I. U.S. and Russian priorities for the bilateral agenda
Nuclear security:
- No significant commentary.
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs:
“Russia Can Profit From North Korea’s Missile Tests. Kim’s Provocations and the US’s Failure to Act Strengthen Moscow’s Position,” Fyodor Lukyanov, Financial Times, 09.20.17: The author, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, argues that some of Moscow’s controversial statements regarding North Korea’s missiles stem from what Russia has to gain by skillfully managing the current situation in the Asia-Pacific. Due to its relationships with the East Asian countries involved, Russia finds itself in a unique position. The author suggests one possible solution to the crisis: “a joint initiative by Russia and China (not on behalf of the U.S.), offering North Korea security guarantees and inclusion in major regional economic projects in return for the end of provocations and a verifiable freeze of the nuclear missile program.” While this could be a face-saving option for North Korea, it places a great deal of responsibility on Russia and China, and the U.S. would likely oppose it as rewarding Pyongyang for bad behavior. Although Russia has energy and infrastructure projects that would benefit from the resolution of this issue, preserving the status quo is also attractive to Moscow due to its strong bargaining position among the major players. While Moscow and Beijing can keep dialogue open and increase pressure thanks to gradually increasing U.N. sanctions, Washington’s failure to resolve the crisis becomes “more obvious” as it wears on.
Iran and its nuclear program:
- No significant commentary.
New Cold War/Sabre Rattling:
“The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold,” Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, War on the Rocks, 09.22.17: The author, a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, writes that concerns over Russia’s “alleged ‘lowered nuclear threshold’” may be unfounded. Evidence for the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons early in an armed conflict includes: the alleged “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine; Russia’s large tactical nuclear weapons arsenal; and the inviting opportunity for nuclear blackmail against NATO due its inability to defend the Baltic States. However, this is undercut by the following: lack of hard evidence for de-escalation as part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine; Russia’s quickly improving arsenal of conventional weapons; and the lack of logic behind why Russia would want to pursue conflict with NATO. Although Russia’s updated 2014 public military doctrine features a more restricted stance on the use of nuclear weapons than the doctrine issued in 2000, some believe that the classified document on Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy contradicts the public document. The author argues that this kind of contradiction makes little sense. The “main novelty” of Russia’s 2014 military doctrine was the introduction of non-nuclear deterrence. Russia’s cyber capabilities and the time and money it has devoted to its conventional capabilities further reduce the likelihood of a lowered nuclear threshold. The author argues that fascination with the lowered nuclear threshold idea is symptomatic of Western concerns over facing “a nuclear-armed adversary with mature capabilities and concepts designed to take advantage of Western weaknesses.” Although Russia may have a concerning lower threshold for “nuclear saber-rattling,” that does not mean a lower threshold for using nuclear weapons in conflict.
“Russia Was the Target of NATO’s Own Fake News. Military and Media Reports Hyped the Zapad Military Exercise as a Major Threat. In Fact, What Took Place Was Nothing as Dramatic as the West’s Warnings Would Have Led You to Believe,” Mary Dejevsky, Independent, 09.22.17: The author, a former foreign correspondent, argues that the idea that Russia’s Zapad-2017 war games posed a major threat to the West did not come from “the ‘irresponsible’ media.” Reports by media and military sources prior to the military exercises focused on two claims: the likelihood of over 100,000 troops taking part in the exercises while Russia claimed less than 13,000 would, and that the exercises might serve as cover for a Russian invasion. The author asserts that neither claim turned out to be true despite evidence provided by authoritative experts. such as Igor Sutyagin, senior research fellow in Russian studies at the Royal United Services Institute, has provided evidence that the actual number of participating troops was to have been closer to 65,000-70,000. While the media is being accused of over-exaggerating the threat, a look back shows that media reports “relied on sometimes anonymous, but more often named, sources—sources moreover that could claim some expertise in the matter in hand.” These sources included Eastern European think tanks, the British Defense Secretary and NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. Initial analysis following the war games shows that the scale and intent of Zapad-2017 was actually most like “the sort of exercise that Western forces hold.”
NATO-Russia relations:
- No significant commentary.
Missile defense:
- No significant commentary.
