The Eastern Mediterranean is getting more dangerous, and it’s not because of Russia, Syria, or Iran

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by Michael Rubin  September 18, 2018 04:46 PM  The Washington Examiner

The Eastern Mediterranean is about to get a lot more dangerous, and it’s not because of Russia, Syria, or Iran. Eastern Mediterranean used to be waters the U.S. Navy just sailed through on its way to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, but now it is as militarily active as both.

Of course, during the Cold War, the Eastern Mediterranean was in play. In 1967, the Soviet Union formed the 5th Mediterranean Squadron to counterbalance NATO and the U.S. Navy’s Naples, Italy-based 6th Fleet. But, in 1992, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia recalled the squadron and left U.S. power unchallenged in the region. This changed in May 2013, when Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a 16-ship Mediterranean task force, although these mainly focused on the waters around Syria. That Russia apparently provided Syrian President Bashar Assad with P-800 Oniks supersonic anti-ship missiles is cause for concern but, at the rate Syria and Russia are going, those missiles may pose more of a threat to the Russian task force than the U.S. Navy.

Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s rise to power effectively neutered Iranian ambitions to establish a Mediterranean presence as Suez Canal authorities have effectively blocked the ability of Iranian frigates to transit, even if they do so more by the Egyptian IBM (inshallah, bukra, malesh, i.e., God-willing, tomorrow, never mind) rather than outright prohibition. Hezbollah, meanwhile, brags that it is training in underwater sabotage but there is no evidence that it has been successful. That said, while Lebanon’s maritime dispute with Israelmay be a danger for the future, Lebanon has yet to find gas in the disputed region.

Rather, the looming danger comes from Turkey and the long-dormant Cyprus conflict. It has now been almost 45 years since Turkish forces invaded Cyprus, eventually seizing 40 percent of the island nation. The trigger for Turkey’s invasion was a coup in Cyprus which installed a regime which sought Greece’s annexation of Cyprus. Turkish forces ostensibly intervened to protect Cyprus’ Turkish minority, although the Turkish army ended up seizing more territory than that excuse would justify. Regardless, decades later, Turkey can neither complain about a lack of Greek democracy nor does any Greek threat to Cypriot Turks exist.

Simply put, any justification Turks once claimed is gone; Turkey’s occupation is a simple land grab. It is also Europe’s longest occupation. It has no corollary to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank because, unlike the West Bank, Cyprus was sovereign territory belonging to a recognized country at the time of the invasion.

For years, there has been an on-again, off-again United Nations-led effort to resolve the conflict but this has never resolved the fundamental problem: the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots, acting at Ankara’s urging, declared themselves independent as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, an independent state recognized by no country but Turkey. In effect, Turkey pioneered the strategy which Russia would later adopt when it first invaded its neighbor’s territory and then set up and alone recognized self-styled independent republics like Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and the Donetsk People’s Republic (which only South Ossetia formally recognizes).

Perhaps the dispute would have remained dormant had it not been for the discovery of gas in Cypriot waters and its exclusive economic zone. While Eastern Mediterranean gas fields are equivalent to only one-third of proven U.S. gas reserves and less than one-tenth of what Russia has, they are important for four reasons: They are close to the European market; they bypass both Russia and Iran giving Europe energy independence from those two states; and, as Turkey’s behavior gets more problematic, gas pipelines need not transit Turkey either. This means that Turkey, which has no real energy reserves of its own, could lose billions of dollars annually.

At first, Turkey demanded no one drill in Cypriot waters until the dispute was resolved. In September 2011, Egemen Bagıs, at the time minister of European Affairs and a close aide to Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, even threatened to use the Turkish navy against American shipping or personnel working in or around Cyprus. “This is what we have the navy for. We have trained our marines for this; we have equipped the navy for this,” he declared, adding, “All options are on the table; anything can be done.” Turkey then changed tack and began using its navy to escort its own ships drilling in Cypriot waters. In effect, it seeks to pillage Cypriot resources to subsidize Turkey’s floundering economy and, given the state of corruption in Turkey, perhaps to augment Erdogan’s own fortunes as well. Compounding the tragedy is that Turkish Cypriots increasingly want nothing to do with Turkey. Not only have decades of Turkish occupation condemned Turkish Cyprus to poverty, especially relative to unoccupied portions of Cyprus, but Erdogan’s Islamism also increasingly chafes Turkish Cypriots who traditionally have been more moderate and tolerant in their Islam.

That’s all bad enough, but why this crisis now? Increasingly it looks like Turkey is again going to shake the status quo. Turkey’s state-controlled press now signals that Turkey plans to build a Turkish military base in occupied Cyprus. On Sept. 17, Erdogan endorsed the idea. A Turkish military base on Cyprus would effectively undercut any possibility of a peaceful resolution to the Cyprus question, as it would become a fact on the ground that no future Turkish government could forfeit.

