew scrambling to respond, leading them to notify Mission Control with the famous words “Houston, we’ve had a problem” (later erroneously popularized as “Houston, we have a problem”). 

    NASA

  • Headlines of London evening newspapers describe the Apollo 13 troubles, and the battle to bring the astronauts and their crippled spaceship back to Earth on April 14, 1970. 

    Eddie Worth / AP

  • Marilyn Lovell (standing, second from right), wife of astronaut Jim Lovell, prays at the Lovell home during the Apollo 13 crisis, in Houston, Texas, on April 15, 1970. 

    Bill Eppridge / The LIFE Picture Collection via Getty

  • A view of the lunar surface as Apollo 13 swings around, using the moon’s gravity to slingshot back home to Earth. The spacecraft flew 158 miles above the surface of the far side of the moon, incidentally leading the crew to set the record for the farthest distance humans have ever been from Earth: 248,655 miles (400,171 km). 

    NASA

  • Astronaut James Lovell’s wife, Marilyn, watches coverage of the Apollo 13 mission on television while her children sit on a couch nearby at her home in Houston. 

    Bill Eppridge / Time Life Pictures / / Getty

  • This bright-rayed crater on the lunar far side was photographed from the Apollo 13 spacecraft during its pass around the moon. 

    NASA

  • Earth is seen in the distance, through a window of the lunar module, as the Apollo 13 crew heads toward home. 

    NASA

  • One of the Apollo 13 astronauts tries to get some sleep aboard the spacecraft. 

    NASA / Corbis via Getty

  • Yet another problem: excess carbon dioxide inside the spacecraft on the return journey. Deke Slayton (checkered jacket) shows an adapter devised to make use of lithium-hydroxide canisters to remove the excess carbon dioxide from the Apollo 13 lunar-module cabin. 

    NASA

  • An interior view of the Apollo 13 lunar module, showing some of the temporary hose connections and apparatus that were necessary when the three Apollo astronauts moved from the command module to use the lunar module as a “lifeboat”. Astronaut John L. Swigert Jr., command-module pilot, is on the right. An unidentified astronaut on the left holds in his right hand the feed water bag from the portable life-support system. 

    NASA

  • An in-flight photo of the “mailbox” device constructed by the crew from duct tape, maps, and other materials they had on hand as instructed by Houston. This device allowed use of lithium-hydroxide canisters in conjunction with the lunar module’s environmental-control system, to scrub carbon dioxide from the air inside the spacecraft. 

    NASA

  • A view of the approaching Earth, during undocking procedures prior to reentry 

    NASA

  • Astronaut James A. Lovell Jr., commander of the Apollo 13 mission, is pictured at his position in the lunar module during undocking, prior to reentry. 

    NASA

  • Jeffrey Lovell, son of James Lovell, listens to the “squawk box” installed at the Lovell home, a direct line to Mission Control audio. 

    Bill Eppridge / The LIFE Picture Collection via Getty

  • This view of the severely damaged Apollo 13 service module was photographed from the lunar module/command module, following service-module jettisoning. The lunar module was jettisoned just prior to Earth reentry by the command module. 

    NASA

  • Another view of the damaged Apollo 13 service module, taken shortly before reentry 

    NASA

  • In New York City’s Grand Central Station, all eyes are focused on the giant television screen, watching for the safe landing of the Apollo 13 astronauts in the Pacific, on April 17, 1970. 

    J. Spencer Jones / AP

  • Marilyn Lovell, with her children and other family and friends, watches television coverage of the Apollo 13 return, at home in Houston. 

    Bill Eppridge / The LIFE Picture Collection via Getty

  • Parachutes deployed, the Apollo 13 spacecraft drifts toward a safe splashdown. The command module splashed down in the South Pacific Ocean at noon on April 17, 1970. 

    NASA

  • Marilyn Lovell joyously hugs her son Jeffrey following news of the successful Apollo 13 splashdown, in Houston, Texas, on April 17, 1970. 

    Bill Eppridge / The LIFE Picture Collection via Getty

  • Celebrations in the Mission Control Center, after the successful return of the Apollo 13 mission. Dr. Donald K. Slayton (in black shirt, left of center), director of flight-crew operations at MSC, and Chester M. Lee of the Apollo-program directorate, Office of Manned Space Flight, shake hands, while Dr. Rocco A. Petrone, Apollo-program director, Office of Manned Space Flight (standing, near Lee), watches the large screen showing astronaut James A. Lovell Jr. In the foreground, Glynn S. Lunney (far left) and Eugene F. Kranz (smoking a cigar), two Apollo 13 flight directors, view the activity from their consoles. 

    NASA

  • Apollo 13 astronauts await their recovery helicopter. 

    NASA / The LIFE Picture Collection via Getty

  • A Navy helicopter lowers a net to the Apollo 13 capsule on April 17, 1970. 

    NASA

  • Astronaut James A. Lovell Jr. reads a newspaper account of the safe recovery of the problem-plagued mission. Lovell was on board the U.S.S. Iwo Jima, prime recovery ship for Apollo 13, which was on a course headed for Pago Pago. From Pago Pago, the astronauts flew to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. 

