The arrest warrants issued Friday by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office against 37 Israeli officials are only the start of Turkey’s pursuit of the perpetrators of what it says are systematic acts of genocide and crimes against humanity in Gaza.

As expected, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tops the list, followed by Defense Minister Israel Katz, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir and the commander of the Israel Navy, David Saar Salama. The statement did not name the 32 other individuals for whom arrest warrants were issued.

The statement details dozens of incidents involving harm to civilians, including women and children, citing the destruction of hospitals and other civilian infrastructure and the withholding of food and other humanitarian aid.

A senior Turkish official told Haaretz that the warrants were drawn up on the explicit instruction of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and that the process took weeks. He added that the main dilemma was the timing, with a significant obstacle to issuing the warrants being Turkey’s discussions with the United States and the mediating countries over the composition of the multinational force that is supposed to be deployed in the Strip.

“It seems that Erdoğan concluded that in light of Israel’s resolute opposition to letting Turkish forces operate in Gaza, and the understanding that the American administration tends to adopt Jerusalem’s position,” the official said, “there was no point in waiting any longer.”

However, this Turkish interpretation should be taken with a grain of salt. For Erdoğan, the issue of Turkey’s participation in the multinational force is not yet resolved, and he plans to fight fiercely for it.

It is doubtful whether he sees any contradiction between issuing arrest warrants against senior Israeli officials and increasing Ankara’s chances of joining the multinational force. Erdoğan may well try to leverage his status as the “darling of the Trump administration,” both to punish Israel and to secure American approval for participating in the force.

Erdoğan’s push is not only about cementing Turkey’s position as a pillar in a region that has become the focus of U.S. policy. For years, Turkey was excluded from any involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was not a party to any previous negotiations between American administrations, Israel and the Palestinian Authority revolving around a solution for the “Palestinian problem.”

Even during periods when Erdoğan’s relations with Israeli prime ministers were good and even excellent, such as his close friendship with Ehud Olmert, Israel did not see Turkey as a potential mediator.

Furthermore, Egypt, Jordan, the United States and the Palestinian Authority itself preferred Arab mediation to Turkish involvement. It is not superfluous to mention in this context Turkey’s sharp criticism of the United Arab Emirates when the latter signed a peace agreement with Israel, and Ankara’s threat to sever relations with Abu Dhabi as a result.

Throughout the war in Gaza, too, Turkey never found a seat for itself at the main mediation table, even though in the early days of the war, both Israel and the United States repeatedly sought out Turkey to contribute to the efforts to release the hostages. According to Israeli sources, Turkey did secure the release of five Thai citizens from Gaza, and it participated in other discussions on the release of Israeli hostages.

However, in all the “public shows” led by Qatar, Egypt and the United States, Turkey was absent from the main stage. It appears that only toward the final phase, when U.S. President Donald Trump presented his plan, did Hamas grant Turkey its public status as one of the guarantor countries for the cease-fire and the full implementation of Trump’s 20-point plan.

The partnership with Turkey that Trump embraced in light of Erdoğan’s signing of Trump’s so-called Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity after the October 13 Sharm el-Sheikh Gaza summit has stepped on many toes – not only in Israel.

Egypt, which holds the copyright claim for the blueprint for Trump’s peace plan, is also side-eyeing Turkey’s involvement. While full diplomatic relations between Egypt and Turkey have been restored after about 12 years of estrangement and deep hostility, and trade ties are flourishing, Cairo has weighty reasons to oppose massive Turkish involvement in Gaza.

If Trump’s plan advances past the cease-fire, into its second and third phases, Egypt sees itself as the natural candidate to implement Gaza’s reconstruction plan by supervising the “Board of Peace” that Trump is to head.

For Egypt, this would mean not only billions of dollars in revenue, but also the employment of Egyptian companies and workers in Gaza’s reconstruction, the purchase of consumer goods and building materials, as well as the collection of fees and tariffs for services purchased in Gaza. Egypt seeks to command the multinational force in order to guarantee the “welfare” of its border with the Strip

In this future scenario, the last thing Cairo needs is business competition with Ankara that would eat into the profits Gaza might generate. And this isn’t the only concern. There are political “areas of tension” between Egypt and Turkey stemming from their rivalry in Libya, when Turkey and Qatar politically and militarily supported the recognized government, as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates supported the separatist military commander Khalifa Haftar.

The maritime boundary treaty between Turkey and Libya, which threatened Egyptian gas exports to Europe, also sparked a conflict between the two that has since subsided, especially after Turkey made a gas liquefaction ship available to Egypt to help it overcome its shortage of natural gas. However, the political tension hasn’t quite dissipated.

While Erdoğan has warmly embraced Syria’s new leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, and transformed the country into a Turkish protectorate, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah al-Sissi is still holding the new darling of Trump and his “old friend” Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at arm’s length.

Al-Sissi fears that Turkish forces in Gaza, at a time when Erdoğan enjoys Trump’s support, could transfer the “concession” over security control of the Strip to Turkey, or at least force Egypt to maintain military vigilance. It is no coincidence that al-Sissi did not send Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty or any representative on his behalf to the conference initiated by Turkey last week to discuss Gaza’s future.

When asked to explain Egypt’s conspicuous absence, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan explained that his Egyptian counterpart’s busy schedule precluded his participation. Abdelatty’s published schedule, however, revealed that no important meetings were planned or held in Cairo during the days of the conference in Turkey.

The decision on Turkey’s participation in the multinational force will ultimately be made in the White House, which is under heavy pressure from Arab and Muslim countries that are potential candidates. It remains unclear which countries will join the force, who will command it, and what its exact missions will be.

Above these questions hangs the question of the source of the force’s authority. Will it be a peacekeeping force operating under the authorization of the UN Security Council, or within the framework of an international agreement to be signed by the partners? And if it operates under a United Nations mandate, will it enjoy the powers granted in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which includes the use of military force to enforce peace, or will it be limited to supervisory powers?

The draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on Thursday, formulated by the Trump administration, does not address most of the questions and concerns of the multinational force’s presumed members, and the Turkish foreign minister made it clear that Ankara’s participation will depend on agreeing to the final wording of the resolution.

Turkey is expected to be a key player that could influence both the wording of the resolution and the way it is implemented, even if that wording does not align with Israel’s aspirations. If Turkey decides to fall in line with the White House and serve as a pioneer, paving the way for other countries to join the multinational force, it is doubtful whether Israel – or an Israeli-Egyptian partnership – would be able to prevent the move.

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2025-11-09/ty-article/.premium/turkeys-erdogan-is-determined-to-join-gazas-reconstruction-while-punishing-israel