Nuclear arms control:
- No significant commentary.
Counter-terrorism:
- No significant commentary.
Conflict in Syria:
- No significant commentary.
Cyber security:
- No significant commentary.
Elections interference:
“Bashing Facebook Is Not the Answer to Curbing Russian Influence Operations,” Jamie Collier and Monica Kaminska, Council on Foreign Relations, 09.18.17: The authors, experts in cyber studies, write that due to social media’s “echo chambers,” attempts to convince users of an opinion they do not already hold is quite difficult, making for only a small pool of swing voters susceptible to Russian influence. Even if Moscow’s aim is to exploit existing divisions rather than convince others, the effectiveness of social media campaigns remains unclear, as passive online participation rarely turns into active political mobilization, such as the four person anti-refugee rally organized by a Russian-backed Facebook group that promised to be much larger. The authors argue that Russia’s political advertising on social media is no different than other kinds of propaganda used by both Moscow and Washington long before the Internet. To really address Russian election meddling, policymakers and tech companies need to look at Russian cyber operations “as a spectrum of activity,” not just social media interference. “It is up to political campaigns, not social media platforms, to develop effective public relations strategies to counter the effects of doxing through WikiLeaks and improve their woeful cybersecurity.”
Energy exports from CIS:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian economic ties:
- No significant commentary.
U.S.-Russian relations in general:
“Wanted: Russia Experts, No Expertise Required. Jingoism Has Replaced Scholarship and a Spirit of Real Inquiry When It Comes to Russia. That’s a Mistake.” Leonid Bershidsky, Bloomberg, 09.21.17: The author, a columnist and veteran Russia watcher, writes that the lack of Russia experts on the Committee to Investigate Russia is “a sign of the times.” With both Russian experts and American analysts with dissenting opinions keeping quiet, the voices in demand are those like Molly McKew’s, whose argument that Russia is waging an information war on America “is both simplistic and misguided” with “no market for a robust rebuttal.” Also mostly unheard are voices like those of Roger McDermott, who argues that belief in a Russian “lethal and new hybrid warfare doctrine” is a dangerous one. Arguments that Moscow’s foreign policy is reactive or that Russia isn’t “sophisticated enough to tip U.S. elections” are also hushed. “But Russia will still be there when this phase is over—resentful and hungry for Western praise, defiant and confused, thuggish and loftily intellectual, muscular and aggressive and weakened by graft and incompetence.” Those who will be able to pick up the pieces are those whose work long-time investigating Russia has currently been supplanted by “less through and more politicized ‘investigation.’”
“The Five Lessons That Must Guide US Interactions With Vladimir Putin. US-Russian Relations Will Be Strained for the Foreseeable Future. But Following These Lessons Will Give the US Leverage in the Tense Relationship,” Hal Brands, The Washington Post, 09.22.17: The author, the Henry Kissinger distinguished professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes that the U.S.-Russia conflict is one with deep roots. These tensions come from the U.S. desire to expand the liberal international order and Russia’s desire to resist and undermine it. While there will be no grand bargain between the two countries, even the recent past has shown that there are areas for cooperation, such as on arms control and counterrorism. Domestic politics have often inflamed Moscow and Washington’s divergent worldviews, meaning that “things will get worse before they get better.” Additionally, the Kremlin’s daring has repeatedly surprised the West, so politicians should expect the unexpected. Finally, the author advises Washington to take the next few years to rearrange “the broader geopolitical chessboard” to give the U.S. a better position of strength for engaging in future diplomacy with Russia.