    NASA

  • President Richard Nixon and the Apollo 13 astronauts stand at attention for the national anthem at a ceremony welcoming their safe return and awarding them with the Presidential Medal of Freedom. 

    Robert Knudsen / Richard Nixon Library / Nixon Presidential Materials Staff

  • Confetti pours from the skyscrapers in Chicago’s financial district, as Apollo 13 astronauts John Swigert Jr., (waving left), and James Lovell ride in a motorcade during a parade in their honor on May 1, 1970. 

    AP

How to Think about COVID-19 like an M.D.

Από
anixneuseis
-
0

scientificamerican.com

Harvard medical students created a free curriculum to give their peers and others a physician’s-eye view of the pandemic

How to Think about COVID-19 like an M.D.
Doctor and nurses tend to an intubated and sedated patient infected with COVID-19 at the intensive care unit of a hospital in Paris on April 7, 2020. Credit: Thomas Coex Getty Images

Students studying to become physicians were sent home as the COVID-19 pandemic worsened. Just as many of them were about to begin new medical careers, they found themselves on the sidelines during the most significant health crisis in their lifetime.

That time off has not been passed binge-watching Tiger King, however. Some students have volunteered to staff coronavirus hotlines or to organize food deliveries. And one group of 30 Harvard Medical School students took a different—and extremely ambitious—approach: during the week of March 15, they worked day and night for 72 hours to devise, from scratch, a new university curriculum focused on COVID-19. The team revealed its offering to the world on “Match Day” (March 20)—when soon-to-be graduates typically learn where they will become residents.

“We’re thinking, ‘This is what we’re here for,’” says Michael Kochis, an organizer of the curriculum project. “People are scared. People need us to contribute knowledge or to contribute actual clinical care. Even though we’re at the cusp of being able to provide those clinical services, we can actually play a role here by sharing knowledge.

The curriculum, which was vetted by faculty members, provides a physician’s-eye view into the depths of the pandemic. It begins with first principles: the initial module covers virology and immunology. Readers are told that coronaviruses, in general, have the largest genomes of any RNA-based viruses that infect humans. And the curriculum details our prodigious ability to generate respiratory droplets through a sneeze (40,000 droplets) or cough (3,000) or just by talking (about 600 droplets per minute). A unit on epidemiology compares COVID-19 with the previous H1N1 flu pandemics of 1918 and 2009. Another module teaches how to don and doff personal protective equipment, and how to adjust the settings on a mechanical ventilator.

The curriculum also asks readers to put their thoughts to answering the question “How might the initial mild presentation and later severe disease seen in COVID-19 be explained by the immune response to the virus?” And it has them respond to a query about why this time is different:“Brian has just posted on Facebook: ‘Swine flu was a pandemic, but no one called for us to turn our lives upside down. Why are we freaking out about COVID-19?’ What would you write?”

Further, the curriculum contains units on ethics and patient communication—including methods of expressing empathy, giving bad news and bringing about behavioral changes to prevent infection. “It’s not just [about] training doctors to be technicians or scientists but also humans in the fullest sense,” Kochis says.

A guest book on the curriculum’s Web site has been signed by 2,500 visitors. One of them was a medical student from the Philippines whose city was effectively placed under lockdown. That student noted authorities had “encouraged graduating medical students like myself to try to study this as much as we can—because it is likely we will be deployed very soon to the hospitals due to lack of health workforce. Learned a lot from your modules, am very grateful.”

The curriculum—which is being translated, in whole or in part, into 10 other languages—may also help fourth-year students in the U.S. who are graduating early so they can serve as recruits in fighting the new coronavirus. Kochis says he knows of about 10 schools that are incorporating portions of the project into their classwork. “This curriculum is fabulous in so many ways,” says Margaret L. Plews-Ogan, an associate professor of general medicine at the University of Virginia School of Medicine, which is planning to use the new material to build a broader course for its students. She adds that the authors “know that very soon it will be them on the front lines”—and the curriculum can help their peers prepare.

Cammie Lesser and Max Nibert of Harvard teach a monthlong third- and fourth-year class in microbiology and infectious diseases—and they say the students’ new text will help. “We see a great benefit in being able to use their curriculum as a source of background and preparatory readings for our course,” Nibert says.

Wolfram Goessling, a professor of medicine at Harvard who served as a faculty adviser for the effort, says the knowledge gap between teachers and students is minimal for an emerging disease such as COVID-19. This project, he adds, can “serve as a case study for how students can immediately be involved in contributing to a curriculum on emerging and novel topics.”

If you’ve had enough of the cable news bulletins and want to engage in a bit of social distance learning, you can access the Medical Student COVID-19 Curriculum here. The information is being updated every Friday.

scientificamerican.com

Dr. Anthony Fauci, dedicated to public service, formed at Jesuit high school

Από
anixneuseis
-
0

Mar 27, 2020
by Peter Feuerherd
Dr. Anthony Fauci meets with Regis High School students and President Jesuit Fr. Daniel Lahart in 2019. (Courtesy of Regis High School)*

He’s America’s tough-love grandpa at a moment when top political leaders are frequently more like irresponsible dads prone to happy talk nonsense. Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, has emerged for many as the voice of reason and integrity as the nation confronts the novel coronavirus pandemic.