Given how Erdogan has pivoted Turkey into the pro-Hamas, pro-Russian, and Muslim Brotherhood bloc, it also poses a strategic risk to the United States and its key regional allies: Israel, Greece, and Egypt. Remember: In 1970, President Richard Nixon turned a blind eye toward the Shah’s seizure of three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates because Iran was a U.S. ally. Today, the Iranian military presence on Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs pose a serious threat to the United States and international shipping. Indeed, control of the sea routes is exactly what Turkey is after. Again, from Yeni Safak, Erdogan’s newspaper of record:

“The island of Cyprus is at the center of the oil and trade routes as it stands out with its presence on the energy basin in the Eastern Mediterranean. The island controls the Suez Canal [sic], which connects the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. Cyprus is located on the maritime trade route between the East and West, and controls the transportation routes of Middle Eastern and Central Asian oil, which constitutes more than half of the world’s petroleum.”

Almost all U.S. administrations are reactive rather than proactive. They react when a crisis erupts but disregard the years when concentrated action might have headed it off. Fortunately, Cyprus need not be a partisan issue.

It’s time the Trump administration and Congress warn Turkey: Any base on Cyprus will mean not only increased sanctions, but also an unprecedented provision of military platforms to Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt with which to counter the Turkish threat. When Turkey becomes as much a threat as NATO adversaries, it also means cutting off cooperation with Turkey within the NATO context. Politicians might prefer political theatrics to protecting American security, but U.S. adversaries do not cease their activities whenever the circus comes to Washington. It’s time for a concerted effort to stand up for Cyprus.

Michael Rubin (@Mrubin1971) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner ‘s Beltway Confidential blog. He is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a former Pentagon official.

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/the-eastern-mediterranean-is-getting-more-dangerous-and-its-not-because-of-russia-syria-or-iran
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1 ΣΧΟΛΙΟ

  1. ΤΟ ΙΔΙΟ ΤΟ ΚΡΑΤΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΚΥΠΡΟΥ ΔΕΝ ΔΙΑΘΕΤΕΙ ΙΔΙΑ ΑΕΡΟΠΟΡΙΑ/ΝΑΥΤΙΚΟ. απαιτείται να αποκτήσει στόλο 4 πλοίων επιφανείας, και 2 υποβρυχίων, όπως επίσης μια ενισχυμένη μοίρα 25 μαχητικών, και το ανάλογο πυραυλικό οπλοστάσιό τους. Δεν είναι απαραίτητο να αγοραστούν ολοκαινούργια, αλλά μεταχειρησμένα/δοκιμασμένα όπλα θα κάνουν τη δουλειά. Θεωρούνται αυτονόητα κοινό ναυτικό κέντρο διοίκησης με το ελληνικό ναυτικό, και επίγεια ραντάρ πέρα του ορίζοντα σε Κρήτη/Κύπρο. παράδωση στην Κύπρο ή/και στο λιμενικό του αποσυρόμενου υλικού μας (η Κύπρος επίγεται να αποκτήσει πλοία/υποβρύχια/μαχητικά) , κοινή διοίκηση ναυτικού Ελλάδος/Κύπρου, βελτιστοποίηση τακτικών/επέκταση ναυστάθμων Κρήτης/Κύπρου. Απαιτείται η διερεύνηση μεταχειρισμένου/δοκιμασμένου υλικού από συμμαχία. Τα πρώτα έσοδα από το φυσικό αέριο να διατεθούν για δημιουργία κυπριακού ναυτικού τεσσάρων πλοίων επιφανείας και δυο υποβρυχίων, όπως και κυπριακής αεροπορίας μιας ενισχυμένης μοίρας μαχητικών. Η ελλάδα θα μπορούσε να της πουλήσει/εξυγχρονίσει προς απόσυρσή της υλικό σε αεροπλάνα/πλοία. Ενα συνολικό πρόγραμμα 5 δισεκατομμυρίων θα υπεραρκούσε, για δημιουργία μικρής κυπριακής αεροπορίας/ναυτικού, που θα εγγυηθεί ότι οι μελλοντικές αδειοδοτήσεις για εξορύξεις δεν θα γίνονται χωρίς αντίκρυσμα. Αυτονόητη και η κοινή ναυτική/αεροπορική διοίκηση με κοινό ΓΕΕΘΑ μεταξυ ελλάδος-κύπρου. Μακροπρόθεσμα η πίεση της τουρκίας θα εξαναγκάσει την κύπρο προς ομοσπονδιοποίηση με την ελλάδα, ειδάλως δεν επιβιώνει. Κατόπιν θα αποκτηθεί και δυναμική για στρατιωτική απελευθέρωση των κατεχομένων από την ομοσπονδιοποιημένη ελλάδα/κύπρο.

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