II. Russia’s relations with other countries
Russia’s general foreign policy and relations with “far abroad” countries:
“An Ambiguous Partnership: The Serpentine Trajectory of Turkish-Russian Relations in the Era of Erdoğan and Putin,” Pavel K. Baev and Kemal Kirişci, Brookings Institution, September 2017: The authors, senior fellows at the Brookings Institution, write that while relations between Russia and Turkey “may appear to be friendly,” they are unstable and likely to remain that way. The relationship’s economic foundation is not solid, and for both countries, their economic relationship with the E.U. is of greater importance. While both resent the West, their geopolitical interests in the eastern hemisphere clash. However, the personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan remains of great importance. Turkey downsized its military in July 2016, and as a result, NATO has found it difficult to keep up its traditionally close relationship with the Turkish military. For Washington, the U.S.-Turkey relationship is of lower priority than its relationship with Moscow. However, the ties between Turkey and Russia are important to the U.S. with regards to Iraq and Syria. Turkey is looking to use Russia to show the U.S. “that tactical cooperation with YPG must not be transformed into a political commitment.” The U.S. can use NATO to contend with possible ramifications of the relationship between Russia and Turkey. The West could focus its efforts on reassuring Turkish anxieties in its relationship with Russia, and should bring Turkey further into NATO in order to manage “the risks in the uncertain new strategic environment.”
“Energy Alliance Propels Russia-Saudi Cooperation; King Salman To Visit Vladimir Putin as Links Between Old Foes Broaden From Oil to War, Politics,” James Marson and Summer Said, Wall Street Journal, 09.21.17: The authors, the paper’s deputy Moscow bureau chief and its Middle East energy and OPEC correspondent, look at Saudi King Salman’s upcoming visit to Moscow, the first by a Saudi monarch. During the Oct. 4-7 visit, Riyadh is expected to support the de-escalation zones in Syria and to finalize a deal with Moscow on extending efforts “to withhold global oil supply and prop up crude prices.” Oil coordination is a first move for the two countries to build their relationship. This cooperation with Saudi Arabia has also underscored Russia’s “balancing act” in the Middle East with Iran, Qatar and now Saudi Arabia, as well as its attempts to gain influence in the region. While relations between Riyadh and Washington have warmed some this year, Saudi Arabia is aware of a need for better relations with Moscow, particularly if the U.S. turns its back on the Middle Eastern country again.
“Germany’s Election Gives the Country a Reality Check,” Anne Applebaum, The Washington Post, 09.24.17: The author, a columnist for the paper, writes that while German Chancellor Angela Merkel has won a fourth term in office, Germany has not managed to “escape the Western populist wave altogether.” Germany’s major center-right and center-left parties both did more poorly than expected, while smaller parties did better than in previous elections. The “anti-immigration, anti-European Union, anti-NATO party,” Alliance for Germany (AfD) also did well. AfD had Russian support on social media and is most united by opposing Germany’s admission of large numbers of refugees. With a more fractious domestic government, Germany will find it more difficult to implement the reforms needed to create a more cohesive EU.
China:
- No significant commentary.
Ukraine:
“Ukraine Has Many Problems, and Only One of Them Is Russia,” Judith Miller, Wall Street Journal, 09.19.17: The author, a contributing editor of City Journal and a Fox News contributor, writes that Ukraine’s prospects of surviving “as a free, independent, pro-Western nation” are uncertain. Despite the upheaval since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has overcome many of the challenges it has faced. In 2016, Ukraine’s economy stabilized and began to grow, and is projected to continue doing so. The country recently returned to the sovereign debt market, and is no longer dependent on Russian natural gas. Additionally, the Euro-Maidan Revolution has given rise to “a cantankerous free press and vibrant civil society.” However, corruption remains a persistent problem, with Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the heart of many such complaints, and reforms have slowed down. Government promises of privatization have not been kept, and Ukrainians are growing increasingly discontent. Ukraine is also facing more deaths than births per year, as well as a steady flow of emigration out of the country and little immigration into it.
Russia’s other post-Soviet neighbors:
- No significant commentary.