Much of that he learned at Regis High School, a no-tuition Jesuit college-prep school on New York City’s Upper East Side renowned as an academic haven for gifted boys. Fauci, a member of the class of 1958, told a group of alumni in May of last year that attending the school “was the best educational period I could ever have imagined having.” Fauci is also a graduate of College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts, another Jesuit institution, and Weill Cornell Medicine (then Cornell University Medical College).

The May talk to alumni was part of a return to Regis by Fauci, now 79 years old and known for his power walking, who, while not a household name at the time, was apparently nearing the end of a long career in government service working for six presidents.

“I take great comfort in knowing that when he speaks that he is speaking the truth and nothing but the truth,” Jesuit Fr. Daniel Lahart, Regis’ president*, told NCR. Lahart now supervises a school, like most across the country, confined to online classes as COVID-19 disrupts normal life.

Lahart said that the most famous Regis alumnus has exuded integrity throughout a career, which, before this latest outbreak, was best known for raising the alarm about HIV/AIDS at the highest levels of government in the 1980s.

Fauci has emerged as a no-nonsense truth teller in the latest crisis. While President Donald Trump has been prone to what have been criticized as overly optimistic daily briefings, it’s been Fauci, frequently standing behind the president, who has tempered the optimism, whether it has been about the possibility of miracle cures or the hope of returning to business as usual.

In an interview with Science Magazine this week, Fauci acknowledged that Trump’s stretching of the truth during national press conferences creates an issue. But his response has been limited. “I can’t jump in front of the microphone and put him down,” Fauci told Science, a quote widely seen as an illustration of the tension between science and political blather.

“He’s got a relatively good poker face. But not all of the time,” Lahart said about Fauci.

During Fauci’s visit to Regis last year — he also visited a biology class at the school before talking to alumni — he waxed nostalgically about his four years at Regis. Regis students come from all over the metropolitan region, picked out as eighth graders from the brightest boys from far-flung parochial schools. They often tell tales of heroic commutes. For Fauci it consisted of a couple of bus rides as well as two express subway trains, for a 70-minute, one-way ride to school from his home in Bensonhurst, Brooklyn. He was captain of the basketball team, and if there were games and practices in Harlem or in the Bronx, the ride home could take nearly two hours. Regis students were also expected to do three hours of homework a night, a discipline he takes to public service.

On the first day of his freshman year, he recalled, the Jesuit dean of discipline, a Fr. Flanagan, changed his name from Anthony to Tony, and it stuck.

Fauci said he navigated through six presidential administrations in Washington by being decidedly apolitical and non-ideological. He offered insights into the presidents he served, beginning with Ronald Reagan.

Reagan, who he said was personally a warm and friendly person, never even addressed the AIDS crisis until his second term, unwilling to address the topic for years while the epidemic raged, failing to use the presidential bully pulpit to marshal resources against the disease.

Fauci described Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, as extraordinary, noting that as vice president Bush visited Fauci’s AIDS patients. Bill Clinton was absorbed in the science of countering AIDS, while George W. Bush pushed Fauci to develop a program to counter AIDS in Africa, which Fauci credited with saving 14 million lives via the distribution of drugs that treated the disease. Fauci earned the Presidential Medal of Freedom from the younger Bush for his work in Africa. But Fauci said the president was ultimately responsible for the program, motivated by a concern that the U.S. and other wealthy countries should not be the only places in the world where HIV/AIDS could be effectively treated.

Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the National Institutes of Health, and Dr. Robert Redfield, director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, are seen March 11 after testifying to the House Government Oversight and Reform Committee on Capitol Hill in Washington. (CNS/Reuters/Joshua Roberts)

Last year, he told the Regis group that the long fight against HIV/AIDS, which included times of helplessness when he was unable to assist his dying patients, were “the darkest years of my life.”

Now Fauci is the public face of another dark struggle.

At his Regis talk, Fauci was asked if there was anything that kept him up at night. He responded that his days are usually so long that he always sleeps well. But there was, he said, an issue that worried him when he was awake, namely the emergence of a virus that attacks the lungs, similar to the one that killed millions during 1918 and 1919.

“I worry about a pandemic,” he said last May. Less than a year later, his worries are now a reality and he has emerged as the public face of the fight against coronavirus. He appears concerned yet unflappable.

“Right now there is something he’s trying to figure out. He enjoys the challenge,” said Lahart.

*Editor’s note: An earlier version of this article misidentified Fr. Daniel Lahart as the school’s principal.

YouTube video of May 9, 2019, conversation with Dr. Anthony Fauci at Regis High School

[Peter Feuerherd is NCR news editor.]

ncronline.org

1...2,5062,5072,508...3,034Σελίδα 2,507 από 3,034