III. Russia’s domestic policies
Politics, economy and energy:
“Court and Politburo: Putin’s Changing Inner Circle,” Konstantin Gaaze, Carnegie Moscow Center, 09.22.17: The author, a reporter and political commentator, offers a new take on how to conceptualize the Putin regime. While it has been aptly referred to as “Politburo 2.0,” this Soviet-era concept also coincides with one from Russian imperial times: Putin has a “court,” the author writes, “consisting of figures who do not have government positions but still exercise great power.” Politburo 2.0 “encompasses the most influential and independent centers of power in Russia―a club of select government officials and businessmen that have the president’s trust. The composition of the new Politburo defines the official political strategy, rather than the other way round.” Putin’s court, the author writes, formed in 2009, when “he left the Kremlin and handed over the presidency—temporarily—to Dmitry Medvedev. As prime minister, Putin was forced to restructure his life and revamp his inner circle. His court consisted of those who worked with him every day: bodyguard Alexei Dyumin, protocol officer Anton Vaino, now Putin’s chief of staff, and oligarch-lite Arkady Rotenberg.” In 2012, when Putin returned to the Kremlin, he opted to incorporate rather than dismantle the court. This paved the way for the current system of rule: “a formal presidential administration and cabinet bureaucracy that is complemented by the court.” However, the author notes, this “has created a system in which there are multiple loyalties and confusion about roles.” This challenge looms large among those facing Putin ahead of a fourth term. “He has yet to decide whether to rely more on the informal courtiers he is bringing into government or on the old government structures that his courtiers have been undermining.”
History:
“When Stalin Faced Hitler. Who Fooled Whom?” Stephen Kotkin, Foreign Affairs, 09.19.17: The author, a professor of history and international affairs at Princeton University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, examines the forces that shaped Joseph Stalin as a leader and his response to the threat posed by Adolph Hitler in the lead-up to World War II. The author characterizes Stalin and Hitler as “two very different men from the peripheries of their societies who were bloodily reviving and remaking their countries, all while unknowingly (and then knowingly) drawing ever closer.” Neither Hitler nor Stalin, the author notes, can be explained in terms of his social origins or his early life and influences. “The greatest shaper of Stalin’s identity was the building and running of a dictatorship, whereby he assumed responsibility for the Soviet Union’s power in the world.” The question that primarily concerns the author is whether Stalin miscalculated Hitler’s intentions to invade the Soviet Union. In Berlin, “the Soviet ambassador to Germany, after months of equivocation, finally averred that Germany’s actions signaled an imminent invasion. But Stalin evidently concluded that his envoy in Berlin had been fed disinformation and remarked that he was ‘not such a smart fellow,’” the author writes. “Stalin reasoned that the Americans and the British wanted nothing more than for the Germans and the Soviets to become embroiled in war. He was right, of course. But as a result, he dismissed all warnings of a German attack.” The author notes that “Stalin’s dealings with Hitler differed from British appeasement in that Stalin tried deterrence as well as accommodation. But Stalin’s policy resembled British appeasement in that he was driven by a blinding desire to avoid war at all costs.” For Hitler, the author writes, “a commitment to a prolonged contest for supremacy with the British, whom Hitler expected to be aided more and more by the vast resources of the United States, made quick annihilation of the Soviet Union an absolutely necessary prelude. Moreover, even though Hitler and the German high command knew that the Soviet Union was not poised to attack, the invasion amounted to a preventive war all the same in his logic, for the Soviet Union was only getting stronger and might itself attack at a time it deemed more advantageous.”
“Gorbachev: A Tragic Hero,” Nicholas Burns, Boston Globe, 09.21.17: The author, a Harvard professor and former U.S. ambassador, reviews the book “Gorbachev: His Life and Times,” by William Taubman, and finds it a compelling account of “a brilliant, driven, but flawed leader.” Taubman, the reviewer explains, offers three main reasons why Gorbachev failed in his effort to remake the Soviet system: First, he was far from a perfect leader, failing to win over key figures in the Kremlin’s power structure. Second, Burns notes, Gorbachev had “the bad luck of the Chernobyl catastrophe and waited far too long to withdraw from the disastrous Afghan War.” Third, the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukrainians fought for and deserved their own independence. And most important, Gorbachev never accepted that “the only way to save his country was to quit the failing communist system instead of trying to fix it.” Still, history may prove to be a kinder judge of Gorbachev. “A decade or more from now, Putin and his Soviet-trained generation of leaders will also pass from power. Perhaps then, Taubman concludes in this magisterial book, a younger generation might begin to appreciate anew the extraordinary optimism, hope, and courage that Gorbachev brought to the Kremlin three decades ago when he changed the world for the better.”
Defense and aerospace:
- No significant commentary.
Security, law-enforcement and justice:
- No significant commentary.
https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-analytical-report/russia-analytical-report-sept-18-25-2017
